American strategy for the nuclear age

m

AMERICAN
STRATEGY

WALTER F.HAHN
JOHN C. NEFF, EDITORS

NUCLEAR

AGE

A DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR ORIGINAL

Prepared for the Institute for American
Strategy by the Foreign Policy Research
Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
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http://www.archive.org/details/americanstrategyOOhahn

AMERICAN STRATEGY FOR THE NUCLEAR AGE

AMERICAN STRATEGY

FOR THE

NUCLEAR AGE

Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff, Editors

Anchor Books

Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Garden City, New York

COVER . DESIGN . BY . PETEK . PIENNING
TYPOGRAPHY BY SUSAN SIEN

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 60-13549

Copyright © i960 by The Institute for American Strategy

All Rights Reserved

Printed in tlie United States of America

^

V

^

Walter F. Hahn is executive editor of Orbis, a quarterly
journal of world affairs published by the Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, and a
research assistant of the Institute. A graduate of Temple Uni-
versity, where he also received an M.A. degree, he is a fre-
quent contributor to magazines and journals, including the
New Leader and the Yale Review. Mr. Hahn assisted in the
preparation of the curriculum for the first National Strategy
Seminar for Reserve Officers, held at the National War College
in Washington, D.C., 1959.

John C. Neff, Colonel, United States Army Reserve, is Chief
of Staff of the 77th Infantry Division, located in New York
City, one of six combat divisions in the Army Reserve. A vet-
eran of five campaigns in the European Theater during World
War II, he served in the Intelligence Section of the 83d In-
fantry Division. A graduate of Kenyon College in 1936, he has
published articles, book reviews, and stories in the New Mex-
ico Quarterly Review, the Infantry Journal, the Army Infor-
mation Digest, the Sunday New York Times Book Review,
and Collier's.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD, by the Editors xvii

prologue: The Delusion of Appeasement, by Briga-
dier General Donald Armstrong, U.S.A. (Ret.) xxi

PART ONE— THE MID-CENTUHY STAGE

Introduction i

1. Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy, by

Council on Foreign Relations 3

The Impact of the World Wars— The Postwar Di-
lemmas—The Cold War— The Configuration of the
Globe— The Spectrum of Conflict— The Changing
International Environment— The Role of the United
States— The Burdens of Leadership
z. The Protracted Conflict, by Robert Strausz-Hupi 16
The Systemic Revolution— The Present Paradox-
The Scavengers of Revolution— The Policies of
Lenin and Stalin— Containment and the Commu-
nists' Tactical Shift— A Dialectical Theory of Con-
flict—Implications of Russia's Technological Leap—
The Battleground of the "Gray Areas"— Toward an
Understanding of the Conflict

3. Can We Survive Technology? by John von

"Neumann 32

Dangers, Present and Coming— When Reactors
Grow Up— "Alchemy" and Automation— Controlled
Climate— The Indifferent Controls— Science, the In-
divisible—Awful and More Awful

4. The Diminishing Freedom of Choice, by Robert

Strausz-Hupe 42

Means, Timing, and Self-Defense—The Emerging
One-Way Street of Diplomacy— Postwar Capabili-
ties—The Shift in the Power Balance— Preventive

Vm CONTENTS

War and Total Conflict— Can We Recapture the In-
itiative?

PABT TWO— COMMXJNISM; its NATXniE, STRENGTHS,
AND WEAKNESSES

Introduction

5. The Ideological Core of Communism, by Gerhart

Niemeyer
The Ideological Origins of Communism— The Bour-
geois-Proletarian Polarity— Phases of Historical De-
velopment—The Basic Legacy of Marx— Lenin's
Addenda— The Myth of the Revolution— The Role
of the Party— The Doctrine of the Two Revolutions
—The Role of the State— The Place of the Soviet
Union— The Power of Ideology

6. The Appeals of Communism, hy J. Edgar Hoover
Economic Appeals— Sociological Appeals— Politi-
cal Appeals— Psychological Appeals— A Tarnished
Image

7. Whither Soviet Evolution? by Vladimir Petrov
Organization of Soviet Society— Is Democracy Pos-
sible in Russia?— Government versus Party Controls
—The Illusion of Freedom in Russia

8. Communist Vulnerabilities, by Bertram D. Wolfe
The Theoretical Foundation: Marxism— The Su-
premacy of Politics over Economics— Marxism as
an "Ism"— The Strategy and Tactics of Leninism—
The Russian Revolution, Promise and Performance

PART THREE— COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Introduction

9. The Orchestration of Crisis, by Colonel William R.

Kintner, U.S.A.
The Strategy of Protracted Conflict— Eocamples of
Piecemeal Strategy— Contrasting Concepts of War
and Peace— The Undesirable Status Quo— The War
of Attrition— Ethics-in-Reverse Concept of Conflict
—The Instruments of Terror

CONTENTS IX

10. Tiie Larger Strategic Vision, by Alvin J. Cottrell

and James E. Dougherty 117

The Globe as a Battlefield— The Interchangeability
of Military and Political Instruments— The Ebb and
Flow of the Revolutionary Tide— Exploiting the Co-
lonial Struggle— Military Conflict for Political Ob-
jectives—Soviet Controlled Warfare— The Larger
Dimensions of Conflict

11. Communist Psychological Warfare, by Stefan T.

Possony 129

The Conditioned Reflex— The Use of Freud's The-
ories—The Psychoanalytic Interview— Hypnosis and
Suggestion— Communism and Religion— Commu-
nist Sociological Assumptions— Communist Crowd
Psychology

12. Soviet Strategy of Disarmament, by Thomas W.

Wolfe . 139

Preferred Strategy and Dictates of Reality— Just
and Unjust Wars— Avoidance of Frontal Military
Encounter— Dual Approach to the Power Struggle
—Soviet Proposals of Full and Partial Disarmament
—Will Soviet Disarmament Strategy Change?

13. Changes in Soviet Conflict Doctrine, by Anne M.

Jonas 152

Khrushchev's Strategic Innovations— The Role of
Nuclear Weapons— The Role of Peaceful Revolu-
tion—Paralyzing the Will of the West— The Role of
War— Initiation of War— The Search for a Strategic
Synthesis

PART FOUR— PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Introduction 169

14. Values, Power, and Strategy, by Richard B. Foster
The Power of Nuclear Weapons and Fundamen-
tal Values— Polarity of Power and Formulation of
Strategy— Planning and Uncertainty— Relative Ad-
vantages in the Balance of Power— Power, Value,
and National Resolve— Value Considerations Re-

CONTENTS

lated to Strategic Problems—Your and My Respon-
sibility

15. Strategy on Trial, by John F. Loosbrock

The Margin of Deterrence— Survival and Penetra-
tion—The Idea of Mutual Invulnerability— Con-
trolled Peace

16. The Delicate Balance of Terror, by Albert

Wohlstetter
The Presumed Automatic Balance— The Quantita-
tive Nature of the Problem and the Uncertainties—
The Delicacy of the Balance of Terror— The Uses
and Risks of Bases Close to the Soviets— Summary

17. The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deter-

rence, by Herman Kahn
Damage versus Commitments— Type 1 Deterrence
(Deterrence against a Direct Attack)— Type 2 De-
terrence (Deterrence of Extreme Provocation) —
Type 3 Deterrence (Deterrence of Moderate Prov-
ocation)

18. The Lead-Time Problem and Technological

Waste, by Ellis Johnson
The Cost Factor— The Effect of Lead Times and
Obsolescence Policy— The Dilemma of the Opti-
mum—Effect on Military-Economic Competition—
The Cumbersome Industrial-Military System— How
Security Regulations Can Increase Lead Time-
Forgotten Lessons of World War II

ig. Limited War, by Hanson W. Baldwin

What Is "Limited" War?— Can Wars Be Kept from
Spreading?— The Need for Clear Objectives Clearly
Defined— Nuclear Bombs Mean Total War— Clean
and Dirty Bombs— Radioactivity and Small Weap-
ons—Nuclear War in Europe— Quemoy and the Nu-
clear Threat— Nuclear Bombing and Asian Opinion
—Ability to Fight Is Our Best Defense

20. Needed: A New NATO Shield, by Alvin J. Cot-
trell and Walter F. Hahn
The Strategic Requirements of the United States
and Western Europe— The Alternative of Reliance

CONTENTS

on Tactical Nuclear Weapons— The Alternative of
Disengagement— The Alternative of "Nuclearizing"
Our NATO Allies— A Dual Capability
2,1. Security through Sea Power, by Commander
Ralph E. Williams, Jr., U.S.N.
Weapons' Cost— Strategy of the ig^os—The Dan-
ger of a Fortress America Strategy— The Advan-
tages of a Sea-Based Deterrent— A Comprehensive
Military Posture

22. Unconventional Warfare, by James D. Atkinson
Unconventional Warfare as a Modern Phenomenon
—Communist Propaganda— Espionage and Subver-
sion—Economic Warfare— Guerrilla Warfare— Po-
litical Warfare— Summary

23. Disarmament: Illusion and Reality, by Henry A.

Kissinger
The Vicious Circle of Armaments— The Technologi-
cal Problems— Inspection and Control— "Prevent-
ing" Surprise Attack— The Chimera of an Interna-
tional Authority

24. The Strategic Role of Civil Defense, by Rogers

Cannell
Nonmilitary Protection in Total War— The Cost of
Protection— The Objective of a Civil-Defense Pro-
gram—Civilization Can Recover— Recovery from
Total War

PAKT FIVE— PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Introduction

25. The Economic Threat of Soviet Imperialism, by

Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, U.S.A.
Steel and Petroleum Production— The Soviet Labor
Force— The Soviet Industrial Surge— Comparative
Trade Positions— Economics as a Controlled Soviet
Weapon— The Gross-National-Product-Debt Ratio
—Increasing Our Growth Rate— Pressing Our Eco-
nomic Advantages

26. Soviet Economic Growth and United States Policy,

by Howard C. Petersen

xii CONTENTS

Ways in Which Soviet Economic Expansion May
Affect Us-MUitary Strength-Aid and Trade with
Underdeveloped Countries— Attitudes of Peoples
Throughout the World-Implication for U.S. Policy
—A Competition of Systems, Not of Growth Rates
—Our Untapped Economic Resource

2,7. The Stages of Economic Growth, by Walt W.

Rostow 365

The Stages in History-The Stages Today-The
Conditions of Aid— Many Roads to Growth

28. Military or Economic Aid: Questions of Priority,

by Arnold Wolfers 375

Labels versus Purpose— Short-Run Defense Needs
—External versus Internal Defense— Stability Aid:
Military and Economic— Economic-Development
Aid

29. Private Enterprise: America's Best Export, by

Robert L. Garner 388

The Stakes in the Underdeveloped World—
The Fallacy of Rapid and Massive Development
Schemes— The Characteristics of Underdeveloped
Areas— The Shortcomings of Government Assist-
ance—The Merits of Private Investment— Some
Concrete Measures

30. The Defense We Can Afford, by James F.

Brownlee 398

Threats We Face-The Problem of Choice-The
Health of Our Economy

PART SIX—RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

Introduction 407

31. The Premises of American Policy, by Dean G.

Acheson 409

The Requirement of Western Unity— Selectivity in
Assistance Programs— The Requirements of Mili-
tary Security— The Chimera of a "Moral" Solution

CONTENTS Xiii

32. A Political OflFensive against Communism, by

David Sarnoff 422

Our Counterstrategy—The Enemy Is Vulnerable-
Guidelines for Political Offensive— The Message of
Freedom— Toward Cold-War Victory: Organiza-
tion — Financing — Implementing the Counterof-
fensive — Propaganda — Communist Targets — Free
World Targets— Use of Facilities in Friendly Coun-
tries—Passive Resistance— Organized Resistance-
Collaboration with Emigres and Escapees— Planned
Defection— Training of Cadres— Diplomacy Is a
Weapon

33. What Is to Be Done? by Frank Rockwell Barnett 440
The Lead Time of Survival— Students of Strategy

— Where Our Opportunities Lie — The Fourth
Weapon: Psychopolitical Forces— Citizen Experts
in Political Warfare— Proposal: A Dynamic History
of the American Experiment— Proposal: A Propa-
ganda-Analysis Newsletter — Proposal: Business
Training for Overseas Community Relations— The
"Ultimate Weapon"

EDITORS' NOTE

This book is published under the auspices of the Institute for
American Strategy, 140 South Dearborn Street, Chicago 3, Il-
linois. The Institute is a voluntary, tax-exempt, educational en-
tity, organized by private citizens to widen public understand-
ing of U.S. strategic problems in a world threatened by Soviet
military, scientific, and industrial might, combined with Com-
munist techniques in propaganda, subversion, insurrection, and
economic and psychological warfare. The Institute is nonprofit
and nonpartisan. Its directors are eminent educators, business-
men, and retired senior oflBcers. The current chairman of its
Executive Committee is Mr. Edwin A. Locke, Jr., President,
Union Tank Car Company. Its executive director is Mr. Dan
Sullivan, of the Armour Research Foundation of the Illinois
Institute of Technology. The Institute organizes the annual
National Military-Industrial Conference in Chicago and spon-
sors Strategy Seminars in various parts of the country.

The Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of
Pennsylvania, under whose direction this book was prepared,
was established in February 1955. Its task is to submit funda-
mental and long-range problems in U.S. foreign poHcy to dis-
ciplined examination by men and women selected on the basis
of intellectual achievement and practical experience in inter-
national relations. The research product of the Institute is de-
signed to provide imaginative and constructive concepts on
vital issues which will confront the United States for many
years to come.

The Institute, directed by Dr. Robert Strausz-Hup6, is a
nonprofit and tax-exempt organization. It is supported largely
by research grants by private foimdations to the trustees of
the university. The Richardson Foundation, Inc., of Greens-
boro, North Carolina, and New York, made the initial grant
estabhshing the Institute. Subsequent grants of this and five

XVI EDITORS NOTE

other foxindations have contributed tov/ard the financing of
operating costs and special projects. Some research is also con-
ducted under contract with agencies of the U. S. Government.
Three broad areas of research make up the total field of
the Institute's activities: the world-wide Communist move-
ment; the systemic revolution in the imderdeveloped world;
and the Western alliance. The Institute relates its research in
each area to the problems of decision making created by the
organization of the federal government, the difficulties of op-
erating a peacetime alHance, and the evolution of the pattern
of international organizations.

FOREWORD

One hundred years ago, national strategy was the exclusive
concern of only a few men, all at the top echelons of govern-
ment. Today, the conflict we are engaged in is total, its strategy
is total, it involves every facet of society and is the concern
of everyone in the Free World. The fundamental question be-
fore mankind today is this: Will the globe be dominated by
communism or will it, in its diverse ways, achieve freedom? In
brief, the formulation of national strategy has become the ur-
gent concern of everyone.

Today, at the beginning of the second half of the twentieth
centiu-y, communism has made some notable advances. So far,
the Communist leaders have understood better than the lead-
ers of the West the revolutionary character of our times. Only
an informed pubhc can and will muster the energy and deter-
mination needed to win this global struggle and to master the
forces designed to defeat not only freedom but civiUzation it-
self.

What is the changed global environment in which we
find ourselves today? What is the nature of our enemy— his
strengths, weaknesses, strategy and tactics? What is the scope
of the military challenges confronting us? What are the eco-
nomic policies by which we can meet the challenges? Finally,
what are some of the specific courses of action which should
be taken if we are to win the struggle?

This book attempts to answer these and other questions.
It is an outgrowth of the first National Strategy Seminar for
Reserve Officers, held at the National War College, Washing-
ton, D.C., in July 1959. It contains edited versions of many of
the addresses presented there as well as the writings of other
authorities which have appeared in various magazines, jour-
nals, and books during the past few years. The majority of the
contributions are presented in book form for the first time.
The editors do not presume to consider this volume of read-
ings definitive. Admittedly there are many other writings

XVm FOREWORD

which could have been included. But within the space avail-
able, the editors have tried to present a comprehensive ac-
count of as many aspects of the Free World's struggle against
communism as possible.

The Seminar mentioned above was held under the authority
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was attended by two hundred
and eighteen carefully selected reserve oflBcers, representing all
branches of the armed services as well as the fifty states and
Puerto Rico. Participating organizations were the Institute for
American Strategy, the Foreign PoUcy Research Institute of
the University of Pennsylvania, the Reserve OflBcers Associa-
tion. The Richardson Foundation, Inc., of New York City,
made available the funds needed to develop the curriculum.
It was addressed by more than fifty speakers distinguished by
their understanding of the many aspects of the conflict between
the Communist world and the Free World.

The student body of the Seminar included two governors,
three congressmen, seventy educators, and more than forty
men in the newspaper, pubHshing, radio, television, and writ-
ing fields. The Seminar was designed to provide a better un-
derstanding of the cold war, of the organization, resources,
and methods used by the Communists in their drive to domi-
nate the world, and to develop programs for creating the reso-
lute, informed, and vocal pubhc opinion without which the
contest cannot be won.

The Seminar provoked a chain reaction of conferences across
the covmtry which continues to this day. Two seminars were
conducted in New York City— one for oflBcers of the Regular
and Reserve forces, another for business and industrial leaders.
In April i960 the Stanford Research Institute, in co-operation
with the U. S. Sixth Army, conducted a seminar for 500 re-
serve officers at Asilomar, California. In Chicago, Cleveland,
New Orleans, and Wilmington, Delaware, seminars were
held for business, industrial, financial, and educational leaders.
Conferences have also been conducted in CaHfomia, Massa-
chusetts, Texas, and Washington, D.C. Tens of thousands of
Americans have thereby become better equipped to under-
stand and to cope with the problems of national strategy.

This volume could not have been prepared without the per-
mission of copyright owners to use their materials. For their

FOREWORD XIX

generous co-operation the editors are indebted. The editors
also wish to thank the stafiF and associates of the Foreign Pohcy
Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania for their
assistance in the selection and preparation of many of the
chapters which follow. Particular debts of gratitude are given
to the following: Dr. Robert Strausz-Hup6, director, Dr. Wil-
liam R. Kintner, deputy director, and Drs. Alvin J. Cottrell,
James E. Dougherty, and Mr. Robert C. Herber, research as-
sistants of the Foreign Policy Research Institute; Mr. Frank
R. Bamett, director of research of the Richardson Foundation,
Inc.; Brigadier General Donald Armstrong, U.S.A. (Ret.);
Rear Admiral Chester Ward, The Judge Advocate General,
Department of the Navy; Inspector William C. Sullivan, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; and oflBcers of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible
for service information and education programs. The editors
are especially grateftd for the assistance of these three people
in the task of proofreading: Marjorie Bamett, Barbara Mitch-
ell, and Robert E. Maxwell. Finally, the editors thank the di-
rectors of the Institute for American Strategy, who authorized
the publication of this book, and the Donner Foundation,
whose generosity made it possible.

May 2, iq6o walter f. hahn

COLONEL JOHN C. NEFF, U.S.A.R.

The Delusion of Appeasement

History's verdict on appeasement is unmistakable: it simply
does not pay. It has been tried many times. It has been the
refuge of the weaker, less virile, less courageous nation in many
a struggle for survival. Inevitably each act of appeasement
has made the aggressor stronger and the appeaser relatively
weaker. It has usually made war a certainty rather than pre-
served the peace.

A striking case history of the failure of what must be one
of the most abject appeasements on record should be a salutary
warning to the Free World today. Moreover, the circumstances
of the conflict for mastery of the Mediterranean world twenty-
one centuries ago were analogous to the wider world struggle
of our own times. Change the names of the protagonists in
this sentence from Polybius, the Greek historian in the employ
of Rome, and the conclusion must be reached that there is
nothing new under the sun: "The Carthaginians were fighting
for their own security and the dominion of Africa, and the
Romans for the empire of the world."

When our story begins, Rome and Carthage were nearing
the end of more than a hundred years of cold and hot war-
fare. In 149 B.C. the Carthaginians faced a dilemma. Should
they "expose their country to war and its terrors, or, not daring
to face the attack of the enemy, yield unresistingly to every

Appeared originally as the Foreword to the Summer 1959 issue of
World Affairs, published by the American Peace Society {founded
in 1828), Washington, D.C. Reprinted by permission.

XXii PROLOGUE

demand"? This same question is being asked in some quarters
today. The Carthaginians chose the latter course. What did
it profit them to submit to the cynical, ruthless, and arrogant
demands of their enemy? They must have known that Cato,
Kke Hitler and the Communist conspiracy, had made no secret
of Roman objectives. "Carthage must be destroyed," Cato
thundered in the Roman Senate. Let us now examine the valu-
able assistance the Carthaginians themselves gave the Romans
in achieving their own defeat.

The Romans began their negotiations with a demand for
300 children of their noblest families as hostages. If they com-
plied and promised "to obey their orders in other respects, the
freedom and autonomy of Carthage would be preserved." So
double talk is no new invention, as the event shows. For the
Carthaginians complied amid the waihng and lamentations of
the bereaved mothers, many of whom, Appian tells us, pre-
dicted with rare prescience "that it would profit the city noth-
ing to have delivered up their children."

The next demand came in no time at aU. "If you are sin-
cerely desirous of peace, why do you need any arms? Come,
surrender to us all your weapons and engines of war, both
pubhc and private." Again, the Carthaginians complied, and
Appian reports that complete armor for 200,000 men, innu-
merable javelins, and about 2000 catapults together with the
ships of their navy were collected and delivered to the Romans.
Then came the ultimatum which was dehvered with unparal-
leled cynicism and arrogance, of which the following excerpt
gives only the faintest inlding;

"Bear bravely the remaining command of the Senate. Yield
Carthage to us, and betake yourselves where you like within
your own territory at a distance of at least ten miles from the
sea, for we are resolved to raze your city to the groimd." In
spite of every effort made by the Carthaginian ambassadors,
the Romans refused to soften their ultimatiun. When the news
reached Carthage there was consternation and a "scene of
blind, raving madness." This is not surprising. Carthage, the
late dominant sea power, whose livelihood was gained on the
waters of the Mediterranean, was ordered to permit the de-
struction of her city and give up her commerce. In their
desperation, the Carthaginians, in spite of having no weapons.

THE DELUSION OF APPEASEMENT XXUl

declared war, and for three years, with improvised weapons,
resisted the siege of their city. The odds were too great, how-
ever, and Carthage was finally taken. The comparatively few
survivors who did not commit suicide were sold into slavery.

Now, the Romans were, they claimed, peace-loving aggres-
sors. No more than Hitler did they desire war for war's sake.
Like all actual or would-be conquerors, before or since, the
Romans preferred to get what they wanted without having to
fight, and the dove of peace was a convenient symbol for the
unwary then as now. And successive demands for concessions
and surrender of one thing after another to reduce the will
and the ability to fight was one of their most effective tools
of aggression.

The Carthage of those days, on one of the world's most
magnificent sites, has disappeared completely from the face
of the earth. No atomic-bomb attack could obHterate more
absolutely any modem city of half a million inhabitants. The
epitaph for the city-state of Carthage might well be a warning:
"Put not your trust in appeasement."

DONALD ARMSTRONG

Brigadier General, U.S.A. (Ret.), Comman-
dant of the first National Strategy Seminar for
Reserve Officers, and former Commandant, In-
dustrial College of the Armed Forces.

In the sweep of the past half century, powerful forces have
shattered the retaining walls of the state system and are beat-
ing against the last defenses of traditional international society.

One of these forces is the "systemic revolution"— a historic
phenomenon which attends the breakdown of an old order
and the ensuing quest for a new equihbrium. Another is the
technological revolution, which has radically transfigured the
globe and broadened the stakes of conflict from "mere" vic-
tory or defeat to the survival of civiHzation itself. In this revo-
lutionary environment, two systems vie for ascendancy. They
are locked in a conflict which is protracted in time and ubiqui-
tous in space.

As the late John von Neumann suggests, the velocity of
technological change is such that we are literally running out
of room. Robert Strausz-Hupe contends that the range of our
foreign policy is being similarly constricted. Is it the irony of
our times that we are rapidly becoming the helpless prisoners
of the very forces which we ourselves set in motion?

1.

by Council on Foreign Relations

The following chapter is a reproduction of
the first portion of a report submitted to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Sen-
ate, by an ad hoc group meeting under the
auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and published by the U. S. Government
Printing Office as Report No. 7, November
25, iQSQ. The report reflects the group's gen-
eral thinking but does not represent unani-
mous agreement on all points. Members
participating in the discussion were: Frank
Altschul, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Elliott
V. Bell, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Robert Blum,
Robert R. Bowie, Harlan Cleveland, John
Cowles, Arthur H. Dean, John Sloan Dickey,
Thomas K. Finletter, William C. Foster, W.
Aver ell Harriman, Philip C. Jessup, Joseph
E. Johnson, G. A. Lincoln, Henry R. Luce,
James A. Perkins, L L Rabi, Herman B.
Wells, and Henry M. Wriston (chairman).
The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-
profit institution devoted to the study of the
problems of foreign policy with emphasis
on long-range problems. Through various
publications (including the world-renowned
quarterly Foreign AfFairs) and small off-the-
record meetings, it seeks to help members in
positions of leadership and others throughout
the nation to enlarge their understanding of
the problems of U.S. foreign policy.

4 THE MID-CENTUHY STAGE

During the nineteenth century the basic aims of the American
nation, which are best expressed in the preamble of the Con-
stitution, were shaped by its geographical position on what
had been a virtually empty continent, by its urge for rapid
growth, by the nature of its free institutions, and by a sense
of destiny and of difference from the Old World. Its foreign
policy was directed largely to insuring the nation's abihty to
grow in freedom and to carry through its expansion to the
Pacific. Two historic policies supported that basic purpose:
the policy, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine, of preventing
non-American powers from establishing themselves in the
Western Hemisphere, and the concomitant avoidance of in-
volvement in the alliances and conflicts of the great powers
of Europe.

Although insulated by geography and by these policies from
the politics and wars of the major powers, the United States
was no hermit state. It was a part of the Western world, of
the international community of that time. It stood for freedom
of the seas, the free exchange of ideas, and freedom for its
citizens to trade and to do business abroad without discrimi-
nation. It stood for respect for international obligations and
the promotion of peace through techniques of negotiation, ar-
bitration, and judicial settlement. It stood also— and this made
the United States a revolutionary influence in the world of that
time— for the right of aU peoples to national and individual
freedom, a principle which has remained ever since a salient
element of America's attitude toward the world.

Foreign policy in practice, of course, rarely corresponds
fuUy to broad statements of aim and principle, for it must be
based also on calculations of national interest in the specific
circumstances in which decisions are made and actions taken.
American concern for the cause of freedom abroad was an
aspiration which colored national attitudes rather than a con-
crete objective engaging the nation on behalf of popular revo-
lutions all over the world. Nevertheless, the example of Amer-
ica as a working democracy served as a symbol of freedom,
and the boldness of its declared position unquestionably ex-
erted a significant moral and even political influence beyond
its borders. Thus, when the United States came onto the world
stage in the First World War and in the peace settlement

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOKEIGN POLICY

which followed, it was a great moral force as well as a principal
member of the victorious AUied coalition.

The Impact of the World Wars

That war was a turning point in American history. The pros-
pect of a German victory had threatened to demolish the pro-
tective hedge behind which we had been able to concentrate
on cultivating our own garden. By its intervention in 1917, the
United States showed that its weight could be thrown onto
the scales to prevent an aggressive power from gaining domi-
nance in Europe— a consideration which again came into play
when Nazi Germany and later the Soviet Union presented a
similar threat. By the time of the First World War, moreover,
the United States had become so large, productive, and po-
tentially strong that it was bound to be a major factor in the
world balance.

The two main elements in President Wilson's program
—a just peace settlement based as far as possible on self-
determination, and a world organization for collective security
—were basically consistent with historic American attitudes,
even though the American people were not ready after the
war to accept the responsibilities of full participation in world
affairs. After the twenty-year interval between the two wars
had demonstrated the futility of isolation, they again turned
to those two goals. America's peace aims in the Second World
War, expressed in a series of congressional resolutions, official
statements, and international agreements, envisaged a fust and
stable peace settlement, a world organization to keep the
peace through collective security and to protect human rights,
and a set of international economic arrangements and institu-
tions that would insure maximum trade, set up safeguards
against crisis, and encourage economic growth.

The Postwar Dilemmas

The American people accepted the fact that the United
States must play a leading role in the postwar world. They

6 THE MID-CENTTJRY STAGE

have continued to accept it. But the conditions under which
those responsibihties have to be carried out have brought new
and unprecedented challenges. Some became apparent as early
as 1945; others later. The magnitude of the responsibilities,
both of American leadership and of the nation as a whole, is
driven home to us every day.

The choice for responsible and continuing participation in
world aflFairs was one of the great decisions in the history of
our country. From it came the estabhshment of the United
Nations, America's leading role in the world's recovery from
the destruction left by the war, and the sense of purposeful
commitment to the principles of freedom and justice for which
the American people had fought.

It soon became apparent, however, that the new world or-
der was not going to be orderly at all; that forces of tyranny
and aggression were active in a new quarter of the globe; that
many new and revolutionary forces were making themselves
felt; that both the American people and those specifically
charged with the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign pol-
icy would have to develop a greater understanding of the
nature of those forces; and that new "great decisions" would
have to be made. The major developments of the past fifteen
years, though familiar to many, need to be recalled to mind
in order to illuminate the aims, and the needs, for the future.

The Cold War

The combination of great power and expansionist ambitions
represented by the Soviet Union— to which were added by
1949 the European satellites and Communist China— has
posed the threat that this massive agglomeration of power
would continue to expand into other areas and threaten the
security of the United States itself. Violating its agreements,
the Soviet Union refused to restore independence to the east-
ern European states its armies had overnm in the course of
the war. It converted temporary lines of occupation into rigid
territorial barriers separating the Communist from the non-
Communist world. It maintained vast military power and sub-
jected other states to threats and pressures aimed at territorial

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 7

changes or political submission. It refused to agree to a peace
settlement which would end the division of Germany, and
without a settlement on Germany no stable settlement for Eu-
rope as a whole could be achieved. Confident of the ultimate
victory of communism throughout the world, the Soviet lead-
ers have followed a persistent and dynamic policy of expan-
sion. They have used a variety of means, including, in the case
of Korea, direct military aggression by sateUite forces. While
Soviet tactics vary from time to time, mixing blandishments
and talk of peace with threats, the world has no reason to
count on basic changes or on internal developments that will
weaken the economic, political, or military power of the Soviet
regime or change the main direction of Soviet poHcies.

China, wliich the United States hoped to see a strong and
friendly ally, has come under Communist domination, except
for Taiwan and a few small islands remaining under the con-
trol of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Mainland China
has risen rapidly since 1949 from a position of near helpless-
ness to one of great strength under the direction of a Com-
munist regime allied with the Soviet Union and from the start
deeply hostile to the United States. Its policies toward many
countries on its borders, some of them closely associated with
the United States, have been overbearing and aggressive, and
in one case (Korea) it deliberately embarked on open war-
fare against United Nations forces under American leadership.

The conflict which came to be known as the cold war has
proved to be beyond the capacity of the United Nations to
prevent or control. Because of the basis on which the organiza-
tion was established, action to check aggression or threats to
the peace rests on the imanimity o£ the great powers, a con-
dition which has seldom been attainable siBce 1945. Thus,
there has been no international authority through which the
principle of collective security could be made consistently ef-
fective against direct or indirect aggression on the part of the
Soviet Union or Communist China. The United Nations did
play a significant role, however, in certain of the postwar cri-
ses, in support of that principle: in Korea, where it assumed
responsibihty for the military operations taken under Ameri-
can leadership to resist aggression; in the Suez crisis, where
resolutions of the General Assembly led to the cessation of

8 THE MID-CENTUBY STAGE

military action by Britain, France, and Israel, and where the
U. N, Emergency Force helped in the liquidation of the aflFair;
and in a number of cases involving nations other than major
pow^ers where the authority of the United Nations was exerted
to bring an end to hostilities. The Uniting for Peace Resolution
and the work initiated by the Collective Measures Committee
at least opened the possibihty that the United Nations might
be able to take effective action in spite of a veto in the Security
Council. But in facing the reahties of the postwar period, the
United States and other nations have had to look primarily to
regional groupings and to policies of self-defense in order to
find ways of protecting the Free World.

The Configuration of the Globe

Western Europe, an area vital to the security of the United
States and linked to it by common values for which both had
just fought, was in a state of great weakness in the early post-
war years. By themselves the western European nations could
not regain their new forms of association among themselves
and with the United States, As a result of far-reaching meas-
ures of recovery and co-operation begun under the Marshall
Plan and with the establishment of NATO, western Europe has
registered a remarkable growth in productivity, strength, and
cohesion. But despite this considerable progress, the over-all
strength and unity of western Europe continue to be hampered
by conflicts of national poHcies and of economic interests, evi-
dent, for example, in the unsettled economic relationship be-
tween the six nations of the European Economic Community
and the other nations outside it.

A revolution has taken place in the former colonial and less
developed areas of Asia and Africa. Many new nations have
won their independence, with others sure to follow; the drive
for independence in Africa has been much stronger and more
rapid than was expected. These nations have acquired a spe-
cial importance in world affairs for a niraiber of reasons: stra-
tegic location, large and growing populations, resources (such
as oil), their insistence on rapid economic development, and
above all, the magnitude of their own problems, to which the

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 9

rest of the world cannot be indifferent. Political stability has
been hard to achieve, as the exercise of self-government proved
a more complex task than the attainment of it. The working
out of new relationships with the industrial countries has been
a particularly difficult process on both sides. Attitudes stem-
ming from the past relationship of dependence did not easily
disappear, especially at a time when Communist powers were
making strong and not unsuccessful efforts to extend their in-
fluence into these areas. Endeavors of the United States to
establish a basis of co-operation with the Asian and African
nations have been complicated by its association with the for-
mer colonial powers, by local conflicts such as the strife over
Palestine, and by wide differences of view on the nature of
the Communist threat and what to do about it.

Latin America, although outside the main theaters of the
cold war, has been beset by political and economic instability
and by the problems of adapting its institutions to rapid social
change. It is apparent that the attitudes and policies of the
United States may be crucial in determining whether the
growth and travail of the Latin-American coiantries will
be a controlled revolution taking place without disruption of
the inter-American system and the Atlantic community, or
whether they will become the scene of uncontrollable unrest
and cold-war competition.

The Spectrum of Conflict

The gradual shift from possession of an atomic monopoly
toward a position of virtual nuclear parity with the Soviet Un-
ion deprived the United States of a significant military advan-
tage. It could no longer regard its massive striking power as
so effective a deterrent to aggression or as a guarantee of vic-
tory at acceptable cost in the event of the ultimate test of war.
The growth of Soviet nuclear power, together with the main-
tenance of huge conventional forces in the Communist bloc,
has compelled the United States and other free nations to be
prepared for a wide variety of mihtary moves the Communist
powers might make, from the fomenting of civil conflict to the
launching of all-out war. Because of the need for a global mill-

lO THE MID-CENTURY STAGE

tary posture adequate for deterrence and for the necessary
operations if deterrence failed, the United States has had to
sustain a peacetime military effort of unprecedented size and
cost and has also sought new relationships with a large num-
ber of countries based on common efforts for mutual security.
The pace of technological change led to weapons of such
destructive power that both the United States and the Soviet
Union have had to consider whether the arbitrament of total
war could be accepted even as the ultimate means of preserv-
ing vital interests and national security. Nuclear weapons and
their delivery systems, however, have taken their place beside
other weapons within the existing scheme of world politics,
which is in essence a conflict between two great blocs over
the control or denial of territory, involving on both sides an
intricate complex of strategic plans and calculations, fears,
warnings, commitments, and considerations of prestige. Thus,
while the possession of the means of massive destruction by
both sides has produced a situation of mutual deterrence, total
war remains a real possibility, whether resulting from a direct
military challenge to the territory of one bloc or the other,
miscalculation, or a local conflict which could get out of con-
trol. The Soviet refusal to accept an adequate system of in-
spection and control has made it impossible to reach agree-
ment on an international system of arms limitation which
would reduce or eliminate these terrible prospects. But the
United States can take little comfort in assigning blame for the
deadlock to the Soviet Union. The urgency of finding some
means to control nuclear weapons and other armaments
remains.

The Changing International Environment

In addition to its application to weapons, the march of sci-
ence and technology is rapidly changing the environment in
which all nations live, without necessarily respecting or con-
forming to the political and other relationships which have
grown up over the centuries. The accelerating pace of change
has upset traditions, created new demands, encouraged revo-
lutionary ferment. It affects what nations want and what they

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 11

can or cannot do. Increasingly, their problems have gone far
beyond handling as matters of purely national policy. The in-
terdependence and interpenetration of societies require re-
assessment of what is meant by such terms as "sovereignty"
and "nonintervention." Governments find themselves dealing
primarily with complex situations, with wide-ranging political
and economic forces, not just with relations with other gov-
ernments. Man's ventures into space call into question existing
legal and political concepts. Such problems as are involved in
the production and use of the world's resources of energy and
raw materials have forced many nations, including the United
States, to face new choices on how to work out relations with
one another and with existing or new regional groupings, how
to modify or expand international economic institutions, and
whether to seek the basis of a new world order. Scientific ad-
vance, with its promise of plenty, brings not only new prob-
lems but great new opportunities.

The Role of the United States

The United States, new to the exercise of vast international
responsibilities, has not found it easy to adjust to all these rap-
idly changing conditions. The fundamental principles of its
historic approach to world aflFairs were surely relevant to the
new situation, but its established policies, as well as many of
the plans with which it emerged from World War II, were
clearly inadequate. Nevertheless, the record of the past fifteen
years has been a creditable one. The nation showed that it
could adjust constructively to new conditions. At critical points
the government took and carried through, with the support of
the people, major decisions which were bold in conception
and salutary in their efi^ect. Such were the original decisions of
1943-45 to ^^^^ ^ leading part in setting up the United Na-
tions, the decisions for aid to Greece and Turkey and for the
Marshall Plan in 1947-48, the resistance to Communist ag-
gression in Korea in 1950, and the stand taken in the Suez
crisis of 1956.

Many other ground-breaking steps were taken, providing
the outlines of a national strategy. At the core of American

mm

12 THE MID-CENTXmY STAGE

policy has been the creation of a common front with like-
minded nations of the Atlantic world, marked by the establish-
ment and groMiii of NATO and by the reorganization and
strengthening of the inter-American system. The peace treaty
and security arrangements with Japan provided an anchor of
Free World security in the Far East. The chain of alliances,
regional security organizations, and arrangements for bases—
not all of them of equal importance from the standpoint of
military security and some carrying political liabiUties as well
as beneiSts— was gradually extended to include other countries
threatened by Commimist imperiahsm. The United States, as
the strongest power and the only one participating in all these
aUiances, thus became the leader of a world-wide coalition. A
program of military aid has been developed to cement the al-
hances and to provide strength and self-confidence to the part-
ners. In addition to the alliance system, the United States has
taken the lead in building a wider network of arrangements
for economic and technical assistance to niunerous cotmtries
of the Free World (both allies and neutrals) , based on mutual
recognition of a common interest in strengthening their inde-
pendence against outside pressures and in fostering their eco-
nomic progress.

Concentration on resisting the Communist threat, especially
the military threat, has had its successes. Although Communist
influence has increased in some areas, for all practical pur-
poses the territorial expansion of the Communist world has
been checked since 1949, save for the one breakthrough in
North Vietnam, which received international recognition in
1954. But the demands of the cold war, the need for meeting
successive challenges at this or that point on the periphery of
the Communist empire, have obscured many other demands
which are boimd to affect America's interests and role in the
world of the future. They have also tended to divert attention
from the formulation and pursuit of long-term policies, with-
out which we can see no clear outHne of our future relations
with other nations, and indeed no successful outcome of the
cold war itself.

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY I3

The Burdens of Leadership

The record of the postwar period shows abundantly the dif-
ficulties and dilemmas which a democracy faces in playing a
role of leadership in the contemporary world. A few of the
critical issues have been clearly presented, and could be
clearly decided. For the most part, the complex forces and
situations with which the United States has had to deal re-
quire an understanding on the part of government and people
and an eflSciency in the process of policy-making which we
are only beginning to develop. Unhke totalitarian states, the
United States has no rigid doctrine, no dreams of empire, no
dynamic strategy of expansion by force or subversion. Its con-
cept of a legal international order justifies the use of force to
resist aggression but not to engage in it. Concern for the opin-
ion of other free nations and the real risks of war also serve
to limit the dynamic nature of the policies the United States
can adopt in directly challenging the Commrmist bloc within
the territories it now holds. In that sense American policies
have had a defensive character. But clearly the United States
could have more dynamic and positive policies in the Free
World itself, where it does have more freedom of action and
opportunity for leadership.

Here, too, there are real limitations, although they pro-
vide no excuse for passivity. World aflFairs are unpredictable,
charged with dilemmas that appear to be, and may in fact
be, insoluble in this generation. The United States cannot de-
fine for itself a single foreign poUcy that covers aE countries
and all contingencies. The choices cannot always be clear and
consistent. Policy has to deal with the world as it is and as
it evolves. It cannot rest solely on an idea of the world as we
would like it to be.

Basically the United States relies on persuasion and consent
in order to obtain the co-operation and support of others, and
the fact is that nations of the Free World often see the issues
in a quite different light from that of the United States: they
have their own interests, their own ideas on such matters as the
relative importance of the Communist threat and the merits

14 THE MID-CEJSmjRY STAGE

of participation in military alliances. Some of the conflicts
within the Free World go deep, and the United States has fre-
quently found that it cannot act decisively in regard to them,
especially when it is trying to retain or to win the co-operation
and good wiU of all the contending parties.

Yet the instruments available for the exercise of leadership
are considerable. The fact that those nations which seek a bal-
ance to Soviet power and security against aggression look to
the United States as the nucleus of Free World strength gives
this country great influence. Its material wealth and produc-
tivity provide economic resources which weigh heavily in rela-
tions with other nations. And international leadership based
on consent need not mean compromising our fundamental
principles and poHcies. Such leadership makes heavy demands
on the leader, but it promises solid and lasting results. It is a
matter of finding common ground, for which America's own
conduct, both international and domestic, is as important as
the persuasiveness of its diplomacy.

When aU the factors more or less inherent in the world situ-
ation are given their due, it still must be said that the United
States has failed to cast its policies adequately for the long
term. Part of the explanation may He in defects in the ma-
chinery of policy making, defects which can be corrected. Part
may Ke in the constitutional division of responsibility for for-
eign pohcy between the executive and legislative branches of
the government, which, besides requiring a special diplomacy
of its own, tends to tie important policies and programs to the
Procrustean inflexibihty of the fiscal year. Yet fundamentally
it is a question of attitudes, foresight, and leadership within
the American body politic. The traditional division of powers
does not preclude co-operation or prevent either branch from
taking the initiative in developing such co-operation along new
lines of foreign poHcy. The Senate, in particular, has shovioi
itself on occasions in the past a source of fruitful ideas and
approaches. While it should not take on itself the detailed
planning and policy functions which he within the province
of the Executive, it can and should play a great part in leader-
ship, especially in the guidance of public opinion, as it has at
times of crucial decision: for example, in the Vandenberg Reso-
lution of 1Q48.

BASIC AIMS OF U.S. FOKEIGN POLICY I5

Whatever the reasons, the tendency of the United States up
to now has been to treat foreign relations as a series of crises,
of moves and countermoves in the cold war, in which the
United States has attempted to combine firmness in holding
the line against Communist expansion with measures to build
up defensive strength in the Free World and with a wilhngness
to negotiate on outstanding issues. This will not be suflBcient for
the future. The great question is whether the United States
can, concurrently, act decisively to meet the succession of
threats and challenges from the Communist bloc as they arise
and also add new dimensions to its foreign policy by taking
measures aimed at the world's other problems and at the
longer-term future. Although the past few years have seen
many Communist gains, as well as some setbacks, there has
been nothing inevitable about it. Present conditions are as fa-
vorable to initiatives on the part of free nations as they are
to those of the Soviet Union or Commimist China. Opportuni-
ties to create conditions conducive to the growth of freedom
in the world and to the establishment of a durable peace are
there. The question is whether the United States will have the
will and ability to seize them.

Long-term estimates and planning cannot safely ignore such
subjects as the course of developments within the Communist
empire over the next ten years, the eflFects of China's growing
power, the kind of relations the United States should aim to
achieve with the Soviet Union over the long run, the growth
of new international institutions, the future importance of na-
tionalism on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and all the forces
near or under the surface today which are hkely to change
the shape of the world's major problems over the next ten
years or so. Constructive planning should guide us not only
in meeting the crises of the future but in doing now what we
can to shape that future.

by Robert Strausz-Hupe

Dr. Strausz-Hupe is recognized as one of the
leading writers in the field of geopolitics.
Born in Vienna, a banker by profession be-
fore he turned to teaching and writing, he is
the director of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.
He has been a consultant to both the United
Nations Secretariat and the United States
Government and has lectured widely in this
country and abroad. He has published many
books dealing with geopolitical and strategic
problems and has contributed articles to nu-
merous magazines and journals. He is co-
author of the book Protracted Conflict and is
editor of Orbis, a quarterly journal of world
affairs published by the Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute. Dr. Strausz-Hupe lectured
at and was course director of the first Na-
tional Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

In the conflict between the United States and the U.S.S.R.,
two alien systems confront each other. This confrontation takes
place in space and in time; the contest is over the domination
of the earth— and, now, its outer space— and over the future of
human society. It is the climactic phase of the systemic revolu-
tion through which the world has been passing ever since
1914. It is thus a struggle of power politics as well as a social
contest, a war as well as a revolution.

Adapted from an article, "Protracted Conflict: A New Look at
Communist Strategy," Orbis, Spring 1958. . .

THE PROTKACTED CONFLICT I7

In the language of politics, the term "revolution" stands for
a certain kind of historical change: an old order dissolves and
a new one emerges; old rulers are replaced by new ones; men
feel that the tempo of events is quickening and that, willingly
or unwillingly, they are breaking with the past; and the transi-
tion is enlivened by more or less spectacular bursts of violence.
Indeed, these were the characteristics of the French Revolu-
tion and the Russian Revolution, the most familiar examples
of "revolution" in modem history. Both these cataclysms lasted
for known spans of time; both were national, insofar as they
occurred within historical states. It is plausible to say that the
two world wars were revolutionary wars. It is easy to identify
the milestones of the "Revolution of Our Times." It is more
difficult to relate these discrete events— national revolutions and
international revolutionary wars— to a general development
which, in different ways, occurs in all coimtries, affects all men,
and lasts over an indefinite period of time.

The Systemic Revolution

Cycles of history completed long ago afford us a better in-
sight into the nature of the unfolding world revolution than
do the more recent happenings which we call revolutions and
which are, in fact, mere tremors, albeit sometimes momentous
ones, of a vast and lasting disturbance. Such a vast and lasting
disturbance seems to have shaken the ancient world. It started
with the Peloponnesian War and reached its climax in the
Roman Civil Wars, which pitted first Pompey against Caesar
and then Caesar's heirs against one another. The revolution,
although its most celebrated stages were Athens and Rome,
was not confined to any one city or country. It rolled over
the entire Mediterranean region— the imiverse of the ancients.
We may call it a systemic revolution. When it had run its
course of four centuries, the state system had changed from
one of many city-states into one of a single luiiversal empire.
A new order had been established, not only for Rome or Ath-
ens, for Italy or Greece, but for all peoples of the Mediter-
ranean region, and even for those peoples who had never
known the nile of the city-state. Then again, at the time of

l8 THE MED-CENTXIRY STAGE

the Renaissance and Reformation, Europe was recast. The
emergent system of nation-states marked a break with feudal-
ism as radical as that which sundered the vmiversal Roman
state from the poHs of antiquity.

In each of these systemic revolutions, states fought great
wars among one another. These wars between states were also
civil wars, for the disturbance of the system spread into aU its
parts, erasing the distinction between civil and external, na-
tional and international. Each of these great upheavals traced
a definite pattern of events that bafiBed the participants al-
though it became meaningful to posterity. The design of the
systemic revolution, hke that of the business cycle, is woven
from the actions of masses of men who neither understand nor
desire what they are about to fashion. Design there is, but it
is a design that is neither conscious nor rational.

The Present Paradox

This generation faces a bewildering and unprecedented
paradox: new and virtually unlimited resources are within our
reach, and we stand at the threshold of a new rich and univer-
sal civihzation; yet the survival of civihzation itself has been
put in doubt. So terrible is our dilemma and so pressing are
the demands of the hour that we incline to mistake each bend
of the road for a historic turning point. Unique as is our situa-
tion, it is but the latest episode of a long story. No one knows
how this story will end and whether the leading characters
of the current installment will figure in the next. We can but
surmise that destiny has placed us in the midst of a revolution-
ary epoch, comparable, on a global scale, to those which em-
braced the passing of the city-state, the "fall" of Rome, and
the breakdown of European feudalism. For many decades, his-
toric institutions and their sustaining faiths all over this earth
have swayed and broken under the impact of revolutionary
forces. The nature of the process is still largely veiled to our
eyes, for the complete returns are still not in and ovir judgment
is clouded by passion. We may ti-ace, with some semblance of
accuracy, this or that root cause: the truths unlocked and the
powers unleashed by the natural sciences; the global spread

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT I9

of industrialization; the rapid growth of populations; and the
ever accelerating mobility of men, ideas, and things. Yet the
political and social crisis of this century remains as ineffable
as the human condition to which it has given rise.

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion now holds the center of the historical stage. Yet this con-
frontation is the mere contemporary expression, the vast pow-
ers arrayed in each camp notwithstanding, of pervasive conflict
that encompasses all lands, all peoples, and all levels of society.
The United States and the Soviet Union are now the leading
protagonists; the struggle, which is civil as well as interna-
tional, cleaves all societies. Hence any effective strategy for
waging the ubiquitous protracted conflict must be, by neces-
sity, a revolutionary strategy: to wit, a strategy that puts to
its own use the revolutionary forces "on the loose" in politics,
economics, culture, science, and technology and denies their
exploitation to the enemy. Insofar as Communist strategy has
been able to do just that, it has been effective. The Commu-
nists have benefited from the errors of their opponents who
let themselves be bemused by the Marxist myth of revolution
and remained blind to the realities of revolutionary strategy.

The Scavengers of Revolution

Marxist thought is rooted in a concept of dynamic historical
change. The Russian Communists, saturated with a dynamic
philosophy of history and astride a formidable territorial base
of operations, saw what the West did not: that "the august,
unchallenged, and tranquil glories of the Victorian age," tar-
nished by World War I, were to depart forever amid the ris-
ing commotion of Asia and Africa.

The West's rapid expansion to all continents challenged
gravely the authority of all the world's surviving civilizations.
Western society pressed its forms upon all societies; it planted
everywhere the seeds of its creativeness— and of its ovm dis-
sensions. Thus, revolutionary change within the historic West
is inextricably linked with the transformation of the non-
Western societies. The concurrence of the crisis of the West
itself and the impact of Westernization upon the rest of man-

20 THE MID-CENTURY STAGE

kind impart irresistible force to the secular and universal, the
systemic world revolution.

Far from being revolutionaries in the commonly accepted
sense, the Russian Communists have excelled in capturing nas-
cent revolutionary movements launched by others. The Com-
munists have scored their most significant successes wherever
an existing "revolutionary situation" offered them opportuni-
ties for conspiratorial "boring" from within and military black-
mail from without.

The Russian Communists did not create the "revolutionary
situation" in Asia; that "situation" had been taking shape for
a long time. The Communists, however, were quick to exploit
it and "to push what was falling." First hampered by ideologi-
cal preconceptions, they soon adjusted their sights to political
realities: the colonial peoples would forge the political ideas
which they had received from the West into instruments for
dislodging the Western powers from their imperial holdings.
Although the incipient breakdown of the colonial system
would be paced by economic and social transformation, the
prospect of proletarian revolution held, for the Kremlin, less
attraction than the strategic prize: to inflict upon the Western
powers, who were, in point of time, the principal opponents
of the Soviet Union, heavy losses in political prestige, markets,
and raw-material resources and to weaken them through the
debilitating effects, military, economic, and moral, of colonial
wars of attrition.

The Policies of Lenin and Stalin

Lenin's singular contribution to Communist theory was the
conversion of Marxism from an abstract doctrine of conflict
between classes into a highly effective instrument of conflict
between nations. Lenin projected the class struggle from capi-
talist society— which Marx had assumed implicitly as being
confined by the boundaries of a national state such as nine-
teenth-century France or England— into world pohtics. Lenin
discerned in the clash of rival imperialisms the swan song of
capitalism. By analogy, the competition between capitahsts

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT 21

within a state evolves dialectically into a competitive struggle
between capitalist states.

The Congress of the Peoples of the East, convened at Baku
in 1920, affords a preview of a Communist strategy designed
to outflank, so to speak, the capitalist order by carrying the
revolution to the colonial empires. At Baku, the Bolshevik
leaders met with the national revolutionaries of Asia. The Con-
gress resolved dutifully upon a program for the subversion of
the European colonies. The fact that many of the participants
played, up until the present, leading roles in Asia's revolution-
ary movements bespeaks the importance of the Baku Congress.
The immediate results of Baku disappointed the Bolsheviks.
During the 1920s, one revolutionary attempt after the other
ended in failure, partially because the Communists had not
allowed sufficient time to prepare the professional core of
trained revolutionaries so essential to their method. The Bol-
sheviks could no longer blink the fact that the resources of
Russia were grossly disproportionate to the task of spreading
the global revolution and even to the task of keeping com-
munism ahve in its first historic abode, namely, in Russia. The
eclipse of the ideologists had become a necessity, Stalin as-
sumed the management of Russia and bent the energies of his
reluctant countrymen to the estabHshment of socialism in one
country, namely, in their own.

Stalin was no ideological purist. Outside of Russia, the Com-
munist Party was expendable. In Europe, Stalin sanctioned
cheerfully such ambiguous devices as the Popular Front and
outright alliances with fascism. Outside of Europe, Commu-
nist initiative was limited to the oblique and far from generous
support of Communist movements that had managed to sur-
vive the defeats of the 1920s and the recurrent purges of their
respective commands by Stalin. Only in one respect did Stalin
prepare the ground for the resumption of the offensive in Asia
and Africa: he launched a long-range program for the training
of native Communist cadres, to be deployed under more fa-
vorable circumstances.

After World War 11, Stahn set out to repair the damages
caused by German invasion and to modernize the Soviet armed
forces. Soviet strategy in the immediate post- World War II
period was essentially defensive. Stalin's principal objective

22 THE MID-CENTX7RY STAGE

was to deter the West from contesting the Soviet gains in east-
em Europe and from thwarting, by means of a preventive
war, the Soviet Union's gigantic eflFort to close the military-
technological gap. Until Stalin's death, Soviet policy remained
relatively inactive throughout the rimlands of Asia, including
the Middle East and the Arab world. Although it can be ar-
gued that Stalin pursued a positive policy in China, there is
strong evidence that Mao Tse-tung often took his own counsel
and even proceeded sometimes in opposition to StaUn's wishes.

Containment and the Communists' Tactical Shift

American foreign policy, from the late 1940s onward, was
presumably designed to counter the StaUnist policy in Europe.
American pohcy sought to contain what it conceived to be
the main thrust of Soviet expansionism directed at central and
western Europe. Its principal tools were the Marshall Plan and
the Atlantic Alliance. Although the bland doctrine of contain-
ment was cast in a global mold, its principal objective was
to stop the Russians in Europe.

In January 1954, American policy, by reinforcing the doc-
trine of containment with the doctrine of "massive retaliation,"
sought to redress the strategic balance in Europe and signified
implicitly the United States' determination to fight for the pres-
ervation of the status quo in Europe as well as in Korea.

The policy of deterrence forced the Communists to desist
from such direct challenges as they had presented in Korea
and to devise more subtle modes for the penetration of the
"gray areas." Neither John Foster Dulles' "massive retaliation"
nor, for that matter, the doctrines of "limited war" advanced
by his critics coped adequately with Communist strategy,
which now had shifted into new political and paramihtary di-
mensions. Moreover, the growing nuclear power of the Soviet
Union put in doubt the United States' readiness to invoke
"massive retaliation" imless confronted by a direct threat to
national survival.

The 1955 Geneva simrimit meeting was made possible, if
not unavoidable, by prevaihng Western public sentiment-
weariness with the exactions of the cold war and a charac-

THE PROTBACTED CONFLICT S3

teristic craving for final and formal settlements— and by mount-
ing disagreements among the Western allies.

The Soviet leaders, although they were fully aware of West-
em motives and integrated them in their ovim calculations,
prompted the encounter at Geneva because of considerations
fundamentally different from those inducing their Western op-
posites to meet with them at the summit. With the demise
of Stalin disappeared a formidable obstacle to liquidating a
number of demonstrably unproductive ideological positions.
The thesis of capitaHst economic crisis could now be put con-
veniently into storage. The petty feud with Tito had been
composed, and the Yugoslav leader's alleged heresy could be
turned from an ideological liability into a diplomatic asset.
More important still, the long overdue reorganization of the
Communist system, blocked by Stalin's personal idiosyncrasies,
could now be launched under comparatively favorable con-
ditions. By conceding that "many roads lead to socialism," the
Soviets hoped to attract the Afro-Asian neutrals, whom Stalin
had neglected and whose aversion to totalitarianism sprang
not so much from rooted democratic convictions as from dis-
taste for Stalin's unsophisticated methods. By shifting the inter-
national cadres of communism from close-order to open-order
drill, by purporting to loosen the reins of Moscow's control over
the Communist parties outside Russia, the Khrushchev "col-
lective" sought to check the West's military build-up and oc-
casional psychopolitical stabs at the Soviet empire in eastern
Europe.

It is doubtful that the summit meeting at Geneva marked
a turning point of history. In the protracted conflict between
t^vo vast systems, no single event, be it conference or battle,
can be decisive. The real significance of the Geneva meeting
seems to lie not so much in the importance of the issues under
negotiation as in the insight it afforded into mental states: the
Western statesmen, whatever might have been their private
reservations, were carried to Geneva on the crest of their peo-
ples' perennial hopes for a settlement wiih finality and sur-
cease from strife; the Soviets came to estabHsh another posi-
tion of maneuver in the protracted conflict. The Soviets adroitly
avoided, as they always had done before, a showdown with
Western strength and shffted their weight, as they always had

24 THE MID-CENTXJRY STAGE

done before, to bring it to bear against Western weakness.
The West's key position— NATO— was too strong to be taken
by frontal assault; the Communists moved to outflank it. The
chosen field of maneuver was the area not explicitly covered
by the system of Western alliance treaties. The first probing
thrust, which was launched shortly after the vacuous Geneva
communique, was the Czech arms shipment to Egypt. By the
time the numbness induced by Geneva had worn oflF, the West
saw itself confronted with a phenomenon unprecedented in
modem history: the emergence of Russia as a Middle Eastern
power.

In the West, the summit meeting at Geneva was vested with
a meaning that transcended the reticent phrasing of the decla-
rations issued by the assembled statesmen: the United States
and the Soviet Union, having recognized the catastrophic hor-
rors of thermonuclear war, had reached a de facto agreement
to renounce force. If this had been indeed true, a new epoch
of international relations would have opened at Geneva. The
idea that the Soviets now eschewed all violent conflict in favor
of "peaceful" competition was pleasing to the Western mind.
To the Western mind, conflict as a conscious, managed strug-
gle, the goals of which are mutually incompatible, is an unpal-
atable idea, for it does not fit the Western image of modem,
civilized society. By contrast, regulated competition, because
it is impersonal and unconscious in its operation among in-
dividual groups bidding for a share of economic goods, is
conducive to economic welfare and, if conducted with pro-
priety, to good feeling. After Geneva, the West construed the
phrase "peaceful, competitive coexistence" in the Ught of its
own concept of competition, just as in the past it was willing
to accept other samples of Communist semantics, such as "pop-
ular democracy," "free elections," "imperiahsm," and "coloni-
alism," as though they meant the same thing to the Soviets
as they did in Western parlance.

A Dialectical Theory of Conflict

Classic Marxian economics is dead; nowhere is it probably
taken less seriously than in Russia, Yet commimism has out-

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT 25

lived its intellectual sterility as well as its moral bankruptcy.
Communism now draws its vigor from a dialectical theory of
total conflict of indefinite duration between world political

systems.

The salient characteristics of the doctrine of protracted con-
flict are: the total objective, the carefully controled methods,
and the constant shifting of the battleground, weapons sys-
tems, and operational tactics for the purpose of confusing the
opponent, keeping him off balance, and wearing down his re-
sistance. The doctrine of protracted conflict prescribes a strat-
egy for annihilating the opponent over a period of time by
limited operations, by feints and maneuvers, psychological
manipulations, and diverse forms of violence. In, Communist
theory, various techniques of political warfare and graduated
violence are so co-ordinated as to form a spectrum that reaches
all the way from the clandestine distribution of subversive lit-
erature to the annihilating blow delivered with every weapon
available.

We can now see how the Commimists have applied this
doctrine to the strategic situation confronting them from 1945
to 1957. The problem was to aimul the Western democracies'
technological and strategic superiority while presenting them
with no challenge sufficiently decisive to trigger that type of
response which Hitlerian strategy forced upon them. At first,
the American atomic monopoly deterred Russia from present-
ing the United States with a forthright military challenge.
Later, even after they had developed their own nuclear power,
the Western air-base system, which formed a ring around the
Communist heartland, kept them at a strategic disadvantage.
Through this period, they confined their military challenges to
the indirect and irregular type, employing proxies to do their
work.

In June 1950, the troops of the Communist puppet regime
of North Korea, striking across the 38th Parallel, put to the
test the firmness of American intentions in the Far East. Mos-
cow parried the affirmative American response to that aggres-
sion by persuading the Chinese Communist regime to enter
the war. Even though the U.S.S.R. supplied arms to the North
Korean-Chinese forces, the Russians did not allow themselves
to become drawn directly into the war. When, after a year

26 THE MID-CENTUBY STAGE

of combat, the Communist forces in Korea were unable to win
new ground and the American-South Korean build-up per-
mitted potentially decisive offensive operations, the Russians,
far from threatening the West with a general war, suggested,
in 1951, that negotiations for a truce be opened.

After the Communists had worn down the West's will to
fight in Korea by two years of devious armistice discussions
and had blanketed the Free World with their peace propa-
ganda, mounted elaborately and financed largely by the con-
tributions of Western Communists, fellow travelers, and paci-
fists, the Korean truce signaled a stepping up of the operational
pace in Indochina. Here France fought an "old" war, heavily
encumbered by ambiguous political and moral issues which
militated against any vigorous Western response. The Soviet
Union thus embroiled the West in Asian wars waged by its
Korean and Chinese as well as its Malayan and Indochinese
proteges. Their barefaced connivance notwithstanding, the So-
viets dodged the responsibility for the actions of their proxies.
In this farce, they were assisted by the legal-mindedness of
the Western nations and the political naivete of many of the
"uncommitted" Asians.

Follovidng the Soviet forced march into the realm of thermo-
nuclear power, the Kremlin leadership felt capable of intro-
ducing important innovations into its postwar tactics. Initially,
the Soviets sought to penetrate contiguous areas. In this en-
deavor, they depended upon the Sino-Soviet superiority in con-
ventional armies and guerrilla-warfare methods. Now, for the
first time in their history, the Soviets were able to "leap over"
the Western treaty barriers into the more remote areas to which
they had always been denied strategic access. By cannily de-
vising proxy arms deals, the Soviet Union was able to extend
its influence to Guatemala, Egypt, Syria, and, through Egypt,
to Algeria.

Since 1945, the Communists have succeeded in their efforts
to confine, on the whole, the cold war to the "war zone" of
the non-Communist world, while keeping the "peace zone,"
namely the Communist bloc, virtually closed to Western inter-
vention and, incidentally, the ministrations of the United Na-
tions. The West was willing to give a round and take a round.
If the West won a round, as in Korea and Jordan, for exam-

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT 27

pie, it was in the defense of the status quo. When the Com-
munists won a round, as in Czechoslovakia, China, Indochina,
and the Middle East, tliey gained access to ground previously
closed to them. At best, the West stood its ground; but the
Communists, in winning their rounds, made a net gain. At
Geneva, the West accepted, together with the "balance of ter-
ror" thesis, the Communist-devised rules of the game, namely,
to play it anywhere but in the Communist "peace zone" and
to content itself with winning and losing the alternate rounds
elsewhere.

Implications of Russia's Technological Leap

The integration, in the early 1950s, of nuclear striking power
into the Communist military establishment marked the first sig-
nificant closing of the gap between the Commimist and West-
em military-technological power. The acquisition of atomic
capabilities and delivery systems signaled several important
and, for the West, ominous changes in the Communist strat-
egy of protracted conflict. These changes have been not so
much in the kinds of techniques used as in the degrees of
pressures brought to bear upon the West.

Ever since the Communists had to abandon their hopes for
a simultaneous world revolution, they relied primarily on the
psychopolitical modes of protracted conflict. Their strategy,
in the broadest terms, has been to eschew the massive use
of hardware and to produce psychological disturbances wdthin
the West, while at the same time keeping the imcommitted
nations imcommitted or drawing them into the Commimist
orbit.

Whatever the pace and intensity of Soviet strategies in a
given period, Soviet objectives remain the same. They are, in
the short run: first, to force the withdrawal of the West from
its strategic footholds, especially from the SAC network of
bases; second, to compel the West to divert vital economic
and military resources from Europe; third, to take Western
pressure and attention off eastern Europe; and fourth, to ex-
acerbate the divergencies within the Atlantic AUiance. The
long-run Soviet objectives, too, are the same: namely, to iso-

Z8 THE MID-CENTUBY STAGE

late the West, deprive it of its sotirces of strategic raw ma-
terials and markets, and to encircle it via Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa, until the West, its economic roots having
withered, will fall under its own weight.

The Battleground of the "Gray Areas"

The West is bent upon the crucial problem of its survival
in the face of the Communist threat. The West thus offers a
ready and profitable target for blackmail. The "backward"
peoples' common, albeit naive, admiration for Commimist per-
formance, especially for the Soviets' short cut in industrialiaa-
tion, has been deepened by the Soviets' recent technological
triumphs and the West's patent discomfiture. The neutrality
of Asian coimtries such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt tends
toward diverse shadings of benevolence toward the Soviets.
This brand of neutralism is quick to take offense at any West-
em initiative— except the West's proffer of gifts "without po-
litical strings."

In most of Asia and, to some measure, in most underde-
veloped lands, the "forces of history" are not on the side of
the West; they favor the Communists. In the short nm, at
least. Western chances of effecting a decisive improvement in
Eastern standards of Kving are slim. Conceding even the du-
bious thesis that economic improvement stands in any palpable
relationship to the growth of democratic institutions or, for that
matter, of any political institutions, it is imlikely that what-
ever the West manages to accomplish within, let us say, the
next twenty or thirty years in assuaging the aspirations of the
underdeveloped peoples will alter significantly the power re-
lationship between itself and the Commimist bloc. At best, the
Communists will not grow stronger; the West will not grow
weaker.

The increase of international trade and investment and the
more rapid economic growth of Asian and African lands are
desirable ends in themselves. As great as are the West's eco-
nomic and strategic stakes in Africa and Asia, its moral stakes
are even more important: the West has accumulated a vast
capital of good will among all non- Western peoples. Indeed,

THE PKOTBACTED CONFLICT 20

in all noncommitted countries large numbers of individuals,
including public officials, intellectuals, and members of the
professions, are deeply committed to Western values; not a
few chafe under the ambiguities of their governments' non-
commitment. But hardly anywhere have such pro-Western
sentiments sufficed to reverse official policy or, for that matter,
the deeper currents of mass hostility.

In the non-Western world, the West's strategy cannot be
more than a holding action. There, the task must be to gain
time, to avoid fixed commitments, to improvise, and to ab-
stain from action for action's sake. The idea that large-scale
and long-range economic aid— a vast program for the develop-
ment of the underdeveloped countries— can reverse, within the
foreseeable future, the verdict of 300 years of history is born
of hubris. Unseemly pride has led, in the past, many a mighty
nation to perdition. It might have been possible after World
War I, when the West's power was still unchallenged and the
forces of nationalism in Asia were relatively weak, to trans-
form gradually the social and economic order of the under-
developed lands and to provide an economic basis for stable
governments. The very existence of Communist power makes
this now impossible. For no matter how much the West is
willing and able to invest in the development of the "uncom-
mitted" countries, there will always be a gap between the
Western contribution and native expectations. The Commu-
nists need only move into this gap, be it even with the most
modest resources, in order to divert to themselves whatever
credit the recipient peoples might have been willing to accord
a foreign giver.

In the area outside of the system of Western treaties of
alliance— in the world of ex-colonial peoples and of the colored
races- the Communists have learned that they can proceed
with impunity and with a minimum of direct or even indirect
involvement. Everywhere in this world, powerful forces inimi-
cal to the West have been rising. All the Communists need
to do is to fan the fire. In most of Asia and Africa, the economic
theories of Marx are even more irrelevant than they are in the
highly industriahzed West; the Leninist theory of imperialism,
however, is alive in Communist strategy and, as a doctrine of
conflict, marches from victory to victory. In the battle for the

30 THE MID-CENTURY STAGE

"uncommitted" peoples, the West can only expect to hold the
ground which it has not as yet lost; it cannot force a decision
in the protracted conflict with the Communists.

Toward an Understanding of the Conflict

The West can hope to defeat the Commiinists only by giv-
ing battle on its own chosen terrain. It must carry the battle
to the vital sectors of Commimist defense. To do that it must
learn to counter the strategy of protracted conflict— to manage
conflict in space and in time.

The development of proper Western attitudes toward pro-
tracted conflict wiU be immensely difficult. The Commimists
possess a mentality that is much better suited to protracted
and controlled conflict than that of the Western peoples. The
West has neither a doctrine of protracted conflict nor an inter-
national conspiratorial apparatus for executing it. What is
more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political ap-
paratus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of
the Free World, in trying to combat the Commtmists, should
become like them. Some of our "weaknesses" vis-a-vis the Com-
munists are irremediable: we cannot turn omrselves into a con-
flict society, nor can we assign to the government and, in the
last resort, to the police the discipline of oui conscience. It is
within these limitations— which are the ramparts of civilized
self-restraint— that we are forced to cope with Communist per-
versity.

Pericles long ago was confronted with a similar problem.
As the leader of the open society of Athens, locked ia an ir-
reconcilable conflict with the garrison state of Sparta, he recog-
nized a relatively simple fact which many of the theorists of
war in the nuclear age have overlooked, namely, that there
are subtle alternatives to the risky and blunt strategy of en-
gaging the enemy in direct and decisive military action. In
the protracted conflict known as the Peloponnesian War, Peri-
cles chose to pursue an extended strategy which was designed
to avoid a showdown battle while wearing down, by a cam-
paign of economic, pohtical, and psychological attrition, the
enemy's will to resist. LiddeU Hart pointed out that the Peri-

THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT 3I

clean plan was simply a war policy aimed at "draining the
enemy's endurance in order to convince him that he could
not gain a decision."^ In today's protracted conflict the United
States must maintain and use its power for the same ultimate
purpose: to turn the tide of battle against the Communists, to
induce them to overextend themselves, to exploit the weakness
of their system, to paralyze their will, and to bring about their
final collapse. Within the framework of mutual deterrence,
both sides can employ the strategy of protracted conflict, and
we can do so quite efi^ectively without the dispensation of a
jealous and demanding dogma of conflict for conflict's sake.

A psychopolitical offensive, directed against the Commu-
nist citadel itself, offers the West its best chance for winning
the battle for its own survival and for spoihng the Communist
strategy for the subversion of the imcommitted world. Al-
though the currents within the uncommitted world are run-
ning against the West, the West need not despair of holding
its remaining positions once it has forced the Communists on
the psychopolitical defensive by engaging them on the most
favorable terrain, namely, the Communists' own "peace zone."

It is rather in the psychological arena than in its technologi-
cal workshop that the West has displayed its most alarming
shortcomings. Objectively, Western strategy has been far more
effective than the sensational charges of its critics will have it.
It is improbable that either side from now on will be able to
achieve decisive technological superiority for more than a tem-
porary, even brief, period. No doubt, oxxr mihtary posture is
susceptible to a great deal of improvement. But an exagger-
ated zeal for improvement, especially when it is triggered by
pained svirprise at the latest ploy of Commimist psychological
warfare or considerations of domestic pohtical advantage,
might prove to be "counterproductive" in developing our real
range of power. Do not let us pour the baby out vidth the
bath water. What we need now more than anything else is
an understanding of the comprehensive, complex, subtle, and
consistent strategy of our opponent— and the calm resolution
to draw the practical consequences.

IB. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 31.

3. Can We Survive Technology?

by John von Neumann

The late Dr. Von Neumann, a native of Hun-
gary, was recognized as one of the world's
most accomplished mathematicians. His book
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
which he wrote with the economist Oskar
Morgenstern, is regarded as a classic study
of strategy in war, business, and poker. In
1933 he joined the Institute for Advanced
Study at Princeton, New Jersey, and took
leave after President Eisenhower appointed
him to the Atomic Energy Commission in
1954. From 1940 on he served as consultant
to the armed forces and for his work received
two major decorations. Dr. Von Neumann
died in 1957 at the age of fifty-three. Al-
though written in 1955, this article's analysis
and prognosis is still extremely pertinent to
strategic considerations of the 1960s.

"The great globe itself" is in a rapidly maturing crisis— a crisis
attributable to the fact that the environment in which tech-
nological progress must occur has become both imdersized and
underorganized. To define the crisis with any accuracy, and
to explore possibilities of dealing v^^ith it, we must not only
look at relevant facts but also engage in some speculation. The
process vdH illuminate some potential technological develop-
ments of the next quarter century.

In the first half of this century the accelerating Industrial
Revolution encountered an absolute limitation— not on tech-

In its original form, this selection was published in the June 1955
issue of Fortune. Copyright 1955, Time, Inc. All rights reserved.

CAN WE SXJRVrVE TECHNOLOGY? 33

nological progress as such, but on an essential safety factor.
This safety factor, which had permitted the Industrial Revo-
lution to roll on from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth
century, was essentially a matter of geographical and poUtical
lebensraum: an ever broader geographical scope for techno-
logical activities, combined with an ever broader political inte-
gration of the world. Within this expanding framework it was
possible to accommodate the major tensions created by tech-
nological progress.

Now this safety mechanism is being sharply inhibited; lit-
erally and figuratively, we are running out of room. At long
last, we begin to feel the eflFects of the finite, actual size of the
earth in a critical way.

Thus the crisis does not arise from accidental events or hu-
man errors. It is inherent in technology's relation to geography
on the one hand and to poHtical organization on the other.
The crisis was developing visibly in the 1940s, and some
phases can be traced back to 1914. In the years between now
and 1980 the crisis will probably develop far beyond all earher
patterns. When or how it will end— or to what state of aflFairs
it will yield— nobody can say.

Dangers, Present and Coming

In all its stages the Industrial Revolution consisted of mak-
ing available more and cheaper energy, more and easier con-
trols of human actions and reactions, and more and faster com-
munications. Each development increased the eflFectiveness of
the other two. All three factors increased the speed of per-
forming large-scale operations— industrial, mercantile, politi-
cal, and migratory. But throughout the development, increased
speed did not so much shorten time requirements of processes
as extend the areas of the earth affected by them. The reason
is clear. Since most time scales are fixed by human reaction
times, habits, and other physiological and psychological fac-
tors, the effect of the increased speed of technological proc-
esses was to enlarge the size of units— political, organizational,
economic, and cultural— affected by technological operations.
That is, instead of performing the same operations as before

34 THE MID-CENTURY STAGE

in less time, now larger-scale operations were performed in the
same time. This important evolution has a natural hmit, that
of the earth's actual size. The hmit is now being reached, or
at least closely approached.

Indications of this appeared early and with dramatic force
in the military sphere. By 1940 even the larger countries of
continental western Europe were inadequate as military units.
Only Russia could sustain a major mihtary reverse without
collapsing. Since 1945, improved aeronautics and communica-
tions alone might have sufficed to make any geographical unit,
including Russia, inadequate in a future war. The advent of
nuclear weapons merely climaxes the development. Now the
effectiveness of offensive weapons is such as to stultify all plaus-
ible defensive time scales. Soon existing nations will be as vm-
stable in war as a nation the size of Manhattan Island would
have been in a contest fought with the weapons of 1900.

Such military instability has already found its political
expression. Two superpowers, the United States and the
U.S.S.R., represent such enonnous destructive potentials as to
afford little chance of a purely passive eqiiilibrium. Other
countries, including possible "neutrals," are militarily defense-
less in the ordinary sense. At best they will acquire destructive
capabilities of their own, as Britain is now doing. Conse-
quently, the "concert of powers"— or its equivalent interna-
tional organization— rests on a basis much more fragile than
ever before. The situation is further embroiled by the newly
achieved political effectiveness of non-European nationalisms.

These factors would "normally"— that is, in any recent cen-
tury—have led to war. WiE they lead to war before 1980? Or
soon thereafter? It would be presumptuous to try to answer
such a question firmly. In any case, the present and the near
future are both dangerous. While the immediate problem is
to cope with the actual danger, it is also essential to envisage
how the problem is going to evolve in the next two decades,
even assuming that aU will go reasonably well for the moment.
This does not mean belittling immediate problems of weap-
onry, of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions, of the evolution and revolutions
of Asia. These first things must come first. But we must be
ready for the follow-up, lest possible immediate successes

CAN WE SUHVIVE TECHNOLOGY? 35

prove futile. We must think beyond the present forms of prob-
lems to those of later decades.

When Reactors Grow Up

Technological evolution is still accelerating. Technologies
are aWays constructive and beneficial, directly or indirectly.
Yet their consequences tend to increase instability— a point that
will get closer attention after we have had a look at certain
aspects of continuing technological evolution.

First of all, there is a rapidly expanding supply of energy.
It is generally agreed that even conventional, chemical fuel-
coal or oil— will be available in increased quantity in the next
two decades. Increasing demand tends to keep fuel prices high,
yet improvements in methods of generation seem to bring the
price of power down. There is little doubt that the most sig-
nificant event affecting energy is the advent of nuclear power.
Its only available controlled source today is the nuclear-fission
reactor. Reactor techniques appear to be approaching a con-
dition in which they will be competitive with conventional
(chemical) power sources witliin the United States; however,
because of generally higher fuel prices abroad, they could al-
ready be more than competitive in many important foreign
areas. Yet reactor technology is but a decade and a half old,
and during most of this period effort has been directed pri-
marily not toward power but toward plutonium production.
Given a decade of really large-scale indtistriai effort, the eco-
nomic characteristics of reactors will undoubtedly surpass
those of the present by far.

"Alchemy" and Automation

It is worth emphasizing that the main trend will be system-
atic exploration of nuclear reactions— that is, the transmutation
of elements, or alchemy rather than chemistry. The main point
in developing the industrial use of nuclear processes is to make
them suitable for large-scale exploitation on the relatively small
site that is the earth or, rather, any plausible terrestrial in-

36 THE MID-CENTtJRY STAGE

dustrial establishment. Nature has, of course, been operating
nuclear processes all along, well and massively, but her "natu-
ral" sites for this industry are entire stars. There is reason to
believe that the minimum space requirements for her way of
operating are the minimum sizes of stars. Forced by the limi-
tations of our real estate, we must in this respect do much
better than nature. That this may not be impossible has been
demonstrated in the somewhat extreme and unnatural instance
of fission, that remarkable breakthrough of the past decade.

What massive transmutation of elements will do to tech-
nology in general is hard to imagine, but the eflFects will be
radical indeed. This can already be sensed in related fields.
The general revolution clearly under way in the military
sphere, and its already realized special aspect, the terrible pos-
sibilities of mass destruction, should not be viewed as typical
of what the nuclear revolution stands for. Yet they may well
be typical of how deeply that revolution will transform what-
ever it touches. And the revolution will probably touch most
things technological.

Also likely to evolve fast— and quite apart from nuclear evo-
lution—is automation. Interesting analyses of recent develop-
ments in this field, and of near-future potentialities, have ap-
peared in the last few years. Automatic control, of course, is
as old as the Industrial Revolution, for the decisive new fea-
ture of Watt's steam engine was its automatic valve control,
including speed control by a "governor." In our century, how-
ever, small electric amplifying and switching devices put auto-
mation on an entirely new footing. This development began
with the electromechanical (telephone) relay, continued and
unfolded with the vacuum tube, and appears to accelerate
with various solid-state devices (semiconductor crystals, fer-
romagnetic cores, etc.). The last decade or two has also wit-
nessed an increasing ability to control and "discipline" large
numbers of such devices within one machine. Even in an air-
plane the number of vacuum tubes now approaches or exceeds
a thousand. Other machines, containing up to 10,000 vacuum
tubes, up to five times more crystals, and possibly more than
100,000 cores, now operate faultlessly over long periods, per-
forming many miUions of regulated, preplanned actions per

CAN WE SURVIVE TECHNOLOGY? 37

second, with an expectation of only a few errors per day or
week.

Many such machines have been built to perform compli-
cated scientific and engineering calculations and large-scale
accounting and logistical surveys. There is no doubt that they
will be used for elaborate industrial process control, logistical,
economic, and other planning, and many other purposes here-
tofore lying entirely outside the compass of quantitative and
automatic control and preplanning. Thanks to simplified forms
of automatic or semiautomatic control, the efficiency of some
important branches of industry has increased considerably dur-
ing recent decades. It is therefore to be expected that the con-
siderably elaborated newer forms, now becoming increasingly
available, will effect much more along these lines.

Fundamentally, improvements in control are really improve-
ments in communicating information within an organization
or mechanism. The sum total of progress in this sphere is ex-
plosive. Improvements in communication in its direct, physical
sense— transportation— while less dramatic, have been consider-
able and steady. If nuclear developments make energy unre-
strictedly available, transportation developments are likely to
accelerate even more. But even "normal" progress in sea, land,
and air media is extremely important. Just such "normal" prog-
ress molded the world's economic development, producing the
present global ideas in pohtics and economics.

Controlled Climate

Let us now consider a thoroughly "abnormal" industry and
its potentialities— that is, an industry as yet without a place
in any list of major activities: the control of weather or, to
use a more ambitious but justified term, climate.

Weather control and climate control are much broader than
rain making. All major weather phenomena, as well as climate
as such, are ultimately controlled by the solar energy that faUs
on the earth. To modify the amoimt of solar energy, is, of
course, beyond human power. But what really matters is not
the amount that hits the earth, but the fraction retained by
the earth, since that reflected back into space is no more use-

38 THE MID-CENTURY STAGE

ful than if it had never arrived. Now, the amount absorbed
by the soKd earth, the sea, or the atmosphere seems to be
subject to dehcate influences. True, none of these has so far
been substantially controlled by human will, but there are
strong indications of control possibihties.

The carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere by indus-
try's burning of coal and oil— more than half of it during the last
generation— may have changed the atmosphere's composition
sufficiently to account for a general warming of the world by
about one degree Fahrenheit. The volcano Krakatoa erupted
in 1883 and released an amount of energy by no means exorbi-
tant. Had the dust of the eruption stayed in the stratosphere
for fifteen years, reflecting sunlight away from the earth, it
might have sufficed to lower the world's temperatiire by six
degrees. This would have been a substantial cooling; the last
Ice Age, when half of North America and all of northern and
western Europe were under an icecap like that of Greenland
or Antarctica, was only fifteen degrees colder than the present
age. On the other hand, another fifteen degrees of warming
would probably melt the ice of Greenland and Antarctica and
produce world-wide tropical to semitropical climate.

The Indifferent Controls

Such developments as free energy, greater automation, im-
proved communications, partial or total climate control, have
common traits deserving special mention. First, though all are
intrinsically useful, they can lend themselves to destruction.
Even the most formidable tools of nuclear destruction are only
extreme members of a genus that includes useful methods of
energy release or element transmutation. The most construc-
tive schemes for climate control would have to be based on
insights and techniques that would also lend themselves to
forms of climatic warfare as yet unimagined. Technology-
like science— is neutral all through, providing only means of
control applicable to any purpose, indifferent to all.

Second, there is in most of these developments a trend to-
ward affecting the earth as a whole, or, to be more exact, to-
ward producing effects that can be projected from any one

CAN WE StTRVIVE TECHNOLOGY? 39

to any other point on the earth. There is an intrinsic conflict
with geography— and institutions based thereon— as understood
today. Of course, any technology interacts with geography,
and each imposes its own geographical rules and modaUties.
The technology that is now developing and that will dominate
the next decades seems to be in total conflict with traditional
and, in the main, momentarily still vahd geographical and po-
htical units and concepts. This is the maturing crisis of tech-
nology.

What kind of action does this situation call for? Whatever
one feels inclined to do, one decisive trait must be considered:
the very techniques that create the dangers and the instabilities
are in themselves useful, or closely related to the useful. In
fact, the more useful they could be, the more unstabilizing
their eflEects can also be. It is not a particular perverse de-
structiveness of one particular invention that creates danger.
Technological power, technological efficiency as such, is an
ambivalent achievement. Its danger is intrinsic.

Science, the Indivisible

In looking for a solution, it is well to exclude one pseudo
solution at the start. The crisis will not be resolved by inhibit-
ing this or that apparently particularly obnoxious form of
technology. For one thing, the parts of technology, as well as
of the underlying sciences, are so intertwined that in the long
run nothing less than a total elimination of all technological
progress would suffice for inhibition. Also, on a more pedes-
trian and immediate basis, useful and harmful techniques lie
everywhere so close together that it is never possible to sepa-
rate the Hons from the lambs. This is knovsm to all who have
so laboriously tried to separate secret, "classified" science or
technology (military) from the "open" kind; success is never
more— nor intended to be more- than transient, lasting perhaps
half a decade. Similarly, a separation into useful and harmful
subjects in any technological sphere would probably diffuse
into nothing in a decade.

Moreover, in this case successful separation would have to
be enduring (unHke the case of mihtary "classification," in

40 THE MID-CENTXmY STAGE

which even a few years' gain may be important) . Also, the
proximity of useful techniques to harmful ones, and the pos-
sibility of putting the harmful ones to military use, puts a com-
petitive premium on infringement. Hence the banning of
particular technologies would have to be enforced on a world-
wide basis. But the only authority that could do this eflFectively
would have to be of such scope and perfection as to signal
the resolution of international problems rather than the dis-
covery of a means to resolve them.

Finally, and most importantly, prohibition of technology is
contrary to the whole ethos of the industrial age. It is irrecon-
cilable with a major mode of intellectuality as our age under-
stands it. It is hard to imagine such a restraint successfully
imposed in our civilization. Only if those disasters that we fear
had already occurred, only if humanity were already com-
pletely disillusioned about technological civilization, could
such a step be taken. But not even the disasters of recent wars
have produced that degree of disillusionment, as is proved by
the phenomenal resihency with which the industrial way of
life recovered even— or particularly— in the worst-hit areas. The
technological system retains enormous vitality, probably more
than ever before, and the counsel of restraint is unlikely to be
heeded.

Awful and More Awful

The problems created by the combination of the presently
possible forms of nuclear warfare and the rather unusually vm-
stable international situation are formidable and not to be
solved easily. Those of the next decades are likely to be simi-
larly vexing, "only more so." The U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension is bad,
but when other nations begin to make felt their full potential
oflrensive weight, things will not become simpler.

Present awful possibilities of nuclear warfare may give way
to others even more awful. After global climate control be-
comes possible, perhaps all our present involvements will seem
simple. We should not deceive ourselves: once such possibili-
ties become actual, they will be exploited. It will, therefore, be
necessary to develop suitable new political forms and proce-

CAN WE SURVIVE TECHNOLOGY? 4I

dures. All experience shows that even smaller technological
changes than those now in the cards profoundly transform po-
litical and social relationships. Experience also shows that
these transformations are not a priori predictable and that most
contemporary "first guesses" concerning them are wrong. For
all these reasons, one should take neither present difficxilties
nor presently proposed reforms too seriously.

The one solid fact is that the diflSculties are due to an evolu-
tion that, while useful and constructive, is also dangerous. Can
we produce the required adjustments vidth the necessary
speed? The most hopeful answer is that the himian species
has been subjected to similar tests before and seems to have a
congenital ability to come through, after varying amounts of
trouble. To ask in advance for a complete recipe would be
unreasonable. We can specify only the human quahties re-
quired: patience, flexibility, intelligence.

4. The Diminishing Freedom of Choice

by Robert Strausz-Hupe

The United States is heading for the most dangerous stage of
its history: it is losing control over its foreign and security
policies.

For more than a hundred years, the United States has been
able to choose, within an ample margin of discretion, between
peace and war. Up until a few years ago, the United States
could decide whether it should join international conflict or
keep out of it. No other state could make this decision for
the United States; no other state could force the United States
to go to war against its better judgment or emotional in-
volvement.

In both world wars of this century, the United States was
free to decide if and when to join the belligerents and, al-
though popular legends tell of but one alternative, which side
to succor. The United States might have kept out of the First
World War. Many millions of Americans would have been
content to choose this alternative. In the Second World War,
the United States could have remained neutral; it could have
gone to war and still have withheld support from the Soviet
Union. Many millions of Americans would not have caviled at
either of these solutions.

One can argue— and it is easy to do so after the event— that
national interest and ethical commitment predetermined Amer-
ican participation and alignment in both world wars. The fact
is that Americans could take their time determining how com-
peHing was the logic of their interests and hearts. This is, at
least, how other peoples saw it. Their leaders were far from
sure which way the United States was going to jvimp, and

Originally published as "U.S. Near Most Dangerous State of Its
History," in the August 17, 1956, issue of U.S. News & World Re-
port, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washing-
ton. Copyright 1956, United States News Publishing Company.

THE DIMINISHING FREEDOM OF CHOICE 43

spared no effort to influence the American decision by every
means of persuasion. They may have been prescient enough
to see that ultimately the American people would have no
choice; they certainly did not act on this supposition. In the
eyes of the world, the United States had the freedom of de-
cision.

Since the United States could decide freely to stay at peace
or go to war "at times and places of its own choosing," it could
—if it so desired— forestall aggression by the timely employ-
ment of force. No one can deny that a state has the right, if
not the bounden duty, to meet threats of aggression by ap-
propriate mihtary measures. Since international law fully rec-
ognizes the right to self-defense in the face of clear and pres-
ent threats to the peace, the question here is simply one of
capability and not one of morality.

Means, Timing, and Self-Defense

A state that decides to use force must not only be reasona-
bly sure that its opponent will indeed become a source of ag-
gression unless blocked by anticipatory action, but it must also
exercise a wide latitude of choice as regards means and timing.
A state that proposes to forestall a potential aggressor must
be strong. No government will venture upon anticipatory mili-
tary action that does not estimate the chances of victory to
be very high. For the penalties of failure, too, are very high:
neither domestic nor world opinion looks kindly upon a govern-
ment's unsuccessful attempt at playing Providence; the poten-
tial aggressor might, had he been left unmolested, have
changed his mind; no nation has the right to mete out punish-
ment against another nation before the latter is proven guilty
of a breach of international law, and presumed intention is
insufficient proof; and the worst peace, we are told, is better
than the best of wars.

It is because of these homely and practical as well as ab-
stract and elevated considerations that the American people
have professed their abiding distaste for using force to resolve
international disputes. This popular attitude notwithstanding,
the United States has been singularly fitted by natural and

44 THE MrD-CElSTTOHY STAGE

contrived circumstances for arbitrating conflict. It is certain
that both world wars would have been shorter and mankind
would have suffered less had the United States exploited
promptly its capabilities for waging preventive war against
Germany and Japan. It is hardly debatable that the United
States, even though it eschewed the direct road to war, pur-
sued—wittingly or unwittingly— certain policies that contained
elements of war strategy: the Germans, in both world wars,
and the Japanese, in 1941, were maneuvered into tipping their
hands. Granted even that their ultimate designs were aggres-
sive and that they really meant to fight the United States
rather than content themselves with regional domination, then
U.S. action forced them to change the timetable of their ag-
gressive operation. This was fortunate, although no American
statesman has cared to claim the credit for having made the
potential aggressor fight just then, when it was time for the
United States to go to war.

Among historians, there is still wide disagreement on exactly
how the United States came to participate in the last two
world wars; among moral philosophers, there has always been,
and always will be, wide disagreement as to whether a nation
should refrain from using force except as a last resort against
all-out armed attack.

The Emerging One-Way Street of Diplomacy

Hardly any American will disagree that his country's capa-
bility of fighting a war "at times and places of its own choos-
ing"—no matter whether that capability is used or not— con-
stitutes a healthy restraint on foreign aggression. As matters
now stand, it is uncertain, to say the least, that the United
States possesses a weapons system that favors decisively offen-
sive operations. More important still, the decision as to whether
and when to go to war, preventive or reactive, lies no longer
with the United States alone or with its friends or with the
United States and its friends together.

The capability of using force is the prerequisite of a foreign
policy that is independent rather than reactive. Once the po-
tential aggressor knows that he need not reckon with the

THE DIMINISHING FREEDOM OF CHOICE 45

anticipatory action of his opponent and that only direct mili-
tary attack will provoke the intended victim into retaliatory
action, he can apply safely any and all stratagems of conquest
short of direct military attack. More important still, he can
prepare safely that direct military attack itself and even ven-
ture upon aU kinds of probing actions designed to test the de-
fensive reflexes of the intended victim.

Loss of the capacity to enforce the peace, rather than let-
ting the aggressor determine when and how to break it, marks
the end of effective diplomatic negotiation; for the potential
aggressor knows that his intended victim will apply the sanc-
tion of violence only when it is confronted by outright aggres-
sion, that is, when the aggressor sees fit to rupture all diplo-
matic negotiations and to engage in that most violent of
unilateral actions, war.

This does not mean that the potential aggressor will eschew
diplomatic negotiations: on the contrary, he will launch him-
self eagerly upon formal diplomatic negotiations, the more
elaborate the better. He need not shirk this contest, for he
stands to gain not only concrete concessions but also valuable
propaganda advantages; nor need he fear any serious discom-
fiture, since his opposites will not back up their diplomacy by
force except in self-defense against overt military attack.

Diplomacy is thus turned into a one-way street along which
the potential aggressor pushes his intended victim— now quiet-
ing its fears by hearty smiles and well-advertised, though
trivial, concessions; now goading it into angry verbal protests
by the summary refusal to make any concessions whatsoever
—toward public humiliation, diplomatic isolation, and domestic
demoralization. In history, such a strategy has been crowned
with not a few "bloodless victories,"

Postwar Capabilities

The overarching fact about the postwar relationship be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union is this: The
United States possessed, from 1945 to 1951, the capability of
waging war, and the Soviet Union did not.

The Communists, steadfast in their purpose and perhaps

46 THE MID-CENTXJRY STAGE

crediting the United States with an estimate of Soviet inten-
tions far more reahstic than they needed to fear, placed the
contingency of an American-initiated war at the top of their
calculations. Atomic m.onopoly and superior air power en-
dowed the United States with the capability required for
fighting against Communist forces— provided the United States
had been determined to mobilize the total of its "conventional"
as well as "unconventional" military resources.

There can be no doubt that the principal objectives of Soviet
pohcy throughout the first decade after World War II was to
close the technological gap between the United States and
Russia and to dissuade, by diplomatic and psychopolitical
means, the United States from launching military action un-
der optimum conditions. In this purpose, Soviet policy suc-
ceeded brilliantly.

Up until the end of the Korean War, the logic of the relation-
ship between the American and Soviet weapons system ar-
gued conclusively for an American strategy of unrelenting
pressure upon the Soviet Union.

For the Soviets, this period was, within their empire, one of
consolidation, and, at the periphery, one of defensive sorties
and cautious probing actions. In Europe, the Soviets concen-
trated upon the strengthening of the positions which they had
acquired at the end of World War II. In Asia, the Soviets
were concerned chiefly with the completion of the Commu-
nist conquest of China— in which transaction, incidentally, they
refrained discreetly from overt intervention— and the estabhsh-
ment of a working partnership with the new rulers of main-
land China.

The Soviet blockade of Berlin, intrusion in Iran, and support
of Red China during the Korean War must be viewed in retro-
spect as probing and diversionarj'^ actions which the Soviets
broke off as soon as they met determined Western resistance
and discerned the danger of an all-out Western riposte— that
is, of genera! war latmched by the United States.

No doubt the Soviets would have pressed home these thrusts
had they encountered less vigorous opposition, for many of
their earlier successes had been won through the skillful ex-
ploitation of tactical opportunities. The creation of NATO
closed western Europe not only to whatever miHtary adven-

THE DIMINISHING FREEDOM OF CHOICE 47

tures along the Elbe or in the Mediterranean the Soviets might
have contemplated but also to Communist pohtical warfare
on the Czechoslovak model.

In Asia, the deployment of American forces in Korea and
the Formosa Strait counseled the Commimists to pursue their
ends by diplomatic negotiations rather than by mihtary opera-
tions. But the true purpose of Soviet maneuvers from Greece
to Berlin and from Iran to Korea can now be clearly seen: to
screen the build-up of the modernized Red Army and Navy
and to divert the West from what, by Soviet logic, should have
been its true purpose, namely, to crush Soviet power before it
had attained technological parity.

The leaders of the Western democracies vied with one an-
other in renouncing indignantly the very thought of such a
"spoiling operation." What mattered to the Soviets was to make
doubly sure that the democracies would not deviate from the
highroad of self-restraint. Their peace campaigns were de-
signed to confirm the Western peoples in their conviction that
to insure peace by preparing for war is wasteful, if not Mdcked,
and that to strike the potential aggressor before he can strike
is wastefulness and wickedness compounded.

The Shift in the Power Balance

The Soviets, during the long years of their military "incuba-
tion," were keenly aware of the West's capabilities. The West
possessed the capability, although not the will, of retaliating
against Soviet moves "at times and places of its own choosing."
The Soviets' release from the haimting fear of the West's doing
just that coincided with the change o£ rulers in Russia. This
accident is at the root of much confusion. No one can tell what
Stalin would have done had he been at the helm in 1955, the
year of Geneva. More important than conjectures on differ-
ences between successive Soviet bosses is the fact that any
Soviet ruler or ruling-chque incumbent would have confronted
in 1955 the same profound change in the balance of power
in favor of the Soviet Union. Nikita Khrushchev was only ac-
knowledging a long-standing fact when he boasted, in his
speech to the Supreme Soviet of January 14, i960, that "a

4o THE MID-CENTXTRY STAGE

fundamental shift has taken place in the balance of power be-
tween the socialist and capitalist states."

That change in the power balance was not due to the al-
tered tactics o£ Stahn's successor; the "new look" of Soviet
diplomacy was the result of the "new look" of the Soviet armed
forces. When President Eisenhower declared, at Geneva, that
there was "no alternative to peace," he acknowledged imphc-
itly the successful completion of the most daring and danger-
ous transformation which Soviet power underwent in its daring
and dangerous history: the change-over— under the West's
atomic guns, so to speak— from the Red Army of 1945, con-
sisting almost entirely of ground forces, to today's Soviet war
machine, equipped with nuclear weapons, jet bombers, inter-
continental missiles, and long-range submarines.

If their intelligence services should have failed to confirm
completely the Soviet leaders' estimates of the situation, then
the President's words must have suppUed the missing bits and
pieces; the West accepted the nuclear stalemate and discarded
war as a means of pursuing diplomatic objectives.

Preventive War and Total Conflict

To abjure the use of force under aU circumstances except
self-defense in a contest with a revolutionary power is a fate-
ful decision. The principal deterrent to the revolutionary ag-
gressor is the status quo power's capability of forestalling him
with superior force. Bismarck once said that he who counseled
a preventive war reminded him of the man who committed
suicide because he was afraid to die. This is an apt character-
ization of preventive war in a world where the furies of revolu-
tion have been chadned. In the nineteenth century, even the
most "dynamic" powers aimed at no more than limited-power
political objectives within the existing order, not at the over-
throw of that order itself.

By contrast, Hitler proposed to carry the Nazi revolution
from one end of Europe to the other and, if luck held, to far-
ther shores. Is it a debatable question that an Anglo-French
war against Nazi Germany, as soon as it took the revision of
the peace settlement of 1919 into its own hands, would not

THE DIMINISHING FREEDOM OF CHOICE 49

have been just and would not have saved mankind from the
worst calamity of its history? Is it possible to argue that the
United States would now be less secure, and the prospect of
human freedom less bright, had the United States wielded its
power diplomatically and, in the last resort, militarily in order
to force the Soviet Union to surrender its unlawful gains and
renounce its sponsorship of international subversion?

Although the full imphcations of the "atomic stalemate"
and, more important still, of its acceptance by American diplo-
macy as a fact of life have not yet received that sober and
searching attention which so portentous a development war-
rants, there have been some attempts to show how the United
States can regain, at relatively small cost, its freedom of ma-
neuver and recapture the initiative. It is hoped, for example,
that a bold new program of economic assistance to the "un-
committed" peoples of Asia and a bolder bid for "the minds
of men" will blunt Soviet oflFensives in these sectors of the cold-
war front and thus give the West a decisive advantage in the
coexistential competition.

Although eflFective economic policies and imaginative propa-
ganda are integral to the defense of the Free World, they can-
not, however, be expected to right the balance of power in
favor of the United States. Is it plausible to assume that even
the most massive economic aid to, let us say, India will dent
the neutralist disposition of its rulers, or that the most skillful
presentation of the West's cultural and moral ascendancy in,
let us say, Afghanistan or Indonesia will transform either of
these countries into bastions of the Free World's defense? The
best one can hope is that neither of these countries will move
closer to the Communist camp than it has to date.

In the Near and Middle East, the alarming inroads of the
Soviets cannot be ascribed to American failures in the fields
of propaganda or economic policy. The Soviets succeeded in
gaining footholds in the Arab world because the United
States and Britain could not, or thought they cotild not, em-
ploy mihtary sanctions, such as a naval blockade and search
of the Arab bloc.

50 THE MID-CENTtrHY STAGE

Can We Recapture the Initiative?

The conclusions deduced from the above analysis are as
follows: The containment of a revolutionary power aiming at
the overthrow of the existing world order rests upon the de-
fender's capability of taking anticipatory action— of forestalling
war with force. In the absence of this capability— of which the
resolution to use it is an intrinsic element— a mihtary and diplo-
matic stalemate ensues. This stalemate favors, and can be
broken most advantageously by, the revolutionary power; for
the contest is thrown from the covut of military and diplomatic
arbitrament into the arena of psychopoHtical warfare, which is
the revolutionary's natural habitat. The old doctrines of limited
war do not oflfer practicable alternatives.

The conditions which, in the eighteenth century and, al-
though somewhat attenuated, in the nineteenth century, im-
posed upon all belligerents a measure of self-restraint no longer
obtain. Nor is it likely that the United States can, at this stage
of technological development and mass psychological revulsion
against war, reproduce at some future occasion the conditions
which enabled it to fight a "controlled" war in Korea.

The recapture by the United States of the diplomatic and
psychopoHtical initiative in the contest with the Commtmist
bloc depends, therefore, either on a massive technological
breakthrough which will restore American military superiority,
or on the development of new strategic and tactical concepts
which will cancel out, in favor of the United States, the parity
of American and Soviet materiel, or, finally, on the devotion
of a larger portion of America's national product to this effort.
None of these alternatives are now in public sight. The two
remaining alternatives are the transformation of the Soviet
Union into a status quo power or the adoption by the United
States of the revolutionary techniques of international conflict.
The former contingency lies beyond the control of the United
States; the latter implies radical alteration of American society
as now constituted and a complete change of context in the
world-wide ideological struggle. These alternatives, too, fail to

THE DIMINISfflNG FREEDOM OF CHOICE 5l

furnish, here and now, an escape from the American dilemma
in world pohtics.

In sum, the position of the United States in relation to the
Soviet Union has worsened. Unless the American people real-
ize that time is no longer on their side and take the actions
necessary to right the scales which are tipping now against
them, their position will continue to worsen and worsen criti-
cally. Then American foreign policy will vainly seek to recap-
ture its historic freedom of choice, and the fortunes of the
American people will be controlled increasingly by the incal-
culable decisions of a hostile power.

The adverse implications of this conclusion call for correc-
tive effort, not resigned acceptance. For history is made by
men: nothing is inevitable except when men make it so by
their acts of commission or omission. The American people can
regain their freedom of choice in world politics. They will do
so whenever their leaders demand those sacrifices which Amer-
icans have never failed to bring in times of national peril.

INTRODUCTION

The faces of communism are many.

Commimism is an ideology propounded by Marx and Eng-
els, expanded by Lenin, and tailored by his successors to the
concrete requirements of the Soviet state and the global revo-
lution. Although tarnished by time and Commimist practice,
the Utopian appeal of this ideology continues to beckon power-
fully to the uprooted, the disinherited, and the impressionable.

Communism is a social system, ruthlessly disciplined, rig-
idly organized, and cut to an over-all blueprint of society. It
is a system in the throes of change, but the trajectory of this
transition is yet indistinct.

Communism is a global revolutionary movement, centered
in an empire stretching from the Elbe River to the far reaches
of the Pacific Ocean and guided by a central inteUigence.
Shaken by recent explosions, this empire is groping slowly for
a new organizational basis. The strength of this movement
is undeniable. Yet the all-powerful "monolith" which allegedly
is communism is more a myth contrived by the Kremlin's
propagandists than a fact of international life. Communism's
inherent contradictions are ready to be exploited— if only the
Free World can muster the requisite means and determination.

5.

by Gerhart Niemeyer

A native of Germany, Dr. Niemeyer is widely
recognized as an authority on the history and
nature of communism. He studied at the
universities of Cambridge and Munich and
received his doctorate from Kiel University.
He has taught at the universities of Frank-
furt and Madrid, and at Princeton, Ogle-
thorpe, Yale, and Columbia universities.
From 1950 to 1953 he was planning adviser
in the U. S. Department of State. Since 1955
he has been professor of political science at
the University of Notre Dame. In 1959 he
was on leave as a member of the Depart-
ment of Political Affairs of the National War
College.

"Communism" to some people comiotes the present regime in
the Soviet Union, to others the Commimist Party and its ac-
tivities, to still others a set of ideas about history and society.
Actually, communism is essentially the ensemble of these three
aspects. The regime in the Soviet Union would not be a threat
if it were not meant to be forcefully imposed on other coun-
tries as well and if it did not command a world-wdde network
of Communist organizations which serve this very purpose of
the Soviet regime. The Communist Party system, in turn,
would not be dangerous if it were not governed by a doctri-
naire ideology which links it to the power aspirations of the
Soviet Union. And the set of ideas that identify communism
would hardly be a threat if they did not constitute the creedal

This is an expanded version of the address given by Dr. Niemeyer at
the National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

li

56 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

core of a strictly disciplined combat organization operating un-
der the direction of the Soviet Union. Bearing in mind that,
in the phenomenon of commtmism, ideology is intertwined
with party organization and the power of a large bloc of na-
tions, we now turn to the ideological roots from which this
complex phenomenon has grown.

The Ideological Origins of Communism

There is a widespread misconception that Communist ideol-
ogy emanated from a burning sense of injustice, or compassion
for human suffering, which supposedly inspired the "founding
fathers" of the Communist Party.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Lenin, the creator
of present-day communism, drew his ideas from the philoso-
phy of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx, and Marx, in tvim,
developed his ideas chiefly from philosophical impulses he re-
ceived from the philosophers Hegel and Feuerbach. From
Hegel he received the idea that history is a process by which
an underlying logic of change works itself out in the events of
society. Hegel himself ascribed this underlying logic to some-
thing he called the Absolute Spirit, a kind of impersonal Mind
that he conceived as realizing itself through progressive his-
torical developments. Feuerbach criticized this as a kind of re-
ligious concept. He maintained that all rehgion is nothing but
a fiction of human imagination and that, in reahty, there is
nothing but nature and man. Feuerbach was, in other words,
a materialist, that is, a thinker who asserted that matter is all
the reality there is, and consequently he denied the reahty of
the spirit. Marx accepted materialism from Feuerbach and
combined it with Hegel's view of history. The result was his-
torical materialism, the idea that history occturs because of
changes in material, economic conditions, which make for
changes in hxmian existence and which proceed according to
an inherent logic.

Before any Communist program of action was ever planned,
Karl Marx thus developed a world view, a comprehensive ex-
planation of human existence, social development, and the
meaning of historical change. The basic tenets of this world

THE 3DDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 57

view can be summarized as follows: (i) Life is fundamentally
not a relation between man and God, but a relation between
man and matter. (2) There are laws of history; they can be
scientifically determined; and the Marxist interpretation of
change in terms of developing modes of economic production
is the only "scientific" key to the knowledge of history. (3)
Because history is essentially a process in which the inherent
logic of human affairs works itself out, one can find general
truth about human affairs only by participating in historical
change, not by abstractly speculating about it— so that the
point of philosophy is not to interpret but rather actively to
change the world.

From this last idea flows the revolutionary activity which
Marx and Lenin considered not as a mere implementation of a
program but rather as a way of life; from the second tenet is
derived the Communist's confidence in the almighty power of
History, whom he has decided to serve; from the first principle
flows the Communist's certainty that his behefs are corrobo-
rated by scientific proof. Communism thus began as a world
view, and its main appeal today is still that of a world view.
Its concern with economics is only an elaboration of certain
detailed "proofs." Its revolutionary, destructive will is inspired
by its vision of an eventual "true" society, which is expected
to arrive, according to history's "laws," after the present "false"
society has been utterly conquered. This, however, leads to
the question of what, according to Marx, the "laws of history"
decree.

The centerpiece of the Communist teaching about society
and its historical changes is the doctrine that all societies above
the primitive level are split into classes, and that these classes
are engaged in an unceasing and irreconcilable struggle. Power
is interpreted basically as the rule of one class over others. Ac-
cording to communism, it is private ownership of the means
of production which enables a class to rule. Those who own
the means of economic production can use their property to
exploit others who do not own means of production. Political
struggles are explained in terms of the determination of the
ruling class to hold on to power at a time when new means
of production have already enabled a new class to form and
to make a bid for the ruling position. Thus communism does

58 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

not merely observe different classes according to ownership,
but also attributes to these classes the wiU and the capability
to act in history. It assumes that human consciousness is es-
sentially class consciousness, that is, that men act according to
interests derived from their class environment. It also takes it
for granted that people belonging to a given class think sixffi-
ciently alike to be able to act in history without being organ-
ized for common action. Above all, Communists, for these rea-
sons, think of society not in terms of peace, unity, and order,
but rather in terms of continuous struggle. For Communists,
struggle is not an abnormal condition, but rather the charac-
teristic trait of all historically recorded societies. If the Chris-
tian looks upon Hfe as a "vale of tears," the Communist regards
it as the scene of imceasing battle.

The Bourgeois-Proletarian Polarity

The perennial class struggle, according to communism, has
taken on a peculiarly sharp and significant form in the present-
day, or bourgeois, society. Each type of society is character-
ized by the rule of a particular class. The ruling class of the
present-day society is the bourgeoisie, the class of factory
owners, who produce commodities through hired wage labor.
Under the rule of this class, the class struggle has narrowed
down to a conflict between the propertied bourgeoisie on the
one hand and the propertyless wage workers on the other—
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Within the womb
of bourgeois society, the proletariat is supposed to be the rev-
olutionary force which one day will overthrow the rule of
capitahsts.

The coming revolution of the proletariat, however, is a revo-
lution which differs markedly from the other upheavals of his-
tory. In the past, aU classes which overthrew a previously rul-
ing class owned some new type of means of production, which
they sought to protect as soon as they had gained ascendancy.
The proletariat is supposed to differ from all these revolution-
ary classes because it possesses no means of production. Since
only property can allegedly engender class rule, the proletar-
iat, being without property, cannot set up another class rule

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMXJNISM 59

by its victory. The revolution of the proletariat is therefore
expected to end all class rule and to inaugurate a new type
of society, in which there will be no classes, no exploitation,
and no need for political power— sociaHst society.

Phases of Historical Development

Even more important than this view of the present-day so-
ciety, however, is the Communist doctrine that all human
societies pass necessarily through successive phases of de-
velopment which must eventually lead them to the present
bourgeois-proletarian polarity. Communists distinguish be-
tween types of society in terms of techniques of production
and the corresponding rule of certain classes over others. Work-
ing back in history, they trace bourgeois society to the preced-
ing feudal society (in the European West), the feudal society
to the slaveholding society of antiquity, and that, in turn, to
the primitive society on the tribal level, in which classes were
not yet discernible. They insist that these constitute general
patterns of social organization which are necessarily bound to
succeed each other as "phases" of historical development.
Thus, not only in the West but everywhere, from primitive
beginnings a slaveholding society would develop, from that
a feudal society, from that a bourgeois society, and from that,
by means of a proletarian revolution, a socialist society. Ac-
cording to this scheme, a Communist future is thus assured by
the "laws of history." Official Communist ideology denies that
there are any other than these five "phases" of societal de-
velopment, even though Marx himself, and, at times, Lenin,
recognized at least one other type: Asiatic society. This is a
society in which power is wielded not by owners of private
property but by the state bureaucracy, and the people are
held not in private slavery, serfdom, or labor contract, but
rather in what Marx called "general slavery." It turned out
that the fact of Asiatic society did not fit the Communist
scheme, for not only had this society been stable for thou-
sands of years and never been essentially changed by revolu-
tions but it also had not issued into feudal society. Once the
dangerous implications of this concept were realized by the

60 COMMXfNISM: NATURE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

leading Communists, references to Asiatic society were first
ignored and then suppressed in Communist ideology.

It is clear that the entire body of ideas about history, class
struggle, proletarian revolution, and phases of society consti-
tutes not so much scientific knowledge as a kind of mythology
in scientific garb. Together, these ideas give to Commimists
their sense of direction, the justification for their actions, and
their corrfidence in ultimate success. The class struggle is seen
as a kind of curse which is fastened on mankind as the result
of the introduction of private property. Because of private
property and the class struggle, men have been ahenated from
one another, classes have used oppressive power, a machinery
for oppression— the state— has been invented, and wealth has
been generated only at the price of poverty. All this will not
be ended until the curse is removed and a human society free
from class rule emerges. Hence Commimists not only are con-
fident that, in the course of the immutable "laws of history,"
socialism will eventually come to pass but they also look upon
their image of the future as the "true" reality of human life
and consequently reject all of the present world as "false,"
unreal, and doomed. It is to these judgments about the present-
day world that we must now turn.

The Basic Legacy of Marx

The Communists' views on present-day society flow from
ideas developed by Karl Marx in his main work, Capital, in
which he elaborated his analysis of bourgeois society already
contained in the earlier Communist Manifesto. One can sum-
marize the significance of this work by saying that Marx left
to his followers these ideas about the society in which they
live: ( i) In bourgeois society, all men are ruled by the capital-
ists, who exploit the people for the sake of profit. (2) The evil
of this system is not the personal intention of the exploiters but
inheres in the system as such and cannot be removed except
by the destruction of the entire system. (3) The inherent con-
tradictions of the capitalist system will necessarily bring about
its collapse, its overthrow by the proletariat, and sociaHsm as
the successor society. In other words, Marx furnished his fol-

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 6l

lowers with a target for hostility (the bourgeoisie), a motive
for irreconcilable hatred of the present-day society (the inher-
ent evil of exploitation), and the prediction of a catastrophic
but hopeful end (collapse and revolution).

Marx supposedly proved the exploitation of the workers by
the capitahsts through his doctrine of surplus value, which in
turn is based on the so-called labor theory of value. The capi-
talists buy from the worker his labor power. The value of
labor power, according to Marx, is what it takes to keep the
laborer in physical existence. This is what the capitalist pays
him. The worker himself, toiling for the capitalist, earns his
own keep. For that, however, no more than a part of the full
workday is required. The capitalist, who hires the worker for
a full day, thus obtains from the worker a surplus over and
above what it costs to buy the worker's labor power. This is
called surplus value, which allegedly is the source of profit and
capital formation. The capitalist, who, according to Marx,
holds all the trump cards, squeezes the wealth of society out
of the worker but uses it himself. The entire system is based
on the wage contract, which enables the capitalist to pocket
the surplus value, which he, allegedly, had no share in pro-
ducing.

This system, however, is, according to Marx, beset by inner
contradictions which will lead to its downfall. It is based on
competition. As a result, workers' wages will be pressed lower
and lower. Capital will be gathered in fewer and fewer hands.
Increasing wealth will accumulate on one side, increasing mis-
ery on the other. Wider and wider masses will be drawn into
the proletariat. Periodically, capitalism will fall into crises in
which overproduction will glut the market and result in stag-
nation. These crises will increase in severity and eventually
lead to complete paralysis. At this point, the indignation of
the masses, the reaction to their suffering, will have reached
the breaking point. A revolution of the proletariat will break
the fetters that have held them down. The "expropriators will
be expropriated."

62 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

Lenin's Addenda

These ideas, developed at full length in Marx's Capital, were
essentially transformed by Lenin. The analysis of capitaUsm
which Lenin made in his book Imperialism provides now the
formulas in which Communists think about the present-day
society. While Lenin's description of capitahsm seems to differ
in important points from that of Marx, he also points out to
his followers a target for hostility (the imperiahst cotintries),
a motive for undying hatred (the imperialist tendency toward
war), and the prediction of a catastrophic but hopeful end
(the defeat of imperiahsm by the colonial and socialist forces) .

Lenin explained that capitalism has now moved into a mo-
nopolistic stage, which, so he asserted, is capitahsm's "final"
stage. Monopoly having replaced competition, capitalism now
requires the pohtical control of markets and resource areas.
The ruling power is in the hand of financiers, and their main
need is the export of capital. Industrial covmtries are thus
driven to conquer and dominate colonial areas. Having divided
up the world among them, they proceed to redivide it again
and again, thus becoming embroiled in conflicts from which
wars are inevitably bom. Capitalism in its "imperialist" stage
is, in other words, at the end of its tether, and thus the capi-
talist nations turn on each other in mutually destructive wars.
The "inherent contradictions" are here seen as essentially po-
htical contradictions.

Just as Marx saw hope in the rise of a revolutionary force
in the womb of capitalist society, so Lenin looked for redemp-
tion through the victory of the enemies which imperiahsm be-
gets through its exploitation of the colonial peoples. These
peoples, together with the revolutionary workers of the in-
dustrial countries, will rise against the oppressive capitahst
rule. The entire world scene has thus become the theater of a
great conflict between two camps: the industrial countries on
the one hand and the camp of socialism and anti-imperiahsm
on the other. The eventual victory of the latter over the former
will supposedly not only destroy capitalism, imperiahsm, and
exploitation but also the tendency to war. The sociahst and

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 63

anti-imperialist "camp" comprises, according to Lenin, the
"overwhelming majority" of the world's population, just as, in
the analysis of Marx, the proletariat, at the time of the revolu-
tion, would constitute the "overwhelming majority" of the peo-
ple. Thus, the revolutionary cause is presented as the cause of
the "overwhelming majority" and thereby given a kind of dem-
ocratic justification.

Without giving up the idea of an irreconcilable class strug-
gle and without abandoning Marx's total rejection of present-
day society, Lenin thus managed to explain why capitalism,
sixty years after Marx, had not yet collapsed, why the workers'
lot in industrial countries had improved, and why more work-
ers had not become revolutionists. His answers were that capi-
talism had not yet collapsed because it had found new fields
of exploitation in the colonies, that the lot of workers in indus-
trial countries had improved at the expense of the colonial
peoples, and that the "upper" part of the working class had
allowed itself to be "bribed" by a share of capitalist wealth.
At the same time, Lenin saw the struggle of the revolutionary
forces against capitalism as a world-wide struggle between
two international "camps" and claimed that it is a struggle not
only against capitalist oppression but also against war. Revolu-
tionary cause and world politics here are merged into a single
pattern.

The Myth of the Revolution

One can reduce Marxism-Leninism to one central proposi-
tion: The present-day society, which is rotten beyond any
hope of redemption, Mdll be destroyed in a great epochal con-
flict, and from that conflict will rise a new society, in which,
for the first time, man will enjoy the fullness of real life. Com-
munist ideology, in other words, centers in the tension be-
tween two societies: the "false" one of the present and the
"real" one of the future. The chief business of Communists,
according to the ideology, is to fight the struggle of the future
against the present. This struggle is the Socialist Revolution,
or simply "the Revolution."

The doctrine of the Revolution ( i ) predicts the inevitable

communism: natube, strengths, weaknesses

tastrophic end of the present-day society, (2) issues a
all "toilers" to unify under the leadership of the Corn-
Party, for the purpose of fighting the revolutionary
e, and (3) justiJBes any method required in that strug-
the name of the eventual hoped-for result. The predic-
ys that the rule of the bourgeoisie will engender its own
diggers," who eventually wdll rise up and overthrow
ism. The call for action insists that dehberate action
aUtical organization are required to bring about the
ill of the present-day society. The justification presents
ture society in terms of such ideal harmony that no
es can be deemed excessive in the struggle for its reali-
All this together constitutes what one might call the
>f the Revolution, a myth centering in the notion of the
riat as a class with the historical mission to redeem
id from the curse of the class-divided society. On the
i this myth, Communists have developed their typical
e, which considers everything "revolutionary" as hal-

myth of the Revolution is, however, not the same as
^rational doctrine of the Commmiist struggle. The latter
chief guide for Communist practice and theory. There
despread misconception that Communist ideology con-
iie blueprint of an ideal society which Communists, if
their faith, should consistently seek to implement. Any
to hew to the hne of this implementation is scored as a
;ning of the revolutionary ideology."
lally, Commvmist ideology does not draw up a blue-
3r an ideal society. The future society is not designed
Jier expected, as an automatic result from victory of
olutionary forces over the forces of the present-day so-
I^ommunist ideology, therefore, focuses entirely on the
e against now existing societies, institutions, ideas, and
f life. In this struggle, the brilliance of a hoped-for fu-
rves as a promise of eventual good to come from bitter
rather than as an immediate object to be realized,
operational doctrine of communism is thus concerned
with the requirements of the struggle in which Com-
s see themselves engaged for an indefinite time to come,
jctrine was shaped entirely by Lenin, who also insisted

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 65

on the indefinite duration of the period of struggle. In the
vision of Marx and Engels, the Revolution had appeared as a
kind of climactic event, a single, mighty upthnist that would,
at one fell sw^oop, usher in the new society. Lenin taught that
the struggle would continue with undiminished fury, not only
against external but also against internal enemies, long after
Communists had seized power. He thus changed the idea of
the Revolution, for practical purposes, from that of a single
upheaval to that of a "protracted struggle." With respect to
that struggle, Communist ideology now teaches important
doctrines concerning ( i ) the Communist Party and its relation
to the masses, (2) principles of Communist strategy, (3) the
use of the state by Communists, and (4) the role of the Soviet
Union.

The Role of the Party

The Party, in Communist ideology, is defined as the "van-
guard" of the proletariat. Lenin did not believe that the
proletariat, by itself, could have the "socialist consciousness"
required to carry out its mission. Without "socialist conscious-
ness," however, there could be no Socialist Revolution. "So-
cialist consciousness" can be developed only by a small group
steeped in the theoretical knowledge of the 'laws of history,"
a group guarded by the strictest discipline against any devia-
tion from the sole correct ideology. The Communist Party, in
Lenin's concept, is thus not only a quasi-miUtary combat or-
ganization of professional revolutionaries but also a priesthood
of the "truth of history" and, as such, ranking high above the
masses, including those of the proletariat.

As the keeper of revolutionary theory, which is, by defini-
tion, the most "advanced" thinking, the Party is infallible. This
does not mean that it cannot be mistaken; it means that nobody
else can be as "advanced" in his thinking as the Party is. The
Party is, therefore, necessarily the judge of the correctness of
anyone's thought. Deviations from its "line" must be tanta-
mount to hostility to the Revolution and sympathy for the
bourgeoisie. Because there can only be one truth, the Party
must be centralized, disciplined like an army, and united un-

66 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

der its leadership. Membership in the Party is not merely a
fuU-time job but a twenty-four-hours-a-day dedication to the
profession of revolution.

Since this kind of Party must of necessity remain relatively
small, the masses cannot belong to the Party. Rather, the
masses are mobihzed to support the Party by means of so-
called "transmission belts." Transmission belts are non-Party
organizations and institutions in which Communists hold con-
trolling positions. The masses are manipulated through the
appeals of non-Party institutions rather than through the di-
rect appeal of Communist control, which often remains con-
cealed.

The Doctrine of the Two Revolutions

The fundamental premise of Lenin's doctrine of the Com-
munist Party is that it will remain numerically small and will
forever constitute a minority among the population. From this
a number of strategic principles were developed, aU of which
turn on the problem of how a small but compact organization
can control large-scale revolutionary movements and changes.
Most of them teach Communists how to use revolutions made
by others, chiefly by bourgeois revolutionary movements.

The "doctrine of the two revolutions" states that in countries
like Russia a revolution by the bourgeoisie must precede the
Socialist Revolution. It demands that the "bourgeois" revolu-
tion, no less than the Socialist Revolution, be led and con-
trolled by the Communists, but by Communists acting under
bourgeois rather than Communist slogans and programs (for
example, "land for the peasants"). The Communists, accord-
ing to this doctrine, can come to power only as the leaders of
non-Communist and even nonproletarian masses. The power
they would thus set up would be a dictatorship of the pro-
letariat and the peasantry. Only after full consohdation of this
(bourgeois) revolution would the Communists proceed to
carry out their own (Socialist) revolution, this time against
their erstwhile allies.

From this flows another strategic principle, which bids Com-
munists to seek the "alliance" of all kinds of discontented forces

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 6/

whose additional strength is required to help Communists ob-
tain power. Among these forces are nationalistic movements,
the bourgeoisie of colonial peoples, peasants, and intellectuals.
The Party, however, is exhorted to "watch its ally as if he were
an enemy."

A third strategic principle is that of "neutralization." It calls
on Communists to divide their enemies into three parts: those
who by some means can be induced to support the Party,
those who are irreconcilably hostile to the Party, and those
who are undecided. The hostile part must be attacked and
destroyed. This will be possible only after the undecided part
has been "neutralized," that is, made to sit out the struggle
on the side lines.

A fourth principle teaches the Party to engage always in
both "legal and illegal activities." As a minority group, the
Party is supposed to work as a conspiracy and to organize an
underground apparatus. At the same time, however, above-
ground activities vvdthin the legal framework of nonparty and
even nonpolitical organizations are considered necessary, be-
cause the Party, being a minority, is admittedly too weak to
conquer all resistance by direct action.

The Role of the State

In the Communist teaching on the state, dogma is curiously
mixed with operational prescriptions. The state, Lenin insisted
along with Marx and Engels, wiU "wither away" when classes
have disappeared and there is "nothing any more to suppress."
The "withering away" of the state will alone bring about a
society of full freedom. The road, however, leads through the
"dictatorship of the proletariat." In other words, until that
promised day arrives, the state has to be used dictatoriaUy, as
a "rule based upon force and unlimited by law." Thus, Com-
munists look upon a state controlled by them as an instrument
of class warfare. They use it to destroy everything suspected of
hostility to the Party and to control and manipulate all human
activities and thoughts. At the same time, somewhat irra-
tionally, they expect this kind of totalitarian dictatorship even-
tually to issue into a society free from any state power. At any

68 COMMtTNISM: NATURE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

rate, the state is for Communists not an order of the common
good but a basis for combat operations of the Party.

The Place of the Soviet Union

The last of the Communist operational doctrines concerns
the place of the Soviet Union in the revolutionary struggle.
After the seizure of power in Russia, the Party faced the choice
between instigating a chain reaction of proletarian revolutions
in one after another of the industrial countries on the one hand,
and consolidating its power in Russia on the other. It decided
on the latter alternative. The implications of this decision were
embodied in the strategic principle called "socialism in one
country." As "socialism in one country" was elevated to the
rank of a revolutionary strategic principle, Soviet Russia be-
came a chief instrument of the world revolution and the Com-
mimist International the tool of Soviet Russia— roles which
would have been reversed had the Party chosen the first al-
ternative. Henceforth the national power, national security,
and national expansion of the Soviet Union came to be inter-
twined with communism as an ideological cause, so that Soviet
national interests and Communist objectives have become well-
nigh indistinguishable.

As a result, Soviet foreign policy was incorporated into the
arsenal of methods by which the revolutionary struggle is to
be carried on. The problem of war assumed new significance.
Before the seizure of power, Communists faced only the deci-
sion whether or not to support a given war effort as a Party.
Now their choice became one between war or peace as a
national policy. Too weak to think of a frontal attack on their
class enemies, the Soviets devised a "strategy from weakness"
similar to that applied to the operations of the Party as such.
"Peaceful coexistence" is a term actually introduced by Stalin,
but, as a principle, it was formulated by Lenin. Periods of
advance would alternate with periods of equilibrium, during
which one had to make concessions to the enemy. These "com-
promises," however, should never be allowed to weaken the
basic Communist determination to win the life-and-death
struggle. War between the Soviet Union and its enemies is

THE IDEOLOGICAL CORE OF COMMUNISM 69

considered "inevitable" only if the enemies choose to resist. In
any war in which the Soviet Union is engaged, though, it
actually fights for "peace," because it combats imperialism,
which is the true cause of war. The Soviet Union, standing
for the cause of peace, represents not merely its own national
interests but the interests of the whole of mankind, which will
be "liberated" by the victorious struggle of the Soviet camp
against the camp of imperialist capitalism.

The Power of Ideology

In conclusion, it should be pointed out that the motivating
force of the Communist ideology is not weakened either by
the inherent contradictions of its teachings or by the repeated
changes to which it has been subjected. It belongs to the class
of total, apocalyptic, and chiliastic views of the world, society,
and history which have turned out to have an irresistible ap-
peal to people despite all difficulties in keeping the various
parts together. In addition, the Communist ideology holds an
undisputed monopoly in the education, pubhcation, art, and
public discussion of one third of the globe. In the countries
of the Soviet bloc, the meaning and justification of the entire
social system rests squarely on ideological foundations. Were
these foundations to be removed, neither Communist rulers
nor their subjects would know what actions to take from one
day to the next.

For the Communist masters of these coxmtries, the ideology
contains the meaning of their hves, the hope that inspires
them, and the assurance of what they believe to be their
ultimate success. Communism has been called a "philosophy
in action." More accurately, it should be described as a closed
and doctrinaire ideology equipped with, the entire arsenal of
modem material means of power.

by J. Edgar Hoover

Mr. Hoover entered the Department of Jus-
tice in igij, became special assistant to the
Attorney General in igig, and two years
later assistant director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. In IQ24 he was appointed
director of the Bureau and has served in that
office ever since. In IQ38 he published Per-
sons in Hiding and has contributed articles
to numerous magazines, law reviews, and
police journals. His most widely acclaimed
book. Masters of Deceit, was published in
1959-

Communism is the great tempter of our time. It promises all
things to all men. Its all-embracing philosophy purports to
explain man's origin, development, and destiny. Like Mephi-
stopheles in Faust, communism promises man the world in
exchange for his sovereign soul. It holds forth the Utopian vi-
sion of a world-wide society in which complete equality and
material abundance wiU prevail and in which the exploitation
of man by his fellow man will be ended. It offers a compre-
hensive program of political action to achieve these goals. The
appeal of communism, therefore, is a universal one.

By its very nature, communism impinges upon every facet
of man's existence. No phase of human experience, economic,
sociological, political, psychological— to mention just the broad
categories— is immune. The combination of communism's all-
embracing appeal, the complexities of human nature, and the
wide variations in the social, political, and economic levels of
the nations of the world makes it impossible to isolate any one

THE APPEALS OF COMMUNISM 7I

factor as the predominant appeal of communism. Although
one appeal may prove more decisive than another in a specific
case, the acceptance of communism, in most instances, has
been due to the interaction of two, or more, or even all, of
these appeals.

Communism openly proclaims its intention of changing the
world. It insists that aU non-Communist systems contain in-
herent contradictions which cannot be alleviated by mere re-
forms. Communism is offered, therefore, as the only alterna-
tive. In its dedication to the complete transformation of all
non-Commimist societies, communism continuously exploits
both the negative and the positive aspect of each appeal. Nega-
tively, communism stimulates the desire for a fundamental
change in any society in which such problems as unemploy-
ment, discrimination, and political instability persist. Positively,
communism invites the non-Commimist world to join in creat-
ing what it alleges will be the best possible future.

Today, the major Communist appeals are being presented
within the framework of a world-wide propaganda campaign.
The tactical slogans are "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful
competition." This campaign is clearly designed to exploit the
almost instinctive yearning of mankind for international peace
as the precondition for all further progress.

Economic Appeals

The economic field is frequently, but incorrectly, regarded
as the particular province of communism. With unflagging en-
thusiasm, communism hammers at its themes of economic and
historical determinism in an attempt to convince the world
that the triumph of communism is not only desirable but also
inevitable. Yet, the Communist appeal in the economic realm
is largely a negative one. By distorting economic issues, com-
munism foments hatred of the existing order and demands its
complete destruction as the first step in resolving aU economic
difficulties.

The importance of the economic appeal is illustrated by
the Communist-bloc emphasis on trade and aid. These pro-
grams embody a number of significant impHcations— pohtical

72 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

as well as economic— particularly for the underdeveloped na-
tions, many of which are still uncommitted in the struggle
between freedom and communism. This adroit Communist
economic offensive lends a certain amount of credence to the
sincerity of the peaceful-coexistence campaign. It creates an
impression that there is relative prosperity in the Communist
nations. It is used in support of the spurious claim that the
Soviet Union, which has been transformed from a largely agri-
cultural nation to the second-ranking industrial nation in the
world within forty years, should be the model for all under-
developed countries in their efforts toward rapid economic
growth.

Sociological Appeals

Communism's sociological appeal, while often not as obvious
as the economic, is probably more chronic. The attraction of
the Communist economic appeal tends to diminish during
periods of economic prosperity. This is not true of the sociologi-
cal appeal, based as it is on problems of a more deep-rooted,
persistent nature which are rarely susceptible to quick solu-
tion. There are probably as many Communist appeals in the
sociological field as there are social issues throughout the non-
Communist world.

Dissatisfaction and frustration over sociological issues— real
or imagined— are exploited by communism to incite rebellion
against non-Communist societies. Dissatisfaction may arise
from such factors as discrimination in any form, the prevalence
of crime, and corruption in public life. Frustration may be
caused by such personal experiences as poor housing, the lack
of educational opportunities, inadequate medical care, and
even domestic difficulties. Claiming the only solution to
these and similar issues, communism portrays itself, in non-
Communist nations, as the champion of social protest. Today,
communism asserts that peaceful coexistence would make it
possible, particularly for the major non-Communist nations, to
divert current large expenditures from armaments to extensive
social-welfare programs for the benefit of their citizens.

THE APPEALS OF COMMUNISM 73

Political Appeals

Communism boasts that its political system is responsible
for the significant progress of the Soviet Union within the com-
paratively short period of forty years. If this claim is accepted
uncritically, the political appeal of commxmism becomes ob-
vious. Communist "eflBciency" could easily dazzle the under-
developed nations, all of which are intent on rapid progress.
Moreover, leaders of some nations which are troubled by po-
litical instability may look to the totalitarian discipline of com-
munism as the solution to that problem.

The political appeal of communism is being enhanced by
the peaceful-coexistence campaign. In many areas of the
world, the Communist political system is gaining additional
prestige because Commimist propaganda is, to some extent,
erasing the image of the Soviet Union as a totahtarian, im-
perialistic power attempting to impose its domination upon the
entire world.

Psychological Appeals

The heart of the Communist peaceful-coexistence campaign
is its psychological appeal. Aimed at the instinctive longing
for peace essential to the successful pursuit of man's destiny,
this campaign touches on every phase of human endeavor. It
is here, too, in the psychological area, that the interrelation of
all the broad appeals of communism is most evident. Com-
munist propaganda urging, for example, disarmament and an
end to the testing of nuclear weapons carries with it implica-
tions which go far beyond immediate mihtary considerations.

Without any factual justification, communism insists that
Marxism-Leninism is the product of a "scientific" analysis of
nature, man, and history. The claim is made that commxmism,
rather than reacting to historical developments, plans the or-
ganization and direction of society according to "scientific"
principles. According to Marxism-Leninism, the progress of
society toward communism is not only desirable but also his-

74 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

torically inevitable. Viewed in this perspective, communism
fraudulently appeals as the invincible "wave of the future,"
against which all opposition seems futile.

A Tarnished Image

However, it is in the psychological field that communism
exposes a serious, inherent vulnerability. In this area, as in so
many others, Communist practices refute Communist theories.
Communism's dependence on the psychological appeal im-
plicitly affirms what communism openly denies— that man has
fundamental spiritual needs, values, and ideals which tran-
scend the material necessities of life.

The large number of Americans who, at one time or an-
other, were members of the Communist Party, U.S.A., attests
to the deceptive attraction of Communist promises. Yet, in
our coimtry today there are many more ex-Communists than
members of the Party— clear evidence that Communist appeals
are illusory. There is no one word which completely describes
the experience of these former Communists. If there were such
a word, it would be one with the connotation of disillu-
sionment.

Rarely, if ever, has any other m.ovement promised so much
to so many. Rarely, if ever, has any other movement so fla-
grantly reneged on its promises. History has proved that those
who have been deluded by the Communist dream have, to
their sorrow, awakened to a grotesque reality.

7.

by Vladimir Petrov

Mr. Petrov fled his native Russia in 1^44,
after seven years of forced labor in a Siberian
gold mine. At Yale since 1947, from 1955 to
1957 ^^ served as editor of the Russian-
language broadcasts of the Voice of America
transmitter in Munich. At present lecturer in
Slavic languages and literature again at Yale
University, he is the author of Soviet Gold
{1949) and My Retreat from Russia (1950) .

Few observers of the Russian scene would question the fact
that Soviet society is given to significant change. True, these
mutations take place within the rigid framework of a mono-
lithic state. Nevertheless, ever since the Revolution of 1917,
life in Russia has imdergone profound change.

This change is not reflected so much in official policy. To
gauge Russia's future on the basis of the twists and turns of
the Kremlin's pronouncements would be illusory. The very
nature of dictatorship, with its power of arbitrary decision
making and its disregard for the desires of the masses, renders
any sound prognosis unthinkable.

Nonetheless, Communist leaders are not completely free
agents. Their freedom of action is limited not only by external
forces and developments within the vast Communist world
but also by the underlying trends and moods of the Soviet
masses. No matter how xmlimited may seem the range of op-
tions open to the Soviet dictatorship at any given time, the
success of its policies depends, at least to some extent, on the

Revision of an article which appeared in the Fall 1959 issue of
Orbis. Reprinted by permission.

76 COMMUNISM: NATURE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

co-operation of the people. To a much greater degree than in
StaHn's time, the present Party leadership is forced to court
various segments of the population.

Policy in a dictatorship is conditioned primarily by the ne-
cessity of self-preservation. The Party, to preserve itself in
power, must not only maintain its control over the machinery
of the state but must also command the loyalties of certain
strata of the population. The postwar expansion of the U.S.S.R.
created the need for many thousands of trusted agents charged
with carrying out the dictatorship's policies throughout the
world: in the satelhtes, in China, in the uncommitted nations
of Asia and Africa, and in the West. IndustriaKzation, which
has immensely complicated the internal relationships of So-
viet society, requires the voluntary and loyal co-operation of
milHons of technicians and administrators. Without their loy-
alty, the Soviet economy— and the foreign policy of the gov-
ernment—would falter and eventually collapse.

This dependence of the government upon the co-operation
of its people suggests that some clues to the future course of
Soviet communism may be found not in official Soviet policy
but in a relatively stable element of the Soviet scene: Soviet
society itself. The adverb "relatively" needs to be stressed. In
1913 almost three quarters of the Russian population were
peasants; today only 40 per cent of the Soviet people tend the
soil. The old bourgeois and landowning classes have disap-
peared, and the number of noncoUectivized peasants and in-
dependent artisans is negligible. The number of industrial
workers and technicians has increased many times. And a new
class— the ruling class of the Soviet nation— has been bom.

Russia has become more literate. Although its poptdation
has increased by only 25 per cent since 1914, there are today
seven times as many colleges and universities and fifteen times
as many students. Thirty million children attend the elemen-
tary and secondary schools of the Soviet Union— a threefold
increase over 1914.

These are symptoms of tremendous changes which have
taken place over a span of forty years. In part they were the
product of time: the old generation— or that part of it which
survived the civil war and the bloody purges of the Stalin era
—is rapidly passing from the scene. In another ten or twenty

WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? JJ

years no one in the Soviet Union will remember pre-Revolu-
tionary Russia: its life, traditions, and values. This eclipse is
of particular importance in Russia, since the intrusion of Com-
munist doctrine and ideology into all spheres of culture shat-
tered, in effect, the normal continuity of the cultural history
of the nation. The old classics, both Russian and foreign, are
still published and widely read, but everything that contradicts
Communist doctrine has long ago been removed from the li-
brary shelves and from the publishers' lists.

Still, this echpse in the mentahty of a nation, significant
though it is, should not be overestimated. It would be absurd
to assume that forty years have undone the character of a
great nation compounded by a thousand years of history. Rus-
sian sons understand their fathers, though with an effort, and
the appreciation of old Russian cultural achievements is deep.
There are yoimg kolkhozniks whose craving for a plot of land
of their own is no less intense than that of their grandfathers.
Members of the Komsomol, despite forty years of violent anti-
religious propaganda, occasionally venture to marry in church
and bring their children to be baptized.

Behind all progress, whether social or material, lies discon-
tent with existing conditions. But discontent alone cannot trig-
ger sociopolitical improvement; equally essential is an under-
standing of the forces which move society. Soviet society lacks
a "thinidng minority" which can formulate discontent and
channel it toward desirable political goals. The "thinidng peo-
ple" in the Soviet Union are, for all practical purposes, either
absorbed into or fully controlled by the Party. This does not
mean, of course, that there may not be people in Russia who
have pondered the implications of Communist rule and are
capable of projecting the future course of the nation along
lines different from those of the Communists. But we know
nothing of them, and we may safely assume that the Soviet
public at large knows nothing of them.

The Communist rulers of Russia have been eminently suc-
cessful in solving the problem of opposition to their regime:
the most gffted and energetic elements either have been at-
tracted by the promise of better Hving conditions and other
rewards or, if they refuse to play along, have been eliminated.
There is no doubt that many of those who have chosen to be

78 communism: natube, stbengths, weaknesses

loyal to the regime are dissatisfied with conditions at large or
in their individual fields of endeavor. However, this dissatisfac-
tion finds loyal rather than hostile expression. Their criticism,
if voiced at aU, remains constructive: it must appear to further
the improvement of the Soviet way of life. Never do these
critics take a negative attitude toward the regime as such;
never are their demands radical.

Unconcealed hostility toward the Soviet regime is mani-
fested only in the lower strata of society: among the peasants,
the workers, and the Soviet youth. But this opposition is in-
articulate, disorganized, unaccustomed to action, and lacks
spokesmen among the representatives of the "leading class."
It presents no real danger to the regime— at least so long as a
massive police apparatus regulates Soviet life.

Organization of Soviet Society

Contemporary Soviet society is a pyramidlike structure,
topped by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union and its Presidium. Below these lofty bodies
we find: (i) the leading members of the government and of
the army command and (2) the technical and scientific elites,
leading writers and artists, and members of the state and Party
bureaucracy.

These two groups, which may constitute about 2 per cent
of the population (about 5 per cent if we include the members
of their families), represent the upper layer of Soviet society,
its "new class," deeply committed to tlie preservation of the
regime. Much further below on the social scale are the rank
and file of the intelligentsia— professional men, school and col-
lege teachers, and minor specialists— the workers, and, finally,
the peasants.

For the members of the last three groups, access to the
upper layer is barred except through a Party career. But such
a career is usually chosen only by those incapable of achieving
success in other fields of endeavor, by the unscrupulous, and
by men indifferent to the opinions of others. Some of the most
loyal Soviet subjects regard Party membership as at best an
unavoidable evil.

WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? 79

A Soviet citizen, even one with a college education, has at
best a nebulous idea of the forces which shape his life. Soviet
mass psychology has succeeded in confusing him. It has in-
culcated in him a number of taboos— forbidden topics of
thought. And he has developed an extraordinary ability to
shed from his mind all disturbing questions. He has learned
from childhood that it is the Party which thinks and decides
for him, and that whatever initiative he himself can muster
must be limited to the range of his immediate competence:
his kolkhoz, his factory, his office— wherever he may "legiti-
mately" claim to be an expert. He knows that all meetings
and demonstrations are organized by the Party alone, that
strikes are forbidden, and that outspoken criticism of the Party
leadership is a punishable crime. And although in his every-
day life a Soviet citizen may violate many regulations and
laws which stand in the way of the improvement of his stand-
ard of living, he is psychologically incapable of assuming the
role of an "enemy of the Party." He has long ago learned that
"enemy of the Party" means "enemy of the people" or "po-
htical criminal" (an opprobrium far more serious than that of
common criminal) .

Demonstrations against the regime or its evil manifestations
are extremely rare. It is interesting to note that even in the
Russian territories occupied by the Germans during the Sec-
ond World War there were extremely few instances of the
Russian people's physically harming Soviet officials who stayed
behind. They were not allowed to participate in local affairs;
sometim.es they were reported to the Gestapo; but rarely were
they subjected to violence even when violence could go un-
pxmished.

Is Democracy Possible in Russia?

To evaluate the prospects for democracy in Russia one has
to imagine the conditions under which formal democracy
might replace the totalitarian regime. It is obvious that politi-
cal democracy would have to come first, for little experience
in genuine self-government, let alone a democratic tradition,

8o COMMUNISM: NATURE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

can be developed under a totalitarian regime of the oppressive
kind which rules Russia.

There are only two conceivable ways in which a formal
democracy can be estabhshed in Russia. One is by force,
through an overthrow of the Soviets. Another is through the
evolution of the Soviet regime. The overthrow may take place
as a result of war, of a coup d'etat, or of a revolution. The
chances of war or coup d'etat are beyond predictability. We
can assert with reasonable confidence, however, that the pos-
sibility of a revolution is almost nil. The emergence, under the
watchful eyes of a well-organized totahtarian state, of a mass
clandestine organization capable of overthrowing the govern-
ment, is less than unHkely. Local insurrections should not be
ruled out— and there have been several such risings in the past
forty years— but the mighty poHce machine can easily cope
with such trifling challenges.

Besides the Communist Party there are two nation-wide
organizations in Russia: the Army and the Church. Neither
has the means or the desire to engage in purposeful political
action; both are effectively controlled by the Party. The army
leadership, even if it chafes occasionally under government
pohcy, is fuUy aware of its dependence on the Party and its
inabiHty to rule the enormous nation.

Occasionally we hear of proposals to activate latent anti-
Soviet forces in Soviet territories populated by non-Russian
ethnic groups. Fervent nationalism, we are told, pits the
Ukrainians, the Georgians, and the Armenians unalterably
against their Russian overlords. These forces, it is argued, can
trigger a general insurrection against Moscow's domination
and thus bring about the downfall of the Soviet state.

This theory does not merit serious consideration. First of all,
the non-Russian territories of the U.S.S.R. have their own lead-
ing class, whose survival depends entirely on the preservation
of the status quo. For the last thirty years, no more overt
discontent has been evident in these areas than in Great Rus-
sia proper.

There have been no movements approaching the scale of,
let us say, the Greek imderground on Cyprus. Then, too, any
uprising in the Caucasus or in Central Asia would necessarily
be a local one and would be quickly crushed by the central

■WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? 8l

government. There were reports of mass demonstrations in
Tbilisi, Georgia, on the third anniversary of Stalin's death; yet,
it still is not clear whether these were anti-Soviet riots or pro-
tests by StaHn's compatriots against Khrushchev's denigration
of the late dictator.

In brief, there are many forces at work in the Soviet Union
which can compHcate the life of Soviet policy makers and
Party leaders. None of these forces, however, seems powerful
enough to pose a serious challenge to the Soviet regime. Bar-
ring war or other unforeseen developments, the regime's iron
grip over Soviet society is not likely to loosen.

Government versus Party Controls

Although the chances of a peaceful transformation of the
Soviet system into a Western type of democracy appear to be
nil, it may be useful to explore the possibilities of its evolution
toward a less rigid and more enlightened form of dictatorship.
To what extent can a Communist state "relax" without ceasing
to be itself? What elements of democracy could be introduced
in the Soviet Union in years to come? In order to form some
tentative conclusions, let us first project the most favorable
conditions possible.

Since Stalin's death we have witnessed changes in the Soviet
Union which could be interpreted as a trend toward liberaliza-
tion. There has been, for example, a noticeable departure from
Communist economic dogma. The new leadership decided to
abandon rigidly centralized planning in favor of a partial de-
centralization of the economy, thus giving local leaders more
say in local affairs. The fact that, following the inauguration
of this program, there were signs of the reins being tightened
again is not necessarily discouraging; rather, it appears that
the original plan was not thought out properly and the Soviet
leaders decided to slow the pace of decentralization pending
a more comprehensive blueprint.

Even more significant has been the apparently sincere de-
sire of the post-Stalin leadership to improve the standard of
living of the population as a whole. A standard of minimum
wages (low as they are) has been made into law. Pensions

82 COMMUNISM: NATUBE, STBENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

for the aged and for invalids have been increased. The peasants
have been given certain incentives to produce more; the
machine-tractor stations, those embodiments of "socialism,"
have been dissolved, and the machinery has been turned over
to the collective farms. The current Seven-Year Plan provides,
at least on paper, for a considerable rise in the production of
consumer goods. An attempt has been made to make Soviet
statistics somewhat more honest, and some unflattering figures
have been published in Moscow. One may argue that these
measures were dictated by necessity, expedience, and plain
common sense. Whatever the motivations, however, doctrine
and its rigid practice never before have been sacrificed with
such nonchalant abandon.

Since Stalin's death, the government apparatus, which
formed the backbone of the Soviet system during the twilight
of Stalin's rule, has yielded in importance to the Party. This
has meant a relative diminution of the role of the so-called
managerial class and a growth in the power of Party profes-
sionals. As dixring the first decade after the Revolution, the
Party represents the only stepladder to social improvement.
This function by the Party gives its leadership fuU control
over individuals in commanding positions, whom it can re-
ward or punish through Party channels without having to
bother with the cumbersome formalities of a government
bureaucracy.

To secure the loyalty of Party members the new leadership
has offered them certain personal guarantees. Ever since the
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the power— and the au-
tonomy—of the police have been curtailed. Nowadays, the ar-
rest of a Party member involves a rather complex procedure;
the Party professionals are further beyond the law than ever
before. At the same time, the revised Penal Code, while mak-
ing legal procedures more orderly and less arbitrary, provides
for considerably stricter punishment for "crimes against the
state"— that is, for attempts to weaken or overthrow the rule
of the Party. As before, the Party remains above the law,
which it writes and rewrites at will.

There has been little change in the cultural field. The period
of the "thaw," which flourished in 1955-56, has been brought
to an end: apparently the Party considered it fraught with too

WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? 83

many dangers. Nevertheless, the new conformity does not re-
semble the rigid synchronization of Soviet society under Stalin.
Although the right to oppose the official line is still denied, the
right to dissent under certain circimistances exists in fact, if
not as a recognized principle.

These changes are significant. Yet precisely how significant?
Do they signify a meaningful evolution of the Soviet state into
a more mellow and liberal society? Are they likely to lead to
democratic reforms?

A careful study of Russian history indicates that suppression
in Russia— including the police terror— has always been a meas-
ure of the internal and external insecurity of the regime. This
cause-and-effect relationship remains true today: the present
regime cannot permit "relaxation" to the point where it would
infringe upon the sense of security of Party professionals.

It can be argued that the Soviet leadership should, by all
rights, feel more secure today than ever before. The Soviet
Union, after all, has emerged as a military power of the first
rank and may claim to be strong enough to destroy its enemies
in the event of war. Yet the ruling elite knows that the next
war may totally destroy the power base which it has wrought
with such enormous effort. True, the "socialist" camp, includ-
ing China and eastern Europe, possesses a tremendous poten-
tial in terms of human and industrial resources— a potential
unprecedented in its history. At the same time, events in Po-
land and Hvmgary have demonstrated that Communist assets
can quickly turn into dangerous liabilities. The Soviet leaders
clearly realize that no accounting sheet can be drawn today
which could show a comfortable balance in their favor. This
basic insecurity to a great extent lies behind the baffling con-
tradiction of themes in Soviet propaganda: the mixtiire of
overtures for "peace" with blustering threats of war.

At home, the Soviet leadership has attempted to buy secu-
rity by bidding for the loyalty of larger segments of the people.
Under Stalin, hostility to the regime was deep and pervasive,
fed as it was by an oppressive machine of terror; today, dreary
resignation has given way to hopefulness and expectation. New
and glowing promises have been made to the population at
large, and recent improvements in its standard of living spur
the hope that these promises will be fulfilled.

84 communism: nature, stbengths, weaknesses

Yet disillusionment is certain to set in. Khrushchev's "horn
of plenty" is limited by the productive capacity of the Soviet
economy and by the staggering commitments of the Soviet
state. Despite all efiForts, per capita agricultural production in
Russia is still below that of 1913. The cost of armaments is
colossal. The efficiency of the Russian industrial estabhshment
is well below the standards of the average capitalist enter-
prise. If one adds to these biu-dens the Soviet foreign-aid com-
mitments, the astronomical cost of the propaganda machine,
and the subsidies for "progressive" movements abroad, it be-
comes clear that little is left over for appreciably raising the
standard of living of the rank-and-file citizen. Then, too, the
Soviet leadership has to support an army of Party profes-
sionals, perhaps three miUion strong— a completely nonproduc-
tive and parasitic body— and to support it on a lavish scale.

Although this privileged group tends to grow— in fact, there
has been a noticeable effort to enroll new members into the
Party in the last few years— it is likely to remain an exclusive
club. The Soviet Communist of today is a realist. He has not
read much of Marx or Lenin, and he cares little for doctrine.
He would favor decentralization of industry if this measure
could be justified economically to his satisfaction. He would
agree to the loosening of controls over collectivized agriculture
(a move which would cause Stalin to turn in his grave), if
he felt confident that this would benefit him directly.

But there is one thing which the Party professional would
resist to the bitter end: the loosening of the Party's grip on
the people. He himself may be disdainful of Communist doc-
trine, but he wiU allow no one else to question it, since all his
claims to a privileged position in Soviet society, as well as his
Party's sole claim to power, are based on doctrine. Whatever
the citizens may think in the soHtude of their minds, they must
conform outwardly. The Party will maintain its monopoly on
the means of communication for no other reason than to check
the spread of "heresy." Criticism of Marxism, the Party, or the
policies of the leadership will remain a pimishable crime. So-
viet citizens will continue to be denied any but official sources
of information and forced to accept the official interpretation
of events.

In short, no matter what the intentions of the ruling group

WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? 8$

in the Soviet Union may be, its actions are guided, first and
foremost, by the need of self-preservation. The Party will con-
tinue to be above the law, for the law is its major weapon
against real or imagined opposition within the country; and it
will employ the full power of the State to enforce its decisions.
This means that any grants of liberties or social improvements
to the population would carry no guarantee other than the
convenience of the Party leadership.

The precise point at which "relaxation" would endanger the
regime is indeterminable. Probably nothing short of world
domination— if that— wiU make Soviet leadership completely
confident of its ability to survive. History does not know of an
autocratic regime which reformed itself volimtarily, and there
is little reason to believe that the Soviet Union will be an ex-
ception to this rule.

The Illusion of Freedom in Russia

If revolution in Russia is thus out of the question and if
liberalization of the regime cannot proceed beyond certain
rigid limits, what hope— if any— does the future hold for Soviet
man? Perhaps more significantly, what hope is there for the
Free World?

In seeking an answer to these questions, we must, first of
all, shed the illusion that the drive for freedom is inexorable
and universal. The majority of Russians do not resent the ab-
sence of political freedom— they do not for the simple reason
that they cannot miss something which they never possessed.
Lacking any other choice, they can reconcile themselves to a
one-party system. They can learn to tolerate the dullness of
their press and the monotony of their literature, movies, and
drama. They can continue to do the Party's bidding and re-
main loyal to the regime, for experience has shown them that,
in order to survive, they must adjust to the harsh realities of
Soviet life.

There is, however, one variable in the Soviet equation:
namely, the material and social aspirations of the Russian peo-
ple. Sooner or later, Soviet citizens will expect some rewards
for submission and loyalty. Sooner or later— if not already to-

86 coMMtnsriSM: nature, strengths, weaknesses

day— they will expect a reasonably high standard of living,
which has been promised to them so often by so many of their
leaders. They will expect that a man of "low" social back-
ground be given at least a modest opportunity to ascend the
social ladder. They will expect that, as long as they are loyal
to the regime, they should be trusted more, and not treated
like retarded children incapable of deciding even the most triv-
ial matter for themselves. And they will expect from their gov-
ernment a little more fairness and honesty.

Few of these expectations are likely to be met in the fore-
seeable future. Russia is a class society in which the privi-
leged class, hypersensitive to real and imagined threats to its
existence, jealously guards its privileges. There may be some
concessions in the economic realm. Barring war or other ca-
lamity, the material lot of the Soviet man should continue to
improve. He may never reach the level of well-being of the
average man in the West, but eventually his basic needs in
food, clothing, and housing wiU be satisfied. As the output of
the economy increases, however, the appetite of the public
will grow commensurately— a dangerous trend in a society
which functions on the principle that the state determines all
individual needs.

With the general improvement in the Soviet economy, its
material benefits will be more evenly distributed among the
Soviet aristocracy. At the same time, membership in the elite,
while it may vdden somewhat, will tend increasingly to be-
come hereditary. The appetites of the "haves" are likely to
grow faster than the economy of the nation, and they will
have to be given first priority. Although the coimtry's gross
national product vdll become considerably greater, the work-
ers' and peasants' share in it will tend to be proportionately
smaller. There will be an increasing disparity within Soviet
society.

Thus, the cycle which began with, the death of Stalin will
have run its full course. Even though, in the end, Soviet man
may be better off materially, popular moods are rarely deter-
mined by absolute want. The present leadership fully realizes
this and is attempting to close the gap somewhat between
the "haves" and the "have nots." These attempts cannot be
successful, for the simple reason that the Soviet economy, even

WHITHER SOVIET EVOLUTION? 8/

if it becomes more efficient and productive, will never be able
to give to everyone "according to his needs." The members
of the elite wiU secure as high a standard for themselves as
possible at the expense of the masses; and the leadership, de-
pendent as it is upon the eHte, wili have to assist them in this
quest.

As this process continues, the present hope of the pariahs
of Soviet society will fade. Their disillusionment inevitably will
lead them to question the justice of the social order which,
while ostensibly dedicated to the goal of a "classless society,"
withholds from them their rightful share in the fruits of their
labors. There is no way of telling what form this discontent
will take. It is clear, however, that the Party, in order to keep
it in check, will be forced to restore full power to the police,
to reduce or eliminate the few hberties of the post-Stalin era,
and to suppress the opposition by the traditional methods of
dictatorship.

The terror is not likely to aflFect the elite. The members of
the Soviet aristocracy, as they develop a more prodigious taste
for the comforts of hfe, will tend to become more avaricious
and close their ranks still tighter. The regime will be protected
from external attack by the powerful deterrent of a few thou-
sand perfected ICBMs, with push buttons on the desk of the
First Secretary of the Party. It will be protected at home by a
mighty police machine surpassing even Stalin's fondest dreams.

Under these conditions— prosperity and relative freedom for
some, and austerity and repression for the rest— the Communist
state may be able to exist indefinitely. The Roman Empire
was in dechne for four centiu-ies, and would have lasted still
longer had it not suffered invasion by more dynamic con-
querors.

Yet all empires have their life span. In time, the Soviets,
unwilling to risk an uneasy stability at home in doubtful ad-
ventiu-es abroad, may gradually shed the dynamics of their
revolutionary faith. Thus, while the future holds little prom-
ise for the average Soviet citizen, there is hope, albeit a distant
one, for the Free World. The West, if it weathers the chal-
lenges of the present aggressive "flow period" of Soviet power,
may yet witness a reversal of the Communist tide. The pros-
pects are not uniformly bright. There is always the danger

bo COMMUNISM: NATURE, STBENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

that the Soviet leadership, sensing that the "dialectic of his-
tory" is turning against it, will in desperation detonate the
nuclear Armageddon. But short of a pre-emptive war, a war
which contravenes the very ethos of Western society, the West
has no alternative except steadfastness, courage, and patience
—and the hope that time will reap what man cannot.

8. Communist Vulnerabilities

by Bertram D. Wolfe

Mr. Wolfe, who writes in the fields of both
history and political science, ranks among
the outstanding Soviet experts of the United
States. Born in Brooklyn, New York, he re-
ceived his B.A. from the College of the City
of New York and his M.A. from Columbia
University. He has held senior fellowships in
Slavic studies at Stanford and Columbia and
set up and headed the Ideological Advisory
Staff of the State Department for the Voice
of America. Among his books are Three Who
Made a Revolution {1948) and Khrushchev
and Stalin's Ghost (1957). He is at present
at work upon the second volume of his his-
tory of the Russian Revolution.

Vulnerability implies an alert and determined opponent, ready
to take advantage of every weakness and every opening. Only
then do weaknesses and inconsistencies become vulnerabilities.
But this determination and this readiness are today lacking in
the Free World.

The Communists know that they are engaged in what Pro-
fessor Robert Strausz-Hupe and his associates at the Foreign
Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania
have called "a protracted war." They know that they are en-
gaged in a war to the finish, a war for the world. Every sepa-
rate issue, every negotiation, every conference, every utter-

Originally published in the September 7, 1959, issue of the New
Leader, this is based on an address Mr. Wolfe gave to the National
Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers. Reprinted by permission of
the author and the New Leader.

go communism: nature, stbengths, weaknesses

ance, they regard as a move in that war, whereas for us in the
West each is treated as a separate concrete issue to be settled
once and for all in order that we may relax.

We aim to persuade our opponents that our intentions are
friendly. We aim to "reassure" the Soviets as to their "secu-
rity." We aim to trade concessions, which in practice means
only to give away positions we possess, so that the other side,
which offers nothing in exchange, can renew the battle from
a more advantageous position.

Edward Gibbon once wrote, "Persuasion is the resource of
the feeble; and the feeble can seldom persuade." We are not
feeble. Actually, America and the Free World are at this mo-
ment stronger economically and militarily than the opponent
who is determined to destroy us. But we are acting as though
from feebleness, thus endangering peace by making the Com-
munists underestimate our stiength and luring them, without
intending to do so, into the folly of an attack. Thus, the very
moves we make to preserve peace are moves which profoundly
endanger the peace.

Insofar as we act as if we were weak, as if our task were
to persuade the unpersuadable and to settle what cannot be
settled; insofar as we have permitted the Communists to divide
the world into their "peace zone," where we may not and do
not intervene, and our "war zone," where the entire world and
the United Nations and they also may intervene— to that ex-
tent it is not they but we who are vulnerable. We are proving
vulnerable because of our incapacity and unwillingness to use
the openings which their system has provided, does provide,
and will continue to provide.

What we need, first of all, is an understanding of this uni-
versal, unitary, unending war to the finish. Second, we need
a revolutionary strategy, to put the revolutionary forces of our
time at our disposal and deny the Communists their use and
exploitation. Only then will their system prove more vulner-
able than ours, as potentially it is. With this caveat in mind,
let us examine first their theoretical foundations and, second,
their strategical and tactical vulnerabilities.

COMMUNIST \nmLNERABiLrnES 91

The Theoretical Foundation: Marxism

The Communist theoretical foundation lies in something
called Marxism. We must first examine the self -refuting incon-
sistencies in Marxism and its prophecies that have been re-
futed by history.

One hundred and ten years ago, Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels issued their call to arms in the Communist Manifesto,
with its dogmatic pronouncements and apocalyptic expecta-
tions. A decade later, Marx undertook to lay bare "the law of
motion" of industrial society in a work called Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy. Those 110 years have not
dealt kindly with Marx's predictions and have mocked and re-
futed the very "law of motion" which he claimed to have
discovered.

The heart of those works was an expectation of an early
apocalypse. The world was headed toward immediate and
total catastrophe. In 1848, this catastrophe was only days, or
at most weeks, away. It would come with the next street skir-
mish. Before the year was up, it was to come with the next
war, within the year. When it came neither with the street
skirmishes nor with the wars which Marx advocated, he de-
cided it would come with the next downswing in the business
cycle. But the apocalypse failed to appear.

The second startling thing about the Communist Manifesto,
which aimed to be the program for the Revolution of 1848,
is that it prophesied the end of nationalism. Yet 1848 wit-
nessed the greatest explosion of nationalism in the history of
Europe. And now, in the twentieth century, two world wars
and their revolutionary aftermaths have proved that national-
ism is the one great cause for which millions are ready to fight
and die. It has spread from Europe, which was its home, to
Asia and Africa, which in Marx's time knew not the nation.
National feeling provides great vulnerabilities in the Soviet
empire, if we have the wit to exploit them. At the same time,
it provides great vulnerabilities for the Free World in Asia and
Africa, because the men in the Kremlin do have the wit to

92 communism: natube, steengths, weaknesses

exploit the nationalism which the Communist Manifesto said
was on the way out or was already out.

Marx's third prophecy dealt with the increasing polarization
of society. It treated industrial society, in mythical Hegelian
terms, as a system all the parts of which were so connected
that no change could be made in it; the system could not be
improved or reformed; it could not evolve; it could only be
scrapped. The defects were treated as integral to the system
and incapable of being removed defect by defect and replaced
by other structures or circumstances; they could only be shat-
tered and replaced by another system. The special mission to
do the shattering was assigned by Marx to the working class.
When this did not come immediately, as the Communist
Manifesto anticipated, Marx began his long work to give a
"scientific" foundation to this expectation of the apocalypse.

Marx's Capital has this as its function. The book is strangely
constructed, so that most of it consists of empirical evidence,
striking descriptions of tlie workings of industrial society,
drawn from the England of Marx's day, or rather the England
of the day before Marx's day. He took most of the evidence
from the Parhamentary Blue Books, reports of a Parhament
that had already investigated the evils of early industriahsm
and was busy regulating, moderating, reforming, and remov-
ing the evil excrescences of industrialization. His book thus
gives overwhelming evidence of this evolution and reform, as
he himself is compelled finally to point out. When he is dis-
cussing the achievement of the ten-hour-work law, regulation
of child labor, and other such achievements of the England
of his day, he writes: "Capital is under compulsion from so-
ciety. The factory magnates have resigned themselves to the
inevitable. The power of resistance of capital has gradually
weakened. The power of attack of the working class has grown
with the number of its allies. Hence, the comparatively rapid
advance since i860."

If one reads Marx's Capital as an empirical student should
read it, the overwhelming evidence of the Blue Books drives
one, as it drove him, to this conclusion. Yet when one comes
to the last chapter, "the last for which the first was made," a
chapter called "The Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumu-
lation," one finds that capital came into the world conceived

COMMUNIST VULNERABILITIES 93

in original sin, "a congenital bloodstain on its cheek, dripping
with blood and dirt from head to foot, from every pore." And
it is destined to leave it now in a fearful cataclysm, a day of
wrath and doom, by the workings of "the immanent laws of
capitalist production itself."

"One capitalist kills rtiany"; all other classes are destined to
be proletarianized; and, as if by mitosis, society is to be po-
larized. "Along with the constantly diminishing number of
magnates of capital . . . grows the mass of misery, oppression,
slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with this grows, too, the
revolt of the working class. . . . The monopoly of capital be-
comes a fetter upon the mode of production. Centrahzation
of the means of production, and socialization of labor, at last
reach a point where they become incompatible with their capi-
talist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell
of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are ex-
propriated." Thus, the conclusion of 1848 is tacked on again
after the mass of empirical material to the contrary which
makes up the bulk of the volume. But for this it was not nec-
essary to study the ParHamentary Blue Books.

Such has been the perversity of history that it has not vouch-
safed the revolution Marx expected in the countries of ad-
vanced industry, but has vouchsafed revolutions which invoke
Marx's name only in underdeveloped countries on the eve or
in the incipient stages of industrialization, in countries shaken
by the impact of the West's economy and equality upon auto-
cratic institutions which Marx regarded not as pre-sociaHst but
as pre-bourgeois or non-bourgeois.

Another thing which would startle Marx were he to be res-
urrected today is the succession of industrial revolutions which
followed his "industrial revolution." He knew the development
from cottage artisanship to machinofacture, from the use of
wind and water and animal and manpower to the use of steam
power. This was the industrial revolution that Marx studied.
But the industrial revolution is unending. He thought that in-
dustrial society had reached "the end of its development" in
1848, when he pronounced its doom so stirringly. Actually it
was but at the beginning of the development of its productive
forces. Since then have come the age of electricity, conveyor
belt, combustion engine, synthetic chemistry, electronics, auto-

94 communism: nature, strengths, weaknesses

mation, fission, fusion; and the end is nowhere in sight, unless
atomic war should bring a cataclysm indeed, but not Marx's
cataclysm.

The society which he thought was to polarize until it had
reached the breaking point of total polarization has actually
been depolarizing. Intermediate classes have not disappeared;
they have multiplied. The industrial proletariat has not be-
come the whole of society; it has lost in numerical weight in
society while it has gained in status and in economic and po-
litical power. Classes have become more fluid and more equal-
ized—not merely in comparatively classless America but in once
caste-ridden England and France and Germany as well.

In America— absurdly, Marx would think— one man, woman,
and child in every eight is today a stockholder in the great
corporations which he thought were going to provide the little
"handful" of capitalists to be destroyed. Main Street frequently
exercises more power than Wall Street, and labor and farmers
have more influence on legislation than corporation executives
or bankers. The latter could only fume impotently and curse
"that man in the White House" while we went through the
tremendous revolution in our society known as the New Deal.
And even the "owning class" was divided in its attitude.

The state thus has proved refractory to Marxist prophecies.
In place of becoming an executive committee of a shrinking
bourgeoisie, as he described it, it has been increasingly democ-
ratized, subjected to pressure of the labor vote, the farm vote,
and the intermediate-class votes, even to the pressure of stra-
tegically located minorities such as the Negroes in the big cities
of the North. Out of labor's influence on government, and out
of the classless pressure of the whole of society, has come a
state regulation of economic life, a legal limitation of the hours
of work, a minimum wage, collective bargaining, the legis-
lated right to organize, and a whole sweep of social-security
legislation. "The state," as the French socialist Marcel D6at
wrote, "has undergone a process of socialization, while social-
ism has undergone a process of nationaUzation."

COMMUNIST VULNERABIHTIES 95

The Supremacy of Politics over Economics

In Marx's day there was a general superstition, of which
Marx was the most prominent advocate but which was gen-
eral for most of the leading thinkers of his age: the superstition
that "economics determines politics." The twentieth centtiry
has made it a commonplace that politics tends to determine
economics. In fact, totalitarianism is, from this angle, an at-
tempt totally to determine the economic and social structtire of
society by putting one's hand on the powerful political lever,
the lever of unified centralized and exclusive power.

Thus, what has happened to the economy is that it has been
increasingly politicalized. Moreover, the whole notion of an
autonomous economy, with its own autonomic laws, on which
Marx based himself and on which Marx's opponents in the
mid-nineteenth century based themselves no less— all this has
become obsolete and has revealed itself as no longer a worka-
ble hypothesis. In its place has come the increasing social and
political regulation of the economy. Politics determines eco-
nomics through tariffs, protectionism, quotas of export and im-
port, currency regulation and manipulation, regulation of the
interest rate, deficit spending, price floors, price ceilings, pari-
ties, subsidies, state fostering of cartelization as in Germany,
state persecution or prosecution of cartelization as in our anti-
trust acts in the United States, and supranational economies
Hke Benelux, the "inner-six common market," the "outer-seven
free-trade area," and all the other supranational economies
that are beginning to grow up. And in vast areas of the world
there is total politicalization and autarchy. Not a word of what
Marx has written is helpful in approaching the problems of
our era. Whether these features are to be welcomed or to be
feared, they have surely produced a world which makes the
projections of Marx and the projections of his nineteenth-
century opponents alike irrelevant.

Unkindest cut of all, the worker himself has not consented
to be increasingly proletarianized, increasingly impoverished,
and to have thrust upon him the mission with which Marx
endowed him. If the worker has engaged in a "class struggle,"

g6 communism: natuke, stbengths, weaknesses

it has been one to put off from himself this increasing pro-
letarianization and impoverishment and this mission which
Marx and the Marxists would confer upon him. In this strug-
gle, the workers have displayed stubbornness, tirelessness,
courage, selfishness, solidarity, skill, incapacity to recognize
when they are defeated, and the power to enlist the sympathy
of the rest of society in fighting off this prophetic destiny and
this prophetic assignment.

Unlike the intellectuals who offered them socialist leader-
ship, they have no stomach for being reduced to nought, the
better to prepare themselves for becoming all. To win the suf-
frage on the continent of Europe, to influence and exert con-
trol over government, to legalize and contractualize improve-
ments in the hours of their lives that are spent in labor, to
win some security and dignity within the system in which they
Uve, to become "something" in the world in which they have
their being, rather than to be "everything" in the world which
exists only in the fantasy of the Utopians, of whom Marx was
perhaps the greatest— it is to these aims that they have rallied.
For this they have fought their struggle, and to these aims
they have succeeded in rallying most of modem society.

Those who "being nought were to become all" having be-
come something, the whole scheme loses its tidy outhnes. Thus,
the flaw in the foundation itself, the theory on which com-
munism claims to build, lies in the fact that a hundred years
of subsequent history have reduced every theoretical tenet of
Marxism to a shambles.

Marxism as an "Ism"

Insofar as it has claimed to be a science, Marxism is dead.
Marx and Engels in their last years were uncomfortably aware
of this and were beginning an uneasy and reluctant patching
or revising of their dogmas. But after their death the revision-
ists v/ho followed were outlawed and condemned, and ceased
to be Marxists, and those who claimed to be Marxists survived
only with the aid of the frozen orthodoxy of a dogmatic creed
no longer subject to scientific examination or revision. Indeed,
in this lies the strength and the staying powers of Marxism

COMMUNIST VULNERABILITIES 97

after Marxism as a "science" has proved itself bankrupt. As a
science, it has produced only invalid results, but it is also an
"ism"— Marxism. There is no "Lockeism," no "Smithism,"
"Millism," "Durkheimism," "Micheletism," "Rankeism" or
"Gibbonism," but there is a Marxism. And this is a funda-
mental difference which we must strive to understand.

Besides having claimed to be a science, it has been a creed
which can be clung to by faith when the intellect questions
and rebels. While as a theory Marxism can be refuted by in-
tellect talking to intellect, the strength of the Marxist move-
ment as such lies not in the realm of ideas but in the realm
of emotions. It is an ersatz religion, and this is harder to reach
with rational argument and harder to cope with.

Though the Marxist revolution never occurred, and is not
hkely to occur, we do indeed live in an age of revolution, a
revolution which began before Marx's time and which will
outlast our own lifetime. It is not the revolution which Marx
predicted; nor did it grow from the seeds he sowed. His theory
was but one of the misunderstandings of this revolution. The
West's rapid expansion to all the continents of the world up-
set all the world's surviving civilizations. Western society
planted everywhere the seeds of its own creativeness, its own
problems, and its own dissensions.

This is a world revolution in the true sense. The Commu-
nists did not create it, but they study ceaselessly to utilize it
for the spread of their power and for the destruction of ours.
We did create it. But we do not try to understand or to utiHze
it, or to aid it in finding new forms of abundance and of free-
dom. The Communists seek to give neither abundance nor free-
dom. What they propose to do is to extend their power and
their zone; to set up regimes of specialized productivity for
power and for war, not regimes of plenty and freedom; to link
the revolutionary forces afoot in the world to their war for
the winning of the world. Whoever harnesses the forces of
that revolution which the West has set in motion yet has not
striven to understand, whichever side manages to put to its
own use these forces in politics and economics, in science and
technology, in all fields of life, and to deny them to its op-
ponent, that side will win the struggle for the world.

Insofar as the Communists are doing just that and we are

go commxtnism; natube, strengths, weaknesses

not, they are slowly winning the war and will continue to win
the war which will occupy the rest of our century. And there-
fore, in spite of the inconsistencies, cruelties, and absurdities
of their system, the balance of vulnerability has been swing-
ing from their side to ours.

The Strategy and Tactics of Leninism

Leninism is the strategy and tactics for waging this war, for
utilizing the revolutionary forces afloat in the world for the
purpose of building totalitarian single-party power through-
out the world. Leninism claims to be Marxism: the Marxism
"of the period of imperialism, world war, and world revolu-
tion." Leninism claims to be Marxism, yet in all essential re-
spects it has stood Marxism on its head as Marx claims to
have stood Hegelianism on its head.

Marx; Economics determines politics. Lenin: Politics deter-
mines economics.

Marx: Revolution comes after capitalism has reached its
pinnacle and comes first in the most advanced countries. Le-
nin: Revolution comes first where capitalism is weakest— "the
break in the system at the point of its weakest link."

Marx: The revolution will come first in England, or perhaps
Germany or France. Lenin: The revolution comes first in Rus-
sia, where capitalism is weakest, and then we carry the revolu-
tion to advanced Europe, or, failing in that, to Asia and Africa
from backward Russia in order to deny to the advanced coxm-
tries their outlets and markets, cut them ofiE from the backward
part of the world, and cut the undeveloped countries off from
them.

Marx: The working class is destined to develop its own con-
sciousness, its own theory, its own organization, its own party,
and its own revolution. Lenin: The working class left to itself
is capable only of bourgeois thought. Not the "bovirgeois-
minded and vacillating" working class, but a revolutionary
elite, a classless vanguard party, is the guardian of the work-
ing class. It dictates to the working class. It rules over the
working class— and all other classes. It uses the working class
as a battering-ram because the tirban working class is the

COMMUNIST VXTLNERABrLITIES gg

most unified and concentrated, but it uses the peasantry as a
battering-ram, too, and it tries to use discontent in all classes.
And piling up the discontents, it aims to put in power not the
working class but its own elite vanguard nonclass party.

If this is so, a revolution can be made in a backward coun-
try where the working class is not ripe, and the vanguard party
can profess to be estabhshing a dictatorship in the name of
the proletariat where it is only beginning to come into ex-
istence. Or, as in China, the peasantry can be used as the
battering-ram. And when the scepter of power has been seized,
the vanguard party can claim that it has established the dic-
tatorship of a proletariat which does not yet exist. Or where
is the proletariat of North Vietnam? Ho Chi Minh, dictator in
the name of a dictatorship of a nonexistent proletariat through
a nonexistent party of the proletariat, dictates over a society
which is not only not sociaHst but is still pre-capitaHst.

Leninism can be understood as a strategy and tactics for
the conquest of power, for the maintenance and expansion of
power, for making that power absolute and total; as a pre-
scription for the building of a party designed to seize and hold
power; as a strategy and tactics for the utilization of the dis-
contents, the unrests, the disturbances, and the revolutionary
forces which the West has set afloat in the world— to the end
of subverting and destroying all that the West stands for and
all that the West dreams of. It is a revolutionary strategy for
the winning of the world and for the remaking of man accord-
ing to Lenin's blueprint. As such, it is, of course, highly vul-
nerable if it is confronted by an alert, determined, and watch-
ful opponent, ready to utilize the revolutionary situations and
strategies and to contest for the leadership of the forces set
free by Western civilization itself.

The Russian Revolution— Promise and Performance

The Russian Revolution is now over forty years old. In the
four decades that this new power has existed and become total,
all of its original promises have turned into their opposites.
Here is where an alert opponent would find more vulnerabili-

100 communism: natuhe, steengths, weaknesses

ties than he wolild know what to do with if he were really on
the job.

1. It promised "land to the peasants." But id the end it took
away even the land which the peasants had under the Czars,
and it herded them into a new state-owned serfdom.

2. It promised "perpetual peace." Instead it has produced
a totahtarian state which forever wages a twofold war— a war
on its own people to remake them according to its blueprint
and a war upon the world. And the word "war" is meant not
figuratively but hteraUy. When it wages war on its own peo-
ple, it is a real war, a war of nerves, a war of quarantine (the
Iron Curtain), a war of propaganda, of agitation, of condition-
ing, of psychological warfare, of physical warfare, of prisons,
of concentration camps, of bombardment by loud-speakers and
press and movies and all the means of cultural conditioning,
and, when necessary, a bullet in the base of the brain. At the
same time it has used this war upon its own people to keep
them mobilized for unending war to win the world.

3. It promised "production for use," that is, for the sake of
the consumer and consumers' goods. Instead it has set up
production for production's sake, for the sake of expanding the
oppressive power of the producer-owner state.

4. It promised "plenty," and it has produced perpetual scar-
city of all the goods that make life gracious, pleasant, easy,
cultured, rewarding, full of promise and possibility.

5. The state that was "to wither away" has expanded to
totality. Lenin promised that "every cook is to become master
of the affairs of the state." Now the state is the master of the
affairs of every cook.

6. It promised "freedom," and it has abolished all freedoms.

7. It promised "the workers' paradise," and it has immured
its people behind an impenetrable waU and turned their coun-
try into a prison for their thoughts and for their very Hves,
which cannot be penetrated by learning what happens on the
outside or by the freedom to discuss what is happening to
themselves on the inside.

8. It has raised the banner of "national self-determination"
and "anti-imperialism," but it has become the most aggres-
sive, the most oppressive, the most rapidly expanding imperial-
ist power in the history of man.

COM2MUNIST VULNERABILITIES 101

Thus— and the above are only a few of communism's poten-
tial vuLnerabilities— all the revolutionary slogans which Lenin
sought to use, and which the Kremlin uses today against aU
peoples, governments, and institutions, could easily be turned
by a determined opponent, in tune with our age and ready
to use revolutionary strategy, into weapons in our hands. The
Communists' hands would prove nerveless and lifeless if we
would but grasp the weapons which they are using against
us, which are not theirs by right and which by right can be
made to belong to us, for they are indeed our weapons.

We, not they, are today the advocates of genuine agrarian
reform and the right of each man to till his own land. There
is no country in the world more badly in need of agrarian
reform than the U.S.S.R. itself.

We, not they, are the advocates of a just and endiulng
peace, based on the respect for the rights and the existence
of aU nations in being or a-boming or yet to be.

We, not they, are the champions of the rights and freedoms
of workingmen, the freedom of movement, the freedom to
change jobs, the freedom to build organizations of their own
choosing under their own control, the right to elect their own
officials, to formulate and negotiate their own demands, the
right to strike, the right to vote for a party and a program
and candidates of their own choice.

We, not they, are able to call the armies to "fraternize across
the trenches," for it is they who must cut off their armies from
the news of what is happening in the West, and we who must
make our armies and theirs imderstand what is happening in
their land.

We, not they, are the champions of the freedom of the hu-
man spirit, of the freedom of the arts and sciences, freedom
of conscience, freedom of belief and worship, freedom from
scarcity and want and from the tyranny of irresponsible and
omnipotent officials. Though, in all these things, the Free
World has its own imperfections and lapses, these are the
things that the Free World stands for and in good measure
realizes, and these are the things which totalitarianism com-
pletely destroys and makes high treason even to think upon.

In the battle for the future shape of the world, all the crea-
tive and explosive weapons are in our hands if we have the

102 COMMUNISM: NATtTRE, STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES

wit and the londerstanding to take them up. If we do not, then
there are no psychological or ideological vulnerabilities of com-
munism. If we do, the Communists are vulnerable on every
front and at every moment and in every layer of their society.
Whether the answer to this question is "Yes" or "No" will de-
termine the outcome of the protracted war that is likely to
occupy the rest of our lives and the rest of ovu" century.

In little more than four decades, communism has grown from
a rented room in Zurich, Switzerland, into an empire covering
nearly one third of the earth's surface. The mainspring of this
thrust to power has been a revolutionary strategy— to wit, the
strategy of protracted conflict. The salient characteristics of
this strategy are: the careful blending and co-ordination of all
available techniques of conflict, from the "nonviolent" methods
of subversion and infiltration to the ultimate annihilative blow;
a broader view of the terrain of struggle; a greater understand-
ing of— and, therefore, a greater capacity to exploit— the forces
which shape, or misshape, international society; and, finally, a
deeper insight into the psychological matrix of human beings
—their motivations, actions, and interactions.

9. The Orchestration of Crisis

by Colonel William R, Kintner, U.S.A.

Presently assigned to the Office of the Chief
of Research and Development, Department
of the Army, Colonel Kintner was deputy
commandant of the first National Strategy
Seminar for Reserve Officers. He graduated
from the United States Military Academy
in 1Q40 and received his Ph.D. from George-
town University in 1949. He served in Eu-
rope during World War H and commanded
an infantry battalion during the Korean
War. He is recognized as one of the Army's
outstanding students of international affairs,
and he is currently working on a special proj-
ect with the Foreign Policy Research Insti-
tute of the University of Pennsylvania. He is
the author and coauthor of several books, in-
cluding Protracted Conflict, and contributes
frequently to national magazines.

The master plans for world conquest have often depended to a
great extent on the inertia and ignorance of the proposed vic-
tims. Ironically enough, many of these plans, even those as
recent as Hitler's Mein Kampf and the Japanese Tanaka Me-
morial, were available to the ignorant well in advance of the
onslaught. And though advanced students at Moscow's Lenin
School of Strategic Studies are not allowed to take notes from
their classes, the master plan of Communist strategy is clear,
too, for anyone willing to study and analyze not only the bla-
tant Communist record of aggrandizement but also the pub-

Reprinted from Esquire, May 1959. Copyright 1959 by Esquire, Inc.

106 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

lished writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung. To one who
understands the Communist formula, the seemingly disparate
crises of the past decades become interlocking parts of an over-
all pattern of conflict with but a single purpose: to destroy
the Western world and make Communist totahtarianism su-
preme everywhere.

The Strategy of Protracted Conflict

The Communist plan is the strategy of protracted conflict.
A hard look at protracted conflict— at its meaning, at its his-
torical development, at the many ways it is currently used
against us to forward the aims of a relentless enemy— might
provide us with a key for survival.

The term "protracted conflict" was first used by Mao Tse-
tung. Mao's term aptly describes the multifront, multiweapons
nature of Communist operations. Most generally, it is, by its
very name, a method of conflict whereby weaker powers, in
time, gain the strength necessary to overcome stronger ones.
This strength is gained not only through warfare— which is
often, in fact, a last resort— but through other, subtler means
of conflict as well: political, economic, and even psychological.
It is a method requiring infinite patience; the purpose of each
action, military or otherwise, is not to gain an immediate
smashing victory but rather to enhance the relative power
position of the weaker at the expense of the stronger. The
parallel to a game of chess is unmistakable. White's disadvan-
tage is black's advantage. Poker players, as we are in the West,
always hoping for the lucky draw, are helpless before it.

Of course, there are those who would say that Soviet tech-
nology has so developed in recent years that we have become
the weaker in this life-and-death game. This is too extreme a
view; on balance, the West still appears to be the stronger.
Even if we have lost ground, we have definitely not lost the
power of enormous, possibly fatal, retaliation. And one car-
dinal principle of Communist operational doctrine is well un-
derstood: the Soviet Union, the base of the world revolution,
must not be risked in the pursuit of any one objective. Thus,
the problem of Communist strategists is now (as it was in the

THE ORCHESTRATION OF CRISIS 10/

departed days of decisive U.S. nuclear superiority) : How can
the greatest freedom of maneuver be maintained so that power
and space may be gradually amassed without the risk of being
plunged into a full-scale atomic war?

Protracted conflict is the obvious answer. A strategy of lim-
ited actions, of indirect threats, it is also one in which no single
move constitutes adequate provocation for the unleashing of
the West's engines of nuclear destruction. And for its success
it relies most heavily on our fears that any introduction of
such weapons would surely produce a global chain reaction.
Because Western strategy has been mainly predicated on the
concept that war, if it comes, will be total in character, in-
volving maximum violence, we are still ill equipped to meet
the diflFuse and dangerous challenges offered by that form of
conflict at which the men in Moscow and Peiping are most
proficient.

Examples of Piecemeal Strategy

A brief backward look at the Korean War is instructive in
a discussion of the Communist piecemeal strategy. In June
1950, the Soviets, testing the firmness of U.S. intentions in the
Far East, acted indirectly by manipulating the puppet regime
of North Korea to launch an attack on its neighbor to the
south. They then parried the aflBxmative American response
which followed by inducing the Communist Chinese to enter
the war, doubtless by persuading them that here was their
golden opportunity to establish themselves as a major power.
Even after 1950 the United States was inclined to think that
the war in Korea was still over Korea, with the additional fea-
ture of Chinese intervention superimposed. A mental block
obscured the fact that this was now a conflict between Com-
munist China and the West, which refused to extend opera-
tions even after the meaning of the war itself had been ex-
tended. The chief fear was that an expansion of the theater
of action (by air raids on Chinese bases north of the Yalu)
and of the weapons system (by the use of tactical nuclear
arms ) might have sparked the Soviets into action and brought
on a general war. There is good reason now to conclude that

108 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

the West's fear was more emotional than logical. However they
bluster, the Soviets seem manifestly reluctant to leap into an
all-out fight. At any rate, the West failed in Korea to revise
its strategy to meet the new situation.

There are other examples. Also in Asia, the conquest of In-
dochina constitutes a striking example of Commtmist ingenuity
and energy. There, following hard on Korea, a modem mecha-
nized French military machine, numbering more than half a
million troops and backed by practically vmlimited conven-
tional war supplies from tiie United States, was less defeated
than neutralized in a rapid culmination of events that startled
the world, reoriented the thinking of numerous opportunistic
Easterners, and brought a perjured peace in which a nation
was bisected in a ceremony humihating to the West at Geneva
in 1954.

The conflict in Indochina was a convincing demonstration of
the versatility of Red strategists simultaneously employing the
various weapons of protracted warfare on two continents. In
Europe, especially in France, the tools were political pressure,
intrigue, propaganda, and economic strife. And in the actual
target area, the instances were rare that the Communists made
attempts to match military muscle with the French. Yet when
the situation was ripe and the battle was all but won by an
eight-year campaign of subversion, terror, and guerrilla war-
fare, a conventional but resounding military triumph was en-
gineered at Dien Bien Phu to complete the discomfiture of
the West and to pave the way for new conflicts of the pro-
tracted war.

Contrasting Concepts of War and Peace

Study of the historical development of U.S. and Western
attitudes toward war is enlightening because it reveals the
wellsprings of the general concept which today permits the
depredations of protracted conflict. In general, the Western
tradition, until the latter part of the nineteenth century, vindi-
cated the use of force to defend the moral order. And at the
same time it emphasized that there must be limitations of war-
fare for ethical reasons. For example, the nonmilitary or purely

THE ORCHESTRATION OF CRISIS lOQ

civilian components of the warring societies were to be pro-
tected against direct assaults.

But on the level of intellectual theory, the concept of war
in the mind of the West has suffered a schizophrenic split. In
one ideological extreme there has been a gradual tendency to
exalt power and war until they become exciting ends in them-
selves. By World War II a succession of theorists stretching as
far back as Machiavelli in the sixteenth century had helped
prepare the way for an almost vmquestioning faith in a series
of decisive, crushing sledge-hammer blows as the smrest way to
a strategic victory. But on the other ideological extreme there
has been a tendency to become so skeptical about war that
peace and the total abolition of force from the international
scene become ends in themselves.

The competition of the total-war advocates and the total-
peace advocates for the allegiance of the Western mind has
helped prepare that mind to take it for granted that the issue
today is total nuclear war or some state of nonviolent suspen-
sion which masquerades as peace. Especially since August
1945, when the atomic age was ushered in over Hiroshima,
it has been difficult for Western man to imagine how another
war involving major powers could possibly be anything but a
push-button affair in which the atmosphere over the combat-
ing nations would be instantly and indiscriminately speckled
with mushroom clouds. The idea of conflict involving limited
stakes and less apocalyptic means became as meaningless to
the twentieth-century American as the idea of total war, in-
volving whole populations, would have been to a twelfth-
century knight.

The Undesirable Status Quo

"We both fear war," Stalin is reported to have said to a
high-ranking Western diplomat. "But you fear it more than
we do." Precisely this fear of total war, or, rather, the belief
that it is but one of two alternatives, is the motivation of much
of Western policy. It is the reason we most often tend to sidle
forward to meet each new Communist thrust, the reason why,
in the ever briefer periods of relative quiet, we strive only to

110 COMMXJNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

maintain an often undesirable status quo. It thwarts all initia-
tive and makes it almost unthinkable, even in the minds of
U.S. statesmen and prominent military planners, that we can
undertake limited offensives without the certain risk of abso-
lute war. The Communists are not similarly inhibited.

The roots of present-day Soviet concepts of conflict do not
go much ftirther back in time than the nineteenth century.
On the other hand, Chinese ideas, which today are virtually
the same as their partner's, are f otmded in the ancient writings
of the military writer Sun-tzu, who Lived during the sixth cen-
tury B.C. Sun-tzu is of particular importance because he fore-
shadowed the modem Chinese concept of protracted conflict
when he made the simple suggestion that it is most advan-
tageous to defeat the enemy without doing battle. Central to
his teaching was the principle that the most effective strategy
should either avoid the use of force altogether or employ force
only to consummate a victory already won in political, moral,
espionage, logistic, and territorial terms. Under no circum-
stances should an enemy be faced with annihilation: such an
enemy would fight to the utmost and inflict more damage on
the victor than the annihilation of his forces would be worth.
At any given point the enemy should be allowed to retreat to
a position of further disadvantage. Successive retreats to worse
and worse positions would end in the final loss of the enemy's
mihtary effectiveness.

Mao Tse-tung is a student of Sun-tzu, fond of uttering such
aphorisms from the master as: "Know your enemy and know
yourself," "Avoid the enemy when he is full of dash, and strike
him when he withdraws exhausted," and "Make a noise in
the East, but strike in the West."

In the mid-twenties Mao dedicated himself and his then few
followers to an unending war for power whose final outcome
even he did not pretend to know. He preached war for its
own sake as a means of furthering the revolution. "To learn
warfare through warfare," he declares, "this is our chief
method." And Mao has never been afraid that prolonged war-
fare might sap the moral courage of his people. On the con-
trary, he says: "In the course of such a long and ruthless war,
the Chinese people will receive excellent steeling."

Mao is the world's leading opponent of the concept of cal-

THE ORCHESTRATION OF CRISIS 111

Ciliated warfare. "A military expert," he has written, "cannot
expect victory in war by going beyond the limits imposed by
material conditions, but within these limits he can and must
fight to win." He firmly believes that when a weaker power is
engaged in a struggle with a stronger, protracted warfare is
the only way in which the weaker can move toward ultimate
victory. It is the central principle of his strategy. By hmiting
the scope of the action and keeping its tempos perfectly under
control, the victory may finally be won. And the greater the
disparity and the strengths of the antagonists, the longer must
be the range of view which the weaker side adopts in its
planning.

Mao constantly warns against military adventurism and
makes it clear that the objective of war is not only to armihilate
the enemy but to preserve oneself. In the Korean War he al-
ways kept open the avenues of retreat in the event the United
States showed any inclination to strike at the sotirce of Chinese
Communist power. War is seen not as a destroyer, as the
Western nations view it, but as a creator of strength. Using
this notion of protracted conflict, Chinese Commtinist military
and political forces have often won against overwhelming odds
(particularly over the Japanese and the forces of Chiang Kai-
shek) by maintaining a consistent and cumulative process of
attack, pretense of attack, retreat, and renewed attack.

The War of Attrition

The elements of the indirect Chinese approach fit very well
into Soviet thinking. The doctrine of the war of attrition has
been adopted by many Communist leaders, beginning with
Marx and Engels, and subsequently Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.
Soviet Communists see the world revolution essentially as a
gigantic war of attrition which will last a hundred years or
so, a war undertaken for the purpose not only of destroying
individual forces of the capitalist nations but also of changing
the whole structure of capitahst society. Consequently, Com-
munist forces should avoid all-out engagements except when
they have an impressive tactical superiority. One Bolshevik
doctrine postulates that even the weakest and smallest forces

112 COMMtJNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

can make a definite contribution and that in conflict all availa-
ble forces should be used in some way, without, however, ex-
posing the main strength to extreme risks. Thus, the numeri-
cally small Communist Party in Iraq, playing on the shadow o£
Soviet power to the north, contributed substantially to the
1958 coup d'etat in Baghdad.

Lenin contributed much to the growing strategic conscious-
ness of communism and stressed particularly the need for fit-
ting its entire organization and all methods to the single ob-
jective of conquest. As Mao is of Sim-tzu, Lenin was a great
admirer of Clausewitz, the celebrated German military theo-
retician who once said: "War is a continuation of poHtics by
other means."

From his studies of Clausewitz, Lenin finally developed a
definition of strategy which epitomizes the central concept of
protracted war: "The soundest strategy in war is to postpone
operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders
the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy."

The memory of Lenin's fearsome successor, Joseph Stalin,
is far from sacred in Russia today. Yet his operational theories
have not been rendered obsolete by the ruthless downgrading
process which has gone on since 1953. The basic conflict doc-
trine is not substantially afi^ected by personality changes within
the Soviet structure. The unlamented Stalin's works serve to
illustrate only more concretely the methodically planned op-
portunism of the Communists. Witness his pact with Hitler
in 1939. And it was Stalin who adopted the older Russian
methods of extended strategy, in which indirect means, such
as bribery, espionage, and subterfuge, are preferred to direct
military ventures outside the homeland. Stalin prophesied in
1925 that, through a situation of gradual "socialist encircle-
ment," the capitalist states "will consider it expedient Voltm-
tarily' to make substantial concessions to the proletariat." The
Communist tune of world domination through protracted con-
flict does not change, no matter which leader plays it.

With the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States has
emerged as the chief opponent of communism. The world can-
not be won for bolshevism until the United States has been
disarmed and destroyed as a political entity. To this end the
Soviets and their partners have bent every effort in the past

THE ORCHESTRATION OF CRISIS 113

decade and a half, at the same time putting forth a truly gi-
gantic effort to overcome our atomic lead. Not only have they
caught up with us in weapons technology, they have materi-
ally advanced Stalin's "socialist encirclement" all over the
globe. And, simultaneously, they have avoided the ultimate
showdown. All of their provocations in Europe, such as the
Berlin blockade, were conceived within the framework of a
piecemeal strategy. In Korea and Indochina, the U.S.S.R. has
been able to exploit the blindly legalistic attitudes of the West-
em nations toward conflict to evade responsibility for actions
which have been controlled from Moscow, and thereby to es-
cape the danger of a major war. Even in the Middle East,
where up to present years Russia had obtained no real in-
fluence, the Commxmists have accumulated masked but im-
portant power by the simple expedient of promoting imrest in
an area where we are futilely resisting the irresistible forces
of exploding nationahsm. The protracted-conflict battle hnes
are everywhere.

The Communist doctrine of conflict, then, synthesizes all
the techniques which history has proved to be workable, ev-
erything from persuasion through coercion to the most modem
forms of military warfare. While some of the doctrine's central
concepts have been kept secret, a study of the record over
the past half century clarifies the aims as well as the methods
of the Communists. These seem to be: (i) imdermining anti-
Communist morale; (2) disrupting the social and economic
structxure of non-Communist nations; (3) weakening their mili-
tary capabihties; (4) infiltrating and disrupting their institu-
tions and organizations; (5) causing them to make false pohti-
cal and strategic decisions; (6) cultivating an unreal sense of
security abroad; (7) creating local disaffections and internal
crises which might induce a nation to acquiesce in a Com-
mimist "solution." Concurrently with all these, the Commu-
nists strive to build up both their technological and military
positions. They do not place their reliance most heavily in any
single aspect of this doctrine. Their real skill hes in their ability
to vary the combinations in any given situation.

In time, the Communists are confident they can find ways
to exploit any set of conditions to their own advantage. And
their task is made simpler by virtue of the fact that the in-

114 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

dependent policies of their enemies are rarely co-ordinated.
This condition enabled the Communists to divide the West in
the postwar decade by starting peripheral wars in three dif-
ferent areas, none of which was a focal point of the interests
of all three major Western allies. The French were kept busy
in Indochina, the British by the risings in Malaya, and the
United States by aggression in Korea. The Communists are
masters at the organized promotion of orchestrated crisis.

And the struggle need not always be based on violence,
which is rarely sufficient unto itself and indeed is sometimes
unnecessary. Violence must always be preceded, accompanied
by, and followed with nonviolent-conflict techniques, such as
agitation, propaganda, infiltration, and political sabotage. This
not only renders the violence less risky, it makes it more ef-
fective.

Ethics-in-Reverse Concept of Conflict

Essentially, the entire Communist concept of conflict boils
down to a crystalline-hard summation: Gain strength by weak-
ening your opponent; do unto your opponent exactly the op-
posite of what you want him to do unto you. This code calls
for no moral indignation, as we of the West seem to need be-
fore we can take positive action. It simply involves a kind of
ethics-in -reverse that has maddened us, addled us, and left us
apparently powerless to do anything appropriate about it. In
short, protracted conflict is working precisely according to
plan.

What can we expect in the future? Barring a technological
breakthrough as momentous as the atomic bomb, it is virtually
certain that the Communists wfll continue to prefer the indirect
approach rather than risk a sudden life-and-death engage-
ment. The Soviets will Ukely persist in acting by proxy instead
of directly confronting the United States. If more trouble
comes in the Middle East, it may be stirred up by Afghanistan
or Iraq. If it continues in North Africa, it will be quarterbacked
by Egypt, a nation which, incidentally, might well beware of
indirect Communist assaults which could damage its ambi-
tions. Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. will remain free of military en-

THE ORCHESTRATION OF CRISIS II5

tanglements to become more active in the political, economic,
and psychological penetration of south and southeast Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

The gradual Commrmist build-up not only minimizes the
chances of decisive counteraction, it is also conducive to tem-
porizing on the part of the West. If the United States does
come into conflict, the Communist theory goes, it will come in
tentatively, furnishing aid "too httle and too late."

The Communists will probably be reluctant to undertake
forceful expansion in a direction which would prove offensive
to neutralist nations like India as long as these neutralists serve
useful purposes and other targets are available. This means
that areas of potential military conflict in the foreseeable future
may be limited. There is a high probability that, if any treaty
partner of the United States is chosen as a target, the Com-
munists will carefully avoid anything that looks like conven-
tional war. Instead, they will instigate rebellion and civil in-
surrection against those governments so that U.S. support
could be labeled "intervention," such as happened in Lebanon
in 1958. Tacit Soviet backing of Arab nationalism, for example,
represents an almost ideal embodiment of Communist conflict
doctrine in the nuclear age.

The Instruments of Terror

The forecast is unmistakably grim. And it is rendered still
more grim by the knowledge that the weapons for utterly con-
cluding the conflict, should the moment ripen sufficiently or
desperation demand it, are firmly in Soviet hands. Clearly,
they seem less interested in even pretending to want an agree-
ment. At the very best, nuclear weapons and operational in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles are persuasive instruments of
terror in the protracted conflict.

The great dilemma, unquestionably the most critical of this
or any other age, remains: What can we do about it? How,
within the framework of our Western traditions and ethics,
can we save ourselves? We must continue certainly to react
to present danger. Much more than that, however, we must
learn to act, to seize an initiative that is now never ours. To

Il6 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

cope with future dangers, the United States needs to develop
its own concept for deahng with continuous conflict, not, to
be sure, one so cynically aggrandizing as the Communists', but
one in which our vital interests would be forwarded as well
as protected. And to do this we must be very sure we know
exactly what our interests are. We must develop a clear sense
of national purpose, and act on it, not defensively, but posi-
tively in the sure knowledge of our convictions.

10. The Larger Strategic Vis

by Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty

A Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute, University of Pennsylvania,
Dr. Cottrell is an instructor in the Political
Science Department and assistant to the
chairman of the International Relations
Group Committee, University of Pennsylva-
nia. He is co-author of several books, includ-
ing Protracted Conflict, and frequently con-
tributes articles to national publications, such
as U.S. News & World Report, Orbis, and the
U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Dr. Dougherty is assistant professor of po-
litical theory and international relations at St,
Joseph's College, Philadelphia, and a Re-
search Fellow, Foreign Policy Research In-
stitute, University of Pennsylvania. Together
with his colleague, Alvin J. Cottrell, he ad-
dressed the first National Strategy Seminar
for Reserve Officers. He has contributed arti-
cles to such publications as Orbis, the Politi-
cal Science Quarterly, and the U. S. Naval
Institute Proceedings.

Within four decades, Communist power grew from a gleam in
Lenin's eye to the absolute domination of nearly a billion peo-
ple. One of the principal reasons for the Communists' enor-
mous gains has been their ability to conceive of the struggle

Adapted from Chapter 3 of Protracted Conflict ( Harper 6- Brothers,
^959), hy Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner, Alvin J. Cot-
trell, and James E. Dougherty.

Il8 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

for power— its terms, its theater, its methods, and its goals—
in larger dimensions than their opponents.

The dialectic theory of history, first formulated by Marx and
Engels, is a theory of universal and protracted conflict: the
whole world is transformed into a battlefield upon which socio-
economic forces are locked in a titanic contest of indefinite
duration. Marx and Engels bequeathed to the revolutionary
Communists a conceptual framework which enabled them to
relate the meaning of events to a wider historical process gov-
erned by immutable laws and moving toward a predictable
end. Lenin acknowledged the debt of Bolshevik pohtical and
military strategy to Marxist historical analysis:

"Marxism asks that the various types of struggle be analyzed
within their historical framework. To discuss conflict outside
of its historical and concrete setting is to misunderstand ele-
mentary dialectic materialism. At various junctures of the eco-
nomic evolution, and depending upon changing political, na-
tional, cultural, social, and other conditions, differing types of
struggle may become important and even predominant. As a
result of those sociological transformations, secondary and sub-
ordinate forms of action may change their significance. To try
and answer positively or negatively the question of whether a
certain tactic is usable, without at the same time studying the
concrete conditions confronting [the movement at] a given
moment [and] at a precise point of its development, woxild
mean a complete negation of Marxism."^

The Globe as a Battlefield

This strategy, as developed and refined by revolutionary
communism, transforms the entire globe into a theater of war.
Nations are mere salients to be reduced and continents mere
flanks to be turned.^ While the military commander confines
his analysis of the logistical situation to the immediate theater
of war, the Communist conflict manager extends his evaluation
to the performance of entire rival economic and technological
systems. The morale of one's oviti forces is a question of educa-
tion, training, indoctrination, and other modes of social con-
trol; the morale of the enemy is marked as the target of

THE LARGER STRATEGIC VISION lig

psychopolitical attacks, especially through the enemy's own
media of mass communications. In this broader dimension, it
is not suflBcient to study a single leader, his character, his train-
ing, and his strategic preconceptions. The strategist of global,
protracted conflict must seek to gain insights into the society
which he is bent on conquering: its cultural matrix, its in-
stitutional structure, its popular emotions and neuroses, and its
decision-making machinery. Moreover, he must vary the modes
of his approach— miUtary, paramilitary, political, psychologi-
cal, technological, and economic— and suit them to the place
and the time. He must phase his tactical operations over large
geographical areas and long periods of time, and he must sub-
ordinate all operations to the larger strategic goal; a local mili-
tary victory, for example, may have to be forfeited for the
sake of more enduring poHtical gains.

As the geographic setting of conflict analysis v^dens, the
time needed to consummate the strategic operation must be
lengthened and broadened commensurately. In turn, the ex-
tension of scale calls for suitable organizational techniques and
instruments. In protracted-conflict strategy, five-year logistical
plans are meshed with decades of the tactical movement of
forces and the careful phasing of political, economic, psycho-
logical, and military or paramilitary operations. Hence, the side
which knows how to conceive of the conflict in the appropriate
dimensions of time enjoys the advantage— and can even afford
the luxury of policy mistakes, for the opponent is ill equipped
to recognize and comprehend their significance in time to ex-
ploit them.

The Interchangeability of Military and Political
Instruments

From the outset, Commimist conflict doctrine revealed a re-
markable affinity to military thought. The idea that military
and political instruments are interchangeable in the execution
of one vast strategic plan, central to Clausewitz's thought, is
the pith of Communist doctrine. In his personal copy of the
great German theoretician's famous book. On War, Lenin un-
derscored the following passage:

120 COMMXTNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

If War belongs to policy, it will naturally take its char-
acter from thence. If policy is great and powerful, so also
will be the War, and this may be carried to the point at
which War attains to its absolute form.

It is only through this kind of view that War recovers
unity; only by it can we see all Wars as things of one kind
and only thus can we attain the true and perfect basis and
point of view from which great plans may be traced out
and determined upon.

There is upon the whole nothing more important in life
than to find out the right point of view from which things
should be looked at and judged of and then to keep to
that point, for we can only apprehend the mass of events
in the unity from one standpoint, and it is only the keeping
to one point of view that guards us from inconsistency.^

In sum, war, be it fought with military hardware or with
nonviolent political and psychological instruments, is a unity.
"Hot" and "cold" are phases of intensity in one and the same
war.

If Clausewitz was the unwitting prophet of the Communist
doctrine of protracted conflict, its most incisive modem spokes-
man is Mao Tse-tting. The wide strategic vision of the Chinese
Communist leader derives at least in part from the oriental
tradition of warfare.

As conceived by Mao, the strategy of protracted conflict is
the lever for eflFecting a gradual change in the relative strength
of the two sides— the revolutionary and the status quo. As the
war is prolonged, various forces— political, economic, psycho-
logical, and mihtary— which are vinfavorable to the enemy and
favorable to the revolutionaries can be set in motion, shaped,
and nourished. The Communists will grow in military experi-
ence, technology, and organizational ability and gain increas-
ingly the international mass support. Conversely, the Commu-
nists' foes will sufFer changes for the worse: exhaustion of
resources, disintegration of morale, the alienation of world
opinion, and confusion over the proper policy to be pursued.*
At every turn in the protracted war, the Communists can, by
adopting all kinds of deceptive measures, effectively drive the
enemy into the pitfall of making erroneous judgments.^ Mao,

THE LAKGER STRATEGIC VISION IZl

in one famous passage, distilled the essence of his extended
strategy to sixteen words: "Enemy advances, we retreat;
enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy re-
treats, we pursue."^ The import of Mao's writings is that both
time and wisdom are on the side of the Communists and that,
inescapably, the forces of the status quo, lacking a conceptual
framework of the conflict, will succumb in the enveloping tide
of revolutionary Communism.

In keeping with the broad strategic vision advocated by
Clausewitz and Mao, the Communists have acquired a spec-
trum of weapons much more variegated than that which com-
poses the arsenal of the West. They discern weapons where
the West sees only the implements of peaceful international
relations. According to the Communists' doctrine of protracted
conflict, war, politics, diplomacy, law, psychology, science,
and economics— all form a continuum and all are closely in-
tegrated in the conduct of foreign policy. Moreover, the Com-
munists have developed pohtical, psychological, and organiza-
tional strategies far more sophisticated than the mere physical
seizure of territory. They have mastered the technique of stag-
ing aggression against social institutions and human minds,
without physically violating political borders and thus posing
a casus belli.

The Ebb and Flow of the Revolutionary Tide

What particular method or mixture of conflict methods is
to be used depends upon given capabilities and opportunities.
Psychologically prepared for an indefinitely prolonged strug-
gle, the Communists are steeled against temporary setbacks.
They remain undaunted in the face of adversity, for they are
convinced that their reverses are only partial, or local, or short-
hved. If the Communists suffer an acute loss in one area, they
can take comfort from the victories wrought in another. All
reversals are thus seen as relative; new strength can be drawn
from the lessons which they contain. Every retreat becomes
a "strategic retreat," calculated to produce greater gains sub-
sequently. If plans are blocked and rendered invalid by un-
anticipated events on the terrain of conflict, these events can

122 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

sooner or later be reconciled to the global blueprint, or else
the blueprint can be modified to accommodate them. This con-
cept, that is, the "ebb and flow" of the world revolutionary
tide, is fundamental in Communist strategic thought J

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk constitutes one of the earliest
and most interesting apphcations of the "ebb and flow" con-
cept. Lenin, upon coming to power in 1917, confronted one
overarching problem, namely, how to end Russia's participa-
tion in the world war as quickly as possible, so that the Bol-
sheviks could concentrate their resources on consolidating their
first territorial foothold, the launching platform of future con-
flict operations. Lenin realized that unless peace were made
soon, the fledghng Soviet state might be crushed in the vise of
foreign war and internal armed resistance. So far as Lenin was
concerned, the internal enemy— that is, the White Russian
forces— was more to be feared than the external foe. In order
to guarantee the continuation of his Communist regime, he
came to terms with Germany at a heavy cost to Russia. Under
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin ceded 32 per cent of Rus-
sia's arable land, 34 per cent of her population, 89 per cent
of her coal resources, and 54 per cent of her total industrial
capacity.^

Lenin, however, perceived his strategic problem in larger di-
mensions than did the "triumphant" leaders of Imperial Ger-
many. The severe conditions of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
did not disconcert Lenin in the least. In fact, the Soviet leader,
by yielding to the demands of the victorious, albeit exhausted
Germans, showed a consummate mastery of a strategic tech-
nique which was by no means new in Russian history— trading
space for time. This technique, as applied by Lenin, reflects
what may be aptly termed a "four-dimensional" approach to
conflict. No retreat or loss need be considered fatal for com-
munism if communism thereby strengthens itself or enhances
its capabilities of carrying on futinre conflict. In due time, ev-
erything that has been conceded wiU be taken back.

THE LAKGER STRATEGIC VISION 123

Exploiting the Colonial Struggle

An excellent illustration of the Communists' larger strategic
vision— their abihty to widen the global dimensions of the bat-
tlefield on which the protracted conflict is being waged— can
be found in their poHcy toward the colonial areas. At the end
of the First World War, the Communist leadership realized
that the Asian and African continents were entering a period
of revolutionary transformation. They proposed to harness the
power of the social forces which were about to inundate the
colonial regions. The Communists perceived that developments
impending in these regions would have a direct and important
bearing upon the success of their strategy against the West.
As early as 1921, Stalin caUed attention to this relationship:

If Europe and America may be called the front, the
scene of the main engagements between socialism and im-
perialism, the nonsovereign nations and the colonies, with
their raw materials, fuel, food, and vast store of human
material should be regarded as the rear, the reserve of
imperialism. In order to win a war, one must not only
triumph at the front but also revolutionize the enemy's
rear, his reserves.^

Perhaps Lenin never actually uttered the famous aphorism
which is so often attributed to him: "The road to Paris lies
through Peking." Whether he did or not, it is clear that Lenin
and his successors saw the important part which the anticolo-
nial struggle would play in softening up the West for the final,
decisive phase of the protracted conflict. Today, few would
deny the significant role played by the colonial areas in the
struggle between communism and the West. Yet Lenin fore-
saw this role as early as 1916, when he quoted the following
passage by Rudolf Hilferding:

The thousand-year-old agrarian isolation of countries
situated outside the main current of history is broken, and
they are dragged into the capitalist whirlpool. Capitalism
itself gradually procures for the vanquished the means

124 COMMUNIST STBATEGY AND TACTICS

and resources for emancipating themselves. And they set
out to obtain the objective which once seemed to the Eu-
ropean nations to be the highest objective: national unity
as a means to obtain economic and cultural freedom. This
movement for national independence threatens European
capital in its valuable field of exploitation, where the ra-
diant prospects are opening up before it, and in those
places European capital can only maintain its domination
by continually increasing its military forces.^^

Military Conflict for Political Objectives

The conduct of the Soviets immediately prior to and during
World War II furnished instructive examples of the manner
in which the Communists apply their conflict strategy to con-
crete historical situations.

The Communists, when waging actual military operations,
are not guided by the same set of canons that inform Western
wartime policy. Americans in particular, once they have
throvni themselves into the effort to defeat the enemy with
sheer physical power, are inclined to postpone consideration
of political objectives until after the cessation of hostihties.
Thus, American leaders in World War II planned and con-
ducted an exclusively military strategy which was designed to
produce a crushing victory as rapidly as possible. It is indeed
a paradox of our time that democracies, once fully mobilized
for military conflict, are apt to outdo the dictatorships in wag-
ing total military war— the war for unconditional siirrender.
This paradox derives from the democracies' instability of mood
—the oscillation between the aversion against all things mili-
tary and a war psychosis that can be appeased only by total
victory and the severe punishment of the enemy.

When the war against Germany entered its final phase and
the Soviets took the offensive, Stalin became increasingly con-
cerned with Russia's postwar position in central and eastern
Europe. Earlier, at Teheran, he had exerted his influence to
bring about a Western "second front" in France rather than
in the Balkans, where an attack would have thwarted Rus-
sia's postwar objectives. His primary objective of wdnning the

THE LAKGER STRATEGIC VISION 125

war already assured, Stalin now concentrated Ms efforts upon
the problem of how to exploit the war in its closing stages in
order to maximize Russian poMtical gains. Instead of maintain-
ing unrelenting pressure upon the retreating German forces,
the Soviets paced their military operations to the attainment
of political objectives beyond military victory: they sought to
insure Moscow's postwar domination of the eastern European
governments. An eyewitness of the Soviet conquest of Hungary
wrote:

These operations were directed solely by political ex-
pediency and as a result of that, they were momentarily
illogical from a military point of view. . . . The aim of
all these operations was to eliminate the existence of
strong pro-Ally and anti-German resistance forces in Po-
land, Bulgaria, and Hungary, which, after the liberation
of their countries, could have been significant obstacles
on the avenue to Bolshevization, due to their non-Com-
munist character. The military procedure applied was
that of indirect extermination, indirect co-operation with
the German Army.^^

The U.S.S.R. disdained the opportunity to negotiate armi=
stices with the indigenous governments of the former Nazi sat-
eUites, which were anxious to end their participatioo in the
war as speedily as possible. Instead, the Soviets sought, even
at the risk of delaying their westward militairy advance, to
create a political vacuum in each of the eastern European
countries which could later be filled by a Communist provi-
sional government. The best-documented incident of this truly
Machiavellian strategy occurred in Poland. As the Red Army
approached Warsaw in July 1944, the Soviet radio repeatedly
urged the underground army of Polish patriots in the capital,
led by General Bor, to rise up and fight the Nazis. But when
the Poles launched their insurrection, the Soviet forces imme-
diately brought their offensive to a standstill outside Warsaw
and waited patiently while the Nazis liquidated General Bor's
forty thousand men. The Russians refused to make the slight-
est effort to extend aid and declared that they would not allow
British and American aircraft to use Soviet airfields if they at-
tempted to fly supplies to Warsaw. As a result of Stalin's pol-

126 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

icy, the Polish uprising proved a complete failure. After the
Home Guards had been totally destroyed, the Red Army re-
sumed its advance, "liberated" Warsaw, and established the
hand-picked Lubhn Communist government in power.

Soviet Controlled Warfare

The manner in which the Soviet Union dealt with Japanese
peace overtures in early 1945 furnishes another instructive ex-
ample of controlled warfare.

Although the first Japanese attempt to obtain Soviet media-
tion was made in Tokyo during February 1945, the Soviet
Government concealed this information from the United States
imtil the Potsdam Conference, five months later. Obviously,
Stalin did not wish to see the Pacific war end "prematurely."
He intended to exploit it in two ways: first, by extracting maxi-
mum concessions from the United States for his promise to
enter the war against Japan, and second, by using his actual
participation in the war to estabhsh his claim to a major voice
in the Far Eastern postwar settlement. There is now httle ques-
tion that the Soviet Union held it within its power to take a
step which could have led to the temiination of hostilities even
before the dropping of the atomic bombs. Japan had sought
Soviet help in obtaining from the West a less severe armistice
formula than "unconditional surrender." But the Soviet Union
coold not accede to such a request without forfeiting the
chance to profit pohtically from having taken a beUigerent's
part in the defeat of Japan. Nor could the U.S.S.R. flatly reject
Japan's overtures without prompting Tokyo to make a more
direct appeal to the West.

Thus, StaUn shrewdly led the Japanese to believe that there
was some chance of softening the harsh terms of unconditional
surrender. At the same time, Stalin assured the Western lead-
ers of his loyal adherence to the policy of "vmconditional sur-
render." That he fully intended to enter the Pacific war at the
most advantageous juncttire is borne out by the hasty Soviet
military assault on Japan just forty-eight hours after the first
American atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. ^^

THE LAKGER STRATEGIC VISION izy

The Larger Dimensions of Conflict

Thus, unlike most Western strategists, who have tradition-
ally equated war with the clash of arms, Communist leaders
are trained to think of conflict in much larger dimensions. Mili-
tary action for them is but one of many forms of warfare.
Other forms of conflict— political, sociological, ideological, psy-
chological, technological, and economic—are just as important
or, under certain circumstances, even more important. Quick,
decisive military victory, which for centuries has been the
prime objective of Western strategic planning, does not hold an
equally exalted place in Communist conflict science.

The Western strategist is inclined to consider his job done
once crushing victory has been won on the battlefield; the re-
sponsibility for advancing the nation's political objectives is
then shunted conveniently from the military commanders to
the diplomatists. This delineation of functions reflects Western
democracy's traditional image of war: an aberration from in-
ternational normalcy, resulting from a breakdown in ortho-
dox diplomacy. For the Communists, by contrast, policy and
war are but two sides of one coin. The coin is strategy.

Notes

1. V. I. Lenin, "Partisan Warfare," Orbis, 11, 196. The above is a
translation of the article "Partisanskaya Voina," which has been
reprinted in all four Russian editions of Lenin's Sochineniya
(Collected Works).

2. The Party must make all appraisals "on a sufficiently broad
scale, that is, precisely on a world scale." Nathan Leites, The
Operational Code of the FoUtburo (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1951), p- 15-

3. Cf. Byron Dexter, "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy," Foreign
Affairs, XXIX (October 1950), 49-50.

4. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung ( 5 vols.; London: Lawrence
& Wishart, Ltd., 1954), H, 189.

5. Ibid., p. 216.

128 COMMUNIST STKATEGY AND TACTICS

6. Ibid., p. 164.

7. "The Communist movement never should swim against the
trend o£ the historic cycle. During revolutionary ebbs and non-
Communist tides, it should avoid risk and protect its position
while simultaneously accumulating strength." Stefan T. Possony,
A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revo-
lution (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), p. 394.

8. John W, Wheeler-Bennett, "The Meaning of Brest-Litovsk To-
day," Foreign Affairs, XVII (October 1938), 139.

9. Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial Question
(New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 115.

10. Cited in V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The State and Revolution
(New York: Vanguard Press, 1929), p. 101.

11. John A. Lukacs, "Political Expediency and Soviet Russian Mili-
tary Operations," Journal of Central European Affairs, VIII
(January 1949), 402.

12. Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (a RAND Corporation
Research Study) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958),

PP- 155-21 !•

11. Communist Psychological Warfare

I

by Stefan T. Possony i

Born in Vienna, Dr. Possony received his ]|
Ph.D. from the University of Vienna and
subsequently studied in Rome and Paris.
Since 1947 he has been professor of inter-
national politics in the Graduate School,
Georgetown University. He is an associate of |
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Uni- *•
versity of Pennsylvania. He lectured at the |
first National Strategy Seminar for Reserve
Officers.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Communist propa-
ganda is how dull and unconvincing it is. Its arguments are
not logically persuasive, and their presentation, more often
than not, is repellent and unattractive. The fact that, never-
theless, communism has been able to achieve considerable suc-
cesses, even in the intellectual domain, has been puzzling to
many analysts. One explanation of this apparent mystery may
be foimd in the circumstance that the Communists do not at
all aim to "persuade" the mind. Instead, they seem to be ori-
enting the souls of their audience.

If we accept this as our first hypothesis, we should assume
next that the techniques of "soul surgery" should become clear-
est in situations where they are easiest to apply. Hence, in-
stead of looking for such techniques in the field of international
diplomacy, we should expect the Communist "psywar" tech-
niques to be revealed most dramatically in the indoctrination

Published originally in the January iqsq issue of The OflBcer Maga-
zine, by the Reserve Officers Association. Reprinted by permission.

130 COMMtTNIST STRATEGY AKD TACTICS

of Party members and in the activities commonly called "brain-
washing" or "brain changing." The treatment of war and poHti-
cal prisoners, including Party members, of young Party re-
cruits, and of captive popiilations may give more valuable hints
about the Communists' secret doctrine of psychological war-
fare than their purely verbal efforts in so-called propaganda
campaigns.

The Conditioned Reflex

The Communists have acknowledged that they owe a con-
siderable debt to Ivan P. Pavlov and his discovery of the con-
ditioned reflex. This theory, especially if reinterpreted, can be
evolved as a supplement to the basic theorem of Marxism,
that a change in social conditions wall transform men. In addi-
tion to rejecting the "subjective," or "will," factor, the Pavlo-
vian or post-Pavlovian theory asserts that man's reflexes and
behavior are controlled by signals— social conditions, words,
and mass communications— which in turn are controllable by
scientific procedures. Thus, man's behavior is decided by "ob-
jective" factors and, to the extent that those factors can be
manipulated, is determinable. The person is "other-directed"
by state or Party or, in their absence, by economic "forces";
psychological processes can be managed, fixed, or altered; and
man can be "transformed."

Fundamentally, the Commtmists hold that behavior, espe-
cially the behavior of groups, classes, and nations, can be
manipulated through the conditioning of reflexes, a circum-
stance which is particularly important for those situations
where the human animal is denied food and treated to over-
doses of ringing bells. To a large extent, this theory underhes
Soviet propaganda, especially its insistence on monotonous
repetition and its capture of all the symbolic words which, so
to speak, "ring a bell."

Undoubtedly, the Communists learned from Pavlov how to
influence behavior through proper regulation of work, food,
and leisure, that is, to get at the mind through the body. More
important is the probability that the Communists are making
conscious use of Pavlov's findings concerning methods whereby

COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE I3I

psychological disturbances can be induced in living organisms.
Pavlov has shown that by manipulation of stimuli the desire
for independent action, or what he called the "freedom urge,"
can be weakened or extinguished and neurotic behavior in-
duced.

The artificial creation of insanity— a device which the Com-
munists have applied to their prisoners by subjecting them to
various forms of "invisible torture," such as vmcertainty, fear,
sleeplessness, strong light effects, and kneeling or standing-
may not lend itself to the treatment of large numbers of peo-
ple. However, unpredictable behavior, the acceleration and
calming of disturbances and crises, alterations between smiles
and growls, and the maintenance of tension at perpetuity may
induce quasi-neurotic behavior, increase the values of the "sig-
nal" (as, for example, those of the bell as against the food),
and facilitate the acceptance of new word signals. Whatever
one may think of the determinism inherent in Pavlovian think-
ing, a deliberate application of such techniques makes it pos-
sible to implant in human minds numerous notions, such as
"A follows B," which are not only false to fact but also inhibit
the learning of the proper sequences. The ensuing disorienta-
tion cannot but fail to produce lasting mental crises or, at
least, serious maladjustments.

The Use of Freud's Theories

Perhaps more surprising than the Communist loans from
Pavlov are their unacknowledged adoptions of the findings of
Sigmund Freud. By interfering with family life and placing
major emphasis on pubhc education of infants, the father im-
age is vested in an external and nonhuman entity, the state or
the Party. This method of rearing children probably induces
them to become more submissive to higher authority.

The value systems which are being inculcated by the Soviets
exploit pre-existing Russian patterns. The Soviets make siire
that the human herd obeys the "signals" of authority, while
the individual and initiative remain vmderdeveloped. The rele-
gation of sex and other types of affection to minor and regres-
sive roles induces, or rather is expected to induce, "sub-

132 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

limation" through productive work and Party chores. This
particular technique is employed to transform hvunan beings
into mere cogs within a gigantic machine.

The Psychoanalytic Interview

The Commimists have adopted the basic techniques of psy-
choanalysis, in particular the psychoanalytic interview. Nor-
mally, such an interview is designed to determine the causes
of psychological disturbances. It aims at the removal of these
causes. The psychoanalytic interview between physician and
patient obviously would be impractical if patients were to be
treated in large numbers. Hence the Communists have de-
veloped more streamUned methods, which allow the mass
production not of cures but of "complexes" and "tratxmas."
These techniques include the compulsory writing of diaries,
autobiographies, and histories of one's thought development;
of oral interviews with Party members; of hearings before
ideological commissions and the poHtical police; and of public
"confessions."

The purpose of these interviews, which may be repeated
many times, is to inculcate in the "patient" feelings of error,
guilt, shame, and fear, as weU as desires for repentance and
revenge— and to make available to the Party powerful levers
of blackmail. The expectation is that, through this process,
the patient's conscience will be weakened, his will to obey and
believe increased, and all his survival instincts made phable
for Party purposes.

Normally, these procedures vidll be successful: since prac-
tically everyone is actually or potentially "guilty" within the
framework of the Communist code— because no one ever failed
to doubt the dogma or to wish escape from Party disciphne,
and because every sane person has family and property in-
stincts—the average "patient" can be relied upon to produce
the trauma by himself. Whenever a person shows himself capa-
ble of resisting, treatment may vary between outright pressure
and terror, and "persuasion" of the kind described in Arthur
Koestler's Darkness at Noon.

These processes aim, as does psychoanalysis, at the cleans-

COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WABFARE I33

ing of old thoughts and emotions. While the therapist wants
to eliminate the sources of trouble, the Communist psychologi-
cal manipulator works toward the destruction of the self-
reliant personality. To employ modem terms, he tries his hand
at "brainwashing." Once this operation has been completed, a
supplementary activity, "brain changing," must be under-
taken. The brain is emptied of mundane thoughts, while si-
multaneously the body is weakened and the sensuous drives
are subdued by fatigue, hunger, deprivation, and anguish.
The mind enters a state of receptivity and exaltation. At this
point, thoughts, ideas, symbols, and emotions— in short, "vi-
sions"—are put into the cleansed mind. The "patient"— who
may be a member of a Western Communist Party or a student
at a Party "university"— is invited to learn by rote some of the
basic texts of the Communist literature. He is asked to write
down the various thoughts which he considers the right ones
and to apply the doctrine to current and concrete issues. He
may even be asked to participate in conspiratorial activities
and to commit himself through acts of immorahty, which may
range all of the way from informing and spying to the betrayal
of one's parents, from leading a lynching party to straight
murder.

Hypnosis and Suggestion

Hypnotic and suggestive techniques seem to be used ex-
tensively. The "patient" must indulge in autosuggestion and
tell himself, often by mechanical repetition, that he is becom-
ing a better Communist, that he is cutting himself loose from
all the black shadows of the past, and that he desires to sacri-
fice himself to the cause. In addition, his manipulators follow
the standard practices of hypnosis or, in any event, of sugges-
tion, to make sure that the suitable thoughts really stick. An
interesting aspect of this process is that the "patients" them-
selves, while learning and acquiring the proper reflexes, must
emit the signals to which they themselves and the others must
react. The insistence on parrotlike repetition is designed to
harden the conditioned reflexes, to maintain a system of mutual
suggestion or hypnosis, and to "fix" the desired complexes.

134 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Two key terms of modern psychotherapy have special im-
portance: frustration and guilt. By identifying existing frustra-
tions and stimulating them, the Communists gain recruits and
undermine foreign societies. The Communists try to exploit
professional, social (and racial) status, and intellectual-
cultural frustrations among the persons who place themselves
outside the pale of their own society. The intent is not to allow
these frustrations to incapacitate the man but, on the contrary,
to transform them into aggressive impulses. The international
manipulation of guilt complexes comes out in the Communist
emphasis on the distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars.
Command efficiency and troop morale are lowered through
guilt feelings. A nation is more likely to win in conflict if it
considers its cause to be just. Hence the Communists try to
arrange matters in such a way that any war they are fighting
will be a just war, while any war fought by a democratic
nation will be unjust. The purpose is to inculcate into the Free
World guilt feelings about resistance to communism and at
the same time immunize the "Soviet peoples" with a sort of
ideological vaccination against any notion that Commimist
wars or even "aggressions" may be something less than emana-
tions of an exalted sense of justice. The Free World has been
infected to some degree by bad conscience and guilt feelings.
Hence, partly at least, the often surprising paralysis of demo-
cratic will.

Communism and Religion

In their attempts to undermine hostile societies, the Com-
munists make every effort to destroy religious, ethical, and
other higher motivations, in the expectation that the preoccu-
pation with immediate, mundane, material, and private in-
terests and the destruction of spiritual reserves will create frus-
trations and "atomize" society. As religious beliefs wane, the
number of possible recruits for communism tends to increase.
This is so, not only because there is a mechanical relationship
between communism and atheism but, more significantly, be-
cause the human hunger for redemption and assurance must
be stilled and because the desire for a God craves satisfaction.

COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WAHFABE I35

Communism redeems on earth and proclaims man to be
"God." The revolution is seen as the crucial "religious" event
which transforms man from the "object" into the "subject" of
history, that is, into the "creator" of the perfect society of
history. Paradise is moved from the origin to the destination
of man's wandering.

The Communists' most powerful weapon in their onslaught
on religion is "social criticism" addressed to economic hard-
ship, oppression, racial tension, delinquency, family trouble,
and the shortcomings of religious organizations. The purpose
of "social criticism" is to produce frustration consciousness and
persuade people that they cannot take such frustrations in
their stride, let alone sublimate them by rehgious abnegation
and hope for the hereafter. Instead, they must overcome them
by revolutionary and violent action, and by active sacrifice.
Frustration, let us note, is a forerunner of aggressiveness, espe-
cially if aggressive impulses can be stimulated artificially.

To the extent, therefore, that religion is eliminated as the
Basic Premise, the individual is thrown back onto his own
mental resources. He looks for another Basic Premise and
abandons himself to pleasure seeking and other selfish drives.
Most importantly, having been deprived of the basis of cer-
tainty, he loses judgment and, above all, the Job-like stead-
fastness in trouble.

By contrast, the Communists must find for the societies un-
der their rule a substitute for religion as a foundation of mental
health. They cannot adopt religion, certainly not openly, be-
cause this would sensitize human conscience and thus under-
mine the foundations of their state and their world movement.
Neither can they condone hedonistic tendencies or any open-
minded and multivalued thinking, which would jeopardize
their dogmatic ideology and, most significantly in our context,
preclude the eflFective application of psywar, Communist style.
Their obvious solution is, first, to peddle the pseudo religion
of materialistic communism; second, to retain aspects of re-
ligions: faith, brotherhood, initiation, salvation, redemption,
grace, paradise, consecration, guilt, sin, sacrifice, atonement,
asceticism— all of which have their counterparts in the Com-
munist ideology; and third, to be excessively dogmatic about
it an.

136 COMMtTNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Communist Sociological Assumptions

Many schools of psychology are agreed on the importance
of fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety are considered to be
among the main factors which hinder the proper working of
the mind. There is litde doubt that fear is the disintegrating
factor par excellence. This, of course, is not a new discovery
from the poHtical practitioner. It is not surprising that the
Communists have always laid great stress on terror, violence,
and purges and nowadays have enlisted the specter of nuclear
war in their strategy of terror. In the dimension of psychologi-
cal warfare, they do not expect that much will come from
fxirther readings of the Communist Manifesto, but they usually
obtain good results from giving the impression diat they are
willing to go beyond the "brink of war."

However, the Communists have added an "improvement"
to the age-old art of inducing fright. Men no longer fear a
phenomenon once its nature has been understood and its be-
havior has become predictable. A danger perceived may be-
come a stimulant for action— a most unwelcome possibihty.
Consequently, the Communists have adopted the techniques
of erecting impenetrable "curtains" and of acting unpredicta-
bly and capriciously; for example, by alternating smiles with
growls, arresting the irmocent and freeing the guilty, keeping
prisoners in captivity beyond their terms but releasing them
at any odd moment, and in general showing themselves im-
pervious to reasonable argument and immovable by counsels
of moderation. Deliberately, the impression is being created
that one can never know what is going to happen next; even
if everything is calm now, the "next" disturbance may be of
unparalleled violence.

Let us look at one example of Soviet "irrational" behavior.
The Soviet habit of giving consistently an inflated impression
of Communist strength is unsound according to all rules of the
military art. Schlieffen's motto, generally accepted by thinking
soldiers, was, "Be more than you seem." Specifically, this
method was considered sound by a foremost Soviet expert.

COMMUNIST PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE I37

Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov. But the opposite axiom: "Appear
stronger than you really are," is the most rewarding one for
the purposes of psychological operations, especially if the vic-
tim's reactions to the Soviet strategy of terror can be inhibited
by a show of phony friendliness. The technique of blowing
hot and cold and of alternating confusing signals was used by
Pavlov to instigate "neurotic" behavior in his dogs. It is en-
tirely acceptable to international poHtics.

Another important cause of mental disturbances has been
identified by Emile Durkheim in his concept of anomie. Other
sociologists have amplified this concept by pointing out that,
to be psychologically healthy, the individual needs a close
community life. Precisely because society has changed into a
functional and utilitarian association, the individual needs
emotional security and close human relations. The structure
of the over-all society must be intelligible, so that the individ-
ual can orient himself within it. His dependence on the large
group must offer gratifications sufficient to evoke in him feel-
ings of loyalty, pride of membership, dedication, conviction,
etc.

The Communists aim to produce anomie through propa-
ganda, class warfare, infiltration, disintegration, policy sabo-
tage, and other revolutionary and subversive operations. The
psychological effects are not long in coming. Given an anomie
situation, it is relatively easy to induce in large nimibers of
people some kind of neurotic behavior characterized by hope-
lessness, obsessions, compulsions, and fears of failure. Pro-
tracted disturbances undermine motivation, dedication, loy-
alty, the community spirit, and all those attitudes which keep
society going. As this assault bears fruit and creates defeatism
and hstlessness, anomie grows with cumulative force.

Communist Crowd Psychology

It will come as no surprise that the Communists are close
students of crowd psychology. They have learned Gustave Le
Bon's fundamental postulate that crowd behavior is charac-
terized by the temporary weakening or loss of restraint and
reason. Crowds are suggestible, aggressive, and destructive.

138 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

"Crowd mentality," that is, the loss of impulse and action con-
trols, is contagious. Going beyond Le Bon, the Commtmists
have discovered that "crowds" are not formed just by direct
physical contacts among a mass of people, such as in meetings
or demonstrations, but that, in modem times, crowd attitudes
can be created among people who are physically isolated. It
is merely necessary to arouse excessive fears, exploit a calam-
ity, stimtJate a panicky attitude, give signals for action against
scapegoats or for actions with a symbolic character, and keep
the majority of the population paralyzed. It is easy to see how
the application of conditioned reflexes and fears to otherwise
straightforward propaganda operations can contribute greatly
to the Vermassung of modem man. One of the great objectives
is to induce in all hostile groups the attitude of "no will."

However, the Commtmists know that crowds do not origi-
nate or move by themselves but must be created and led.
Activating concepts are as necessary as paralyzing ideas.
Therefore, the principal aim of Communist activities is to ren-
der the revolutionary leadership group capable of performing
the "rape of the masses." This leadership group must be en-
dowed with one predominant characteristic: "iron will," im-
pervious to the attrition of time. The Commxmists have bor-
rowed Nietzsche's concept of the "length of will." Will is iron
only if the commitment is total in all dimensions, time included.
The Communist leader is a person who cannot turn his back
on communism, and the comrades see to it that defections of
leaders do not really occur, even in the case of expulsions and
purges.

12. Soviet Strategy of Disarmament

by Thomas W. Wolfe

Dr. Wolfe is a long-time student of Soviet
affairs. A native of California, he received his
M.A. degree from Columbia University and
his Ph.D. degree from Georgetown Univer-
sity. He is also a graduate of the Russian In-
stitute of Columbia University.

Soviet disarmament proposals are an integral part o£ a strategy
aimed at degrading Western strengths and reducing the risks
of nuclear war while the Soviets are in the process of building
up their own over-aU power position.

The implications of Soviet disarmament initiatives for the
West are sometimes lost in the search for an unequivocal an-
swer to the question: Do the Soviets expect to win the struggle
for world supremacy via processes of 'liistorical development"
short of major mihtary conflict, as Premier Nikita S, Khru-
shchev pubHcly proclaimed, or do they privately believe that
military power will be required ultimately to bring the West
to its knees?

No categorical answer can be given to this question, which
for all practical purposes can be answered only by events. In
fact, the question itself is misleading, for it fails to distinguish
between Soviet preferences and the strategic necessities which
confront them in their quest to dominate the world. By im-
phcation, the question also neglects the back-up role of mili-
tary power for diplomatic blackmail and other forms of non-
violent Soviet aggression.

140 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Trejened Strategy and Dictates of Reality

The Soviet Union's preferred strategy undoubtedly would
be to force the West— and above all, the United States— to
capitulate without war. However, the Soviet leaders are real-
ists, brought up in a hard school which teaches that power in
its various strategically significant forms is what counts when
great historical issues are to be decided.

As reahsts they know that strategies grow out of the inter-
action between competitors in the power struggle, and not out
of unilateral preferences. Whatever their preferences might
be, therefore, the men in the Kremlin can scarcely shirk their
historic duty of preparing the Soviet camp to subdue the West
by force if it refuses to be disarmed. Moreover, they have in-
herited a weighty legacy of doctrine and experience which,
while cautioning against military "adventurism," nevertheless
clearly prescribes that force and violence are essential levers
in the overthrow of one historic order of society by another.

Marx, for example, who preached that "war is the midwife
of revolution," wrote that "the last word of social science on
the eve of each general reconstruction of society wiU always
remain: 'struggle or death, bloody war or nothingness.'"^
Lenin said, "Great historical questions can be solved only by
violence,"^ while a contemporary Communist theoretician,
Mao Tse-tung, has written:

Every communist must grasp the truth that political
power grows out of the barrel of a gun, . . . in fact, we
can say that the whole world can he remolded only with
the gun.^

Khrushchev himself has not hewn strictly to the traditional
Communist line on the role of war in the struggle between the
Communist and non-Communist camps, although neither has
he strayed as far from it as some observers are wont to believe.
Khrushchev's amendment at the Twentieth Party Congress in
1956 of the Leninist dogma of inevitable war so long as capi-
talism exists is largely responsible for tlie reputation he has
acquired as a doctrinal innovator. Holding that the Communist

SOVIET STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT I4I

camp has become "a mighty force" with "not only the moral
but also the material means to prevent aggression,"^ Khru-
shchev advanced the notion, novel to Commtinist ears, that a
world war might not be necessary before the final global vic-
tory of communism. However, his much publicized assertion
that "war is not a fatal inevitabiUty" was, and subsequently
has been, carefully qualified. According to Khrushchev:

As long as imperialism exists, the economic base giving
rise to wars will also remain. . . . As long as capitalism
survives in the world, reactionary forces, representing the
interests of the capitalist monopolies, will continue their
drive toward military gambles and aggression and may
try to unleash war. But war is not a fatalistic inevitability.
Today there are mighty social and political forces pos-
sessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from
unleashing war, and, if they try to start it, to give a
smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their ad-
venturist plans.^

He stated on another occasion:

Leninism teaches that the ruling classes do not surren-
der their power voluntarily. However, the greater or lesser
intensity which the struggle may assume, the use or non-
use of violence in the transition to socialism, depend on
the resistance of the exploiters . . . rather than on the
proletariat.^

Just and Unjust Wars

Khrushchev's doctrinal position on war can perhaps be best
imderstood in light of the distinction between just and unjust
wars which Commimists have always drawn. By Communist
definition, just wars are "wars of liberation" from "capitalist
slavery," from the "yoke of imperialism" and in defense against
foreign attack, whereas wars by capitalist states against each
other or against Communist states are imjust, or predatory,
wars, "v/ars of conquest waged to conquer and enslave foreign
countries."'^ By definition, Communists cannot fight an unjust

142 COMMXJNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

war, even if they initiate it, because wars fought by commu-
nism are always progressive and revolutionary, that is, just
wars.

Khrushchev has carefully maintained the distinction be-
tween just and unjust wars, even when denying most vocifer-
ously that Communists have any intention of trying to achieve
their aims by force of arms. Thus, for example, in a speech in
Budapest on December i, 1959, he said:

The Socialist countries have no reason whatsoever to
start war, to propagate their ideas by force of arms. . . .
No Communist party anywhere, if it really is Communist,
has ever said that it hopes to achieve its aims through
war.

Consistent struggle against unjust wars of conquest has
been an integral part of the international working class
movement since its very inception.^

In his remarks in Peiping on September 30, 1959, at the
tenth anniversary of the founding of Communist China, he
said:

Marxists have always recognized only . . . just wars
and they have always condemned imperialistic aggressive
wars. This is one of the characteristics of Marxist-Leninist
theory.^

Again, addressing the Supreme Soviet in October 1959,
Khrushchev took a strong stand against predatory and imperi-
ahstic wars.

The point of these and similar statements by Khrushchev,
which reiterate classical Communist doctrine on just and un-
just wars, is that war remains a permissible instrument of revo-
lutionary change so long as it serves the interests of commu-
nism and so long as conditions are suitable for waging it.

His estimate of the probability of an open battle between
the "Soviet camp" and the "camp of imperiahsm" rests on "a
calculation of the chances of effective resistance" by the
latter.io

From the point of view of experience, no less than from a
doctrinal standpoint, there is ample evidence for supposing
that Communist leaders Hke Khrushchev are fully aware of

SOVIET STKATEGY OF DISAKMAMENT I43

the relationship between military power and Communist ex-
pansion. History shows that not a single country in the world
has been brought under Communist domination except where
nonviolent revolutionary techniques have been backed up by
armed conquest or the close presence of Communist military
power. In Western countries with traditionally strong Com-
mimist movements, hke Italy, France, and Greece, the Com-
munist revolution has made no headway in the absence of
direct Soviet military support, as Stalin privately pointed out
in his correspondence with Tito in 1948.^^

To suppose that hard-boiled realists like the Soviet leaders
are unreservedly optimistic about the likelihood of bringing
off a Communist revolution in the United States without an
assist from Soviet arms is to imply that they have drawn no
lessons from some forty years of Communist experience.

ExpHcit recognition of the historical dependence of commu-
nism on war can be found in a new Soviet textbook, Founda-
tions of Marxism-Leninism. Discussing the question "Is revolu-
tion obligatorily linked with war?" the text states:

Up to now historical development adds up to the fact
that revolutionary overthrow of capitalism has been
linked each time with world wars. Both the first and sec-
ond world wars served as powerful accelerators of revolu-
tionary explosions.^^

After noting Commimist gains from these two wars, the
text goes on:

From these historical facts the conclusion can be fully
drawn that in the epoch of imperialism, world wars—
which sharpen the social-political contradictions of capi-
talist society to the extreme— inevitably lead to revolution-
ary upheavals.^^

The textbook also reiterates the traditional Commmiist doc-
trine that war is not "an obligatory prerequisite," applying this
notion, however, only to national-liberation revolutions. Re-
cent examples cited to support the point were the revolutions
in Iraq (1958) and Cuba (1959).^^

Both the English and the American revolutions also were
what the Communists term 'TDOurgeois democratic" revolu-

144 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

tions. Like the "national liberation" types, they were not "pro-
letarian revolutions." Therefore, the implication is clear to any
trained Communist. Other forms of revolution may occur
peacefully, but "proletarian revolutions" require the exercise
of some degree of violence.

Avoidance of Frontal Military Encounter

The strategy of the post-Stalin leadership has been marked
by the tendency carefully to steer away from any major frontal
military encounter with the West. This exercise of elementary
caution, which is fully consistent with the Bolshevik schooling
that the realities of power must be weighed carefully at ail
times, probably has served more than anything else to sustain
the image of Khrushchev as an advocate of peaceful conquest.

It is doubtless evident to the Soviet leaders that, so long as
the West maintains its global nuclear power unimpaired, Com-
munist ambitions would be placed in jeopardy under any of
the calculable situations in which major military power of the
Soviet and Western camps might become engaged. These sit-
uations would be: (i) the case of Western reaction to a war
started by the Soviet bloc; (2) the case of a war started by
the West, such as the "desperate lashing out" of moribund
capitalism, in line with Marxist doctrine; and (3) the case of
a major war which might grow out of limited war, or otherwise
occur by accident or miscalculation.

Seen in this light, the central aim of the Soviet disarmament
campaign is to clear the strategic landscape of a serious road-
block to world revolution by engineering the nuclear disarma-
ment of the West. If this can be accomplished, not only would
the Soviets gain elbow room to pursue a more aggressive po-
litical strategy but, fully as important, the stage would be set
for seeking a decisive reversal of the military balance.

From the Soviet viewpoint, reversal of the military balance
by the brute process of trying to outbiuld the United States
on a massive scale in modem weapons probably has not looked
as a particiJarly promising task. Even forging ahead of the
United States in a new weapons system like the ICBM might
well seem to offer only a transient advantage in a situation of

SOVIET STHATEGY OF DISAKMAMENT I45

unrestricted arms competition. As a powerful industrial nation
put on notice that its survival depended on success in an all-out
arms race, the United States would plainly be capable of
upping the ante and canceling out the Soviet advantage. In-
deed, this sort of aboveboard arms competition is undoubtedly
what Khrushchev had in mind when he deemed it "high time
to put an end to the arms race." The logic of the Soviet dis-
armament campaign is to avoid just such an open competition,
the more so at a time when the Soviets may calculate that
they have managed to pull ahead.

Dual Approach to the Power Struggle

Much more in keeping with the classical Soviet approach
would be the dual process of immobilizing the nuclear weap-
ons systems on which American military power is mainly
based, while at the same time accumulating advantages on
the Soviet side through such means as technological and psy-
chological surprise, hidden mihtary preparations, clandestine
storage of decisive weapons, and the like.

In fact, it can be said without exaggeration that the Soviet
disarmament campaign has become the central strategic battle
of the times. Rather than constituting a Soviet acknowledg-
ment that the path to world revolution is henceforth closed to
all but peaceful means of competition, the disarmament cam-
paign represents a major attempt to keep this path open to
all means of struggle, including whatever use of military force
may be necessary to reach the Communist goal of world
domination.

There is also another element of deep strategic significance
behind the Soviet disarmament campaign. Since the level of
armaments and over-all security posture of the Free World
represent fimdamentally a defensive stance against Commu-
nist aggression, acceptance of any precipitate program of dis-
armament by the West would mean, in a basic strategic sense,
that the West no longer felt capable of insuring its own sur-
vival. This acknowledgment alone would constitute for the
West a strategic defeat of enormous magnitude, leaving an
irresolute Western world only the recourse of seeking accom-

146 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

modation with an aggressive movement which is dedicated to
achieving mastery of the globe.

Soviet Proposals of Full and Partial Disarmament

Soviet disarmament proposals fall into two categories: first,
the "full and complete" disarmament scheme advanced by
Khrushchev before the U. N. General Assembly on Septem-
ber 18, 1959; and second, a group of partial-disarmament
measures, including earlier Soviet proposals of 1955, upon
which the Soviet Union has declared itself ready to negotiate
if the Western countries "do not for some reason or other ex-
press their willingness to agree to general and complete dis-
armament."

Tactically, the sweeping Khrushchev proposal was meant
to put the West on the defensive and to create a climate in
which the West could be maneuvered into accepting less radi-
cal but nevertheless crippling disarmament measures. If by
outside chance the West should lose its balance completely
and go along with the scheme of total disarmament in four
years, this would be regarded by the Soviets as a pure wind-
fall. The control and inspection provisions of the Soviet pro-
posal are so vague, and its period of execution so brief, that it
could not possibly provide the conditions necessary for a stable
and orderly transition to a peaceful world. The basic object
of the plan is to confuse Western opinion, paralyze Western
decision-making processes, slow down Western defense efforts,
and forestall the marshahng of effective opposition during a
vital phase in the historical process of reversing the power
balance between the Communist and non-Communist camps.

From the Communist viewpoint, the world is now passing
through a significant and possibly decisive phase of transition
between two historical periods. "Capitalist encirclement" has
been broken. "Commtmist encirclement" does not yet exist,
but the rapidly growing strength of the Communist camp "is
opening up new prospects for it."^^ Allowing for the fact that
Communist advances are deliberately exaggerated for psycho-
logical effect, there is nevertheless ample evidence that the
Communist leadership now sees a real prospect ahead for

SOVIET STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT I47

"turning the corner," as it were, and reversing once and for all
the power balance between the Communist camp and the Free
World. In a basic sense, the Kremlin's great strategic task is
to turn this historical comer without a collision which might
throw the whole Communist movement for a fatal loss. Its
peaceful-coexistence strategy— of which disarmament is the
most dramatic concomitant— is calculated to help carry oflF this
task successfully.

Aside from the tactical and strategic purposes noted above,
advocacy of total disarmament serves Soviet pursuit of the
East- West struggle in other ways. It strengthens a diplomatic-
propaganda oflFensive against the West during a period of im-
portant international negotiations and gives dramatic support
to the Soviet effort to pose as the champion of world peace
and security for all peoples. It also enables the Soviet leader-
ship to shift the blame on the West for any diflBculties its
domestic programs may encounter. For example, Khrushchev
hinted to the Soviet people that if benefits like a six-hour work-
ing day are not widely realized during the present Seven- Year
Plan, it will be because the West refuses to accept his total-
disarmament proposal.i^

The partial-disarmament proposals which have been ad-
vanced by the Soviets offer little novelty. One proposal calls
for a European inspection zone and reduction of foreign troops
in the NATO area, designed to bring about a weakening of the
NATO "shield." A second calls for a ''denuclearized zone" in
central Europe along lines of the Rapacki Plan of 1957, the
object of which is to divest NATO forces of their tactical
nuclear weapons and to prevent the nuclear arming of West
Germany. Another proposal is for total withdrawal of foreign
forces from Europe, but this is conditioned by the stipulation
that foreign military bases everywhere be liquidated— a provi-
sion aimed at the world-wide deployment of American strate-
gic forces. In return for what they ask, these and other partial
disarmament proposals give up very little and are clearly cal-
culated to advance basic Soviet military and political ob-
jectives.

To the extent that both the total-disarmament scheme and
the various partial-disarmament steps would call for a lengthy
period of negotiations, the KremHn may well calculate that

148 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Western parliamentary governments, operating vmder the
pressure of public opinion, can be encouraged to slacken their
defense efforts while the closed Soviet system presses on with
its own military preparations.

A drawn-out period of negotiations on the crucial issue of
disarmament might also hold another interesting prospect for
the Communists. The Soviets consistently regard the negotia-
tion of agreements as a means of registering and confirming
the power balance. They may look on an arms-negotiating
period as one during which further build-up of Soviet-bloc
economic and military power can be expected to tip the scales
decisively in Soviet favor, particularly if the negotiations serve
at the same time to put a brake on Western defense prep-
arations.

For example, the "missUe lag," which is calculated to grow
to Soviet advantage in the early sixties, would coincide with
a series of disarmament discussions. If the talks themselves
yielded nothing but interminable sparring over control and in-
spection problems, like the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotia-
tions, they might nevertheless take the steam out of Western
attempts to overcome the Soviet missile lead while, behind
the curtain of Soviet secrecy, Soviet missile plants and research
establishments would go on preparing further "surprises" for
the West at the negotiating table.

Soviet expectation of the gains to be derived from disarma-
ment negotiations with the West will be conditioned to a con-
siderable extent, of course, by their estimate of the firmness
and unity of the Western camp. If the West shows no dis-
position to accept agreements on terms other than those which
serve its own vital security interests, the Soviets conceivably
could be forced to reconsider their whole approach to the dis-
armament issue. There is, despite the mutual incompatibiHty
of basic Soviet and Western goals, some possibihty that the
Soviets might be brought around to acceptance of genuine
arms-control measures on conditions compatible with Western
security.

SOVIET STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT I49

Will Soviet Disarmament Strategy Change?

Several factors which might motivate a Soviet interest in
some types of "genuine" arms-control agreements can be ad-
duced, although it remains to be demonstrated whether any
of them are compelling enough to dictate a real change in
Soviet attitudes and behavior.

One of these is concern over the danger of war by accident
or miscalculation. Soviet leaders have alluded to this danger
frequently, although usually attributing it in a propaganda
context to Western military activities and deployments. At
bottom, there may be real uneasiness among the Soviet leader-
ship that accidental war represents an incalculable element
over which they have no control. However, there is Httle good
evidence to date that the Soviets are yet sufficiently concerned
over the "accident factor" to accept the kind of control and
inspection measures which would be necessary to alleviate the
danger.

Economic pressure is another factor which might influence
the Soviet attitude toward disarmament. The rising costs and
rapid turnover rates of modem weapons systems may give
pause to the Kremlin's planners, even though their growing
economy allows more leeway than in the past for military al-
location of resources. Manpower might also pose a particular
problem at this time, due to the coincidence of World War II
aftereffects and the expanding labor-force requirements of the
Seven- Year Plan. However, as suggested by Kltrushchev's Jan-
uary 14, i960, speech on armed-force reductions,^'^ this need
is being met in part at least by rational readjustment of the
Soviet military establishment to cut down its oversized troop
strength and substitute the firepower of modem arms. On bal-
ance, the Soviets appear to be under no great compulsion to
offer significant disarmament concessions out of economic
necessity.

The possibility also exists that the Communists may be will-
ing to pay a price at the disarmament negotiating table for
insuring further consolidation of the Soviet bloc and reducing
potential sources of internal stabihty. Some types of agree-

150 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

merits might appeal to the Kremhn— for example, if they would
put a seal on Soviet-dominated regimes in eastern Europe and
smother any lingering hopes of dehverance. The Soviets might
also find some interest in arrangements which would discour-
age the growth of too much military capability in Communist
China, particularly attainment of independent nuclear statvis.
While such factors as these may have some influence on
the attitude which the Soviet leaders take toward disarmament
negotiations with the West, there is still no reason to assume
that their real view of disarmament is less hardheaded and
calculating than that of their forenmner, Lenin, who said:
"Only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie will
it be able, without betraying its world-historical mission, to
throw all armaments on the scrap heap I . . ."^^

Notes

1. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Fhilosophy (London: Martin Law-
rence, Ltd., 1936), p. 147.

2. V. L Lenin, Selected Works (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1943), III, 313.

3. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Pub-
lishers, 1954), n, 2.72,-73.

4. Leo Gniliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies II: The Documen-
tary Record of the 20th Party Congress and Its Aftermath ( New
York: Praeger, 1956), p. 37.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 38,

7. Short History of the CPSU (b) (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1945), pp. 168-69.

8. The New York Times, December 2, 1959.

9. Ibid., October 1, 1959.

LO. Facts on Communism, Vol. I: The Communist Ideology, Com-
mittee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives,
December 1959, p. 115. Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer of Notre Dame
University is credited with this analysis.

Li. The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, Text of the Published Corre-
spondence (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,
1948), p. 51-

SOVIET STRATEGY OF DISARMAMENT I5I

12. O. V. Kousinen (ed. ), Osnovi Marksisma-Leninisma (Founda-
tions of Marxism-Leninism) (Moscow: State Publishing House
of Political Literature, 1959), p. 519.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 520.

IS- See Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces, U. S.
Senate Document No. 57 (Washington: Legislative Reference
Service of the Library of Congress, September 1959), p. 2.

16. Pravda, November 18, 1959.

17. Ibid., January 15, i960.

18. V. I. Lenin, "Military Program of Proletarian Revolution," Col-
lected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1942), XIX,
366.

by Anne M. Jonas

Mrs. Jonas has been engaged in full-time re-
search on the U.S.S.R. in Washington, D.C.,
since 1951. A graduate of the University of
Virginia, she has also studied at American
University and Georgetown University. Her
extensive knowledge of Russian has enabled
her to monitor in depth the shifts in Soviet
strategic thinking.

Slowly but surely, the U.S.S.R. is adapting its strategy and
tactics to the realities of the technological world revolution.
This adaptation is being accomplished within the framework
of Communist orthodoxy. Briefly summarized, the orthodox
teaching has been, and still is: direct all efiForts toward the
main goal of achieving global victory for communism, but
change tactics and techniques to conform to concrete con-
ditions.

These broad tactical shifts can be attributed to two factors.
First, the U.S.S.R. has acquired new weapons— nuclear explo-
sives and advanced means of delivery. Second, it possesses
greater fundamental strength than ever before— economic,
technological, and psychopolitical.

Khrushchev's Strategic Innovations

Khrushchev's irmovations have been twofold. First, he has
placed increasing emphasis on attempts to strengthen Com-
munist capabilities for relatively "bloodless" world revolution.
Second, he has adapted military-force structure to nuclear

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE 153

realities— an attempt to prepare Commtinist forces for world
revolution through conquest, if necessary.

Khrushchev's combination of a "peaceful coexistence" cam-
paign and a sweeping modernization of the mihtary establish-
ment is true to the best Communist style and conforms fully
to the doctrine of "dialectics." But in strategic sophistication
and tactical variety, intensity, and scope, his innovations ex-
ceed those of earlier days. True, Khrushchev commands new
and far more powerful tools in the historical struggle for world
domination. Yet the problems posed by nuclear firepower have
become more diflBcult to solve. Khrushchev's moves are an at-
tempt to find an original solution to the risks and complexities
of nuclear war.

Far from abandoning hope for completing the world Com-
mtinist revolution, he has voiced new confidence in the likeli-
hood of its success. Nuclear long-range weapons have fur-
nished, for the first time in history, a capability to attack the
principal capitalist power— the United States, which, hereto-
fore, was beyond the access of the Soviet military machine.
Khrushchev has stated that, if all-out nuclear war occurred,
capitalism would vanish. Presumably, in his belief, the U.S.S.R.
would survive a new world war, to lead the international Com-
munist movement to definitive victory on a global scale.

How well will Khrushchev succeed in his attempts to ex-
tend Communist power without unleashing nuclear war? Fail-
ing decisive success in this endeavor, xmder what conditions
is he most hkely to initiate war? An analysis of the challenges
with which Khrushchev has confronted us may provide a par-
tial answer.

Although dozens of factors are involved, an examination of
four key elements within Communist conflict doctrine may
furnish clarification. These crucial factors are: the role of nu-
clear weapons, the role of peaceful revolution, the role of war,
and the conditions for initiating war.

The Role of Nuclear Weapons

When President Truman first told Stalin about joint U.S.-
British work on the atomic bomb, Stalin appeared indiflFerent.

154 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

After the first bomb fell on Hiroshima, propagandists, and
Stalin himself, took pains to disparage atomic weapons and
to deny their miHtary effectiveness. The subsequent record
proved, as should have been expected, that this w^as but an-
other example of deception. While the Soviet leaders publicly
vi'ere berating the effectiveness of atomic weapons, simultane-
ous development of across-the-board atomic capabilities was
enjoying highest priority. Apparently as early as 1943, Stalin
had ordered Russian physicists to resume their prewar re-
search, and espionage networks had been requested to collect
as much Western nuclear information as possible.^

Despite these intensive efforts, though apparently tm-
planned, the strategy of the cotrnteroffensive proved, once
more, in World War 11, to be Stalin's winning strategy.^ The
concept of luring the enemy deep into the great spaces of Rus-
sia and defeating him at the far end of his logistics lines had
succeeded several times in the past. Yet if this strategy was
to predominate, it would permit no more than the exercise of
tactical and technological surprise. It ruled out strategic sur-
prise, which already was evolving as the key to success in nu-
clear conflict.

After Stalin's death, Soviet military publications publicly
debated the changed strategic significance of surprise and pre-
emption in the nuclear age.^ It was now "admitted" openly
that surprise could be of decisive importance; hence there
arose the need to "pre-empt" a hostile strike before it is
launched.

Khrushchev has been somewhat circuitous in admitting the
strategic importance of a surprise nuclear blow in current So-
viet doctrine. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet, he refrained
from going beyond the hint that, to minimize retahation,
the attacker should try to wipe out all enemy ICBM sites and
nuclear stockpiles with the first blow.^ In addition, he ad-
mitted the obvious— futtire wars would begin not on the fron-
tiers, as formerly, but with massed missile attacks during the
first minutes of the war on strategic targets in the heart of
the warring countries.^ Khrushchev pointed out that the
U.S.S.R. was developing a potent deterrent against defeat by
surprise attack— namely, a second-strike capability. "We de-
ploy our missile complexes in such a way that dupHcation and

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE 155

triplication is guaranteed. The territory of otir country is huge;
we are able to disperse our missile complexes and to camou-
flage them well."^ The West, Khrushchev asserted, was more
vulnerable than the Soviet Union:

In the event of a new world war . . . we, too, would
suffer great calamities^, toe would have many losses, yet
we would survive. Our territory is immense; our popula-
tion is less concentrated in major industrial centers. . . .
The West would suffer incomparably more. . . . A new
war not only would be their last war, it would also be the
end of capitalism.'^

In announcing a one-third reduction of the officers and men
constituting the military estabhshment, Khrushchev left no
doubt about his views on the decisive importance of nuclear
and hydrogen weapons in contemporary warfare. "The de-
fense potential of a country depends, to a decisive extent, on
the total firepower and the means of delivery."^

Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense,
bluntly stated: "Our premise is that a future war will be waged
with mass use of nuclear weapons." Also, he went beyond
Khrushchev and stressed the advantages of ICBMs in terms
of global targeting flexibility and ground and in-flight invul-
nerability. He told the Supreme Soviet:

Present-day ballistic missiles guarantee a high proba-
bility of inflicting powerful strikes simultaneously on a
great variety of targets. The tremendous range and speed
of missiles make it possible to redirect firepower quickly,
shifting the decisive thrust from one target or one theater
of operations to the other, and by means of massed nu-
clear strikes to influence and change the situation to one's
own advantage. . . . The launching sites of missiles are
easy to camouflage and even to conceal completely
(ukryt'), and thus possess the highest probability of sur-
vival and invulnerability. . . . Destroying a ship at sea
or bringing down an airplane or destroying an aircraft
projectile in the air causes no great difficulty when present-
day means . . . are employed. But neutralizing a ballistic
missile to destroy it in flight so far is impossible— it hits
the target relentlessly.^

156 COMMUNIST STKATEGY AND TACTICS

In accepting the importance of nuclear firepower and vari-
ous missile-delivery systems, Khrushchev has modernized, but
not abandoned, Communist doctrine on the need for a mixed-
force structure, the combination of all arms, and the contin-
uous variation and modernization of the weapons of conflict.
He is adapting his force structure to permit all-out surprise
attack. In addition, he is retaining a spectrum of capabiUties
to wage all types of warfare. At the two extremes of his force
structure are nuclear-delivery systems and proxy guerrillas. His
views that no single weapons system is decisive under aU con-
ditions conforms to traditional guidelines of Communist strat-
egy. New in the Communist operational lexicon is the realiza-
tion that nuclear weapons must figure, in one way or another,
in any attempt to defeat the United States and its major allies.

In addition to recognizing the miUtary advantages of
nuclear-thermonuclear-missile weapons systems, the Soviet
leaders have demonstrated, both by word and deed, keen ap-
preciation of their inherent psychopoHtical potentialities. Out-
side the bloc, the fears about nuclear weapons and their various
means of dehvery have become the keystone in one of the most
intensive efforts at neutralization through military blackmail in
the history of communism.

The Role of Peaceful Revolution

Three basic motivations underlie current Communist efforts
to accompHsh world domination by peaceful means: the di-
lemma presented by the risk of all-out nuclear war; the emer-
gence of new states in a period of technological revolution;
and, corollary to these phenomena, changed estimates on the
rapidity of the world revolution.

The "contradictions" inherent in these motivations are,
briefly, these:

1. For the first time, the Soviet Union has the capability
of attacking the chief capitalist enemy, the United States, and
of accomplishing the world revolution by mihtary means.

2,. Contrary noises from the Kremlin notwithstanding, many
obstacles prohibit decisive— and even "adequate"— victory over
the United States at the moment, and presvimably for the near

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE I57

future. Two principal obstacles obtrude. The first of these is
the political intent of Communist conquest— wars are not won
until occupation is accomplished and a Communist regime in-
stalled. Even though a Soviet surprise attack may prove to be
devastating, it wiU not necessarily vault the Commimists into
power in the United States. Second, a fundamental Communist
doctrinal tenet holds that the "base of the world revolution"—
the U.S.S.R.— must be kept inviolate. Even if Khrushchev is
prepared to have the Soviet countries absorb the destruction
of nuclear war, as he insists, unrest in the satellites, in China,
and perhaps in Russia itself cannot be ruled out; nor can a
vicious intra-Party struggle. Hence nuclear war poses extreme
danger to the continued solidarity and stability of the Com-
munist bloc. It is most unlikely that the Kremlin is obKvious
to this hazard.

On the other hand, aggressive nuclear war waged under
favorable conditions against the United States would consid-
erably spur the world revolution.

The Communist view of the rapidity of the world revolution
has changed several times. Events disproved earlier predictions
of a cataclysmic and global crisis of capitalism which, if ex-
ploited by the proletariat, would flame into immediate world
revolution. After some hesitancy, the Communists adopted the
concept of protracted conflict— the notion that the world revo-
lution cannot be triggered by a single global crisis, but will be
accomplished, instead, in installments and over the span of an
entire "era." In the interim the Soviet Union was to be forged
into the main power base of the world revolution— primarily
through a build-up of war potential and of the armed forces
as the chief instrument of the revolution. The role of foreign
Communist parties also changed: they should act, in most
cases, as auxiliaries of Soviet power.

In an attempt to reconcile the risks and promises implicit
in the new weapons, Khrushchev has opted for an assortment
of tactics. As Stalin phrased it, "in order to win a war, one
must not only triumph at the front but also revolutionize the
enemy's rear."^*^ This effort is conducted according to the un-
written "inverted golden rule" of Communist doctrine: "Do
unto your opponent exactly the opposite of what you want him
to do unto you."^^

158 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Against the major powers, the principal Communist tactics
under Khrushchev have been: deterrence to gain time; paraly-
zation and demoralization of will through nuclear blackmail;
and attempts at force degradation through "disarmament" and
"coexistence" moves. ^^ The strategy is obviously a phased
one. The objectives are, first, to inhibit progressively the Free
World's responses to Soviet gambits and, second, to achieve
the active— though perhaps unwitting— co-operation of forces
within the West.

Paralyzing the Will of the West

According to standard Commimist procedure, the predomi-
nant enemy group should not be attacked in any decisive man-
ner before its leaders and cadres have become unsure of their
capabilities, intentions, and rights and, above all, of their
chances of success. Through the neutralization of allies and
the paralyzation of principal sources of domestic support, the
leadership elite in the chief enemy country can be made to
vacillate. As it falls victim to paralyzing ideas and political
and ideological splits, and suffers from progressive loss of socio-
pohtical group cohesion, the military and security forces at
its command are infected, become unreliable and ineffective.
This degradation of military strength, in turn, emasculates the
pohtical leadership. "Disanuament" tactics are among the
preferred means of accomplishing these objectives. Another
method is the wooing of political parties, which, for one reason
or the other, can be induced to seek "accommodation" with
the Soviet Union. Simultaneously with attempts to neutralize
the principal opponent and his allies, indirect gains must be
achieved in the "intermediate strata"— the rest of the world.
The principal tactics now being apphed are attempts at "so-
cialist encirclement" of the United States through: (1) dis-
paragement of "imperialism" and encouragement of national
liberation and bourgeois democratic revolutions; (2) exploita-
tion of fears of nuclear war to create hostility toward the
United States and its allies; and (3) exercise of "political sabo-
tage" through parliamentary infiltration and penetration, par-
ticularly in unstable countries.

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTBINE 159

For the latter purpose, tlie Socialist parties have assumed
new importance: the period when they were described as "so-
cial Fascists" has passed. Now they are considered, in a num-
ber of nations, to be "stirrup holders" to Communists eager to
get into the saddle.

To the extent that the will of the chief opponent can be
paralyzed, the neutralization of his allies and of non-allied
powers wiU progress more rapidly. Khrushchev, in his speech
to the Supreme Soviet in January 1960, reiterated the concept
of '"socialist encirclement" of the United States. The greater
the degree of isolation of this country and other key members
of the Free World alliance, the more easily some minor coun-
tries may loosen their ties with the West and even shift their
loyalty to the "revolution."

As these strata break away, the disintegrating processes
within the anti-Communist nucleus is accentuated in turn. The
ultimate purpose of this dialectic process is to break the entire
nonrevolutionary camp into small and disjointed fragments and
to prevent its standing cohesively and firmly against external
and internal revolutionary attack.

The Communists appear confident that their tactics are
proving effective. They claim that the "forces of peace" are
gaining ground throughout the world, while more and more
people in the principal nations of the Free World— including
the United States— are becoming fatahstic, are losing their
faitli in the future, and are adopting a passive attitude toward
all aspects of life. This is the principal justification for Khru-
shchev's changed "estimate" that war is not likely at present
and that the world balance of forces now favors the Commu-
nist camp.

Total paralysis of Western will and debilitation of Western
military, economic, and political power— this is the ultimate
aim of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" campaign. Once
general moral dislocation has been brought about, but not
before, the optimum time has come for the decisive contest-
provided the military capability of the Soviet Union to launch
an effective surprise attack and subsequent blows of exploita-
tion has been brought to the quahtative and quantitative level
required, and provided the risks of the contest are considered
acceptable.

l60 COMMUNIST STBATEGY AND TACTICS

The Role of War

There are no valid indications that Khrushchev has aban-
doned Lenin's expressed acceptance of Clausewitz's formula-
tion of the role of war to further pohtical objectives. "War is
part of a whole, the whole is politics," stated Lenin. Yet the
Communists long have believed that, when a critical historical
change is in process, extreme caution must be exercised. This
caution is particularly necessary during the "period of transi-
tion from sociaHsm to communism." The advent of nuclear
weapons, in their estimation, has accentuated the requirement
of resisting "adventurism." Nor is there any coercion to hurry
at the wrong time. The United States is deemed to be de-
terred; neutralization is progressing eflPectively. Meanwhile,
the U.S.S.R. is acquiring the necessary economic and techno-
logical strengths prerequisite to total war. If and when the
appropriate moment arrives, the U.S.S.R. is prepared to attack,
if this should be necessary.

Much of the confusion which leads some observers to con-
clude that the U.S.S.R. does not plan to employ war as an in-
stnxment of policy stems from a misunderstanding of the or-
thodox Communist distinction between "just" and "predatory"
wars. Khrushchev, good strategist that he is, recognizes the im-
portance of deceiving the potential enemy. He also recognizes
the need not to abrogate Commtinist doctrine. His solution to
the problem of how to preach war and peace simultaneously
is to denounce "predatory" war and keep silent about the types
of war which the Party considers both permissible and in-
evitable. However, on at least one occasion since his return
from his visit to the United States in 1959, Khrushchev spe-
cifically told a Communist audience that the traditional Com-
munist doctrine of "just" warfare still appHed. "The Marxists
have always recognized only libera tive, just wars; . . . have
always condemned aggressive imperialist wars."^^

"Just" wars may take any foiTQ or combination of forms,
from world nuclear conflict to guerrilla skirmishes, provided
the Communists fight them. The Soviet leaders do not think
that the less intense or less bloody war also is the less unjust.

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE l6l

Hence, it is important to understand Soviet doctrine on lim-
ited war. Khrushchev's views are closely related to his assess-
ment that capitalist encirclement of the U.S.S.R. is being re-
placed gradually by socialist encirclement of the United States.
They are also related to his belief that the United States is,
at the moment, effectively deterred.

Khrushchev's note of November 5, 1956, to England and
France during the Suez crisis— which contained vague threats
of Soviet missile retaliation if these states failed to withdraw
their forces from Egypt— is credited, post factum, with having
prevented the crisis from developing into total war.^* It is
argued, also, that the "peace forces" prevented the United
States from using atomic bombs in Korea.^^

The Soviet leaders aver that limited war would expand
into aU-out war imder two conditions: (1) if nuclear weapons
were used and (2) if both the United States and the U.S.S.R.
became directly involved.

Since 1957, or earlier, Soviet writers have been attempting
to convince the United States that tactical nuclear weapons
cannot be used without expansion of the conflict.^^ Khru-
shchev himself has said, "The theory of so-called local or minor
wars with the use of mass-destruction weapons has sprung up
now in the West. . . . Should such wars break out, they
could soon grow into a world war."^''^

On the question of total war resulting from both U.S. and
Soviet involvement, Khrushchev has been less specific. How-
ever, at a White House dinner during his visit to the United
States, after downgrading the destructiveness small nations
could inflict on one another, he went on to point out: "If strong
nations hke the United States and the Soviet Union quarrel,
then not only wiU our two countries suffer tremendous damage
but other countries wiU inevitably be involved in a world
catastrophe."^^

The doctrine, if read in conjunction with the historical rec-
ord, seems to state that, if possible, the U.S.S.R. should re-
frain from direct participation in limited wars when a major
Western power is involved. Nuclear blackmail and other forms
of psychopolitical conflict— insurrection, proxy support, secret
arms shipments, and "volunteers"— are equally effective tactics.
The latter involve fewer risks and lower costs. However, vari-

l62 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

ous situations could arise which would motivate a reassess-
ment of this strategy— for example, timing and provocation
considerations, changed views of the degree of eflEective deter-
rence of the United States, prestige and political pressures, and
the like.

By contrast, the orthodox doctrine that limited wars be-
tween lesser powers will continue to occur still applies; if and
when a "revolutionary situation" results, Communist forces
should exploit the opportunity to seize power, or may have
no option but to intervene. ^^

Under the newly announced plan to restructure the mili-
tary establishment, a large force of trained reserves will be
available for immediate call-up.^o The U.S.S.R. has retained
its capability to wage limited or "conventional" war if and
when the situation requires it.

The argument sometimes has been advanced that the
U.S.S.R., since Khrushchev's revision of the orthodox Commu-
nist position, no longer considers war to be "inevitable" during
the lifetime of capitalism. At the Twentieth Congress of the
CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev held that, given the changed bal-
ance of world forces, war was no longer a "fatalistic inevita-
bility."2i He iterated this thesis at the Twenty-first Congress
in January 1959. More recent data clarify the fact that, ac-
cording to current Communist thinking, the inevitabihty— or
avoidability— of war depends on the degree of success achieved
through nonviolent means. Late in 1959, a new, authoritative
textbook on Communist doctrine and tactics was published.
Written at the direction of the Central Committee, apparently
it is meant to replace Stalin's Problems of Leninism. Without
doubt, it updates Communist doctrine and adjusts it to current
international conditions.

Taking their cue from such factors as the growth of Com-
munist strength and the alleged spread of sociahst ideas in
non-Communist nations— an assessment of dubious vahdity-
the authors maintain that peaceful revolution now is a possi-
bility under certain conditions. However, they go on to em-
phasize the following:

In taking into account the possibility of peaceful revo-
lution, the Marxist-Leninists have in no way accepted the

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE 163

reformist position. . . . They know that any revolution-
peaceful or nonpeaceful—is the result of class struggle.
Peaceful or nonpeaceful, a socialist revolution remains
just as much of a revolution if it decides the question of
transferring authority from the hands of the reactionary
class to the hands of the people.

The reformists believe that the peaceful road is the only
road to socialism. Marxist-Leninists, while noting the
emergence of the possibility of peaceful revolution, under-
stand the interrelationships between one and the other:
the inevitability, in a number of instances, of a sharp ag-
gravation of the class struggle. Thus, in cases where the
military-police forces of the reactionary bourgeoisie are
strong, the working class will encounter fierce resistance.
There can be no doubt that in a number o£ capitalist
countries the overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship by
means of armed class struggle will be inevitable.^^

After Khrushchev's return from the United States, this pas-
sage was quoted in the leading theoretical journal of the inter-
national Communist movement as one of the most important
points made in the new textbook.^^ It should be noted that
the phrase "armed class struggle" can have all and any mean-
ing within the spectrum of violent conflict. Under certain con-
ditions it can be a synonym for "war."

Initiation of War

Clearly, the question of whether or not the U.S.S.R. will
initiate war— and, if so, what type of war and when— cannot
be answered by considering any single factor or set of factors.
Existing weapons systems permit Khrushchev broad freedom
of choice, and he himself has said that an assortment of more
advanced weapons are in various stages of development. He
told the Supreme Soviet:

The armament which we now have is formidable arma-
ment. The armament under development is even more
perfect and more formidable. The armament which is be-

164 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

ing created and which is to be found in the folders of the
scientists and designers is truly unbelievable armament?'^

In addition, numerous considerations other than military
ones would be involved in a decision to initiate war. Never-
theless, the principal points relating to the problem of whether,
in the future, Khrushchev will be content to apply his military
capabilities psychopohtically or will decide to wage war are:

(1) the degree of success of his neutralization strategy and

(2) the margin of over-all force superiority— military, psycho-
political, economic, and technological— at the time when an
attack is contemplated or required. Moreover, Khrushchev has
disclosed his preoccupation with the problem of timing. As
the tempo of the technological race quickens, force superiori-
ties may become transitory.^^ If the Soviets fail to attack at
a time when their forces are clearly qualitatively and quan-
titatively superior, they would be guilty of the Bolshevik sin
of flaunting historical opportunity.

There have been indications recently that, in the future,
"outside influences" may have a new and important bearing on
the Communist decision to initiate war.

Under Stalin, the tendency was to overemphasize "organi-
zation" to the detriment of "spontaneity"— a tendency moti-
vated, in large part, by fears of being drawn into battle pre-
maturely and at the wrong place. Yet, increased strength leads
to an increased wiUingness to take chances. "Spontaneity," to-
gether with the concept that in nuclear war "capitalism" can
be dealt quick deathblows, may lead the latter-day Commu-
nists to exhume old notions on tlie "rapidity of world revolu-
tion." Under such circumstances, if a situation arose in which
communism gathered effective and world-wide spontaneous
support, the temptation to accelerate the world revolution
through all-out nuclear war might become overpowering
enough to offset fears for the security of the revolutionary
"home base."

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE 165

The Search for a Strategic Synthesis

Briefly, then, the principal elements in Khrushchev's con-
flict strategy as it had evolved by i960 can be summarized
as follows: (1) employment of combined military and non-
military weapons to degrade and neutralize the opponent
while building up Soviet strength; (2) preparations directed
toward attaining a capability to initiate a surprise attack-
should the proper combination of propitious circumstances
arise— or to pre-empt an enemy attack by military or nonmili-
tary means, or a combination thereof; (3) retention of suffi-
cient "conventional" forces to wage whatever type of war the
occasion demands; and (4) emergence of appreciation of
■^spontaneity."

What is Khrushchev's strategic pattern? According to one
possible interpretation, based upon one set of his statements,
Khrushchev is veering in the direction of strategic nuclear war
and its peacetime version, deterrence. In other words, he is
adopting his own variant of American strategy as reflected by
SAG and the Polaris concept. According to another interpreta-
tion based on a second set of Khrushchev dicta, he is upgrad-
ing political and insurrectional techniques. In other words, he
is reverting to a modern counterpart of the "classical" revolu-
tion envisaged by Marx and Engels.

Both interpretations seem to be right, but neither is valid
by itself. Khrushchev appears intent not on reconciling but on
combining these two strands of strategic thinking. Nuclear
ICBMs and IRBMs are the canopy under which "classical"
revolution, guerrilla operations, and up-to-date poHticai con-
quests can be executed, or a "revolution from without" im-
posed by communist forces. PoHticai warfare culminating in
paralysis of government or seizures of power can serve as the
prelude to nuclear surprise attack and as insurance for the
effectiveness of the surprise blow; or it can heighten the
psychological impact of nuclear blackmail and lead the victim
toward ultimate surrender. Should nuclear conflict eventuate,
guerrilla and insurrectional techniques (perhaps strengthened

l66 COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

by "small" nuclear weapons) could efiFect a favorable outcome
of the "broken back" phase of the Armageddon.

Clearly, Khrushchev is reaching out, in the best dialectic
tradition, for a synthesis. We would do well not to underrate
his capability to develop a genuinely original doctrine truly
applicable to modern conditions. Already he has eliminated
from Soviet doctrine many parts which had become dogma-
tized and, in many ways, inapplicable. Some— like the notion
of constant pressure— had become self-defeating. Second, he
has modernized Soviet strategy and attuned it to technologi-
cal reality. Third, he has upgraded the use of broadly con-
ceived techniques of degradation aimed at neutralization
through disarmament, demoralization, and nuclear blackmail.
Fourth, he has displayed great tactical skill and flexibility in
his execution of the more or less perennial strategy of com-
munism. Finally, he is exuding renewed confidence in the
chances of completing the world Communist revolution.

It cannot be said that, as yet, Khrushchev has proved him-
self an innovator in strategy. But he has demonstrated that he
is indeed a formidable opponent— infinitely more resourceful
and dangerous than his predecessors. He has been "one up"
on Machiavelli: capable of roaring Hke a true lion, he also has
shown himself to be one of the most cunning of all the pohtical
foxes of the twentieth century.

Notes

1. Arnold Kramish, Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 36; The Report of the
Royal Commission . . . to Investigate . . . the Circumstances
Surrounding the Communication . . . of Secret . . . Informa-
tion to . . .a Foreign Power (Ottawa: H. M. Stationery Oflfice,
1946), pp. 694-95.

2. See Stalin's letter to Colonel Razin citing the historic successes
of "Scythian strategy" against Charles XII, Napoleon, and Hit-
ler. Military Affairs, XIII, No. 2 (Summer 1949), 77.

3. The pioneering study is H. S. Dinerstein's War and the Soviet
Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military
and Political Thinking (New York: Praeger, 1959). Changed
Soviet views on the role of strategic surprise and pre-emption

CHANGES IN SOVIET CONFLICT DOCTRINE 167

as they evolved during 1955-58 are analyzed in detail (pp.
167-212), The author is indebted to Arnold HoreUck, of the
RAND Corporation, for pertinent comments concerning more
recent developments, and to Wlodzimierz Baczkowsld, of the
Library of Congress, for drawing my attention to the interrela-
tionships, in Czarist Russian military doctrine, of the concepts
of offense, initiative, and surprise and to Soviet adaptations of
them.

4. Pravda, January 15, i960.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid, (emphasis added).

10. Marxism and the National and Colonial Question (New York:
International Publishers, n.d,), p. 115.

11. Cf. Stefan T. Possony, A Century of Conflict: Communist Tech-
niques of World Revolution (Chicago: Regnery, 1953), pp.
377-83, especially p. 379.

12. Elsewhere in this book, Dr. Thomas W. Wolfe discusses Soviet
disarmament tactics in detail. One of the most useful works on
coexistence is Wladyslaw W, KuIsM's Peaceful Co-existence: An
Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Regnery, 1959).

13. Speech on tlie tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Re-
pubHc, Pravda, October 1, 1959.

14. O. V. Kousinen (ed.), Osnovi Marksisma-Leninisma {The
Foundations of Marxism-Leninism) (Moscow: State Publish-
ing House of Political Literature, 1959), p. 501.

15. Ibid., p. 500.

16. See Kulski, op. cit., pp. 129-30.

17. Reply to questions from a Brazilian journalist, November 21,
^9575 Zfl Prochnyi Mir i Mimoe Sosushchestvovanie (For a
Lasting Peace . . .) (Moscow, 1958), p. 282.

18. Zhif V Mire i Druzhbe! Prebyvanie . . . N. S. Khrushcheva
V SShA, 15-27 sentiabria 1959 g. {Live in Peace and Friend-
ship! N.S. Khrushchev's Visit to the U.S.A., { September 25-27,
1959) (Moscow, 1959), P- 55.

19. Kousinen, op. cit., pp. 507, 520-23, 528-29.

20. Pravda, January 15, i960.

21. Pravda, February 15, 1956, quoted in Kulski, op. cit., p. 92.
Note that the Communists have been talking about this
"changed balance" of power since 1950.

22. Kousinen, op. cit., p. 529 (emphasis added).

ibQ COMMXJNIST STKATEGY AND TACTICS

23. "Scientific Foundations of a Revolutionary Policy," World
Marxist Review, II, No. 12 (December 1959), 43.

24. Fravda, January 15, i960.

25. "In the . . . competition with capitalism . . . the question of
the time it takes to solve economic tasks is of exceptional and
vital importance. . . . The question of the time factor, of gain-
ing time in economic development ... is the main question."
( Speech to the All-Union Conference of Power Industry Con-
struction, November 28, 1959; broadcast by Radio Moscow,
December 13, 1959.)

PART FOUR

INTRODUCTION

Ever since 1914, the countenance of peace has been as
blurred as that of war. As conflict has become total, so have
the strategies designed to w^age it. The spectnim of conflict
today embraces, in effect, the entire range of human actions.

This spectrum is expanding rapidly. Technology is the
major, but not the only, spur to this expansion. The number
of nations which, for one reason or another, want to engage
in conflict continues to increase. Methods of psychopohtical
warfare continue to become more refined and more sophisti-
cated. In the coming years, potential theaters of conflict will
encompass ever greater dimensions. They will include the
spheres of outer space and the depths of the oceans; they will
witness "invisible weapons" and implements which, like com-
puters, "conquer time."

The new element in the strategic equation is the nuclear
weapon. This new weapon will not abolish the traditional
spectrum of conflict as it has been waged throughout history.
Conflict will not lose its multidimensional character. But the
nuclear weapon will become the prime mover of conflict
techniques. Already, all types of conflict systems and tech-
niques, with nuclear weapons as their core, are being merged
into the most powerful instniments of conquest history has
ever known. The essential consequence of the across-the-
spectrum integration is a continual extension and sophistica-

This introduction is based on a lecture given by Dr. Stefan T. Pos-
sony at the 'National Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

170 PROBLEMS OF MILITAIIY STRATEGY

tion of strategy and tactics. More important, with increasing
rapidity the problems of security and survival are becoming
synonymous.

What are the basic characteristics of the conflict spectrum
as it exists at mid-century and as it is likely to evolve in the
future? To a considerable extent, the answer depends on the
areas of conflict, the frequency of conflict, the interrelation-
ships between varying types of military and technological con-
flict on the one hand, and psychopolitical, economic, and other
nonviolent techniques on the other.

"War" against an unstable, weak, and unsophisticated gov-
ernment can be waged at minimum cost, merely by employing
psychopolitical weapons of pressure and coercion and, in later
stages, by resorting to revolution or other forms of "local vio-
lence." Yet, victorious conflict against a stable, pov/erful, so-
phisticated state requires more than the employment of revo-
lutionary techniques. At some time within the span of a
given conflict, it requires the defeat and destruction of the
hostile state as a prerequisite to military occupation or poHti-
cal-revolutionary seizure of power, or surrender.

We must sharpen our understanding of how the spectrum
of conflict is operating in today's world. We must recognize
that the cold war is a means of waging a momentous conflict
through the use of economic and technological progress as a
substitute for more recognizable and orthodox means of war-
fare. At the same time, we must accept the fact that if we do
not surrender at the terminus of the cold war, we will be re-
quired to defend our way of life with force and sacrifice.

The Commxmist system is based on the assumption that con-
flict is all and all is conflict. War and peace are mutually sup-
plementary forms. Military principles, in their traditional ver-
sion and as reformulated by Communist irmovators, apply both
to open warfare and to what Westerners think of as "peace-
ful endeavor" or "competitive coexistence"— in brief, to all as-
pects of life and historical developments. To our opponents,
struggle is the essence of life. They believe that force and vio-
lence are integral parts of the relentless and "dialectic" process
of history.

The first task of free government, if it is to survive, is to
master the intellectual challenge— to rethink the pattern of

INTRODUCTION I7I

conflict. Our partial approach to portions of the spectrum and
our infatuation with the purely "legal" and artificial distinction
of "war" and "peace" must give way to organic comprehension
of the whole problem. It is only through such comprehension
of the conflict spectrum in its entire breadth that we shall be
able to manage our strategy eflFectively, in a melange of tech-
niques suitable to our own purposes. It is only on such a basis
that we shall be able to obtain maximum advantage from our
vast resoxirces, potential and actual.

^s^i^g^rm^z:. _

14. Values, Power, and Strategy

by Richard B. Foster

As manager of the Air Defense Evaluation
Program, Stanford Research Institute, Mr.
Foster directs an interdisciplinary research
team in evaluating programs for the active
and passive defense of the United States and
western Europe against air and missile at-
tacks. The value of his work has been rec-
ognized by the Department of the Army,
which gave him the Patriotic Civilian Service
Award. A graduate of the University of Cali-
fornia in philosophy, his publications include
articles on techniques of production manage-
ment and functional scheduling as well as the
paper "The Lead Time Race" for the Presi-
dent's Advisory Committee on Government
Organization.

In the twilight of the 1950s, a prediction by De Tocqueville
pubhshed in 1835 has come true. America and the Soviet
Union each sway the destiny of half the globe. Vast differences
of values and in ways of hfe separate the Free World— led by
America— and the Communist bloc— led by the Soviet Union.
But no matter how profoimd the differences in starting point
and in the courses that have led the two coimtries to this
polarity of world power, they have some fundamental prob-
lems in common. Perhaps the most critical problem is that
which results from the twentieth-century explosion of science
and technology. Each nation is forced to tame the exploding

From the Stanford Research Institute Journal, Fourth Quarter 1959.
Reprinted by permission.

174 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

technologies that have resulted in weapons of such power that
they may effectively destroy the values and the culture of
either side, and of western Europe as well.

The Power of Nuclear Weapons and Fundamental Values

Both sides are faced with the ancient moral problem of the
relation of power and value. Each side must find new answers
to govern the use and containment of what appears to be al-
most unlimited power. The thermonuclear weapon is not just
another explosive; the ICBM is not just another delivery
weapon. Together they represent a quantum jvmip in the
power to destroy the most basic of aU values— people, wealth,
culture, and history. The possible annihilation of culture by
the use of such potent military armament brings both sides
face to face with the physical consequences of annihilation and
its moral corollary, nihilism.

Wars between great powers are fought to achieve objectives
that lie beyond war. Present and future United States and
Soviet leaders will seek to preserve their values and will strive
to limit wars to those in which their nations can survive and
prevail in the long term. Aside from the danger of unilateral
annihilation, there is a real possibility of a war of mutual an-
nihilation initiated by accident or by a nihihst who rejects all
values. In the coming age of the ballistic missile, the danger of
such a war by accident increases unless both sides make a
supreme effort at control.

The Free World and the Communist bloc share a common
humanity. In the face of the destructive force of nuclear
weapons in abundance, the two sides of the bipolar world must
agree on fundamental values that will constrain the use of their
latent powers of annihilation. At least two areas of agreement
have already automatically been reached by sane men:

1. Wars that threaten to destroy all or a major fraction of
the human race are universally rejected by men of reason.

2. All such men agree that Ufe is better hved with others,
and that the social fabric in which they live is worth pre-
serving.

A third area of agreement is emerging as a consequence of

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY I75

the increasing danger of an accidental nuclear war. If all sane
men agree on these two fundamental values, then an agree-
ment on lessening the danger of such an accidental war is in
the self-interest of both sides of the bipolar world. The impetus
behind such a weapons-control agreement is a mutual fear of
a purposeless war that may in fact turn out to be so destructive
that neither side would survive as a nation if it occurred be-
fore either side was prepared. On the other hand, Khru-
shchev's proposal to the United Nations for total disarmament
in four years would have to be based on mutual trust— a trust
which does not now exist.

Polarity of Power and Formulation of Strategy

Let us focus our attention on some of the consequences of
the polarity of power between America and the Soviet Union
as a first step in evolving a national strategy for the next dec-
ade. We must recognize, first, that the polarity of power is also
in part a polarity of values, although the values of the United
States and the U.S.S.R. overlap to a degree not yet explored.
Second, use of power by either side is constrained and directed
by strategies, and these strategies are, in turn, contained in a
framework of national values and objectives. Third, these na-
tional values and objectives of both sides are in a context of
values of the rest of the world. Each side is making a claim
to the common humanity of all nations. Each side is courting
the public opinion of the world.

How well are we doing in this competition? Presently, our
power is greater than the Soviet Union's, and our values make
a greater claim on the faith of a larger share of humanity;
the Soviets have an advantage in that their strategy is more
coherent and covers a larger area of their economy and of the
daily life of their people than does ours. They may also have
a future advantage in that the rate of growth of their military
power relative to ours is greater.

Finally, each side is seeking both to preserve its values
against the use of force by the other side and to extend its
power in all ways— economic, political, military. Traditionally,
the objectives of the use of military power by civihzed peoples

i^pii^^

176 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

have been to seek out and destroy the enemy's military forces
in the field, not to exterminate people and cultural values. But
too often the problem of values is either ignored or uncon-
sciously assumed when a military strategy is being formulated.

The relationships between steps of decision in formulating
strategy are more complex. Aside from the sequence of deci-
sions that lead to the adoption of a strategy are reservoirs of
undirected power, such as science and technology, or physical
and economic resources. At the base of the decision sequence
lies the most profound statement of human, moral and religious
values that man can make. This is the basis of the pubhc opin-
ion of the world. Within this framework are our national val-
ues, which, in turn, prescribe our national goals and objectives.
On the basis of these objectives we lay out pohcies that to a
large extent determine the way in which we will allocate our
resources. Next up the scale is the selection of a national strat-
egy, including foreign policy, trade, and aid, and the hke.
Within the framework of the national strategy, military strat-
egies are conceived. MiKtary strategy is both art and science.
It is still more art than science, although a very considerable
effort in the past few years has gone into the problem of re-
ducing military strategy to more measurable terms, particu-
larly in the relation of strategy to technology. It is in this area
that a radical improvement in the quality of our military plan-
ning can be made. Strategy, then, helps select the military
forces and weapons to secure the objectives of the nation and
is determined by those objectives. The weapon choice is based
on a selection of technologies out of the scientific and tech-
nological base, and is constrained by policy decisions that al-
locate economic resources.

This complex and dynamic interaction of national values,
policy, allocation of resources, military strategy, and technol-
ogy that results in a selection of a strategy by one side in-
fluences and is influenced by a similar selection made on the
other side. There is continuous action and counteraction in this
two-way selection process. However, too often choices of tech-
nology and economic-allocation decisions dictate strategy with
little concern for either values or the reactions of the enemy.

As we attempt to see why the United States finds itself in
the position of having to face the possibiHty of annihilation, a

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY I77

melancholy fact emerges. A critical turning point v/as the
adoption of the massive-retahation strategy announced in 1954
by the United States. Two things emerge: First, we took no
long-term view of the ethical basis for the strategy. Hence we
are now faced with a profound moral crisis. Second, as a con-
sequence of this decision, certain technologies were most fuUy
exploited to support it. Our selection was primarily of those
technologies that give rise to the weapons with the largest "kills
per dollar"— that is, thermonuclear weapons and the long-range
delivery systems that can apply these weapons against a whole
nation.

We overlook the fact that strategy is two-sided. We find
that we exploited a short-term power advantage. The Soviets
have essentially caught up with us in nuclear technology and
are probably ahead in the ballistic-missile field. The United
States no longer has the comfort of a monopoly of massive
retahation.

Thus, the United States made a narrow selection out of a
wide range of technologies available for consideration, in the
belief that we could get more security at less cost. Instead,
we bought rigidity of posture, and to a certain extent, forced
rigidity on the Soviet Union. There were different technologies,
different kinds of weapons, different kinds of forces available
for choice, some of which could have led to more flexible strat-
egies. Our ability to wage limited wars for limited objectives
in defense of not only our values but those of our allies and
other free nations is withering away. We can no longer solve
the basic issues between ourselves and the Soviet Union by a
thermonuclear exchange; nor can we initiate a thermonuclear
war against the Soviet Union and hope to escape unscathed.

Choice of a thermonuclear war has never been in conso-
nance with our national values. Yet we can predict that force
of some kind will be used to resolve some of these issues. We
find ourselves in a more and more rigid posture, with strategic
flexibility rapidly diminishing. Our strategic thinking and plan-
ning have been too narrow in scope, of too low a quality, and
too short-term. Can we do better in the next decade?

178 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Planning and Uncertainty

As we enter the 1960s we are faced with a complex and
difficult problem: we must evolve long-range plans for greater
strategic flexibility in the face of great uncertainties. Hopefully,
there are feasible solutions to this difficulty. The first require-
ment for a solution is to identify and characterize the uncer-
tainties; the second is to put them into perspective. Only by
taking a very long-term view of both oiu" national values and
where we want to go as a nation do we make these uncer-
tainties recede into their proper perspective. Some of the more
important areas of imcertainty as they affect military strategic
planning are:

1. Technological change. On the one hand, the lead time to
recognize applications of new technologies and then to incor-
porate them into an operational weapon is very long— five to
ten years at least. On the other hand, the technological base
is exploding at a fantastic rate. Future technologies will make
obsolete some weapons now in development before they are
fully deployed.

2. Intelligence. Much of our planning must be based on esti-
mates of Soviet capabilities— present and future. This is ex-
tremely difficult, particularly because om: intelligence on pres-
ent Soviet capabilities is imperfect at best, and we can only
project into the future from an estimate of the present.

3. Planning. After we have decided on a strategy with its
weapons, there remain many uncertainties of planning. Will
our selected weapons meet their predicted schedules and per-
formance goals within the estimated cost?

4. Political stability. Although we may seek to stabilize a
mutual deterrent to general nuclear war, we cannot stabilize
the political situation of a world in ferment— as in Africa, Asia,
the Near East, and South America.

5. Accidental war. We have discussed how both the United
States and the Soviet Union mutually desire the reduction of
this danger.

6. Strategic balance of power. The balance of power may
shift radically at any time. For example, if one side exploits

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY I79

new breakthroughs in defense technology, the other side's
ballistic-missile force may become obsolete; or if a disarma-
ment agreement is reached and one side disarms more rapidly
than the other side, the balance could change very swiftly.

7. Values. Here an immeasurable difficulty exists. Can we
predict with any certainty the level of damage the Soviets are
willing to sustain imder all possible future pohtical conditions?
For example, a high-tension international situation may cause
Soviet leaders to estimate that nuclear war was the least un-
desirable course of action open to them. Furthermore, World
War II proved they can absorb a tremendous loss of life and
still prevail and survive over the long term.

8. Feasibility of nuclear war. This is by all odds the most
important uncertainty of all. We will examine some of the im-
plications of this problem as they affect the formulation of a
United States military strategy for the next decade; for ex-
ample, can stability be achieved in a mutual-deterrence pos-
ture with an "all-offense" system?

Yet, in the face of these uncertainties, long-range strategic
planning is still necessary and desirable, and, moreover, our
achieving it may be more likely than we think. Nuclear weap-
ons are here, and their existence faces us too plainly with the
necessity for making a proper choice of strategies for the future
so that we do not lose the race.

Relative Advantages in the Balance of Power

Before we can formulate long-range plans and strategic con-
cepts for the future, it is well to list the advantages that each
side will have throughout the next decade. Some of the prin-
cipal advantages which favor the Soviet Union might be listed
as follows:

1. Geopolitical. Location in the heartland of the Eurasian
continent enables the U.S.S.R. to threaten to use their land
forces for the forcible occupation of western Europe— the first
prize of the power struggle. If during the 1960s we achieve
a relatively stable balance of power for general nuclear war,
so that both sides are mutually deterred, then the Soviets

l8o PKOBLEMS OF MrLITARY STRATEGY

might estimate that they can fight— and win— a conventional
ground war in order to capture Europe.

2. Relative population density. The United States has a
much higher proportion of its population in metropolitan areas
than do the Soviets. Hence the Soviet Union can cause greater
destruction of life with the same number of nuclear weapons.

3. The organization of government. A highly centralized
form of government gives the Soviet leaders virtually complete
control over allocation of their economy. In a real sense, the
U.S.S.R. is a military state that can set long-range goals and
maintain the discipline necessary to meet them. Their rapid
decision-making capability enables them to shorten lead times
and to exploit the military advantages of new technologies
much more rapidly than in the United States. In addition, the
Russian people are subject to Party and other controls, ena-
bling Soviet leaders to install a civil-defense program with far
greater ease and celerity than in a democracy.

4. Will. Related to the organization of government is the
problem of will— or willingness to go to war. The ICBM with
a thermonuclear warhead gives a tremendous advantage to the
side that can decide to strike first, particularly with surprise,
and the Soviet leaders apparently do not rule out this ad-
vantage.

5. Intelligence access. The Soviet Union has an advantage
in this area. For example, the Iron Curtain makes it relatively
hard for the West to obtain information on new Soviet weapon
developments, on possible ICBM launching sites, and on their
mihtary intentions. On the other hand, the open societies of
the West make all of these intelligence tasks fairly easy for
the Soviets.

The above is a formidable listing of power advantages on
the side of the Soviet Union. These advantages will not go
away if we ignore them; our futile strategies must take them
into account. However, many of the advantages accorded the
Soviet Union by some United States plaimers and policy
makers are not borne out by the facts. For example, let us
look at the so-called Soviet military manpower advantage; a
comparison of census figures for the United States and its
NATO allies with those of the Soviets indicates a preponderant
military manpower advantage on the side of the West. In the

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY l8l

face of the real advantages of the Soviet Union, the United
States has at least two extremely important— and, we hope, de-
cisive—advantages on its side for the next decade. How we
make use of them is a test of our national resolution and of the
depth of the faith of our convictions. These are:

1. Economic supremacy. It is unlikely that the Soviet econ-
omy can achieve parity with that of the United States by
1970. Their economy is strained; ours has a large additional
capacity and expansibihty whose limits have not yet been
tested. Theirs is rigid; ours has a flexibihty yet unmatched in
the world's history. Their labor supply is short; ours has un-
tapped sources, as World War II demonstrated. The Soviet
agricultural economy strains to produce a minimum supply of
food with 40 per cent of their labor; ours produces unmanage-
able surpluses with less than 10 per cent of our labor. The
list could be extended. But this advantage can be thrown away
in the next decade unless we recognize the challenge of the
rate of growth of the Soviet economy, and if we fail to allocate
our economic resources wisely.

2. Our national values. Too often we forget that the source
of our strength is derived from the wellspring of our values—
the freedom and dignity of the individual; the right to liberty
combined with the voluntary sense of responsibility to our
community; the exaltation that lies in the vision of the gran-
deur of a free man's destroy in a world where a high sense of
purpose awaits and invites each individual's participation. The
character of our institutions— the Constitution; the law and the
independent courts; the free-enterprise system with its judi-
cious balance of opportunities and of rewards for individual
effort, and its claims on almost all of us to contribute to our
mutual well-being— reflects these basic values.

De Tocqueville's eloquent statement that "the principal in-
strument of [America] is freedom; of [Russia] servitude," con-
trasts the two systems of values. Our NATO and other Free
World allies are joined with us because we hold that these
basic values are the property of aU mankind, and because we
have shown our resolution to defend tliem with our wealth and
the lives of our youth in two great wars and in Korea in this
century.

We can take pride in the maturity with which we have

iSa PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

abjtired colonialism and the temptations of empire. We have
given not only freedom to former colonial possessions but also
our wealth to support them as nascent democracies, as in the
Philippines. We can contrast our behavior with that of the
Soviets after World War II. We utilized our resources and ovir
power not only to rebuild the economies of owe western Eu-
ropean allies but also to rebuild our erstwhile enemies— Japan,
Germany, Italy. The Soviets captured whole nations, enslaved
their peoples, and stripped their resources and their economies
to enhance Soviet power. Within the framework of this con-
trasting behavior, let us look more closely at the nature of the
Soviet challenge.

Power, Value, and National Resolve

Khrushchev, in his recent unprecedented visit to the United
States in 1959 and in his article "On Peaceful Coexistence" in
the October 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs, stated with great
conviction that he believes in his values and in the Commu-
nist way of life. He expressed a confidence in the Soviet mili-
tary might and warned America: "Should a world war break
out, no country will be able to shut itself off from a crushing
blow." He challenged the West to a transformation from con-
flict to competition and expressed his determination and resolve
to use the resources— human and material— of the Soviets to
win over the West in the long term. Although we and the
Communists share a common humanity, it would be worse
than folly to ignore the fundamental differences between their
objectives and methods and those of the West. No doubt the
Soviet leadership will use all of the power advantages on their
side— including military action. They will exploit uncertainty,
indecision, irresolution, and confused thinking wherever and
whenever these factors in the United States leadership and in
the Western alliance appear. We cannot afford gaps anywhere
in the spectrum of conflict with the Communist bloc— nor is
there any need for this to happen. With a resolution at least
equal to Khrushchev's, the two advantages on our side— eco-
nomic supremacy and our national values— represent the basis

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY 183

for meeting the Communist challenge without resorting to
strategies of extermination.

No low-cost strategies are available to us. We cannot "buy"
our way through the next decade with little or no sacrifice.
We cannot afford either complacency or naivete in the face
of the implacable enmity the Communist leaders have shown
toward Western social and cultural values.

Western ideas of conduct and of fair play are not accorded
the same role in the Communist bloc— in which the ends of
the state justify any means— as they are in the Western de-
mocracies. The Communist society is, by Western standards,
led by moral strangers; the Marxist-Leninist philosophy pro-
duces the technocratic man, a moral neuter, who is an instru-
ment of the apparatus of the Party.

Yet these newcomers in world affairs understand and re-
spect power and resolution. An effective national resolve of
the United States must be strong enough to present the Com-
munist leaders with but two alternatives: the mutual rewards
that derive from respect for the rules of civilized conduct in
the community of nations, or an unacceptable price they would
have to pay for conduct that ignores and destroys these rules.

Value Considerations Related to Strategic Problems

We can isolate three issues that are particularly relevant to
a discussion of the relation of values and power in the formu-
lation of strategy:

1. Is there an ethical basis for deterrence by the threat of
retaliation? The answer to this hinges largely on what actions
we are trying to deter. Self-preservation is a first law of na-
ture: so long as the Soviets have the power to desti'oy or greatly
damage us as a nation, we are obligated to make that use of
Soviet power an unacceptable course of action to Soviet lead-
ers. But a simple statement of national survival is not suffi-
cient. Why is it important not only to us but also to the rest
of the Free World that we survive as a major power? We have
not begun either to ask ourselves or to answer this question
in a serious way.

2. In the "balance of terror" can stability of mutual deter-

184 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

rence be achieved easily and cheaply? A stable and reliable
deterrence to general nuclear war is difiBcult to achieve. We
may go through a period of extreme instability in which the
Soviet military planners may calculate that they can strike the
first blow at our nuclear retaliatory forces and thus reduce the
level of damage they might sustain from the crippled residual
United States SAC force to one which would be acceptable,
taking into account their defensive measures— both active and
passive.

Although all strategists do not wholly accept this thesis, all
responsible military strategists agree that the military objec-
tive of first priority is to achieve a stable deterrent to a direct
Soviet nuclear attack on the United States based primarily on
a capability to retaliate on the Soviet Union. All agree that
this is an absolute requirement for all other strategic objectives.

There is a great controversy, however, about the cost of
such a deterrent system, and about the conditions of stability.
Once again, as in the beginning of the past decade, one stra-
tegic concept is emerging that has a principal appeal— low cost.
The basic weapon system proposed is essentially an all-offense
system, with no real effort made to defend the United States.
Some of the weaknesses of this minimum-deterrence strategy
have been discussed by competent analysts. However, two fal-
lacies in the reasoning related to the problems of power and
value should also be pointed out.

The first fallacy lies in a part of the moral argument. Ef-
forts of the United States to defend its cities and preserve its
values constitute no direct threat to the Soviet's values. An
all-offense system, directed solely at destroying Soviet values,
may be looked upon by the rest of the world and by the So-
viets as a strategy of annihilation— a suicide pact— reflecting
the Communist prediction of the "bankruptcy of Western
capitalist-imperialist values." From the value side, the United
States build-up of an all-offense system for general nuclear war
directed solely toward the threatened destruction of Soviet val-
ues may look to Soviet planners as an extremely imstable situ-
ation and thus invite a pre-emptive attack on United States
general-nuclear-war forces before the relatively invulnerable
all-offensive deterrent forces can be deployed in quantity.

The second fallacy lies in the assumption about United

VALUES, POWER, ANB STRATEGY 185

States knowledge of Communist values— that is, some of the
strategists think they can estimate the level of damage that
any future Soviet leader wiU be wilhng to sustain under all
conceivable political situations. Usually a single strategic value
criterion is selected, such as the destruction of major industrial
concentrations. This is then said to constitute unacceptable
damage to the Soviet Union. Thus the Soviet leaders will be
deterred. This estimate of Soviet values, as we have noted,
is a major uncertainty that must be taken into account in plan-
ning strategies for the next decade. For example, the Soviets
may adopt a plan to evacuate their cities, putting their popu-
lation in fallout shelters and giving up a part of their industrial
base. This base could then be rebuilt if their armies could
capture western Europe intact, and use the western Eiiropean
economy to rebuild that portion of their industrial base de-
stroyed by a United States retaliatory raid— imless we would
also be willing to destroy western Europe to deny these re-
sources to the Soviets.

There are other dangers and fallacies in this proposal. Es-
sentially, it is a proposal that erects a national strategy on the
characteristics of a few oflEensive weapons. The proponents
have not taken a long-term view of either the effect of the
offense-defense balance on the balance of power or the ethical
basis for the strategy. War in the next decade is much too
complex to allow for such simple strategies.

3. What is the role of the scientist in formulating strategy?
Following the brlEiant discoveries of the scientists in World
War II and the increasing impact of technology on strategy,
there has grown a tendency to give the scientist responsibility
for formulating strategy and, in some cases, policy. To the ex-
tent that this has been done, our military and civilian leaders
have been abdicating some responsibilities in the face of the
enormous complexities of science and technology. But science
and technology are merely a part of the reservoirs of undi-
rected power from which we make choices. The strategist and
pohcy maker must understand science and, in addition, know
the nature of warfare, doctrine, and tactics; economics; poli-
tics; foreign policy; and philosophy— disciphnes in which the
scientist is generally not trained. The pohcy maker can do no

l86 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

less, for the grave burden of choice rests on him alone and not
on his advisers.

Your and My Responsibility

A participation in the choice of a national strategy by a
more widely informed pubHc is vital to the continued existence
of a democracy.

We cannot turn back the pages of history and pretend that
thermonuclear weapons with their long-range delivery systems
—bombers, ballistic missiles— do not exist. They do— and on
both sides. The price that will be exacted of us for our own
survival and for the purposes beyond survival is more than
material; it requires, in addition, an examination of the ethical
basis of our strategies within the perspective of long-term
moral consequences.

The premium we might pay for morally acceptable and flex-
ible military strategies that would extend our capabilities be-
yond the rigidity of primary reliance on nuclear-weapon tech-
nology is unpredictable today. But we can predict that the
price of freedom will be high. The advantages on our side
—those of economic supremacy and flexibility, poHtical free-
dom, and Western cultural values— need only our resolve and
hard work to crystallize them into strategies that cover the
entire spectrum of conflict. We can meet the Soviets in all
forms of conflict and competition without ourselves calling into
account the issue of national survival for each side at every
turn in the political and diplomatic road.

Such a choice requires the participation of all of us. At the
minimum we will have to mobilize our resources. But it will
take a considerable economic sacrifice to achieve the long-
term goals and national values. Such goals and values require
that we explore and exploit areas of agreement, starting with
the Soviet Union. Victory in the conflict and competition re-
quires that we work hard at reaching areas of agreement with
our alhes and between the political parties, management and
labor, and the military services. A supreme effort is required
to close the gap between scientists and pohcy makers if we

VALUES, POWER, AND STRATEGY 187

are to bring the power released by scientific discovery under
the control of our enduring values.

The American genius that De Tocqueville noted as a prag-
matic and analytical approach to Hfe must be supplemented
with another fact of the American genius— that of unifying
disparate and often conflicting elements of our society for
achieving a common purpose. We have achieved this feeling
of unity and sense of high purpose during wartime and dur-
ing emergencies. The next decade will demonstrate whether or
not we can achieve it in a period of uneasy peace.

^p^w^^it _ —

by John F. Loosbrock

Mr. Loosbrock has been the editor of Air
Force Magazine since 1Q57. A graduate of
the College of Journalism at Marquette Uni-
versity, Mr. Loosbrock rose from private to
captain during World War 11 and served
with the 1st Infantry Division in North Af-
rica and Sicily. He was formerly an associate
editor of the Infantry Journal and Washing-
ton editor of Popular Science Monthly. He
was the editor of the book Space Weapons,
co-ordinated the editing of A History of the
U.S.A.F.— 1903-1957, and has lectured at
the Air University on Air Force doctrine.

It is a strange paradox that, in a time when science is making
profound impacts on the tools and concepts of war, military
planners are denied, and happily so, the advantage of the ul-
timate in scientific procedure— the controlled experiment to
determine the validity of their theories. Revolutionary new
weapons, strategy, and tactics must now be considered and ac-
cepted without prior trial in war. Nor can bets be hedged by
retaining the tried and true while adding the new. There are
no Indian campaigns, no border skirmishes to test our forces
and try our new weapons. We must choose, now, and accept
the risks. V/e must be prepared at any moment to go with
what we have.

This is a hard burden, for coupled with this essentially mili-
tary problem is a dynamic power struggle between two large
blocs of nations, each led by countries almost equally rich in
essential elements of military power but with antithetic po-
litical ideologies. Thus, in a world which is politically and

STRATEGY ON TRIAL 189

militarily unstable, military plans must be under constant re-
view. They are conditioned by such factors as national policy,
relations with allies, enemy capabilities, technological develop-
ments, and, not least, the economic price the nation is willing
to pay. Some of these factors can be predicted quite accu-
rately; others cannot. But plans must be laid on the basis of
what is known or can be perceived. And we can arrive only
at guidelines, not dogmas.

On this basis, three general military requirements appear to
be valid for this nation into the 1970s. They are proposed in
the interest of avoiding a general war through a combination
of measures and of deterring, or localizing, lesser conflicts so
that the basic position of the Free World is not substantially
threatened. Should the deterrent posture fail to deter, then the
resulting conflict must be won. And, indeed, the weight of
evidence indicates that a posture that can win a general war
is by its very nature the kind of posture that can deter both
it and lesser conflicts.

Within this framework, the first requirement is for strategic
delivery forces, able to absorb a surprise attack and still deal
a crushing blow. These forces are the heart and core of deter-
rence, both of general and of limited war, the sine qua non
which establishes the context in which all other forces and ac-
tions must be studied.

The second requirement is for defense measures, both active
and passive, should the enemy, either through an irrational
act or a wrong evaluation of our offensive power, attempt to
overpower us with a massive, surprise onslaught. Active de-
fenses against a determined air attack do not have an encour-
aging history. The Battle of Britain was won with a defense
that was less than 10 per cent effective, not close to good
enough against thermonuclear weapons. Intercontinental mis-
siles have made the problem all the more difficult to solve,
but there will always be a place for active defense as part of
an ante-raising proposition to discourage attack. Passive meas-
ures, to protect our retaliatory forces and our civil popula-
tion, are still another card in the ante raising and one which,
by and large, has been neglected.

The combination of offensive and defensive strength which
serves to deter the enemy from laimching a general war is

igO PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

likely also to discourage lesser forms of military aggression.
The small war may get out of control and bring down the
full strength of our offensive power upon the enemy home-
land. Nevertheless, he may be willing to take that chance,
and we must be prepared for such an eventuality.

The third military reqxiirement, therefore, is to be prepared
to meet hmited aggression, wherever it may occur, quickly and
in a manner best suited to achieve our national objectives. The
forces to accomplish this must be based on careful considera-
tion of the probable extent and nature of hmited war, the
weapons which may be used, and the size and nature of the
threat to our national objectives.

The Margin of Deterrence

Since defeat in a general war would mean the end of our
free existence as a nation, it is clearly the more serious thieat.
Likewise, the threat of limited aggression is related directly
to the relative general-war postures of the United States and
the Soviet Union. So long as we maintain a superior general-
war capability, so long as we maintain a clearly definable de-
terrent margin, all forms of Soviet mihtary and political ag-
gression will be inhibited. If the deterrent margin shrinks, or
disappears, the Soviet Union will have almost complete free-
dom of action, militarily and politically.

The abihty to retaliate swiftly and decisively, then, stands
as tlie keystone of our deterrent philosophy.

In happier, less comphcated days, even as recently as a
decade ago, the doctrine of deterrence was comparatively sim-
ple to enunciate and to carry out. It was not much more in-
volved than Teddy Roosevelt's dictum to "walk softly and carry
a big stick." Perhaps even less complicated, since during the
pre-Korean period the United States not only possessed the
only big stick in the world but held a monopoly on the means
to deliver it as well.

These days are gone forever. The technological revolution
has also exploded behind the Iron Curtain, where it is being
exploited shrewdly and with great determination. Deterrence
is becoming a two-way street and, with this evolution, has

STRATEGY ON TRIAL IQl

taken on subtle and sophisticated overtones. The big stick
grows ever bigger, yet it must now be handled with the deli-
cacy and finesse of a rapier.

One arrives at a complicated equation, not susceptible of
the kind of simplification usually resorted to in public debate
over "missile gaps." The effectiveness of our retaliatory force,
and hence of our deterrent posture, is not just a matter of
quantity, or of quality, although neither factor can be ignored
and their relative importance will vary according to the weight
of other factors. If the problem can be simplified, perhaps it
is fair to say it boils down to survival and penetration. The
force must be able to leave here and get there.

Survival and Penetration

For purposes of discussion, the problems of survivability and
penetration capability will be considered separately, although
even this dichotomy will necessarily be artificial.

One way to insure the survival of enough of the force to
retaliate decisively is through sheer weight of numbers. The
more bombers and missiles we have, the more the enemy must
destroy in order to cut his homeland damage down to an ac-
ceptable level. Numbers will never cease to be important.

Another element of survivabihty is the state of the active
air-defense system. Every enemy bomber or missile stopped
short of target adds to the number of weapons delivered on
his homeland targets,

A third element is reaction time, which is steadily shrinking
under the impact of increasing speeds of dehvery systems. If
you have moved from the target by the time the enemy's blow
arrives, he cannot hit you— but you still have the power to
hit him.

Dispersal is still another factor in survivability. It multiplies
the number of targets which the enemy must destroy before
he feels that retahatory destruction is reduced to a level he
can accept. In the case of manned bombers, the ultimate in
dispersal is the so-called air-borne alert— vertical, rather than
horizontal, dispersal.

Still another method of reducing the vulnerability of the

192 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

retaliatory force is through hardening— placing weapons and
their command and control systems far enough underground
that almost a direct hit is needed to put them out of com-
mission.

Mobility— land-borne, sea-borne, air-borne— also is a key
method of reducing vulnerability and one that is taking on
increasing importance.

But in an age of intercontinental missiles, with thirty min-
utes' travel time from launch to a target six thousand miles
away, perhaps the most single significant element in reducing
vulnerability lies in the field of warning against surprise at-
tack—both tactical warning that an attack is actually on the
way and strategic warning of signs that an attack is imminent.
The latter truly encompasses the broad field of intelligence.

Thus it is seen that technology has introduced no radically
new elements into the survival equation. One increases the size
of his forces, one either digs in or moves about, one learns all
he can of both the enemy's capabilities and his intentions so
as to survive and counterattack. What technology has done
is, in eflFect, to turn the entire world into a battlefield, with
room for error eliminated for all practical purposes. There are
no opportunities for muddling through. Either you are right
or you are dead.

Through a combination of all or part of the above measures,
a substantial part of the retaliatory force will be spared in
even a surprise attack and will be dispatched against enemy
targets. The efi^ectiveness of this measure will be measured in
terms of its penetration capability— how many warheads get
through to how many targets and with what degree of ac-
curacy. Looking to the future once more, the advent of the
intercontinental ballistic missile has simplified the penetration
problem, inasmuch as, at the moment, there is small prospect
of an active defense system that can detect, identify, intercept,
and destroy a warhead before it reaches its target. Likewise,
the manned bomber, using the so-called stand-off missile or
air-launched ballistic missile, is less likely to have to fight its
way through active defenses to the target. The thermonuclear
warhead has an area of destruction which puts a much lower
premium on accuracy than in the past, although both U.S.
and Soviet achievements in missile accuracy have been Httle

STRATEGY ON TRIAL 193

short of phenomenal. This latter factor, incidentally, is impor-
tant because (i) it reduces the number of missiles required
to inflict an unacceptable level of damage and (2) it makes
of the intercontinental missile a truly counterforce weapon
rather than a city-destroying instrument of vengeance.

Technological developments of the past two decades, then,
have vastly increased and complicated the problems of sur-
vivability of the retahatory force while vastly easing the prob-
lems of penetration to target. The pendulum of advantage has
swung far in favor of attack versus defense and, concomi-
tantly, in the political context of the times, has given the po-
tential aggressor, with the twin advantages of surprise and
initiative, a weU-nigh incalculable degree of superiority, all
else being equal.

On the brighter side, however, the same technological suc-
cesses which have brought us to this impasse may well carry
within themselves the seeds for solutions to the very problems
which they have created. More on this later.

The Idea of Mutual Invulnerability

In terms of hardware, our strategic forces are in a period
of transition from a manned-bomber force to one composed
of both missiles and bombers. The mixed force, our military
planners feel strongly, will give a flexibihty of employment
above that of either an all-bomber or an all-missile force.
Through this decade the mix will be progressively weighted
in favor of missiles until by 1970 substantially more than half
of the long-range deUvery forces will be equipped with Atlas,
Titan, Minuteman, and later-generation intercontinental bal-
listic missiles, reinforced by intermediate-range balhstic mis-
siles in the hands of our western European allies. If the logic
of survivability is followed, these weapons will be securely
housed in hardened sites and dispersed both within the con-
tinental limits of the United States and in overseas bases. In
addition, the mobihty element will be introduced, with Polaris
intermediate-range balHstic missiles in submarines at sea, and
with Minuteman and its follow-on missiles, which are designed
for land-bome mobihty.

194 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

An unforeseeable fraction of the force will be invested in
space-borne systems within the decade, if not in delivery sys-
tems as such, then at least in early-warning, siirveiUance, and
command and control systems. No one can predict with ac-
curacy all of the military applications that will result from
exploitation of space technology. However, it appears that the
advent of space vehicles, manned and unmanned, will provide
the ultimate in target accessibility, intelligence, and early
warning.

In the period under discussion there will continue to be
tasks which manned bombers can perform better than mis-
siles. Among these are the destruction of mobile or ill-defined
targets which require extreme accuracy, combat patrol mis-
sions, exploitation of an enemy defense system which has been
degraded through missile attacks, and missions which require
on-the-spot human judgment. The latter, of course, has to
do with the great advantage of having part of your retaliatory
force subject to recall in case of false alarm or concessions
on the part of the enemy. It is highly dubious that we will
ever wish to stake all on a missile system that must continue
on to target once launched. The stakes are too high and the
danger of war through accident or miscalculation too great.

The strategic progression of the United States and Russia
over the next decade, short of general war, appears to be to-
ward the development of two mutually invulnerable strategic
delivery systems, forces which can wreak unacceptable dam-
age upon the other nation regardless of who starts what, or
when, or how. In such a case, a true nuclear stalemate wall
have been reached, and there are many who feel that such
a stalemate is the only chance for world stability.

But stalemates do not last forever, and the rewards for
breaking one of this magnitude will be high, high enough to
tempt an aggressor into actions designed to do so. As a result,
it will be to our advantage to explore methods of reducing
the mutuality of deterrence, placing us once more in a posi-
tion where our deterrent factor is positive and measurable,
as it was when we possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons
and their dehvery systems.

There are several ways through which this goal may be
pursued, and while their pursuit should not divert us from

STRATEGY ON TRIAL IQS

ovir quest for an invulnerable retaliatory force, neither should
their importance be sloughed off as incidental to the main
problem. They must be sought in addition to, and coinciden-
tally with, the achievement of inAoilnerability. Indeed, they
may be said to contribute directly and indirectly to our over-
all deterrent posture.

One of these is the development of an improved limited-
war capability above that provided by the protective um-
brella of the retaliatory force. This is essentially a tactical job,
with forces designed for quick reaction, global mobility, and
selective application of power to include non-nuclear weapons
if the situation should so dictate. It includes a modernized
airlift capability for small numbers of ground troops to act
as the "starch in the collar" for indigenous forces, hopefully
to be supplied by the enlightened self-interest of our allies.

A second field for exploitation is that of protection of our
military and civil population against fallout and other radiation
hazards, provision of continuity of government on local, state,
and national levels, and insurance of national economic recov-
ery following a general war. Herein would appear to He a
fruitful and purposeful mission for the bulk of our Reserve
forces.

The third field for exploitation in the stalemate lies in space.
Actually, the need for military space vehicles is part and parcel
of our guarantee of invulnerability of the force, but it has been
selected for separate discussion because ( i ) the ramifications
and implications project far beyond the time period under dis-
cussion and (2) because the potential for peace-seeking ob-
jectives in essentially miHtary space systems has largely been
overlooked.

Controlled Peace

Warning against siirprise attack is the key to invulnerability.
That is why we disperse our aircraft and place them on air-
borne alert; why we harden our missile sites and extend our
radar; why we seek mobility through the Minuteman and Po-
laris missile systems. But mainly it is a problem of getting
high enough and seeing far enough. Up to now, our line of

ig6 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

sight has been limited technically by restrictions imposed by
air-bome vehicles and politically by the existence, recognized
in international law, of national frontiers in the atmosphere
—frontiers which cannot be violated with impunity. Now our
progress in ballistic-missile technology can be coupled with
what some term "the electronic revolution" to allow us to keep
sensitive warning, surveillance, and command and control de-
vices in orbit to provide constant warning and control of ag-
gression wherever in the world it might occtir. Positive warn-
ing coupled with positive retaliation may indeed offer the
world its first hope for intelligent, purposeful control of arms
on a practical, rather than an idealistic, basis. Disarmament
has long been a goal of weU-meaning people, in the mistaken
belief that disarmament was synonymous with peace. Now it
is possible realistically to think of peace under positive control
by weapons of war, leading, in the end, to practical reduc-
tions in the world's crushing arms burden without opening the
door of weakness to an aggressor.

It becomes obvious that we cannot do aU that is to be done
in the forthcoming decade within the economic restrictions cur-
rently imposed on military budgets. We are lagging behind
in almost every field under discussion. Granted, there is waste
and duplication of effort imposed by the current defense or-
ganization, with its artificial lines of demarcation between
service interests and responsibilities. We can immeasurably
ease the economic burden by an organization which can con-
centrate resources where they are needed most.

But above and beyond this must come a realization that
peace is not a penny-ante affair, that the competition will get
rougher all the way along the line, and that we must make
an investment large enough to insure our security beyond a
peradventure of a doubt or the billions we have invested to
date will be a total loss.

Our strategy of deterrence cannot be a matter of trial and
error. It is constantly on trial and there can be no room for
error.

16. The Delicate Balance of Terror

by Albert Wohlstetter

Mr. Wohlstetter is a Fellow of the Council on
Foreign Relations on leave from the RAND
Corporation, where he is Associate Director
of Projects. At RAND, beginning in 1951, he
conducted a series of studies concerned prin-
cipally with problems of deterring general
war and the vulnerability of retaliatory forces.
He engaged also in studies of the active and
passive defense of the United States and of
methods and problems of arms control. A na-
tive of New York City, Mr. Wohlstetter was
trained in mathematical logic and in econom-
ics at Columbia University.

The first shock administered by the Soviet launching of Sput-
nik has almost dissipated. The flurry of statements and inves-
tigations and improvised responses has died down, leaving a
small residue: a slight increase in the schedule of bomber and
ballistic-missile production, with a resulting small increment
in our defense expenditures for the current fiscal year; a con-
siderable enthusiasm for space travel; and some stirrings of
interest in the teaching of mathematics and physics in the sec-
ondary schools. Western defense policy has almost returned to
the level of activity and the emphasis suited to the basic as-
sumptions which were controlling before Sputnik.

One of the most important of these assumptions— that a gen-
eral thermonuclear war is extremely unlikely— is held in com-

Abridged version of an article by the same title which appeared in
the January iqsq issue of Foreign Affairs and reprinted by special
permission. Copyright 1959 by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.,
New York.

igS PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

mon by most of the critics of our defense policy as well as by
its proponents. Because of its crucial role in the Western strat-
egy of defense, I should like to examine the stability of the
thermonuclear balance, which, it is generally supposed, would
make aggression irrational or even insane. The balance, I be-
lieve, is in fact precarious, and this fact has critical imphca-
tions for pohcy. Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured nor
impossible but will be the product of sustained intelligent ef-
fort and hard choices responsibly made. As a major illustra-
tion important both for defense and foreign policy, I shall treat
the particularly stringent conditions for deterrence which af-
fect forces based close to the enemy, whether they are U.S.
forces or those of our aUies, under single or joint control. I
shall comment also on the inadequacy as well as the necessity
of deterrence, on the problem of accidental outbreak of war,
and on disarmament.

The Fresumed Automatic Balance

I emphasize that requirements for deterrence are stringent.
We have heard so much about the atomic stalemate and tlie
receding probabihty of war which it has produced that this
may strike the reader as something of an exaggeration. Is de-
terrence a necessary consequence of both sides having a nu-
clear delivery capability, and is all-out war nearly obsolete?
Is mutual extinction the only outcome of a general war? This
belief, frequently expressed by references to Dr. Oppenhei-
mer's simile of the two scorpions in a bottle, is perhaps the
prevalent one.

Deterrence, however, is not automatic. While feasible, it
wiU be much harder to achieve in the 1960s than is generally
believed. One of the most disturbing features of current opin-
ion is the underestimation of this difficulty. This is due partly
to a misconstruction of the technological race as a problem
in matching striking forces, partiy to a wishful analysis of the
Soviet ability to strike first.

Since Sputnik, the United States has made several moves
to assure the world (that is, the enemy, but more especially
our allies and ourselves) that we will match or ovennatch

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR IQQ

Soviet technology and, specifically, Soviet oflFense technology.
We have, for example, accelerated the bomber and ballistic-
missile programs, in particular the intermediate-range ballistic
missiles. The problem has been conceived as more or better
bombers— or rockets; or sputniks; or engineers. This has meant
confusing deterrence with matching or exceeding the enemy's
ability to strike first. Matching w^eapons, however, miscon-
strues the nature of the technological race. Not, as is frequently
said, because only a few bombs owned by the defender can
make aggression fruitless, but because even many might not.
One outmoded A-bomb dropped from an obsolete bomber
might destroy a great many supersonic jets and ballistic mis-
siles. To deter an attack means being able to strike back ia
spite of it. It means, in other words, a capability to strike sec-
ond. In the last year or two there has been a growing aware-
ness of the importance of the distinction between a "strike
first" and a "strike second" capability, but little, if any, rec-
ognition of the implications of this distinction for the balance-
of -terror theory.

Where the published writings have not simply underesti-
mated Soviet capabilities and the advantages of a first strike,
they have in general placed artificial constraints on the Soviet
use of the capabilities attributed to them. They assume, for
example, that the enemy will attack in mass over the Arctic
through our Distant Early Warning Line, with bombers re-
fueled over Canada— all resulting in plenty of warning. Most
hopefully, it is sometimes assumed that such attacks will be
preceded by days of visible preparations for moving ground
troops. Such assumptions suggest that the Soviet leaders will
be rather bumbling or, better, co-operative. However attrac-
tive it may be for us to narrow Soviet alternatives to these,
they would be low in the order of preference of any reasonable
Russians planning war.

The Quantitative Nature of the Problem and the
Uncertainties

In treating Soviet strategies it is important to consider So-
viet rather than Western advantage and to consider the sh-at-

200 PROBLEMS OF MILITAKY STRATEGY

egy of both sides quantitatively. The eflEectiveness of our own
choices will depend on a most complex numerical interaction
of Soviet and Western plans. Unfortunately, both the privi-
leged and xmprivileged information on these matters is pre-
carious. As a result, competent people have been led into criti-
cal error in evaluating the prospects for deterrence. Western
journalists have greatly overestimated the diflBculties of a So-
viet surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons and vastly
underestimated the complexity of the Western problem of re-
taliation.

Perhaps the first step in dispelling the nearly universal op-
timism about the stability of deterrence would be to recognize
the difficulties in analyzing the uncertainties and interactions
between our own wide range of choices and the moves open
to the Soviets. On our side we must consider an enormous
variety of strategic weapons which might compose om: force,
and for each of these, several alternative methods of basing
and operation. These are the choices that determine whether
a weapons system will have any genuine capability in the real-
istic circumstances of a war. Besides the B-47E and the B-52
bombers which are in the United States strategic force now,
alternatives will include the B-52G (a longer-range version of
the B-52); the Mach-2 B-58A bomber and a "growth" version
of it; the Mach-3 B-70 bomber; a nuclear-powered bomber
possibly carrying long-range air-to-surface missiles; the Dyna-
soar, a manned glide rocket; the Thor and the Jupiter, liquid-
fueled intermediate-range ballistic missiles; the Snark intercon-
tinental cruise missile; the Atlas and the Titan intercontinental
ballistic missiles; the submarine-launched Polaris and Atlantis
rockets; Minuteman, one potential solid-fueled successor to the
Thor and Titan; possibly unmanned bombardment satellites;
and many others which are not yet gleams in anyone's eye
and some that are just that.

The difficulty of describing in one chapter the best mixture
of weapons for the long-term future beginning in i960, their
base requirements, their potentiahty for stabihzing or upset-
ting the balance among the great powers, and their implica-
tions for the alliance, is not just a matter of space or the con-
straint of security. The difficulty in fact stems from some rather
basic insecurities. These matters are widely imcertain; we are

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 201

talking about weapons and vehicles that are some time off
and, even if the precise performances currently hoped for and
claimed by contractors were in the public domain, it would
be a good idea to doubt them.

Recently some of my colleagues picked their way through
the graveyard of early claims about various missiles and air-
craft: their dates of availability, costs, and performance. These
claims are seldom revisited or talked about: de mortuis nil
nisi honum. The errors were large and almost always in one
direction. And the less we knew, the more hopeful we were.
Accordingly, the missiles benefited in particular. For example,
the estimated cost of one missile increased by a factor of over
50— from about $35,000 in 1949 to some $2,000,000 in 1957.
This uncertainty is critical. Some but not all of the systems
hsted can be chosen, and the problem of choice is essentially
quantitative. The complexities of the problem, if they were
more widely understood, would discourage the oracular con-
fidence of writers on the subject of deterrence.

Some of the complexities can be suggested by referring to
the successive obstacles to be hurdled by any system provid-
ing a capability to strike second, that is, to strike back. Such
deterrent systems must have ( 1 ) a stable, "steady-state" peace-
time operation within feasible budgets (besides the logistic
and operational costs there are, for example, problems of false
alarms and accidents). They must have also the abihty (2)
to survive enemy attacks, (3) to make and communicate the
decision to retaliate, (4) to reach enemy territory with fuel
enough to complete their mission, (5) to penetrate enemy ac-
tive defenses, that is, fighters and surface-to-air missiles, and
(6) to destroy the target in spite of any "passive" civil defense
in the form of dispersal or protective construction or evacuation
of the target itself.

Within hmits, the enemy is free to use his offensive and
defensive forces so as to exploit the weaknesses of each of our
systems. He will also be free, within limits, in the 1960s to
choose that composition of forces which wdll make life as dif-
ficult as possible for the various systems we might select. It
would be quite v^Tong to assume that we have the same de-
gree of flexibility or that the uncertainties I have described
affect a totahtarian aggressor and the party attacked equally.

202 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

A totalitarian country can preserve secrecy about the capa-
bilities and disposition of his forces very much better than a
Western democracy. And the aggressor has, among other enor-
mous advantages of the first stiike, the ability to weigh con-
tinually our performance at each of the six barriers and to
choose that precise time and circiomstance for attack which
will reduce uncertainty. It is important not to confuse our vm-
certainty with his. Strangely enough, some mihtary commen-
tators have not made this distinction and have founded their
certainty of deterrence on the fact simply that there are un-
certainties.

The Delicacy of the Balance of Terror

The most important conclusion is that we must expect a
vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can
deliver with httle warning and the growth of a significant
Russian capability for an essentially wamingless attack. As a
result, strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely
diflScult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960s we
may not have the power to deter attack. Whether we have it
or not will depend on some difiicult strategic choices as to the
future composition of the deterrent forces as well as hard
choices on its basing, operations, and defense.

Marmed bombers will continue to make up the predominant
part of our striking force in the early 1960s. None of the popu-
lar remedies for their defense will suffice— not, for example,
mere increase of alertness (which wiU be offset by the Soviets'
increasing capability for attack without significant warning),
nor simple dispersal or sheltering alone or mobility taken by
itself, nor a mere pihng up of interceptors and defense missiles
around SAC bases. Especially extravagant expectations have
been placed on the air-bome alert— an extreme form of defense
by mobility. The impression is rather widespread that one
third of the SAC bombers are in the air and ready for combat
at all times. This belief is belied by the public record. Accord-
ing to the Symington Committee hearings in 1956, our bomb-
ers averaged 31 hours of flying per month, which is about
4 per cent of the average 732-hour month. An Air Force rep-

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 203

resentative expressed the hope that within a couple of years,
with an increase in the ratio of crews to aircraft, the bombers
would reach 45 hours of flight per month— which is 6 per cent.
This 4 to 6 per cent of the force includes bombers partially
fueled and without bombs. It is, moreover, only an average,
admitting variance down as well as up. Some increase in the
number of armed bombers aloft is to be expected. However,
for the current generation of bombers, which have been de-
signed for speed and range rather than endurance, a continu-
ous air patrol of one third of the force would be extremely
expensive.

On the other hand, it would be unwise to look for miracles
in the new weapons systems, which by the mid-1960s may
constitute a considerable portion of the United States force.
After the Thor, Atlas, and Titan there are a number of prom-
ising developments. The solid-fueled rockets, Minuteman and
Polaris, promise in particular to be extremely significant com-
ponents of the deterrent force. Today they are being touted
as making the problem of deterrence easy to solve and, in fact,
guaranteeing its solution. But none of the new developments
in vehicles is hkely to do that. For the complex job of deter-
rence, they all have limitations. The unvarying immoderate
claims for each new weapons system should make us wary
of the latest "technological breakthroughs." Only a very short
time ago the ballistic missile itself was supposed to be invul-
nerable on the ground. It is now more generally understood
that its survival is likely to depend on a variety of choices in
its defense.

It is hard to talk with confidence about the mid- and late
1960s. A systematic study of an optimal or a good deterrent
force which considered all the major factors affecting choice
and dealt adequately wdth the uncertainties would be a for-
midable task. In lieu of this, I shall mention briefly why none
of the many systems available or projected dominates the oth-
ers in any obvious way. My comments wiU take the form of
a swift run-through of the characteristic advantages and dis-
advantages of various strategic systems at each of the six suc-
cessive hurdles mentioned earlier.

The first hurdle to be surmounted is the attainment of a
stable, steady-state peacetime operation. Systems which de-

204 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

pend for their survival on extreme decentralization of controls,
as may be the case with large-scale dispersal and some of the
mobile weapons, raise problems of accidents, and over a long
period of peacetime operation this leads, in turn, to serious
political problems. Systems relying on extensive movement by
land, perhaps by truck caravan, are an obvious example; the
introduction of these on European roads, as is sometimes sug-
gested, would raise grave questions for the governments of
some of our allies. Any extensive increase in the armed air
alert will increase the hazard of accident and intensify the
concern already expressed among our allies. Some of the pro-
posals for bombardment satellites may involve such hazards of
unintended bomb release as to make them out of the question.
The cost to buy and operate various weapons systems must
be seriously considered. Some systems buy their ability to ne-
gotiate a given hurdle— say, surviving the enemy attack— only
at prohibitive cost. Then the number that can be bought out
of a given budget will be small and this will aflEect the relative
performance of competing systems at various other hurdles,
for example, penetrating enemy defenses. Some of the relevant
cost comparisons, then, are between competing systems; oth-
ers concern the extra costs to the enemy of canceling an ad-
ditional expenditure of our own. For example, some dispersal
is essential, though usually it is expensive; if the dispersed
bases are within a warning net, dispersal can help to provide
warning against some sorts of attack, since it forces the at-
tacker to increase the size of his raid and so makes it more
liable to detection as well as somewhat harder to co-ordinate.
But as the sole or principal defense of our oflPensive force, dis-
persal has only a brief useful life and can be justified finan-
cially only up to a point. For against our costs of construction,
maintenance, and operation of an additional base must be set
the enemy's much lower costs of delivering one extra weapon.
And, in general, any feasible degree of dispersal leaves a con-
siderable concentration of value at a single target point. For
example, a squadron of heavy bombers costing, with their as-
sociated tankers and penetration aids, perhaps $500,000,000
over five years, might be eliminated, if it were otherwise un-
protected, by an enemy intercontinental ballistic missile cost-
ing perhaps $16,000,000. After making allowance for the un-

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 205

reliability and inaccuracy of the missile, this means a ratio
of some ten for one or better. To achieve safety by brute num-
bers in so unfavorable a competition is not likely to be viable
economically or politically. However, a viable peacetime op-
eration is only the first hurdle to be surmounted.

At the second hurdle— surviving the enemy offense— ground
alert systems placed deep within a warning net look good
against a manned-bomber attack, much less good against in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles, and not good at all against bal-
listic missiles launched from the sea. In the last case, systems
such as the Minuteman, which may be sheltered and dispersed
as well as being alert, would do well. Systems involving launch-
ing platforms which are mobile and concealed, such as Polaris
submarines, have particular advantage for surviving an enemy
offense.

However, there is a third hurdle to be surmounted— namely,
that of making the decision to retaliate and communicating
it. Here, Polaris, the combat air patrol of B-52S, and in fact
all of the mobile platforms— under water, on the surface, in
the air, and above the air— have severe problems. Long-
distance communication may be jammed and, most important,
communication centers may be destroyed.

At the fourth hurdle— ability to reach enemy territory with
fuel enough to complete the mission— several of our short-
legged systems have operational problems such as co-ordina-
tion with tankers and using bases close to the enemy. For a
good many years to come, up to the mid-1960s in fact, this
will be a formidable hurdle for the greater part of our deter-
rent force. The next section of this article deals with this prob-
lem at some length.

The fifth hurdle is the aggressor's long-range interceptors
and close-in missile defenses. To get past these might require
large numbers of planes and missiles. (If the high cost of over-
coming an earlier obstacle— using extreme dispersal or air-
borne alert or the like— limits the number of planes or missiles
bought, our capability is hkely to be penahzed disproportion-
ately here.) Or getting through may involve carrying heavy
loads of radar decoys, electronic jammers, and other aids to
defense penetration. For example, vehicles like Minuteman
and Polaris, which were made small to facilitate dispersal or

206 PROBLEMS OF MILITAHY STRATEGY

mobility, may suflFer here because they can carry fewer pene-
tration aids.

At the final hurdle— destroying the target in spite of the
passive defenses that may protect it— low-payload and low-
accuracy systems, such as Minuteman and Polaris, may be
frustrated by blast-resistant shelter. For example, five half-
megaton weapons with an average inaccuracy of two miles
might be expected to destroy half the population of a city of
900,000 spread over forty square miles, provided the inhabit-
ants are without shelters. But if they are provided with shelters
capable of resisting overpressures of 100 pounds per square
inch, approximately sixty such weapons would be required;
and deep rock shelters might force the total up to over a
thousand.

Prizes for a retaliatory capability are not distributed for get-
ting over one of these jumps. A system must get over all six.
I hope tliese illustrations will suggest that assuring ovirselves
the power to strike back after a massive thermonuclear sur-
prise attack is by no means as automatic as is widely beUeved.

In counteracting the general optimism as to the ease and,
in fact, the Inevitability of deterrence, I should hke to avoid
creating the extreme opposite impression. Deterrence demands
hard, continuing, intelligent work, but it can be achieved. The
job of deterring rational attack by guaranteeing great damage
to an aggressor is, for example, very much less difiBcult than
erecting a nearly airtight defense of cities in the face of full-
scale thermonuclear surprise attack. Protecting manned bomb-
ers and missiles is much easier because they may be dispersed,
sheltered, or kept mobile, and they can respond to warning
with greater speed. Mixtures of these and other defenses with
complementary strengths can preserve a powerful remainder
after attack. Obviously not all our bombers and missiles need
to survive in order to fulfill their mission. To preserve the ma-
jority of our cities intact in the face of surprise attack is im-
mensely more difficult, if not impossible. (This does not mean
that the aggressor has the same problem in preserving his cities
from retaliation by a poorly protected, badly damaged force.
And it does not mean that we should not do more to limit the
extent of the catastrophe to our cities in case deterrence fails.
I believe we should.) Deterrence, however, provided we work

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 30/

at it, is feasible, and, what is more, it is a crucial objective of
national policy.

What can be said, then, as to whether general war is un-
likely? Would not a general thermonuclear war mean "extinc-
tion" for the aggressor as well as the defender? "Extinction"
is a state that badly needs analysis. Russian casualties in
World War II were more than 20,000,000. Yet Russia recov-
ered extremely well from this catastrophe. There are several
quite plausible circumstances in the future when the Russians
might be quite confident of being able to limit damage to con-
siderably less than this number— they make sensible strategic
choices and we do not. On the other hand, the risks of not
striking might at some juncture appear very great to the So-
viets, involving, for example, disastrous defeat in peripheral
war, loss of key satellites Mdth danger of revolt spreading—
possibly to Russia itself— or fear of an attack by om"selves.
Then, striking first, by surprise, would be the sensible choice
for them, and from their point of view the smaller risk.

It should be clear that it is not fruitful to talk about the
likelihood of general war without specifying the range of al-
ternatives that are pressing on the aggressor and the strategic
postures of both the Soviet bloc and the West. Deterrence is a
matter of comparative risks. The balance is not automatic.
First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advan-
tage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at
any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilib-
rium. And second, this technology itself is changing with
fantastic speed. Deterrence will require an urgent and con-
tinuing effort.

The Uses and Risks of Bases Close to the Soviets

It may now be useful to focus attention on the special prob-
lems of deterrent forces close to the Soviet Union. First, over-
seas areas have played an important role in the past and have
a continuing though less certain role today. Second, the recent
acceleration of production of intermediate-range ballistic m.is-
siles and the negotiation of agreements with various NATO
powers for their basing and operation have given our overseas

-^rr

208 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

bases a renewed importance in deterring attack on the United
States— or so it would appear at first blush. Third, an analysis
can throw some light on the problems faced by our allies in
developing an independent ability to deter all-out attack on
themselves, and in this way it can clarify the much agitated
question of nuclear sharing. Finally, overseas bases aflFect in
many critical ways, political and economic as well as military,
the status of the alliance.

At the end of the last decade, overseas bases appeared to
be an advantageous means of achieving the radius extension
needed by our short-legged bombers, of permitting them to
use several axes of attack, and of increasing the number of
sorties possible in the course of an extended campaign. With
the growth of our own thermonuclear stockpile, it became ap-
parent that a long campaign involving many re-uses of a large
proportion of our bombers was not hkely to be necessary. With
the growth of a Russian nuclear-delivery capability, it became
clear that this was most unlikely to be feasible.

Our overseas bases now have the disadvantage of high vul-
nerability. Because they are closer than the United States to
the Soviet Union, they are subject to a vastly greater attack
by a larger variety as well as number of vehicles. With given
resources, the Soviets might deliver on nearby bases a freight
of bombs with something like fifty to one hundred times the
yield that they could muster at intercontinental range. Missile
accuracy would more than double. Because there is not much
space for obtaining warning— in any case, there are no deep-
warning radar nets— and since most of our overseas bases are
close to deep water from which submarines might launch mis-
siles, the warning problem is very much more severe than for
bases in the interior of the United States.

As a result, early in the 19503 the U. S. Air Force decided
to recall many of our bombers to the continental United States
and to use the overseas bases chiefly for refueling, particularly
poststrike ground refueling. This reduced drastically the vul-
nerability of U.S. bombers and at the same time retained
many of the advantages of overseas operation. For some years
now SAC has been reducing the number of aircraft usually
deployed overseas. The purpose is to reduce vulnerability and
has little to do with any increasing radius of SAC aircraft. The

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 209

early B-52 radius is roughly that of the B-36; the B-47,
roughly that of the B-50 or B-29. In fact, the radius limita-
tion, and therefore the basing requirements we have discussed,
will not change substantially for some time to come. We can
talk with comparative confidence here, because the U.S. stra-
tegic force is itself largely determined for this period. Such a
force changes more slowly than is generally realized. The vast
majority of the force will consist of manned bombers, and most
of these will be of medium range. Some U.S. bombers will be
able to reach some targets from some U.S. bases within the
continental United States without landing on the way back.
On the other hand, some bomber-target combinations are not
feasible without pre-target landing (and are therefore doubt-
ful). The Atlas, Titan, and Polaris rockets, when available, can
of course do vidthout overseas bases (though the proportion
of Polaris submarines kept at sea can be made larger by the
use of submarine tenders based overseas). But even with the
projected force of aerial tankers, the greater part of our force,
which will be manned bombers, cannot be used at all in at-
tacks on the Soviet Union wdthout at least some use of over-
seas areas.

What of the bases for Thor and Jupiter, our first inter-
mediate-range ballistic missiles? These have to be close to the
enemy, and they must of course be operating bases, not merely
refueling stations. The Thors and Jupiters will be continuously
in range of an enormous Soviet potential for surprise attack.
These installations therefore reopen, in a most acute form,
some of the serious questions of groimd vulnerability that were
raised about six years ago in connection with our overseas
bomber bases. The decision to station the Thor and Jupiter
missiles overseas has been our principal public response to the
Russian advances in rocketry, and perhaps our most plausible
response. Because it involves our ballistic missiles, it appears
directly to answer the Russian rockets. Because it involves us-
ing European bases, it appears to make up for the range su-
periority of the Russian intercontinental missile. And most im-
portant, it directly involves the NATO powers and gives them
an element of control.

There is no question that it was genuinely urgent not only
to meet the Russian threat but to do so visibly, in order to

210 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

save the loosening NATO alliance. Our allies were fearful that
the Soviet ballistic missiles might mean that we were no longer
able or willing to retaliate against the Soviet Union in case
of an attack on them. We hastened to make public a reaction
which would restore their confidence. This move surely ap-
pears to increase our own power to strike back, and also to
give our alHes a deterrent of their own, independent of oxir
decision. It has also been argued that in this respect it merely
advances the inevitable date at which our allies will acquire
"modem" weapons of their own, and that it widens the range
of Soviet challenges which Europe can meet. But we must
face seriously the question whether this move will in fact as-
sure either the ability to retaliate or the decision to attem^pt
it, on the part of our allies or ourselves. And we should ask at
the very least whether further expansion of this policy wiU
buy as much retaliatory power as other ways of spending the
considerable sums involved. Finally, it is important to be clear
whether the Thor and Jupiter actually increase the flexibility
or range of response available to our allies.

One justification for this move is that it disperses retaliatory
weapons and tliat this is the most effective sanction against
the tliermonuclear aggressor. The limitations of dispersal have
already been discussed, but it remains to examine tlie argu-
ment that overseas bases provide widespread dispersal, which
imposes on the aggressor insoluble problems of co-ordination.

There is, of course, something in the notion that forcing the
enemy to attack many political entities increases the serious-
ness of his decision, but there is very little in the notion that
dispersal in several countries makes the problem of destruc-
tion more difficult in the military sense. Dispersal does not
require separation by the distance of oceans— just by the lethal
diameters of enemy bombs. And the task of co-ordinating
bomber attacks on Etirope and the eastern coast of the United
States, say, is not appreciably more diflBcult than co-ordinating
attacks on our east and west coasts. In the case of ballistic
missiles, the elapsed time from firing to impact on the target
can be calculated with high accuracy. Although there will be
some failures and delays, times of firing can be arranged so
that impact on many dispersed points is almost simultaneous
—on Okinawa and the United Kingdom, for instance, as well

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROH 211

as on California and Ohio. Moreover, it is important to keep
in mind that these far-flung bases, while distant from each
other and from the United States, are on the whole close to
the enemy. To eliminate them, therefore, requires a smaller
expenditure of resources on his part than targets at intercon-
tinental range. For close-in targets he can use a wider variety
of weapons carrying larger payloads and with higher accuracy.

The seeming appositeness of an overseas-based Thor and
Jupiter as an answer to a Russian intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile stems not so much from any careftJ analysis of their re-
taliatory power under attack as from the directness of the
comparison they suggest: a rocket equals a rocket, an inter-
continental missile equals an intermediate-range missile based
at closer range to the target. But this again mistakes the nature
of the technological race. It conceives the problem of deter-
rence as that of simply matching or exceeding the aggressor's
capability to strike first.

The basis for the hopeful impression that they will not is
rather vague, including a mixtxire of hypothetical properties
of ballistic missiles in which perhaps the dominant element
is their supposedly much more rapid, "push button" response.
What needs to be considered here are the response time of
such missiles (including decision, preparation, and launch
times) and how they are to be defended.

The decision to fire a missile with a thermonuclear warhead
is much harder to make than a decision simply to start a
manned aircraft on its way, with orders to return to base un-
less instructed to continue to its assigned target. This is the
"fail-safe" procedure practiced by the U, S. Air Force. In con-
trast, once a missile is launched, there is no method of recall
or deflection which is not subject to risks of electronic or me-
chanical failure. Therefore, such a decision must wait for much
more unambiguous evidence of enemy intentions. It must and
will take a longer time to make and is less likely to be made
at all. Where more than one country is involved, the joint de-
cision is harder still, since there is opportunity to disagree
about the ambiguity of the evidence, as weU as to reach quite
different interpretations of national interest. On much less
momentous matters the process of making decisions in NATO
is complicated, and it should be recognized that such com-

212 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

plexity has much to do with the genuine concern of the vari-
ous NATO powers about the danger of accidentally starting
World War III. Such fears will not be diminished with the
advent of IRBMs. In fact, widespread dispersion of nuclear-
armed missiles raises measurably the possibility of accidental
war.

Second, it is quite erroneous to suppose that by contrast
with manned bombers the first IRBMs can be launched al-
most as simply as pressing a button. Countdown procedures for
early missiles are liable to interruption, and the characteristics
of the liquid-oxygen fuel limits the readiness of their response.
Unlike JP-4, the fuel used in jet bombers, liquid oxygen can-
not be held for long periods of time in these vehicles. In this
respect, such missiles will be less ready than alert bombers.
Third, the smaller warning time available overseas makes more
difficult any response. This includes, in particular, any active
defense, not only against ballistic-missile attacks but, for ex-
ample, against low-altitude or various circuitous attacks by
manned aircraft.

Finally, passive defense by means of shelter is more dif-
ficult, given the larger bomb yields, better accuracies, and
larger forces available to the Russians at such close range. And
if the press reports are correct, the plans for IRBM installa-
tions do not call for bomb-resistant shelters. If this is so, it
should be taken into account in measuring the actual contribu-
tion of these installations to the West's retaliatory power.
Viewed as a contribution to deterring all-out attack on the
United States, the Thor and Jupiter bases seem unlikely to
compare favorably with other alternatives. If newspaper ref-
erences to hard bargaining by some of our future hosts are
to be believed, it would seem that such negotiations have been
conducted imder misapprehensions on both sides as to the
benefits to the United States.

But many proponents of the distribution of Thor and Jupiter
—and possibly some of our allies— have in mind not an increase
in U.S. deterrence but the development of an independent ca-
pability in several of the NATO countries to deter aU-out at-
tack against themselves. This would be a useful thing if it can
be managed at supportable cost and if it does not entail the
sacrifice of even more critical measm'es of protection. But

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERHOR 213

aside from the special problems of joint control, which would
aflFect the certainty of response adversely, precisely who their
legal owner is will not affect the retaliatory power of the Thors
and Jupiters one way or the other. They would not be able to
deter an attack which they could not survive. It is cvurious
that many who question the utility of American overseas bases
(for example, our bomber bases in the United Kingdom) sim-
ply assume that, for our aUies, possession of strategic nuclear
weapons is one with deterrence.

There remains the view that the provision of these weapons
will broaden the range of response open to our allies. Insofar
as this view rests on the behef that the intermediate-range bal-
listic missile is adapted to Hmited war, it is wide of the mark.
The inaccuracy of an IRBM requires high-yield warheads, and
such a combination of inaccuracy and high yield, while quite
appropriate and adequate against unprotected targets in a gen-
eral war, would scarcely come within even the most lax, in
fact reckless, definition of limited war. Such a weapon is in-
appropriate for even the nuclear variety of limited war, and
it is totally useless for meeting the wdde variety of provocation
that is well below the threshold of nuclear response. Insofar
as these missiles will be costly for our allies to install, operate,
and support, they are likely to displace a conventional capa-
bility that might be genuinely useful in hmited engagements.
More important, they are hkely to be used as an excuse for
budget cutting. In this way they will accelerate the general
trend toward dependence on all-out response and so will have
the opposite effect to the one claimed.

Nevertheless, if the Thor and Jupiter have these defects,
might not some future weapon be free of them? Some of these
defects, of course, will be overcome in time. Sohd fuels or
storable liquids will eventually replace hquid oxygen, reliabili-
ties will increase, various forms of mobihty or portability will
become feasible, accmracies may even be so improved that
such weapons can be used in limited wars. But these develop-
ments are all years away. In consequence, the discussion will
be advanced if a little more precision is given such terms as
"missiles" or "modem" or "advanced weapons." We are not
distributing a generic "modern" weapon with all the virtues
of flexibility in varying circvunstances and of invulnerability in

214 PROBLEMS OF MELITAKY STRATEGY

all-out war. But even with advances in the state of the art
on our side, it will remain difficult to maintain a deterrent,
especially close in imder the enemy's guns.

It foUows that, though a wider distribution of nuclear
weapons may be inevitable, or at any rate likely, and though
some countries in addition to the Soviet Union and the United
States may even develop an independent deterrent, it is by no
means inevitable or even very hkely that the power to deter
all-out thermonuclear attack will be widespread. This is true
even though a minor power would not need to guarantee as
large a retaHation as we in order to deter attack on itself. Un-
fortunately, the minor powers have smaller resources as well
as poorer strategic locations.^ Mere membership in the nuclear
club might carry with it prestige, as the applicants and nomi-
nees expect, but it will be rather expensive, and in time it wiU
be clear that it does not necessarily confer any of the expected
privileges enjoyed by the two charter members. The bvtrden
of deterring a general war as distinct from hmited wars is still
likely to be on the United States and therefore, so far as our
aUies are concerned, on the military alliance.

There is one final consideration. Missiles placed near the en-
emy, even if they could not retaliate, would have a potent
capability for striking first by surprise. And it might not be
easy for the enemy to discern their purpose. The existence of
such a force might be a considerable provocation and, in fact,
a dangerous one, in the sense that it would place a great hui-
den on our deterrent force, which more than ever would have
to guarantee extreme risks to the attacker— worse than the
risks of waiting in the face of this danger. When not coupled
with the ability to strike in retaliation, such a capability might
suggest— erroneously, to be sure, in the case of the democracies
—an intention to strike first. If so, it would tend to provoke,
rather than to deter, general war.

I have dealt here with only one of the functions of overseas
bases: their use as a support for the strategic deterrent force.
They have a variety of important miKtary, pohtical, and eco-
nomic roles which are beyond the scope of this chapter. Ex-
penditures in connection with the construction or operation of
our bases, for example, are a form of economic aid and, more-
over, a form that is rather palatable to the Congress. There

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERROR 215

are other functions in a central war where their importance
may be very considerable and their usefulness in a limited war
might be substantial.

Indeed, nothing said here should suggest that deterrence is
in itself an adequate strategy. The complementary require-
ments of a suflBcient military pohcy certainly include a more
serious development of power to meet hmited aggression, es-
pecially with more advanced conventional weapons than those
now available. They also include more energetic provision for
active and passive defenses to Hmit the dimensions of the ca-
tastrophe in case deterrence should fail. For example, an
economically feasible shelter program in the United States
might make the difference between 50,000,000 survivors and
120,000,000 survivors.

But it would be a fatal mistake to suppose that because
strategic deterrence is inadequate by itself it can be dispensed
with. Deterrence is not dispensable. If the picture of the
world I have drawn is rather bleak, it could nonetheless be
cataclysmically worse. Suppose both the United States and the
Soviet Union, given the opportunity to administer the opening
blow, had the power to destroy each other's retaliatory forces
and society. The situation would then be something like the
old-fashioned Western gun duel. It would be extraordinarily
risky for one side not to attempt to destroy the other, or to
delay doing so, not only because it can emerge unscathed by
striking first but because this is the sole way it can reasonably
hope to emerge at all. Evidently such a situation is extremely
unstable. On the other hand, if it is clear that the aggressor,
too, will suffer catastrophic damage in the event of his ag-
gression, he then has strong reason not to attack, even though
he can administer great damage. A protected retaliatory ca-
pability has a stabilizing influence not only in deterring ra-
tional attack but also in offering every inducement to both
powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.

The critics who feel that deterrence is "bankrupt" some-
times say that we stress deterrence too much. I believe this is
quite wrong if it means that we are devoting too much effort
to protect our power to retaliate; but I think it is quite right
if it means that we have talked too much of a strategic threat
as a substitute for many things it cannot replace. If there were

3l6 PROBLEMS OF MILITAKY STRATEGY

no real danger of a rational attack, then accidents and the
"nth" country problem would be the only problems. As I have
indicated, they are serious problems, and some sorts of Umita-
tion and inspection agreement might diminish them. But if
there is to be any prospect of reahstic and useful agreement,
we must reject the theory of automatic deterrence. And we
must bear in mind that the more extensive a disarmament
agreement is, the smaller the force that a violator would have
to hide in order to achieve complete domination. Most ob-
viously, "the abolition of the weapons necessary in a general
or 'unhmited' war" would offer the most insuperable obstacles
to an inspection plan, since the violator could gain an over-
whelming advantage from the concealment of even a few
weapons. The need for a deterrent, in this connection too, is
ineradicable.

Summary

Almost everyone seems concerned with the need to relax
tension. However, relaxation of tension, which everyone thinks
is good, is not easily distinguished from relaxing one's guard,
which almost everyone thinks is bad. Relaxation, like Mil-
town, is not an end in itself. Not all danger comes from ten-
sion. To be tense where there is danger is only rational.

What can we say then, in sum, on the balance-of-terror
theory of automatic deterrence? It is a contribution to the rhet-
oric rather than the logic of war in the thermonuclear age.
The notion that a carefully plarmed surprise attack can be
checkmated almost effortlessly, that, in short, we may resume
our deep pre-Sputnik sleep, is wrong and its nearly imiversal
acceptance is terribly dangerous. Though deterrence is not
enough in itself, it is vital. There are two principal points.

First, deterring general war in both the early and late 1960s
will be hard at best, and hardest both for ourselves and our
allies wherever we use forces based near the enemy.

Second, even if we can deter general war by a strenuous
and continuing effort, this will by no means be the whole of a
military, much less a foreign, policy. Such a policy would not
of itself remove the danger of accidental outbreak or hmit the

THE DELICATE BALANCE OF TERBOR 217

damage in case deterrence failed; nor would it be at all ade-
quate for crises on the periphery.

A generally usefxil way of concluding a grim argument of
this kind would be to affirm that we have the resources, intel-
ligence, and courage to make the correct decisions. That is, of
course, the case. And there is a good chance that we will do
so. But perhaps, as a small aid toward making such decisions
more likely, we should contemplate the possibility that they
may not be made. They are hard, do involve sacrifice, are af-
fected by great uncertainties, and concern matters in which
much is altogether unknown and much else must be hedged
by secrecy; and, above all, they entail a new image of our-
selves in a world of persistent danger. It is by no means certain
that we shall meet the test.

1. General Gallois argues that, while alliances will offer no guar-
antee, "a small nrnnber of bombs and a small number of carriers
suffice for a threatened power to protect itself against atomic de-
struction" (RSaUtSs, November 1958, p. 71). His numerical illustra-
tions give the defender some 400 underground launching sites
(ibid., p. 22, and the Reporter, September 18, 1958, p. 25) and
suggest that their elimination would require 5000 to 25,000 missiles
—which is "more or less impossible"— and that in any case the ag-
gressor would not survive the fallout from his own weapons.
Whether these are large numbers of targets from the standpoint of
the aggressor wiU depend on the accuracy, yield, and reliability of
offense weapons as well as the resistance of the defender's shelters
and a ntimber of other matters not specified in the argument. Gen-
eral Gallois is aware that the expectation of survival depends on
distance even in the ballistic-missile age and that our allies are not
so fortunate in this respect. Close-in missiles have better bomb yields
and accuracies. Moreover, manned aircraft— with still better yields
and accuracies— can be used by an aggressor here since warning of
their approach is very short. Suffice it to say that the nxmierical
advantage General Gallois cites is greatly exaggerated. Further-
more, he exaggerates the destructiveness of the retaliatory blow
against the aggressor's cities by the remnante of the defender's mis-
sile force— even assianing the aggressor would take no special meas-
ures to protect his cities. But particularly for the aggressor— who does
not lack warning— a civil-defense program can moderate the damage

2l8 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

done by a poorly organized attack. Finally, the suggestion that the
aggressor would not survive the fallout from his own weapons is
simply in error. The rapid-decay fission products which are the ma-
jor lethal problem in the locality of a sm-face burst are not a serious
difficulty for the aggressor. The amount of die slow-decay products,
strontium 90 and cesium 137, in the atmosphere would rise con-
siderably. If nothing were done to cotmter it, iJiis might, for example,
increase by many times the incidence of such relatively rare diseases
as bone cancer and leukemia. However, such a calamity, implying
an increase of, say, 20,000 deaths per year for a nation of 200,000,-
000, is of an entirely difFerent order from the catastrophe involving
tens of millions of deaths, which General Gallois contemplates else-
where. And there are measures that might reduce even this effect
drastically. (See the RAND Corporation Report R-322-RC, Report
on a Study of Non-Military Defense, July 1, 1958.)

The Nature and Feasibility
of War and Deterrence

Mr. Kahn is recognized today as one of the
nations best-informed authorities on civil-
defense problems. A physicist, he received
his academic training at the University of
California and the California Institute of
Technology. A visiting research associate to
the Center of International Studies, Princeton
University, in 1959, he has been a consultant
to the Gaither Committee, the Office of Civil
and Defense Mobilization, and the Atomic
Energy Commission. He spent eleven years at
the RAND Corporation studying problems
of weapons design, weapons systems, and
strategy.

On July 16, i960, the world entered the sixteenth year of the
nuclear era. Yet we are increasingly aware that after living
with nuclear bombs for fifteen years we still have a great deal
to learn about the possible effects of a nuclear war. We have
even more to learn about conducting international relations in
a world in which force tends to be both increasingly more
available, increasingly more dangerous to use, and therefore
in practice increasingly less usable. As a result, basic foreign
and defense policies formulated early in the nuclear era badly
need review and examination.

This paper summarizes, sometimes rather cursorily, some of the
points discussed by the author in his hook Thermonuclear War:
Three Lectures and Several Suggestions, published by the Princeton
University Press in iq6o. It appeared originally as a portion of
a longer article in the Stanford Research Institute Journal, Fourth
Quarter 1959. Reprinted by permission.

220 PROBLEMS OF MILITABY STRATEGY

Possibly of first importance is the casting of doubt on the
widely accepted theory that the very existence of nuclear
weapons creates a reliable balance of terror. This theory com-
monly holds that a thermonuclear war would mean certain
and automatic annihilation of both antagonists, perhaps even
the end of civilization. This concept of certain "mutual homi-
cide" has been comforting to some. It makes plausible the
widely held conviction that as soon as governments are ia-
formed of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war, their
leaders will realize that there can be no victors and, therefore,
no sense to such a war. No sane leader would ever start one!
According to this view, the very violence of nuclear war will
act to deter it.

The mutual-annihilation view is not imique to the West.
Malenkov introduced it to the Soviet Union several years ago,
apparendy arguing in the now classical fashion that with nu-
clear war entailing the end of civilization, the capitalists would
not attack; the Soviet Union, he said, could afford to reduce
investment in heavy industry and mihtary products and con-
centrate on consumer goods. A different view seems to have
been held by Khrushchev and the Soviet miHtary. They agreed
that war wovild be horrible, but at the same time they argued
that this was no reason for the Soviet Union to drop its guard:
given sufficient preparations, only the capitahsts would be de-
stroyed. With some modifications their views seem to have
prevailed.

Much depends on the validity of this notion of the balance
of terror. Is it reaUy true? Would only an insane man initiate
a thermonuclear war? Is war, at least of the thermonuclear
variety, completely obsolete? Or are there circmnstances in
which a nation's leaders might rationally decide that a thermo-
nuclear war would be the least undesirable of the possible
alternatives?

It should be clear that if either the Soviets or the Ameri-
cans ever become careless in the operation of their alert forces,
it is conceivable that a war might start as a result of an ac-
cident, some miscalculation, or even irresponsible behaAdor.
But the situation seems worse than this, for one can conclude
that with current technology there are plausible circumstances
in which leaders might decide that war was their best alterna-

NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE 221

tive. To recognize such possibilities is certainly not to endorse
them.

Some experts have come to a quite different set of conclu-
sions. They believe that the balance of terror is indeed stable
and that a war could start only as a result of an accident or
miscalculation. They argue that a thermonuclear war would
inevitably signal the end of our civilization; that even if there
were survivors "these survivors would envy the dead." It is
true that the world will not recover completely from a ther-
monuclear war. The environment will be permanently (that
is, for perhaps 10,000 years) more hostile to hximan life as a
result of such a war. Therefore, if the question "Can we re-
store the prewar conditions of life?" is asked, the answer must
be "No!" But there are other relevant questions. How much
more hostile wiU the environment be? Will it be so hostile that
we or our descendants would prefer death to life? Perhaps
even more pertinent is this one: How happy or normal a life
can the survivors and their descendants hope to have? Ob-
jective studies indicate that although human tragedy would
be increased immeasurably in the postwar world, it would not
be increased to the extent that normal and happy lives became
impossible.

One such study of the possibilities for alleviating the conse-
quences of a thermonuclear war was conducted by the RAND
Corporation several years ago. That study^ was as searching
and objective as we could make it with the resources, infor-
mation, and intellectual tools available to us. We concluded
that for at least the next decade or so, any assumption of total
world annihilation appears to be wrong, irrespective of the
military course of events. Equally important, the assumption
of total disaster is not likely to apply even to the two antag-
onists. Barring an extraordinary course for the war, or tech-
nical developments not yet foreseen, one and perhaps both of
the antagonists should be able to restore a reasonable sem-
blance of prewar conditions quite rapidly. Typical estimates
run between one and ten years for a well-prepared and reason-
ably successful attacker and somewhat more for the defender,
depending mainly on the tactics of the attacker and the prep-
arations of the defender. In the RAND study we shied away
from optimistic assumptions. Thus, we beheve that while the

222 PROBLEMS OF MILITAIIY STRATEGY

uncertainties are large enough so that the actual situation
could be worse than we estimated, it is more likely than not
to be more favorable than the findings of the study indicated.
To support this assertion about the "feasibihty" of thermo-
nuclear war, it is necessary to describe and evaluate the total
impact of a thermonuclear war and to describe the kinds of
risks that might cause decision makers to weigh the alternatives
of going to war and not going to war. For the purpose of this
analysis, it is convenient to describe a thermonuclear war as
being composed of eight stages:

1. Various time-phased programs for deterrence and de-
fense and their possible impact on us, our allies, and others.

2. Wartime performance under difFerent pre-attack and at-
tack conditions.

3. Acute fallout problems.

4. Survival and patch-up.

5. Maintenance of economic momentum.

6. Long-term recuperation.

7. Postwar medical problems.

8. Genetic problems.

To survive a war it is necessary to negotiate all eight stages.
If there is a catastrophic failure on any one of them, there
will be little value in being able to handle the other seven.
Difi^erences among exponents of difFerent strategic views can
often be traced to the different estimates they make on the
difficulty of handling one or more of these eight stages. While
aU of them present difficulties, most civilian military experts
seem to consider the last six the critical ones. Nevertheless,
most discussions among "classical" military experts concentrate
on the first two. To get a sober and balanced view of the
problem, one must examine aU eight. It is of great virgency
that this examination be done well enough so that a "national
debate" can be conducted on which of the alternative strat-
egies should be chosen. While this debate will probably have
to be carried on continuously, it is important that there be
a clear-cut tentative choice so that military planning on the
lower levels for specific items and weapons systems can be
conducted in a context and so that the security and foreign-
policy consequences of the decision can be examined inside

NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE 223

and outside of government. However, in this paper we will
concentrate on the first o£ the eight stages. A systematic dis-
cussion of the other seven stages can be found in the RAND
report already referred to or in my book Thermonuclear War.

Damage versus Commitments

Even if one accepts the balance-of-terror theory and we
don't have to worry about a deliberate Soviet attack on the
United States, we are still faced with important strategic prob-
lems. In 1914 and 1939 it was the British who declared war,
not the Germans. Such a circumstance might arise again; but
if the balance of terror were reliable, then we would be as
likely to be deterred from striking the Soviets as they would
be from striking us, and it would be doubtful that the United
States would resort to an all-out attack on the Soviets, even
to correct or avenge, for example, a major Soviet aggression
limited to Europe.

That this now is plausible can be seen by Christian Herter's
response on the occasion of the hearings on his nomination;
"I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an aU-out
nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly we are in danger
of all-out devastation oiurselves, or that actual moves have
been made toward devastating ourselves."

A thermonuclear balance of terror is equivalent to signing
a nonaggression treaty that neither the Soviets nor the Ameri-
cans wUl initiate an all-out attack— no matter how provoking
the other side may become. Sometimes people do not under-
stand the full implications of this figurative nonaggression
treaty. Let me illustrate what it can mean if we accept abso-
lutely the notion that there is no provocation that would cause
us to strike the Soviets other than an immediately impending
or an actual Soviet attack on the United States. Imagine that
the Soviets have dropped bombs on London, Berhn, Rome,
Paris, and Bonn but have made no detectable preparations
for attacking the United States, and that our retaliatory force
looks good enough to deter them from such an attack. Sup-
pose also that there is a device that restrains the President of
the United States from acting for about twenty-four hours.

224 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The President would presumably call together his advisers
during this time. Most of these advisers would probably tirge
strongly that the United States fulfill its obhgation and strike
the Soviets. Now let us further suppose that the President is
also told by his advisers that even though we wiU kill almost
every Russian if we strike the Soviets, we will not be able to
destroy all of the Soviet strategic forces, and that these svir-
viving Soviet forces wiU (by radiation, or strontium 90, or
something) kill every American in their retaliatory blow.

While such an attack might prompt us to declare war on
the Soviet Union and engage in various military actions, it is
difficult to believe that under these circumstances any Presi-
dent of the United States would initiate a thermonuclear war
by retahating against the Soviets with the Strategic Air Com-
mand. There is no objective of pubHc policy that would justify
ending life for everyone. It should be clear that we would not
restore Europe by our retaliation; we could only succeed in
further destroying it, either as a by-product of OTor actions or
because the Soviets would destroy Europe as weU as the United
States.

There were two important caveats in the situation de-
scribed: the President would have twenty-four hours to think
about his response, and 180 miUion Americans would be killed.
Let us consider the latter first. If 180 miUion dead is too high
a price to pay for punishing the Soviets for their original ag-
gression, how many American dead would we accept as the
cost of our retahation? I have discussed this question with
many Americans, and after about fifteen minutes of discussion
their estimates of an acceptable price generally fall between
10 and 60 miUion dead. No American that I have spoken to
who was at all serious about the matter behoved that U.S.
retaliation would be justified— no matter what our commit-
ments were— if more than half of our population would be
killed.

The twenty-four-hour delay is a more subtle device. It is the
equivalent of asking: Can the Soviets force the President to
act in cold blood, rather than in the immediate anger of the
moment? The answer depends not only on the time he has to
ponder the effects that would accrue from his actions but also
on how deeply and seriously the President and his advisers

NATUKE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE ZZ^

had thought about the problem in advance. This latter, in
turn, could depend on whether there had been any tense
situations or crises that forced the President and the people
to face the concept that war is something that can happen,
rather than something that is reliably deterred by some de-
claratory policy that is never acted on.

I have discussed with many Europeans the question of how
many casualties Americans would be willing to envisage and
still live up to their obligations. Their estimates, perhaps not
surprisingly, range much lower than the estimates of Ameri-
cans—that is, roughly z to 20 million.

Published unclassified estimates of the casualties that the
United States would suflFer in a nuclear war generally run from
50 to 90 million. If these estimates are relevant (which is
doubtful, since they generally assume a Soviet surprise attack
on an unalert United States), we are already deterred from
living up to our alliance obligations. If they are not relevant,
we ought to make relevant estimates for now and the future.

The critical point is whether the Soviets and the Europeans
believe that we can keep our casualties and the other eflFects
of a war to a level we would find acceptable, whatever that
level may be. In such an eventuality the Soviets would be
deterred from very provocative acts, such as a ground attack
on Europe, Hitler-type blackmail threats, or even evacuating
their cities and presenting us with an ultimatum. But if they
do not believe that we can keep casualties to a level we would
find acceptable, the Soviets may feel safe in undertaking these
exb-emely provocative adventures. Or at least the Europeans
may believe that the Soviets will feel safe, and this in itself
creates an extremely dangerous situation for pressure and
blackmail.

Type 1 Deterrence {Deterrence against a Direct Attack)

It is important to distinguish three types of deterrence. The
first of these is: Type 1 Deterrence, or deterrence against a
direct attack.

Most experts today argue that we must make this type of
deterrence work, that we simply cannot face the possibility of a

226 PROBLEMS OF MELITAKY STRATEGY

failure. Never have the stakes on success or failure of pre-
vention been so high. Although the extreme view, that deter-
rence is everything and that alleviation is hopeless, is ques-
tionable, clearly Type i Deterrence must have first priority.

Typically, discussions of the capabihty of the United States
to deter a direct attack compare the pre-attack inventory of
our forces with the pre-attack inventory of the Russian forces
—that is, the nimiber of planes, missiles, army divisions, and
submarines of the two countries are directly compared. This
is a World War I and World War II approach.

The really essential numbers, however, are estimates of the
damage that the retahatory forces can inflict after being hit.
Evaluation must take into account that the Russians could
strike at a time and with tactics of their choosing. We strike
back with a damaged and perhaps un-co-ordinated force
which must conduct its operations in the post-attack environ-
ment. The Soviets may use blackmail threats to intimidate
oin: response. The Russian defense is completely alerted. If
the strike has been preceded by a tense period, their active
defense forces have been augmented and their cities have been
at least partially evacuated. Any of the emphasized words can
be very important, but almost all of them are ignored in most
discussions of Type i Deterrence.

The first step in this calculation— analysis of the eflFects of
the Russian strike on U.S. retaliatory abihty— depends criti-
cally on the enemy's tactics and capabihties. The question of
warning is generally uppermost. Analyses of the effect of the
enemy's first strike often neglect the most important part of
the problem by assuming that warning will be effective and
that our forces get off the groimd and are sent on their way
to their targets. Actually, without effective warning, attrition
on the ground can be much more important than attrition in
the air. The enemy may not only use tactics that limit our
warning but he may do other things to counter our defensive
measinres, such as interfering with command and control ar-
rangements. Thus it is important in evaluating enemy capa-
bihties to look not only at the tactics that past history and
standard assumptions lead us to expect but also at any other
tactics that a clever enemy might use. We should not always
assume what Albert Wohlstetter has called "U.S. -preferred at-

NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE 22/

tacks" in estimating the performance of our system. We should
also look at "U.S.S.R.-preferred attacks"— a sensible Soviet
planner may prefer them I

The enemy, by choosing the timing of an attack, has several
factors in his favor. He can select a time calculated to force
our manned-bomber force to retaliate in the daytime, when
his day fighters and his air-defense systems will be much more
eflFective. In addition, he can choose the season so that his post-
war agricultural problems and fallout-protection problems wiU
be less difficult.

The second part of the calculation— consequences of the lack
of co-ordination of the surviving U.S. forces— depends greatly
on our tactics and the flexibihty of our plans. If, for example,
our oflFensive force is assigned a large target system, so that
it is spread thinly, and if because of a large or successful Rus-
sian attack the Russians have succeeded in destroying much
of our force, many important Russian targets would go unat-
tacked. If, on the other hand, to avoid this we double or triple
the assignment to important targets, we might overdestroy
many targets, especially if the Soviets had not struck us suc-
cessfully. For this and other reasons, it would be wise to
evaluate the damage and then retarget the surviving forces.
Whether this can be done depends critically on the timing of
the attack, the nature of the targeting process, and our post-
attack capability for evaluation, command, and control.

Our attack may also be degraded because of problems of
grouping, timing, and refueling; in some instances our manned
bombers might be forced to infiltrate in small groups into So-
viet air territory and lose the advantage of saturation of the
Soviet defenses. Whether or not this would be disastrous de-
pends a great deal on the quality of the Russian air-defense
system, especially on whether it has any holes we can exploit,
and the kind and number of penetration aids we use. This
aspect is comphcated and classified.

Another point that may be of great importance is that mod-
em nuclear weapons are so powerful that even if they don't
destroy their target, they may change the environment so as
to cause the retaUating weapons system to be inoperable. The
various effects of nuclear weapons include blast, thermal and
electromagnetic radiation, groimd shock, debris, dust, and

228 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

ionizing radiation— any of which may affect people, equipment,
propagation of electromagnetic signals, and so on. One might
say that the problem of operating in a post-attack environment
after training in the peacetime environment is similar to train-
ing at the Equator and then moving a major but incomplete
part (that is, a damaged system) to the Arctic and expecting
this incomplete system to work eflBciently the first time it is
tried. This is particularly implausible if, as is often true, the
intact system is barely operable at the Equator (that is, in
peacetime).

In addition to attacking the system, the enemy may attempt
to attack our resolve. Imagine, for example, that we had a
pure Polaris system invulnerable to an all-out simultaneous en-
emy attack (invulnerable by assumption and not by analysis)
and the enemy started to destroy our submarines one at a
time at sea. Suppose an American President were told that if
we started an all-out war in retaliation, the Soviets could and
would destroy every American because of limitations in our
offense and our active and passive defenses. Now if the Presi-
dent has a chance to think about the problem, he simply can-
not initiate this kind of war even with such provocation.

One of the most important and yet the most neglected ele-
ments of the retaliatory calculation is the effect of the Russian
civil-defense measures. The Russians are seldom credited with
even modest preparedness in civil defense. A much more rea-
sonable alternative that would apply in many situations— that
the Russians might at some point evacuate their city popula-
tion to places affording existing or improvisable fallout pro-
tection—is almost never realistically examined. If the Russians
should take steps to evacuate their cities, the vulnerability of
their population would be dramatically reduced.

The Soviets also know that they can take an enormous
amount of economic damage and be set back only a few years
in their development. Not only did they do something hke this
after World War II, but, what is even more impressive, they
fought a war after the Germans had destroyed most of their
existing military power and occupied an area that contained
about 40 per cent of the prewar Soviet population— the most
industrialized 40 per cent.

The difficulties of Type 1 Deterrence arise mainly from the

NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE 229

fact that the deterring nation must strike second. These dif-
ficulties are compounded by the rapidity with which the tech-
nology of war changes and the special difficulty the defender
has in reacting quickly and adequately to changes in the of-
fense. The so-caUed missile gap illustrates the problem. The
Russians announced in August 1957 that they had tested an
ICBM. Evidence of their technical ability to do this was fur-
nished by Sputnik I, sent aloft in October of that year. Early
in 1959 Khrushchev boasted that the Soviet Union had inter-
continental rockets in serial production. We have httle reason
to beheve that they won't have appreciable numbers of op-
erational ICBMs about three years after their successful test
—which would be in August i960.

Suppose that in 1957 and 1958 we had refused to react to
this "hypothetical" threat, so that when the autumn of i960
appeared we had not completed the needed modifications to
our defenses to accommodate this development. What kind of
risk would we have run?

I will assimie (on the basis of newspaper reports and con-
gressional testimony) that we had approximately 25 urmlert
SAC home bases in 1957. In accordance with the proposed
hypothesis of doing nothing, I will (incorrectly) assume that
we still have 25 bases in i960. The number of missiles that
the Russians would need in order, hypothetically, to destroy
these 25 SAC bases depends on their technology. Assume that
their missile has a probability of one in two of successfully
completing its countdown and destroying the SAC base at
which it is launched. What would we have risked? Simple
calculation indicates that our risk would have been substan-
tial. For example, if the Russians had 125 missiles, then even
if their firing time were spread out over an hour or so, it would
still be possible for Mr. Khrushchev's aides to push 125 buttons
and expect that there would be a better than even chance that
they would destroy all of the aircraft on the groxmd at SAC
home bases, about one chance in three that only one such base
would survive, and a very small probability that two or more
bases would survive. The Soviets could well believe that their
air defense would easily handle any attacks launched by air-
craft from one or two bases. If they are prepared to accept
the risk involved in facing an attack from, say, four or five

230 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

bases, then they need only about 75 missiles, each with a
single-shot probability of one half; if they had 150 missiles,
the single-shot probability could be as low as one third and
still be satisfactory to a Soviet plarmer willing to accept re-
taliation from four or five surviving bases.

This kind of missile attack is much more calculable than
almost any other kind of attack. It is so calculable that many
people believe that the results of such an attack can be pre-
dicted just by applying well-known principles of engineering
and physics. It looks so calculable that even a cautious Soviet
planner might believe that he could rely on the correctness
of his estimates; he might find it the path of caution to attack
while the opportunity was still available.

Actually, even with tested missiles, results of attacks are not
really mathematically predictable. The probabihty of extreme
variations in performance, the upper and lower limits, cannot
be calculated accurately. But laymen or narrow professionals
persist in regarding the matter as a simple problem in engineer-
ing and physics. Therefore, unless sophisticated objections on
the possibilities of intelligence leaks, firing discipline, reliabil-
ity of the basic data, field degradation, and others, are raised,
even an inarticulate Russian general could probably force the
following conclusions on a group of hostile, skeptical, and busy
civilians, whether they wanted to believe them or not: that
in this hypothetical case (where the Russians had 125 missiles,
each with a single-shot probability of one half) if they were
to push these 125 buttons and also latmch a supplementary
co-ordinated attack with ICBMs and tactical bombers on
U.S. and allied overseas bases, there would be a reasonable
chance that the Soviet Union would get away scot free; that
there would be a good chance that they would suffer very
little damage; and that there would be no chance at all that
they would suffer as much damage as they suffered in World
War II.

Let us consider some of the caveats that this Russian gen-
eral would have to concede if somebody raised them, and try
to judge how serious Khrushchev or the Presidium would find
them.

The first is that there be no intelligence leak. Given the
small number of missiles involved and the tight security in

NATUBE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAB AND DETEBBENCE 23 1

the Russian empire, this might look like a reasonably safe as-
sumption. But whether the Russians would be willing to rely
on our lack of intelligence is very hard to say.

The second caveat concerns firing discipline, that is, that
nobody fires either prematurely or too late. If we work on
our original assumption that the U.S. posture remains un-
changed since 1957, when alerts were measured in hours or
so, this is not a rigid requirement. However, if we give our-
selves credit for a fifteen-minute alert, this would mean that
the Russian missile is so reliable that when they press the but-
tons the majority of the missiles are actually ready to be fired.
Given that the Soviet missiles have a "hold" capability, this
may not be a much smaller nimiber than if we define relia-
bihty as the probability that the missile takes ofiF within a few
hours of the assigned firing time. A small reduction in missile
"rehability"— that is, the probability that it takes o£F within a
few minutes of the assigned firing time— would simply mean
that the Russians would need a few more ICBMs. A large
reduction would most likely put the Soviets out of business.

There is an interesting interaction between firing discipline
and measiures designed to reduce the possibility of intelligence
leaks. If the Soviets trained with very realistic exercises, so
that even the people involved in the exercises could not dis-
tinguish until the last minute the exercise from the real thing,
then such exercises could be used to disguise preparations for
attack. But there would be a tendency for somebody to fire
prematurely, perhaps causing an accidental war. If, on the
contrary, the Soviets try to prevent this breach of firing disci-
pline by the use of severe threats and indoctrination so that
nobody wiU fire prematurely, then they rim the opposite risk,
that people will refuse to believe the order when it comes, un-
less alerted ahead of time.

The third caveat is that they must have accurate intelli-
gence about the U.S. miHtary posture. Given U.S. security
practices currently in vogue about the position and use of our
SAC bases and the ease with which information could be ob-
tained about last-minute changes, this also could look feasible.
Probably the only requirement is to try to get the information.

Much more important, they need accurate data about them-
selves—the yield, accuracy, and reliability of their ICBMs, for

232 PHOBLEMS OF MELITAKY STRATEGY

example. While it is surprisingly hard to get reliable estimates
of these quantities, only very sophisticated people will know
this. If the Soviets have some extra margin of performance for
insurance— that is, if they have a much better technological
capability than they need— then they do not require extremely
accurate estimates of this capability. On the other hand, if
their equipment is just marginally satisfactory, then even
though they have an adequate capabihty they are unlikely to
know this.

Last and most important is the question of field degrada-
tion. Let us go back to our Russian general's persuasion prob-
lem. It is perfectly possible, for example, for this general to
take the members of the Presidium out to the range and show
them, say, five or ten ICBMs lined up and ask them, to select
one and make a cross on the map. The range personnel could
proceed to fire that ICBM and hit near enough to the cross
to make the general's point. Or even more convincingly, they
might fire all five or ten ICBMs at once.

This would be an impressive demonstration, but a question
arises. What happens when the missiles are operated in the
field by regular military personnel? How far off from range
performance will they be?

It should also be noted that, so long as our strategic bases
are soft, missile attacks present the Russians with possibilities
for the use of a post-attack blackmail strategy almost as ex-
treme as the one mentioned previously. If the Russians con-
centrate their attack solely against strategic bases and air-burst
their weapons (which is the most efficient way to use a weapon
against a soft target), there will be no local fallout effects.
Then, unless one of the weapons goes astray and hits a major
city, deaths would be limited to a few million Americans as
the result of blast and thermal effects. The Soviets could then
point out (unless we had appreciable levels of air offense, air
defense, and civil defense surviving) that they could totally
destroy our country (while we could only hurt them), and
ask us whether we really wanted to pick this moment to initiate
the use of nuclear weapons against open cities.

While it would take a moderately reckless Soviet decision
maker to press the 125 ICBM buttons even if the assumptions
were as favorable as originally hypothesized, it would be even

NATXJRE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAB AND DETERBENCE 233

more reckless for the United States to rely on extreme Soviet
caution and responsibility as a defense. The need for quick
reaction to even "hypothetical" changes in the enemy's posture
is likely to be true for the indefinite future, in spite of the
popularity of the theory that once we get over our current
diEBculties we will have a so-called minimum nuclear deter-
rent force that wiU solve the Type i Deterrence problem. Some
even maintain that it vdU solve all strategic problems.

Type 2 Deterrence (Deterrence of Extreme Provocation)

A quite different calculation is relevant to U.S. Type 2 De-
terrence, although it is still a Soviet calculation (but this time
a Soviet calculation of an American calculation). Type 2 De-
terrence is defined as using strategic threats to deter an enemy
from engaging in very provocative acts other than a direct
attack on the United States itself. The Soviet planner asks him-
self: If I make this very provocative move, will the Americans
strike us? Whether the Soviets then proceed with the con-
templated provocation will be influenced by their estimate of
the American calculation as to what happens if the tables are
reversed. That is, what happens if the Americans strike and
damage the Russian strategic air force and the Russians strike
back un-co-ordinated in the teeth of an alerted U.S. air de-
fense and possibly against an evacuated U.S. popxilation? If
this possibility is to be credible to the Soviets, it must be be-
cause they recognize that their own Type 1 Deterrence can
fail. If Khrushchev is a convinced adherent of the balance-
of-terror theory and does not believe that his Type 1 Deter-
rence can fail, then he may just go ahead with the provocative
action.

It is important to realize that the operation of Type 2 De-
terrence will involve the possibility that the United States will
obtain the first strategic strike or some temporizing move, such
as evacuation. Many people talk about the importance of hav-
ing adequate civil and air defense to back our foreign policy.
However, calculations made in evaluating the performance of
a proposed civil- and air-defense program invariably assume

234 PKOBLEMS OF MILITABY STRATEGY

a Russian surprise attack and— to make the problem even
harder— a surprise attack directed mostly against civilians. This
is unnecessarily pessimistic. The calculation in which one looks
at a U.S. first strike in retaliation for a Russian provocation is
probably more relevant in trying to evaluate the role that the
oflFense and defense play in affecting some important aspects
of foreign policy.

Under this assumption, if we have even a moderate non-
military defense program, its performance is hkely to look im-
pressive to the Russians and probably to most Europeans. For
example, the crucial problem of obtaining adequate warning
will have been greatly lessened, at least in the eyes of the So-
viets. They are also likely to think that we have more freedom
than we will have. The Soviets may believe that we are not
worried by the possibility that they will get strategic or pre-
mature tactical warning. This could be true in spite of the
fact that in actual practice such an attack would probably
involve a considerable risk that the Soviets would get some
warning. Any planning would have to be tempered by the
sobering realization that a disclosure or mistake could bring
a pre-emptive Russian attack.

The possibility of augmenting our active and passive defense
is very important. That is, rather than striking the Russians if
they do something very provocative, we might prefer to evacu-
ate our city population to fallout protection, "beef up" our air
defense and air offense, and then tell the Russians that we
had put ourselves into a much stronger position to initiate hos-
tilities. After we had put ourselves in a position in which the
Russian retaliatory strike would inflict much less than a total
catastrophe, the Russians would have just three broad classes
of alternatives;

1. To initiate some kind of strike.

2. To prolong the crisis, even though it would then be very
credible that we would strike if they continued to provoke us.

3. To back down or compromise the crisis satisfactorily.

Hopefully the Soviets would end up preferring the third al-
ternative, because our Type 1 Deterrence would make the first
choice sufficiently unattractive and our Type 2 Deterrence
would do the same for the second.

NATUBE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAR AND DETERRENCE 235

Type 3 Deterrence (Deterrence of Moderate
Provocation)

Type 3 Deterrence might be called "tit-for-tat deterrence."
It refers to those acts that are deterred because the potential
aggressor is afraid that the defender or others will then take
limited actions, military or nonmilitary, that will make the ag-
gression improfitable.

The most obvious threat that we could muster imder Type
3 Deterrence would be the capabihty to fight a Hmited war
of some sort. Because this subject is comphcated and space is
limited, I will not discuss this particular Type 3 Deterrence
capabihty— although it is important and necessary. Instead, I
shall consider some of the nonmihtary gambits open to us.

Insofar as day-to-day activities are concerned, the things
that seemingly regulate the other man's behavior are nonmih-
tary. For example, among other things, a potential provoca-
tion may be deterred by any of the following effects or re-
actions:

1. Internal reactions or costs.

2. Loss of friends or antagonizing of neutrals.

3. Creation or strengthening of hostile coahtions.

4. Lowering of the reaction threshold of potential oppo-
nents.

5. Diplomatic or economic retaliation.

6. Moral or ethical inhibitions.

7. An increase in the military capability of the potential
opponent.

Space permits discussion o£ only the last subject, which is
both very important and badly neglected. It has become fash-
ionable among the more sober military experts to regard mo-
bihzation capabihties as examples of wishful thinking. And
indeed, in the few hours or few days of a modem war, large-
scale production of mihtary goods will not be possible.

What deters the Russians from a series of Koreas and Indo-
chinas? It is probably less the fear of a direct U.S. attack with
its current forces than the probabihty that the United States
and her allies would greatly increase both their mihtary

236 PROBLEMS OF MTLITARY STRATEGY

strength and their resolve in response to such crises. The de-
terrent effect of this possibility can be increased by making
explicit preparations so that we can increase our strength very
rapidly whenever the other side provokes us. For example, in
June 1950 the United States was engaged in a great debate
on whether the defense budget should be 14, 15, or 16 billion
dollars. Along came Korea. Congress qtiickly authorized 60
bilHon dollars, an Increase by a factor of fourl

No matter what successes the Communist cause had in
Korea, that authorization represents an enormous military de-
feat for the Soviets. However, it was almost three years before
that authorization was fully translated into increased expendi-
tures and corresponding military power. It is very valuable to
be able to increase our defense expenditures, but this abihty
becomes many times more valuable if authorizations can be
translated into military strength in a year or so. If the Russians
know that deterioration in international relations will push us
into a crash program, they may be much less willing to let
international relations deteriorate. The problem is: Wotild we
have time to put in a useful program? After all, the basic mili-
tary posture (including installations) must be of the proper
sort if it is to be possible to expand it within a year or so to
the point where it is prepared to fight a war in addition to
being able to deter one. Our current posture (i960) is prob-
ably far from optimal for doing this.

If preparations like these were at least moderately expensive
and very expMcit, the Russians might find it credible that the
United States would initiate and carry through such a pro-
gram if they were provocative even, say, on the scale of Korea
or less. The Russians would then be presented with the fol-
lowing three alternatives:

1. They could strike the United States before the build-up
got very far. This might look very unattractive, especially since
the build-up would almost certainly be accompanied by an
increased alert and other measures to reduce the vulnerability
of SAC.

z. They could try to match the U.S. program. This would
be very expensive.

3. They could accept a position of inferiority. Such an ac-
ceptance would be serious, since the United States would now

NATUBE AND FEASIBILITY OF WAH AND DETEHRENCE 237

have a "fight the war" capability as well as a "deter the war"
capability.

In each case the costs and risks of their provocation would
have been increased, and it is hkely that the Soviets would
take these extra costs and risks into account before attempting
any provocation. If they were not deterred, we could launch
the crash program. Then we would be in a position to correct
the results of their past provocation or at least to deter them
in the future from exploiting these results.

It might be particularly valuable to have credible and ex-
plicit plans to institute crash programs for civil defense^ and
limited-war capabilities. It seems to be particularly feasible to
maintain inexpensive and effective mobilization bases in these
two fields, and the institution of a crash program would make
it very credible to the Russians, our allies, and neutrals that
we would go to war at an appropriate level if we were pro-
voked again.

This is one of the major threats we can bring to bear on
the Russians. If we are not aware that we have this threat,
if we believe that doubling the budget would really mean im-
mediate bankruptcy or other financial catastrophe, then the
Russians can present us with alternatives that may in the end
result in their winning the diplomatic, political, and foreign-
policy victory. It is important that we understand our ouai
strengths as well as our possible weaknesses.

Notes

RAND Corporation Report R-322-RC, Report on a Study of Non-
Military Defense, July 1, 1958.

For a discussion of the possibilities, see Herman Kahm, Some
Specific Suggestiom for Achieving Early Non-Military De-
fense Capabilities and Initiating Long-Range Programs, The
RAND Corporation, Research Memorandum RM-2306-RC, Jan-
uary 2, 1958, revised July 1, 1958.

18. The Lead -Time Problem
and Technological Waste

by Ellis Johnson

Dr. Johnson has since 1Q48 been director
of the Johns Hopkins University's Operations
Research Office, which operates under con-
tract to the U. S. Army. During World War
II he was the principal physicist at the U. S.
Navy's Ordnance Laboratory. For the past
several years he has devoted his attention
chiefly to the nation's technological progress.

In the continuing race for global power, one fact has thrown
an elongated shadow over efforts by the United States to
maintain technological supremacy over the Soviet Union: the
fact that Russia can develop a new weapons system in ap-
proximately five years, while the same task takes the United
States roughly twice that time.

What is the nature of this problem of "lead time," the gap
between conception and use of new technological devices?

The Cost Factor

The problem is, first of all, a function of cost. The effect of
increasing physical knowledge on the cost of weapons in a
weapons system has been very great in terms of money and
complexity. For example, the cost of aircraft increased ten-
fold from 1945 to 1955. As would be expected, the over-all
increase was a function of the cost of important elements of
the weapon.

The cost of electronics in fighter aircraft has increased from
$3000 in 1939 to $300,000 in 1954. Factors other than cost
are increased by technical advance. In bombers, the weight

THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM 339

of the bombsight has increased from 125 pounds in 1940 to
2000 pounds in 1955. Each pound added to equipment in-
creases the gross weight of the bomber as much as ten pounds
over-all. Affected also are complexity and reliability. In air-
craft gas turbines, the number of parts has increased from
9000 in 1946 to 20,000 in 1957. Of precious engineering hours,
17,000 were required to design a fighter aircraft in 1940 and
1,400,000 in 1955.

All of these technically caused increases, rising at a tremen-
dous rate as a function of time, stem from the basic fact that
knowledge in the physical sciences is itself increasing expo-
nentially. This is well illustrated by the number of choices
available to the designer in 1935 in the design of a major
bomber weapons system. Then there were on the order of two
major choices available to the designer; in 1955 there were
more than 360 choices available.

The explanation for the observed increase in cost and com-
plexity in attack and defensive systems is that they result from
the very existence of such a large number of choices and
from the regenerative interaction between attack and defense.
V/hen an enemy attack system appears, the defense reacts by
using more modem technology to reduce the effectiveness of
the attack system. Some years after the original attack system
is first estabKshed, the attack system itself reacts to the im-
proved defense by choosing, from among the many new al-
ternative possible improvements that have appeared in the in-
terim, one or more alternatives that wiU produce a new attack
system of increased effectiveness, inevitably of increased com-
plexity and cost.

In a second cycle, the defensive system in its turn reacts
again from an even greater increase in the number of choices
available. The cycle repeats itself continuously, and the attack
and defense systems become ever more complex and costly.
The executive is often almost a helpless observer in this proc-
ess, which results from technological competition and the ex-
ecutive's expressed desire for the "best" or "most effective"
weapons system. Once loose, such forces of technology are not
easily turned off or rehamessed.

These questions arise: Do we necessarily have to let our-
selves be driven to more and more expensive choices? Can we

240 PKOBLEMS OF MrLITARY STRATEGY

not find more timeless solutions in cost in which the military
budget does not have to double every few years? Let us next
examine these questions.

The Effect of Lead Times and Obsolescence Policy

Because a war can now be decided in days instead of years,
it is argued that relative military power now depends more
importantly upon making choices ia a minimum time and in
achieving the minimum possible lead time between decisions
and the availability of a weapons system for use. As I said at
the outset, it presently appears that Soviet lead time between
concept and use may be about five years, on the average, while
the U.S. lead time may be about ten years.

In examining the effect of the disparity in lead times in the
competition between a Soviet air-attack system and a U.S. air-
defense system, let us assume that the Soviet Union decided
upon a particular weapons system in 1955. Let us say that at
that time there were about 200 choices available. It is reason-
able to assume that the Soviet Union is able to keep its techni-
cal choices secret from us from one to two years. Under these
circumstances, it would have been 1957 before we became
aware of the probable characteristics of the forthcoming Soviet
weapons system, which is scheduled by them to become fully
operational in i960. Then suppose that we reacted by making
a decision in 1957 to coimter this new Soviet attack system
by an adequate defense system within our economic capa-
bility. At that time we had 500 choices available, which gave
us an improved situation with respect to the Soviet system
generated two years before, despite the fact that the Soviets
will be able to incorporate at least some of the improvements
generated in the interim. There are, however, serious limita-
tions as to how many improvements can be actually incor-
porated by the U.S.S.R. if the original Soviet schedule is held
to. However, wdth a ten-year lead time, the U.S. defense sys-
tem will not come into being as an operationally effective sys-
tem until 1967— seven years after the Soviet capability first be-
came operational.

We now have to consider obsolescence policy on the part

THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM 241

of the Soviet Union. The meager data bearing on this problem
indicate that the policies of the Soviet Union and the United
States in air-attack systems are such that weapons systems
have an operational Hfe of between five to seven years. In our
case, therefore, the Soviet weapons system, which became op-
erational in i960, will have been phased out sometime be-
tween 1965 and 1967 and will have been replaced by a new
weapons system based upon the technology of about i960 and
1962, and the U.S. defensive technology will thus come into
being after the Soviet attack system which it was designed to
counter is superseded by a superior Soviet attack system. Fur-
thermore, the new Soviet attack system which will come into
being between 1965 and 1967 will be based upon the tech-
nology of i960 to 1962, at which time there wdll have been
available roughly 5000 choices, as compared with the 200
choices available to them at the time of their design of the
original system. Under these circumstances, the U.S. defense
system will come into operational being against a technologi-
cally superior attack system, against which it may have a neg-
ligible or very reduced effectiveness and indeed may be com-
pletely ineffective.

It is perhaps obvious that a particular weapon cannot usu-
ally be improved indefinitely. Instead, it approaches a tech-
nological Hmit in effectiveness after a period of reasonably
intensive development and needs marginal improvement there-
after primarily to maintain production feasibility (in the use of
new or currently available raw materials) and efficiency.
Sometimes the increase in scientific knowledge permits a big-
ger spurt in the improvement of the weapon, but this is rare.
The rifle is an example of an essential, good, but stable weapon.
Weapons systems, often built around a major weapon or tacti-
cal concept— the manned bomber is an example— also evolve
in this sigmoid cycle. This does not for long limit the practical
application of increased scientific knowledge which turns to
alternative weapons systems, that is, to the ICBM as a replace-
ment for the bomber.

The arguments given above make it crystal clear that if
physical knowledge is advancing as fast as appears to be
the case, then, assuming equivalent technological capability
within each culture as is indicated by current evidence, the

242 PKOBLEMS OF MILITABY STRATEGY

struggle between offense and defense can be maintained at
parity only if there are no more than a few months' lag be-
tween Soviet decisions on their attack system and U.S. deci-
sions on its defense system, and if U.S. lead time is equal to or
shorter than the Soviet lead time.

The Dilemma of the Optimum

If there are thousands of choices from which particvilar
weapons systems can be chosen, the executive is faced with
the cruel dilemma of having to choose from among the tempt-
ing array which he must pay for with limited resources in raw
materials, manpower, time, and energy, Presimiably he should
choose the 'Tsest" buy. But this can hardly be done by the
nontechnical executive only with the aid of intuition, as in ear-
her times. What he is usually forced to do is to have "staff"
studies, or "systems analysis," or "operations research," etc.,
made which vdll narrow down the choices to a manageable
few. The trouble wiih such studies is that, if they are to have
a high reliability, they often take from one to four years to
make and thus add to the already long lead time. They may
often, because of long study time, be concerned with choices
already conceptually obsolete at the time they are completed.

The need to choose the "optimum" out of complexity is thus
antagonistic to the need for speed in going from choice to op-
eration. A "quick" weapon, technically inferior because the
optimum was not chosen, may be just as fatal to the user when
battle is joined as a weapon that is technically inferior due to
obsolescence because too much time was taken to bring it into
being.

Effect on Military-Economic Competition

The effect of new technological choices and improvements
forces the side with the longer lead time into the development
of military defense systems that are never able to match the
opposing attack systems. The side defending against an attack
system wlQ be able to meet the gambits of the attacking side

THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM 243

in time, although perhaps not economically, only if its lead
time is short in comparison with the other side and if lag in
intelligence on enemy decisions is short. In fact, the sum of
intelligence lags plus technological lag time must be shorter for
the defense system than for the attack system. Other things
being equal, the side with a grave disadvantage in lead time,
as is now the case with the United States, runs an unreasona-
ble risk of being outgamed politically, strategically, and eco-
nomically in both offense and defense strategies and of losing
the military-economic race.

But what about the size of the military budget? It appears
from our analysis that the increase in the rate of generation of
knowledge has greatly increased rather than decreased costs.
If we are to protect the nation, we are forced to match our
mihtary budget to that of our opponent, or if the military-
economic exchange rate is adverse, as is the likely case in de-
fense versus attack, we may need to spend more for defense
than the enemy spends on attack systems. In the long run,
therefore, the effect of improved technology is to exacerbate
the requirement for the maximum possible military budget ac-
ceptable to the nation.

The Cumbersome Industrial-Military System

Let us turn to a consideration of the factors that make the
present U.S. lead time so long.

Military research and development in the United States is
now achieved in a system whose components are primarily in-
dustry and the Department of Defense. Although there are a
few great "in-house" military laboratories that do creative
work in their own right, most of the creative weapons develop-
ment and design is done by defense industry.

In theory, the guidance and management of this effort comes
from the military officers of the Department of Defense. It is
of the greatest importance to note that civilians vdth military
research and development experience have, except for a small
and relatively unimportant residue, been organized out of all
of the positions of management responsibility and authority
for military research and development programs in the De-

244 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

partment of Defense. This was a deliberate action taken by
the three services, acting in concert, beginning shortly after
the end of World War 11. The concentrated effort followed
the dissolution of the Office of Scientific Research and De-
velopment and culminated in the dissolution of the Research
and Development Board.

The direct influence of science and engineering within the
Department of Defense and at higher echelons of the govern-
ment now is chaimeled through the shadowy fagade of sci-
entific advisory committees. These committees actually have
no responsibility or authority for the development programs,
have neghgible influence upon these programs, and are rela-
tively unacquainted with the substantive content of the mili-
tary-technical problems involved. Almost the entire creative
burden of weapons development, therefore, falls upon indus-
try, yet there is no formal and systematic method to keep in-
dustry informed of the tactical and strategic military require-
ments. It is obvious that this random procedtire not only
extends the time from concept to initiation of development but
it operates under the most severe handicap possible with re-
spect to any high assurance that the development is best
suited to meet the strategic requirements of the United States.

Assuming, however, that the development is a desirable one,
a number of requirements must be met by industry. First, in
order to survive at all, industry must make a profit, a profit
adequate to assure the survival of the company— survival that
hinges primarily upon production contracts that follow suc-
cessful development. The second reqioirement is that steady
employment for scientists and engineers be assured within the
industrial development laboratories. It takes approximately
two years for a new employee in a company to become fully
productive. This makes it impracticable to hire and fire re-
search and development people on a short-term basis and still
retain the competence necessary for successful development. A
steady work load can be assured only by having a large back-
log of development projects. In this case, the development time
for each project is stretched out, increasing the lead time,
while each project awaits its turn on the priority Hst. On the
other hand, if there is no backlog of development contracts,
the work program on the current contract is rigidly scheduled

THE LEAD-TIME PKOBLEM 245

on a stretch-out basis while the sales engineers of the company
work desperately to get the new contracts that will insure sur-
vival of the development laboratory. In this case, development
time is also prolonged, again increasing the lead time.

There are two other unfortunate effects in this industry-
defense system as it is now designed. The company must make
the profit required for survival on the production of the new
weapon. This means that the company will tend to choose and
process developments that have a very high probability of be-
ing successful. This leads to development that is heavily
weighted in the direction of product improvement, since high-
profit, high-risk development programs are too uncertain to
provide assurance that the production facilities of the com-
pany Mali be employed. Thus, our present industrial-military
partnership tends to result in slow, steady, but mediocre
progress.

Another unfortunate factor is use of cost-plus-fixed-fee con-
tracts by the Department of Defense. These contracts have two
effects. They tend to result in an exorbitant use of technical
personnel in each development, since the fee is always tied to
the total cost; the greater the cost (that is, the greater the
number of scientists and engineers working on a weapons de-
velopment) , the higher the profit to the industry. There is thus
no incentive toward economical use of scientific and engineer-
ing personnel. A second unfortunate effect of the cost-plus-
fixed-fee contract is that there is no incentive to take a high
risk which might result in a high profit, because there is no
particular immediate reward for success or punishment for
failure. In times past, success in weapons development was
accompanied by high profits. This provided a desirable and
effective incentive to industry.

There are a number of additional factors that greatly in-
crease weapons-development lead time. The overriding desire
of the Department of Defense is for an immediate payoff in
useful end-item weapons systems. This strong desire for im-
mediate results has led to a tremendous neglect of applied re-
search and component-subsystems development for weapons.
In practice, the prior and independent development of good
components (a rocket of high thrust, for example, is a com-
ponent of a missile or satellite launcher) has been relatively

246 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

neglected. Such development is time-consuming and, because
there is Uttle prestige to the officer-manager within his tour of
duty, there is Uttle interest among the operating group. Far
too small a portion of defense funds have been allocated
to component and subsystem development. Thus, w^hen a
weapons-system development is determined upon, the apphed
research and the component and subsystems development
must be initiated if it is critical to the system development,
or else the development must be frozen at the existing state
of the art.

How Security Regulations Can Increase Lead Time

Before leaving the subject of the difficulties of industrial
weapons development, another most serious problem must be
mentioned: the effect of security regulations upon industry.
These regulations are rigidly enforced, so that not only is in-
dustry unable to make proposals based upon the most forward-
looking tactical and strategic requirements but also industry
does not, in general, have adequate access to the tremendous
amount of prior or parallel work of other industry or military
laboratories. As a result, the classified libraries of industry are
inadequate relative to their need for classified information.

Another eflFect of the "need to know" restriction is that this
so limits communications within the Department of Defense
that there is unnecessary duplication of work. This does not
mean competition in development, but the actual re-solving of
old problems. The eflFect is again to increase development
time, because, if problems have already been solved, the solu-
tions should be adopted instead of wasting technical man-
power to solve the problems again.

The "need to know" crisis is the result of lack of experience
on the part of the higher-ranking military personnel, especially
with respect to the requirement of "tautological" information
on the part of research and development personnel. We ac-
tually are keeping our secrets so closely that this has aided
the Soviet Union to draw ahead of us.

THE LEAD-TIME PROBLEM 247

Forgotten Lessons of World War II

During World War II, the United States and other coun-
tries were tremendously productive in developing many new
weapons. A variety of management methods were used in dif-
ferent laboratories. Yet several factors stood out.

First, most of the great weapons systems were developed
in systems laboratories independent of production control. This
was true in Germany and in Great Britain as well. Second,
and most important, every laboratory was treated as though
it were a facility. There was never a question as to whether
there would be enough work to do; there was never the need
to stretch out the development time, because every laboratory
had more work than it could do during the entire war. The
laboratories worked at maximum speed and concentrated on
each weapons system, usually one by one. There was no diffi-
cult tie-in between development and production from the
viewpoint of profit. There was an acceptance of high-risk,
high-profit development tasks, and failtires were generally for-
given if the effort to make the development successful had
been a great and honest one. There was, in general, a high
and sophisticated support of component and subsystem de-
velopment, as well as of all the necessary applied research. All
of these led to the short lead times of one to five years that
were achieved in American weapons-development systems
during World War II.

There were, of covurse, some other factors. The best scien-
tists in the country joined in weapons development during the
war. Most of them returned to universities or other research
centers at the end of the war. And finally, the motivations
were high. Not only was our goal lofty, but we were sure that
we could achieve it.

Research, in general, was managed by civilians, since most
of the military personnel were then engaged in military opera-
tions or in training the mihtary cadres. Another striking factor
during World War II was the very free exchange of classified
information within and between industry and Department
of War management. We had then not achieved our pre-

348 PROBLEMS OF MILITABY STRATEGY

eminence in weapons systems. The present excessively severe
security rules had not been formulated or designed. Communi-
cations thus were free. This xmdoubtedly speeded up develop-
ment time.

Examination of the current methods used by the Soviet
Union in weapons development indicates that they treat their
laboratories as facilities. There is never an idleness problem;
there is steady employment for all research and development
personnel. Then, too, everything indicates that the Soviets pro-
^/ide heavy support to applied research, to component de-
velopment, and to subsystem development prior to or parallel
with and independent of the specific end-item weapons sys-
tems. This is exactly the method we used during the war,
especially in the Office of Scientific Research and Develop-
ment. Did the Soviet Union learn these lessons from our tech-
niques, the ones we have forgotten?

To summarize the principal factors which contributed to
success on the part of the Free World during World War II
in weapons development, and which appear to lead to im-
portant successes now on the part of the Soviet Union: First,
development laboratories were treated as facilities, were or-
ganized as weapons-systems laboratories, and their develop-
ment programs were not tied on a one-to-one basis to produc-
tion. Second, the communication of classified information was
provided on an adequately free basis, permitting maximum
utilization of progress made, regardless of where results were
obtained in the over-all system. Third, management was pri-
marily in the hands of competent civihans trained in research
and development. Fourth, the motivations were to obtain
maximum technical progress, rather than an absolute assur-
ance of reaching the production stage.

If we are to compete with the Soviet Union in weapons de-
sign, if we are to cut our lead times to effective proportions,
we must remember these lessons of World War 11.

19. Limited War

by Hanson W. Baldwin

A native of Maryland, Mr. Baldwin gradu-
ated from the United States Naval Academy
in 1Q24. He resigned his commission three
years later to begin a writing career which
has brought him wide recognition as an an-
alyst of military affairs. He is the author of
twelve books and is a frequent contributor
of articles to many magazines, including
the Saturday Evening Post, the Atlantic
Monthly, Reader's Digest, and the Marine
Corps Gazette. For many years he has lec-
tured at the several colleges of the armed
services. Mr. Baldwin became military edi-
tor of the New York Times in 1Q42 and the
following year was awarded the Pulitzer
Prize for reporting from the Pacific battle
areas.

In early 1959, a three-star admiral publicly admitted the most
significant politico-military heresy yet confessed by a man in
uniform. Vice-Admiral "Cat" Brown answered a question at
the National Press Club in Washington with a simple nega-
tion which struck at the heart of many of the nation's mih-
tary poHcies. "I have no faith," he said, "in the so-called con-
trolled use of atomic weapons. ... I would not recommend
the use of any atomic weapon, no matter how small, when
both sides have the power to destroy the world." Admiral
Brown added that he did not believe there was any dependa-

This selection originally appeared in the May 1959 issue of the
Atlantic Monthly. Reprinted by permission of Willis Kingsley Wing.
Copyright 1959, by Hanson W. Baldwin.

250 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

ble distinction between tactical, or localized and restricted,
targets or situations and strategic, or unlimited, situations.

Admiral Brown, being human, may well be wrong. But he
has been a serious student of modern war, both at the Air War
College and the Naval War College, and he exercised for l^wo
years one of the most important sea commands the Navy can
offer— the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean— during the period
of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt, a succession of
Syrian crises, the Iraqi coup, and in the summer of 1958 in-
tervention by the United States in Lebanon. Faced repeatedly
in the troubled Middle East with the possibility of limited wars
which might become unlimited, Brown renounced the use of
battlefield nuclear weapons as too risky.

Brown's statement in Washington is representative of the
opinions of other students of war who feel that Henry A.
Kissinger, in his book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,
was guilty of oversimplification. Kissinger's major thesis— with
which nearly all students of war and pohtics in the atomic
age will agree— was that the nation must be prepared to fight
and win limited wars. But he advocated the waging of Hm-
ited wars with small tactical nuclear weapons, and he im-
plied that the development and proper employment of such
weapons would compensate for our inferiority in land strength
compared with that of the Communist powers. Our advanced
nuclear technology was the answer to the hordes from the East.

But, as Roger Hilsman remarked in a paper, "On NATO
Strategy" (written for the Washington Center of Foreign
Policy Research) , "there is nothing to indicate . . . that a good
big atomic army would not be able to defeat a good little
atomic army," And it is clear that Russia will have, in time,
small tactical nuclear weapons in plenty; we may have a tacti-
cal nuclear advantage today, but we shall not have that ad-
vantage tomorrow.

There are many who challenge the comfortable thesis that
limited wars can be fought and won despite inferiority in num-
bers and conventional arms by utilizing small, or battlefield,
nuclear weapons. They challenge this thesis on two grounds:
that of Admiral Brown, that the utilization of any kind of
nuclear weapon is likely to spread the conflagration and to risk
unlimited war; that of Mr. Hilsman, that, other things being

LIMITED WAK 251

equal, a small atomic army is at a disadvantage compared
with a big atomic army.

This debate, which deals in its broadest terms with life or
death for our nation— indeed, for civihzation— requires a cold-
blooded, dispassionate, objective analysis and discussion. This
chapter has been tailored to try to fit these guidelines, not be-
cause the author is imaware of the justifiable fears and emo-
tional pressures of the nuclear age, but because only rational
judgments can help us to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war.

The debate calls for definitions, then for some answers to
these questions: Is limited war possible? If so, how can it be
fought successfully without undue risk of spreading the con-
flict into an unlimited one? Can nuclear weapons be used,
without such undue risks, in limited wars? If they can, would
their military advantages compensate for their admitted poHti-
cal and psychological liabilities?

What Is "Limited" War?

In the Pentagon today, general war— that is, unhmited war
—is usually defined as any war in which U.S. and U.S.S.R.
armed forces meet face to face. There are a few, particularly
in the Army, who beheve that a war between the United
States (and its allies) and Soviet Russia (and its satelhtes)
might possibly be fought vdthout the use, or with restricted
use, of nuclear weapons. But such a war— a war roughly simi-
lar to World War II— scarcely fits the definition of "limited";
it would certainly be unlimited as to area, and the chances of
keeping it non-nuclear would be slight. If there is a world war,
unhmited as to area, between the United States and Russia,
no holds will be barred.

A limited war might be any war in which U.S. and Soviet
forces are not fighting each other. Such a war, in a sense,
was Korea, where Russia fought against the United States
chiefly by proxy, utihzing North Koreans and Chinese
equipped with Soviet arms. The Indochinese war, with com-
munism directly involved ideologically but with Russian par-
ticipation limited to economic aid, weaponry, and perhaps

252 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

some technological advice and assistance, was another limited
war.

Yet, on a small scale, Russian and U.S. armed forces have
frequently opposed each other since World War II in shoot-
ing and nonshooting incidents without general war resulting.

Again and again and again, U.S. and Soviet planes have
clashed in actual shooting frays, from the Sea of Japan and
the vicinity of Kamchatka to the Baltic and Armenia. Num.er-
ous U.S. planes, and probably some Russian planes, have been
lost in these clashes, yet there has been no war. In Korea,
Russian-speaking Soviet pilots flying Soviet planes rose to do
battle with U.S. pilots and planes. Again there was no general
war.

Any definition of limited war, therefore, as one in which
U.S. and Soviet forces do not oppose each other is too narrow.
Under certain restraining circumstances (for example, in Ko-
rea the Soviet pilots utilized the fighting chiefly for training,
as both the Nazis and the Communists did in the Spanish
Civil War) U.S. and Soviet forces might actually fight each
other without general war resulting.

Limited war is limited not so much by the nationalities of
the combatants as by the objectives of both sides, the weapons
and methods employed (in other words, the degree of force),
and the geography and extent of the fighting. The nationalities
involved are, of course, important from a prestige viewpoint,
but communism can always, if it desires and if its objectives
are limited, conceal participation of Russian forces under the
guise of "people's volunteers" or in other ways.

World history demonstrates that limited wars are the only
kind that have occurred since World War II. About twenty-
three limited wars or war situations have been recorded since
1945. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Army chief of staff,
studied seventeen of these wars and pointed out that they have
not necessarily been small or short wars. "By striking a statis-
tical time-manpower balance of all seventeen limited wars," he
said, "one finds that they have averaged about two and a half
years in duration and nearly six hundred thousand men en-
gaged."

In none of these wars have atomic weapons been used,
though they have been available in several instances and at

LIMITED WAR 253

least once their use was threatened (the Soviet missile threat
at the time of the Anglo-French-Israeli attack upon Egypt).

These limited conflicts or situations have ranged in scope
from Korea (where a total of half a million Americans were
engaged over a three-year period at a cost of more than thirty
thousand U.S. lives— our fourth-largest conflict) to the Leba-
nese expedition of 1958, in which a total of some fifteen to
sixteen thousand U. S. Marines and soldiers landed in the
Levant, backed up by the U. S. Sixth Fleet. A few of these
situations, like Lebanon, did not involve actual shooting for
U.S. forces; the vast majority of them, including the revolt
in Hungary, involved the employment by one side or the other
or both of all types of ground arms available— and often many
types of air and naval armaments— short of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the lessons of history are plain: limited wars continue
even in the shadow of the atomic age. General Taylor's "in-
ference that they will continue and that the rate of occurrence
may increase" seems logical, based on past experience.

The answer to the first question— Is limited war possible?—
is therefore clearly an aflBrmative one. But history gives us no
clue as to whether or not nuclear weapons could be used in
such conflicts without spreading them. For in none of the
twenty-three wars since World War II have nuclear weapons
of any sort actually been utilized.

Can Wars Be Kept from Spreading?

Whether or not nuclear weapons can, under certain circum-
stances, be employed or whether, if we want to keep war lim-
ited, they must be relegated to a background role depends
fundamentally upon the answer to the second question: How
can a limited war be fought without undue risk of spreading
into an unlimited one?

A limited war, if it is to be kept limited, must be fought
for limited and well-defined political objectives, with limited
mihtary force, and, generally, in a Hmited geographic area.

A limited war must be hmited first and fundamentally by
the objectives, intentions, and wfll of the participants. As Kis-
singer correctly stresses, the primary requirement for keeping

"UJl-P

254 PROBLEMS OF MtLITARY STRATEGY

a war limited is the limitation of the pohtical and military ob-
jectives for which the war is fought. The destruction of Car-
thage, the unconditional surrender of Germany, were unlim-
ited aims which helped to induce unlimited wars. No war
which has as its objective the absolute destruction of Russian
power or the complete elimination of communism can be lim-
ited; in fact, one can say, with the sure support of history,
that ideological wars have always led to unUmited conflicts.
An idea has peculiar vitality; it cannot be destroyed by the
sword; from death and destraction it springs phoenixlike to
new dimensions. A war of fuzzy, ill-defined, or xmhmited aims
encourages unlimited means. The fundamental requirement to
keep war limited is to know what you are fighting for, to de-
fine the price you are willing to pay for the objectives you
are determined to gain, to make certain that those objectives
are realizable without forcing the main enemy, Russia, into
the position of a cornered wolf— desperate, irrational, fighting
back with all-out efi^ort.

The Korean War, under the ground rules imposed (by our-
selves, our allies, and our enemies), was a war of limited ob-
jectives. One could quarrel with those objectives, with the
strategic and tactical means we used to try to achieve those
objectives, and with our fluctuating pohcies; nevertheless, in
Korea, probably for the first time in our history, we fought for
something besides victory unlimited.

And despite General Douglas MacAxthur's dictum that the
object of war is victory, future wars, if they are to remain
limited and if victory is to have any tangible meaning, must
similarly stress limited objectives. For unless military victory
is defined in tangible political terms, in limited terms, war is
not only slaughter but senseless, irrational carnage.

Hitler started World War II with definite and attainable
limited objectives: the elimination of the Polish Corridor and
the conquest of Poland. But his ambitions, plus the fact that
he forced his adversaries into a corner, led him to substitute
an unattainable and unlimited objective: the conquest of Eu-
rope and Russia— in fact, mastery of the world. The Allies, in
opposing Hitler's ends, postulated a fuzzy and unlimited aim-
unconditional surrender— for what should have been well-
defined pohtical objectives.

LIMITED WAB ^55

The Need for Clear Objectives Clearly Defined

The first requirement for a limited war, then, is a limited,
well-defined political objective attainable by limited military
strength. It should be stated and restated that war is not an
end in itself; war is justifiable only if it is a servant of policy,
if it is invoked to achieve a definite pohtical aim, if it is fought
for the vital interests of the nation, and if it results in increased
secinity for the nation and in a more stable world.

These limited objectives require statement and restatement,
emphasis and re-emphasis, throughout the conflict. This is
important for two reasons : the efi^ect upon our own people and
our friends and the effect upon the enemy. When war starts,
fear, hysteria, and emotion are powerful allies of unreason;
they tend toward the war's extension, the substitution of un-
limited means for imlimited ends. This trend, so pronounced
in Korea, can be checked and controlled only by clear-cut
definitions of our aims, understandable not only and not pri-
marily to a schoolboy but also to the parents of the boys who
must die for limited ends. Reason, indeed, may not be able to
cope with emotion, but unless there is a rational checkrein the
end is chaos.

Similarly, such a statement is essential if a national frustra-
tion, such as that which developed during the latter stages of
the Korean War, is to be avoided. The enemy, too, must be
assured and reassured that our objective is limited, that we do
not intend his complete destruction, that there is a way out,
lest through fear he extend the conflict to an imhmited one.
The corollary to this, of course, is the tacit threat— a threat
credible to him— that unless he, too, keeps his aims and meth-
ods limited we shall clobber him.

The devastating power of nuclear weapons and the speed
and elusiveness of their carriers— jet planes, rockets, atomic
submarines— mean that the first requirement for keeping a lim-
ited war limited is, ironically, the capability of extending it.
The rifleman of today and tomorrow fights under the awful
shadow of the wings of global death. The capability of invok-
ing all-out nuclear retribution is the most certain military sane-

256 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

tion— the surest, though an imperfect, guarantee— that a lim-
ited war will remain limited, that an enemy will not extend it
lest he suffer terribly and unaceeptably in retribution. Thus
national psychology, as well as national aims, plays a part in
limited war.

But i£ war is to be limited, we clearly cannot use unlimited
means to attain limited ends. Limited war implies not only a
tangible definition o£ restricted and attainable objectives but
also a restraint on the use of force, a limitation of the means
and weapons.

Nuclear Bombs Mean Total War

All-out military power today— power unlimited, power un-
restrained—imphes clearly the death of civilization as we know
it. Enough atomic weapons now exist to destroy, if delivered,
the principal cities of Russia and the West, to leave large areas
of irradiated earth uninhabitable, to kill probably hundreds of
millions of people. Clearly the use of large numbers of nuclear
weapons implies an ever expanding and unlimited war. Equally
clearly, discrimination as to the power and size of the weapons
employed is essential if a war is to be limited, for a hmited
war means limited devastation.

A metropolis-busting "thermonuke" with explosive power of
at least a megaton (one million tons of TNT equivalent) is
an area weapon. Its blast and heat effects, though finite, are
tremendous. A megaton weapon, for instance, would devastate
sixty to seventy square miles and cause grave damage weU
beyond this area.

The bomb's invisible killer, radioactivity, would pose a far
less finite and far less calculable effect. The burst of neutrons
and gamma rays released at the instant of the blast would be
dangerous about as far as the blast and heat. But some of the
atomic fission products of the explosion, strontium 90 and other
long-lived particles, would be sucked up into the stratosphere
and deposited around the earth gradually through months and
even years, with physiological and genetic results still impre-
cisely known. Even more dangerous would be the local fallout,
in a wide elliptical swath downwind from the explosion, of

LIMITED WAR 257

dust and dirt particles impregnated with radioactivity by the
blast. Local fallout may vary from negligible— if the fireball is
well above the earth and rain or snow does not quickly precipi-
tate the fission products and residual particles— to very heavy
—if the earth is scourged and beaten and particles are sucked
up into the vortex of the atomic cloud. As the Japanese fisher-
men on the ill-named Lucky Dragon discovered, dangerous
radioactivity from local fallout can lay a blanket of death
across hundreds of miles.

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, a Department of Defense
and Atomic Energy Commission handbook, states that "if only
five per cent of a one megaton bomb's energy" is spent in
scourging the earth with its fireball, "something like so,ooo
tons of vaporized soil material will be added to the normal con-
stituents of the fireball. In addition, the high winds of the
earth's surface will cause large amounts of dirt, dust, and other
particles to be sucked up as the ball of fire rises."

It can be argued that the so-called "clean" bomb vdll re-
duce or ehminate radioactivity. It has, indeed, in certain cir-
cumstances already done so. But the big bombs are triggered
by an initial fission reaction. The megaton-category weapons
are three-stage devices. An atomic trigger explodes and pro-
vides the necessary heat to bring about the fusion (the second
stage) of tritium. In turn, the fusion reaction releases neutrons
which then cause the fission of the third stage, a casing of
plutonium. The nuclear fission products are responsible for
most of the dangerous radioactivity; if they could be elimi-
nated, most of the long-lived global radioactivity could be
eliminated and local fallout would be reduced.

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons gives some startling esti-
mates. About one and three quarters ounces of fission products
"are formed for each kiloton (no pounds per megaton) of
fission energy yield. At one minute after a nuclear explosion
. . . the radioactivity from the one and three quarters ounces
of fission products from a one-kiloton explosion is comparable
with that of a hundred thousand tons of radium." This means
that radiation— exclusive of that released at the instant of blast
—for a megaton bomb is equivalent to that of about one million
tons of radium. This radioactivity decays rapidly, but never-

258 PKOBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

theless some of the long-lived products could make an area
uninhabitable for years.

Clean and Dirty Bombs

Actually, U.S. bombs have been made cleaner by reducing
or eliminating the coating of uranium (the third-stage reac-
tion) and by making the original fission trigger (the first stage)
as small as possible. These steps must inevitably reduce the
power of the so-called clean thermonuke, though it remains
a city-busting weapon. But radioactivity has not been elimi-
nated entirely. The fission trigger is still essential to produce
the heat necessary to activate the fusion of the second stage.
Someday, perhaps, other means of triggering a fusion reaction
may be developed, and the 100 per cent clean bomb that Dr.
Edward Teller and others have talked about may be possible.

Even so, this will not mean the complete ehmination of
radioactivity; no fission or fusion weapon can ever be clean
in the sense that it will explode without any radioactivity. But
the most dangerous radioactive by-products, the long-hved
fission products, will be eliminated, and hence global fallout
of strontium 90 and other dangerous elements will be largely
eliminated and local fallout may be reduced. The burst of
radiation incident to explosion will stiU occixr, and if the fire-
ball touches the earth man will still have to cope with local
fallout incident to the impregnation of dust and dirt by ra-
dioactivity.

The problem of clean bombs is, in any case, a two-edged
one. For the offensive side, if a ground army is to pass over
an area which has been subject to atomic bombardment, a
clean weapon would be tactically desirable. For the defense,
a dirty weapon would increase the hazards of the enemy. For
antiaircraft use or defense of one's own soil against enemy air
attack, the clean bomb obviously offers a desirable safety fac-
tor. In all-out city-busting war, the side that used a clean
bomb while an enemy used a dirty one might weU be at a
disadvantage. The clean-bomb problem, therefore, is far from
simple; it has a Jekyll-Hyde aspect. The important point, how-
ever, is that no bomb now is completely clean; small clean

LIMITED WAB 259

weapons may in time be developed, but only if testing is
continued.

All this adds up to the fact that even the cleanest weapon
is not subject to precise, pre-use prediction as to extent and
lethality and area of fallout; these will depend upon the height
of the burst over the earth, the speed and direction of the
wind, the size and design of the bomb, the composition of
the earth beneath the burst, and other factors. A metropolis-
busting bomb might well be timed to detonate high above a
city, to secure maximum blast effect over a maximum area;
but, on the other hand, if an airfield or a missile emplacement
were the target, groimd or near-ground biusts, which would
maximize local fallout, would be used.

Thus, it seems clear that, no matter what the target, the
use of area-type nuclear weapons in war— huge thermonukes
or powerful fission weapons— would present an incalculable
problem which is not subject to prediction and which would
produce incalculable effects, thus dangerously increasing the
chance of spreading a limited war to an unlimited one.

There might be one exception to this. A single city-buster
actually used against a single city might, in the case of war
between two nations of greatly differing power, produce un-
limited results with, in one sense, limited means. If Russia, for
instance, destroyed Istanbul with a single megaton weapon,
this limited use of force on Russia's part might bring about an
unlimited result for Turkey: imconditional siurender (though
Russia, of course, would face the danger of nuclear retaliation
from the United States) . But in the case of wars between great
powers— specifically, war involving by proxy or subterfuge U.S.
troops and Soviet followers— the use of megaton weapons
would certainly imply unlimited war. Tremendous thermo-
nukes, whether clean or not, almost certainly have no place
in limited war.

Radioactivity and Small Weapons

What about the smaller atomic weapons, the so-called tac-
tical or battlefield weapons?

Already there are some (many say not enough) of these

26o PROBLEMS OF MELITAKY STRATEGY

in the American^ armory. Critics, including former Atomic
Energy Commissioner Thomas Miirray, point out, however,
that the United States has no really small, "discriminating"
tactical weapons today. Even a one-kiloton weapon (equiva-
lent to one thousand tons of TNT) has almost one himdred
times the explosive force of World War II's largest conven-
tionai bomb, which was used only strategically (against
cities), not on the battlefield. There is an important, though
so far minority, school of thought in the Pentagon which be-
lieves that atomic weapons with yields as low as ten tons of
TNT equivalent must be produced. Their advantages, as com-
pared with conventional explosives, would be lightness and
small size and discrimiaation, or locaHzation of the weapons'
effects— the latter obviously important to the limitation of war.

In addition to weapons handled by ground troops, there
are many different types of nuclear weapons for fighter-
bomber use, for air-to-air missiles, and as warheads for anti-
aircraft missiles Hke Nike-Hercules. The Navy has nuclear
depth charges and warheads for missiles (replacing gims) and
torpedoes.

These so-caUed battlefield weapons have one common char-
acteristic: they are all fission weapons, except for the largest,
which may be fission-fusion. Long-Hved fission products are,
therefore, an inevitable result, and clean small weapons are
still some time in the future, if indeed they are ever developed.

Moreover, to destroy many so-called battlefield or tactical
targets— airfields, fortifications, gun emplacements, hardened
missile sites— ground bursts are required. Other targets, such
as troop concentrations, can be eliminated by air bursts. Faulty
fusing will, of course, detonate some weapons intended as air
bursts at groTind level. Furthermore, since many of these
weapons are small and the atomic cloud does not rise to as
high an altitude as the towering clouds produced by the bigger
bombs, the fission particles are not carried upward into the
stratosphere to be gradually precipitated after dissipation hun-
dreds or thousands of miles away. Local fallout is therefore
a danger.

1 The Russians are known to have some tactical nuclear weapons,
but details about types, yields, and numbers are, at best, "guesti-
mates."

LIMITED WAR 26 1

The point is that radioactivity presents much the same prob-
lem in miniature with small weapons that it presents with big
ones; the danger on the battlefield is local, rather than global,
fallout. The Army, indeed, has developed templates keyed to
wind direction and intensity, size and height of burst, which,
when laid down on a map and oriented to ground zero, in-
dicate immediately to a commander the radioactive danger
areas to the enemy or to his own troops. But radioactivity, in
the case of the use of nuclear weapons against ground targets,
tends to defy exact definition and hmitation.

Target selection and ehmination present another problem in
the attempt to exercise restraint, to limit war, in a conflict in
which tactical nuclear weapons are used.

Admiral Brown rightly observed that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between so-called tactical and strategic targets. A
200-mile Redstone missile might be fired at some supply area,
railroad junction, or communications bottleneck far behind
the line of contact. Is this a tactical or a strategic target? This
missile might well hit a city or damage it, vidth consequent
danger— as in World War II, when area bombing by one side
accelerated area bombing by the other— of spreading the war.

Nuclear War in Europe

Even if targets are restricted to troops and guns and tanks
and to commimications and supplies in the immediate battle
zones, the problem of making this restriction stick presents
appalling difficulties if two large armies, both equipped with
aU kinds of nuclear weapons, stand face to face. The tempta-
tion will still be to up the ante, and in closely knit, thickly
settled areas like western Europe the radioactive debris
spewed forth by even the smallest weapons is bound to extend
far beyond the fighting zones. This is particularly true since
the Army's concept of our nuclear-age tactics envisages a battle
zone with units dispersed over very great frontages and vast
depth. Modem ground battlefields may, in other words, hter-
aUy extend across entire countries.

Thus, in considering the possibility of utilizing small nuclear
weapons in limited war, one must take into account not only

262 PROBLEMS OF MILITAHY STRATEGY

the power and type and number of the weapons used, not
only the targets against which they are employed, but the
geography of the battle area. For favorable geographic factors,
it is clear, can help to keep a war limited; unfavorable ones
mean its certain extension. Any consideration of geography—
always a key factor in war— makes it apparent that generahza-
tion about the utihzation of nuclear weapons in limited war is
footless and futile. Each case diflFers; the risks in one theater
are overwhelmingly apparent, in another, slight.

All of the foregoing discussion tends toward one conclusion
as far as thickly settled, closely integrated, compact western
Europe is concerned. Limitation in war must mean, if it is to
mean anything, limitation of devastation. Yet, in Europe, tar-
get systems are too intermixed: civihan and mihtary, area and
point, tactical and strategic; the battlefield is too small and not
sufficiently defined by natural barriers, A limited nuclear war
in western Europe is impossible; the use of nuclear weapons
in this area would invoke catastrophe. One bomb would lead
to another.

Moreover, as far as western Europe's opposing ground forces
(with their supporting tactical air and missile forces) are con-
cerned, it is at best questionable whether nuclear weapons
give any great advantage to the defense. Today, yes; tomor-
row, no. Today, yes, because the West probably possesses a
greater variety and nimiber of tactical atomic arms; but to-
morrow, when both sides have these arms in quantity, a "good
big atomic army" with no major geographic barriers to curtail
and choke its power will possess an advantage over a "good
httle atomic army." Some critics even foresee the possibiUty
that Soviet Russia may soon surpass us in variety and numbers
of small atomic weapons. As one authority puts it, "Barring
changes in present concepts and conditions (budget limitations
and lack of interest at the top level) it is not Hkely that smaller
weapons wiU be stockpiled in significant quantities."

Quemoy and the Nuclear Threat

But there are other battlefields in the world where the nu-
clear stalemate has not inhibited action, cold or hot, and where

LIMITED WAK 263

geography does aid the defense. During the Quemoy crisis in
1958, United States Marines moved some eight-inch howitzers
from Okinawa to Quemoy, emplaced them, and turned them
over to the Chinese Nationalists. The significance of this move
was lost upon much of the world but not upon Peiping and
Moscow. These gims have the capability of firing nuclear
shells. We did not give the Nationalists any nuclear shells. But
the mere emplacement of eight-inch howitzers on Quemoy
served as a dual warning. In the first place, their arrival broke
the Communist blockade at one stroke as far as artillery am-
munition was concerned. A few nuclear shells flown in by
plane would equal the power of thousands of conventional
rounds, which had to be brought in by sea. In the second
place, eight-inch nuclear shells, if fired to detonate above an
invading fleet of amphibious vessels and small craft, would
doom the invasion. The eight-inch howitzers discouraged by
their mere emplacement Communist ideas of conquest.

Thus, in Quemoy, for the first time in history, tactical nu-
clear weapons played the ancient role of the fleet in being.
They were never used; the nuclear weapons were, indeed,
never sent to Quemoy, but they could have been sent there;
the means of dehvery, the howitzer, was at hand, and this
was one of the factors which induced Peiping to back away.
The United States won a limited, incomplete victory in the
Quemoy crisis in 1958; we closed one chapter in an unfinished
book with the advantage on our side. An island position thus
offers some natural advantages to the defense and, from the
point of view of geography, an optimum environment for the
utilization of certain types of nuclear weapons with minimum
risk of spreading a war.

Shells or missiles or tactical nuclear bombs used against an
invading fleet at sea (in the defense of Taiwan, for instance)
or the Nike-Hercules nuclear missile employed against raiding
bombers would represent a finite and limited, as well as a
defensive, utilization of atomics. The sea and the sky are broad
enough to absorb without serious danger the radioactive by-
products, and a minimal number of weapons would be nec-
essary to instire a defensive success. No great risk of spreading
the war would be involved; the enemy's temptation to spread
it, to use "nukes" against Taiwan, would be discouraged by

264 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

the strategic threat of our massed bombing fleets and missiles.

If, on the other hand, the United States in the defense of
Quemoy or Taiwan undertook to knock out the Chinese Com-
munist airfields on the mainland, the possibihty of limiting the
war would be much reduced, particularly when the Chinese
acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, there seem to be some grounds
for believing that nuclear weapons could be used purely de-
fensively to hold some positions that are sharply dehmited and
defined by terrain or other natural barriers, particularly island
positions or peninsulas such as Korea.

Similarly, nuclear weapons might be used at sea in the form
of nuclear depth charges against submarines or possibly in
antiaircraft or air-to-air missiles wdthout too great a risk of
larger involvement. But again a sine qua non for keeping a
limited war limited would imply their defensive use; if they
were used oflFensively, by enemy planes or submarines against
our shipping or by our planes or missiles against enemy land
airfields or missile emplacements, there would be far less pos-
sibility of limitation.

Thus, it is clear that limited war of any kind, but particularly
limited war fought with nuclear weapons, must imply sanctu-
aries for both sides immune either to attack of any kind or to
certain forms of attack.

Nuclear Bombing and Asian Opinion

In weighing the desirability of utilizing nuclear weapons in
limited war, the alternatives must be considered, and the ef-
fects of such use upon pohtical sentiment and mass psychology.

The alternatives to the use of small nuclear weapons in the
defense of Quemoy might be defeat for the Chinese National-
ists and for the United States, their ally, or the development,
deployment, and maintenance in the Taiwan Strait of far
larger conventional forces than the U. S. Seventh Fleet can
now muster. If the U. S. Seventh Fleet were ordered today to
"take out" all Chinese Communist mainland airfields from
which fighter-bomber attacks could be staged against Quemoy
and Taiwan, the numbers of sorties required would be ap-
proximately one thousand times greater if conventional weap-

LIMITED WAR 265

ons were used than if nuclear bombs were used. Instead of
seven sorties against seven airfields, seven thousand might be
required. The United States today does not maintain enough
aircraft to mount such a large-scale conventional assault.

This narrowing of alternatives, therefore— defeat or a far
larger conventional force— funnels our eflForts more and more
toward the utilization of nuclear weapons in limited wars, de-
spite the risks involved. And this canalization is occurring de-
spite the obvious negative political and psychological effects
of the utihzation of nuclear weapons— particularly if used
against Asiatics.

The use of A-weapons in Asia or Africa by the United States
or our alHes against the colored races would be certain to raise
more of a ruckus, even if they brought a quick and advanta-
geous end to the conflict, than the use of A-weapons by Asi-
atics against Asiatics or by Americans against Russians. This
may not be logical, but emotion even more than logic is a
major factor in war. The Asiatics cannot forget that so far the
A-weapon has been used only by a Western country against
an Asiatic one. They associate nuclear power with materialism
and colonialism, and the whole is molded by fairly effective
Commimist propaganda into an anti-Westemism which pro-
vides inflammatory tinder for a fission or fusion explosion.

And the utihzation of nuclear weapons by the United States
would also produce a great surge of pubhc opinion among our
alhes— perhaps in the United Nations— which, depending upon
the circumstances, might hamper or help us in achieving our
political goals. Security in the atomic age is thus a complex
equation.

It is clear that many factors govern the utilization of nuclear
weapons in limited war: the objectives to be attained; the type,
military utility, and manner of employment of the atomic
weapons selected; the target system; the geography; the prob-
able reactions of our friends, the enemy, and neutral nations;
the poUtical, economic, and miUtary alternatives.

In some circumstances, under certain conditions, some types
of nuclear weapons could be used vidthout undue danger of
making a big war out of a little one and probably should be
used, all factors considered. Under other circumstances their
use would be fatal. Our poHcy makers must make the weapon

266 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

fit the battlefield and the enemy; the force used must be tai-
lored to the objective desired.

Ability to Fight Is Our Best Defense

Thus our military policy today presents something of a par-
adox. For, between extensive global political commitments,
some of them to dangerous salients hke Quemoy, and an in-
creasingly limited military budget, we are narrowing the al-
ternatives available to us. We seem to be committing our
armed forces more and more to the utilization of nuclear
weapons in small wars as well as large, despite the risks.

Limited wars require conventional arms, not nuclear weap-
ons. If an enemy is prepared to fight with both large and
small nuclear weapons, we would be at a fatal disadvantage
imless we were similarly prepared. Just as we must keep the
right fist of strategic nuclear power ready in order to deter
enemy nuclear attack upon our cities, so we must maintain
highly efficient tactical nuclear capabihties to deter the battle-
field use of A-weapons.

What general conclusions, then, can be drawn?

A limited war can be fought with weapons— depending upon
geographic, pohtical, economic, moral, and rruhtary circum-
stances—that range from atomic bombs to cloaks and daggers.

The larger and the more powerful the weapon, the less
the limitation in selectivity, in destruction, and in particulari-
zation.

The right fist of all-out nuclear power must remain ready
as a sanction to help insure limited war. But this right fist wiQ
not alone deter an enemy from embarking upon a limited war;
nor can it win such a war without transforming a local con-
flict into a global one.

This establishes the requirement for a second capability,
the capabihty of deterring and, if necessary, winning local and
Limited wars, with or without the use of nuclear weapons.

This may seem a large order. But it is not an impossible one.
Such a deterrence implies, of course, more than a mihtary
capability: creeping commimism cannot be stopped by the

LIMITED WAR 26/

sword alone. It implies economic, moral, psychological, and
political, as well as military, measures.

The problem, the great problem, of our military planners
is to organize and maintain armed forces capable of fighting
any kind of war anywhere. We cannot afford not to prepare
to fight any kind of war anywhere. This does not, of course,
mean that all kinds of forces— strategic air, defensive air, tacti-
cal air, conventional land power, nuclear land power, sub-
marines, carriers, amphibious forces, air-borne forces— should
be maintained at great strength, ready instantly for war. It
means, rather, that we must keep alive the art of fighting any
kind of war anywhere in the world, that we must have at
least cadre forces of many different types keyed to different
missions, capable of expansion in case of war. We must have
fire-fighting forces, police forces capable of taking the first
shock, and a mobihzation potential to raise more of the same
after war starts.

If we do not maintain these diverse capabilities we shall
freeze, in a one-weapon, one-concept mold, not only tactics
but strategy, and our foreign policy will be rigidly tied to an
inflexible strategic concept that permits us no freedom of ac-
tion. Yet the art of diplomacy, tlie art of pohtics, the art of
strategy and war, is the art of choice. We risk defeat in peace
or war if we hmit our military capabiHties to nukes and
thermonukes.

In this time of troubles let us remember that if physical
force has to be invoked it must be tailored, to accomphsh its
purposes, to reasonable and limited objectives and used always
with moral restraint and a sense of decent respect for the
opinions of mankind.

Needed: A New NATO Shield

by Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn

The Soviet attitude toward NATO is conditioned by both
emotional and reahstic considerations. Emotionally, the Soviet
leaders continue to regard the alliance as a "threat" to the
security of the U.S.S.R. Realistically, they view NATO as a
roadblock to the achievement of their global objectives. Their
opposition to NATO, in any event, is irreconcilable.

Indeed, Soviet pressure upon western Europe is likely to
increase during the 1960s. In the immediate future, this pres-
sure will be a military-psychological one, aimed not so much
at military objectives as at reducing Western diplomatic flexi-
bility and driving a wedge between the United States and its
NATO allies. The Soviets will seek to demonstrate, through a
carefully calculated series of "crises," that the main element
of American military power, nuclear retaliation, has been neu-
tralized and that, thus, American power can no longer be
counted upon. This they can accomplish by provoking, at an
appropriate time, a showdown— one in which the United States
wiU be forced to back down.

Russia's growing nuclear maturity will open to the Com-
mtmist leadership an increasingly wide range of political and
military options. The Soviets' capability for waging or sup-
porting nonatomic, indirect aggression remains considerable.
The Soviets, as they approach full nuclear maturity, may well
conclude that limited wars, especially those initiated by satel-
lites under ambiguous circumstances, may be "safe wars"—
wars that will not trigger all-out nuclear conflict. The various
instruments of indirect aggression, such as the deployment of
"volunteers," which have proven so successful in other areas.

This selection is adapted from a report, Western Europe, written for
the Committee on Foreign Relations, V. S. Senate, by the Foreign
Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. It teas pub-
lished by the U. S. Government Printing Office as Report No. 3,
October 15, 1959.

needed: a new NATO SHIELD 269

may soon be tested in Europe. This capability for limited con-
ventional war and indirect aggression may not have to be exer-
cised in actual combat. The implied threat of its use may be
suflBcient to gain limited objectives. '

Given the West's present defense posture and strategy in
Europe, the Soviets are likely to exploit a wide spectrum of '
conflict possibihties short of a pre-emptive strike against the ^
West. Their choice of weapons at all times is determined by I
an assessment of the West's strengths and weaknesses. As the *
gap between the United States and Russia in strategic retalia-
tory capabilities is narrowing, the balance of power may in- |
creasingly shift to the side which holds superiority in the I
ability to wage conflict on levels below that of all-out nuclear '
war.

We are approaching a period when a strategic nuclear capa- '
bility, although indispensable in the total postm^e of each side,
will not be the criterion for success or failmre in a given crisis.
Such a capabihty could become decisive again only if one side I
achieves the ability to strike a mortal blow without incurring
unacceptable damage in return. Therefore, during the next |
few years, the danger of a direct Soviet military thrust against j
western Eturope would seem less likely than that of a Soviet I
crisis strategy designed to paralyze NATO— a strategy calcu-
lated to present challenges that fall below the "threshold" of
an obvious issue of American survival. The Soviets will seek |
to raise this "threshold" through an incessant campaign of
nuclear blackmail— to a point where a move now held to be a
"casus belli atomici" may not be considered an issue of Ameri-
can survival next year or the year after.

The Strategic Requirements of the United States and
Western Europe

Notwithstanding military technological changes, Europe re-
mains a key prize of the protracted war. Western Europe is
thus indispensable to any U.S. strategy designed to arrest a
decisive shift in the balance of power to communism. Soviet
control of Europe, while it might not bring about the imme-
diate defeat of the United States, would turn the tide of con-

270 PROBLEMS OF MILITAKY STRATEGY

flict irreversibly against the Free World. The fall of Eiirope
would mean ultimately and inevitably the loss of Africa, the
Middle East, and the remaining free areas of Asia.

The United States and its NATO allies together must
have military forces capable of discharging three fundamental
tasks:

1. To convince the Soviets that resort to all-out w^ar is a
prohibitive course of action.

2. To convince the Soviets that resort to aggression short of
all-out war would entail costs out of proportion to the objective
sought and would, in any case, court the risk of total war.

3. To provide Western diplomacy with an adequate military
backing.

The Soviet Union may be deterred from a massive assault
against Europe— an attack featuring the use of thermonuclear
weapons against the centers of European and U.S. power on
the Continent— as long as she is deterred from an all-out attack
against the United States. In any such massive assault, U.S.
strategic power would be the Soviets' prime adversary. Thus,
within the context of an all-out global nuclear war, U.S. stra-
tegic power remains essential to the defense of western Europe.

Yet the willingness by the United States to resort to all-out
nuclear war in order to counter local Soviet encroachments in
Europe, in the immediate future if not already today, is open
to question— especially if such encroachments are so ambiguous
as to fall below the "threshold" of a clear issue of American
survival. Soviet nuclear developments permit Commimist ex-
pansion to proceed vdth greater impunity and in the face of a
diminishing risk of an American nuclear response against the
Soviet homeland.

Moscow's transcendent objective in Evirope is to gain domi-
nation. By the Kremlin's reasoning, the inhabitants of western
Europe, bereft of their own means of defense, paralyzed by
the specters of nuclear war and skeptical of America's pro-
tective guarantees, wiU eventually come to heel. The Soviets
are striving, through diplomatic and psychological means, to
convert western Europe into a military vacuum. This objective
is implicit in the various Soviet-sponsored schemes for disen-
gagements and denuclearization in central Europe. The So-
viets want to see neither the growth of western Europe's local

needed: a new nato shield 271

military capability nor a build-up of American nuclear power
at the very borders of the cold war. The Soviets seem con-
vinced that by alternately badgering and cajohng the NATO
nations they can eflFect the withdrawal of the United States
from western Europe. If nuclear power within NATO remains
an American monopoly, then such a withdrawal would mean
de facto the denuclearization of western Europe. This explains
the vehemence with which the Soviet Union, in both public
and diplomatic statements, has opposed the introduction of
tactical weapons into NATO countries.

It is clearly in Russia's interest that our NATO allies remain
dependent on a strategy based exclusively upon American stra-
tegic nuclear power poised outside the European continent.
So long as western Europe remains locally weak, each Com-
munist challenge will strengthen the forces of pacifism, de-
featism, and appeasement, and each Soviet-manufactured cri-
sis will loosen another strand in the fabric of the Atlantic
alUance. The period when the United States and its NATO
aUies could rely primarily on a counter-city retaliatory strategy
has passed. The problem for the United States is to develop a
strategy which will raise the threshold of nuclear reaction so
that the strategic choice of NATO, in any Soviet-manufactured
crisis, is not limited to the extremes of all-out nuclear war or
limited defeat. The time has come, in other words, to give to
NATO the capability for local defense.

Only a comprehensive array of forces can provide an ade-
quate military underpinning of Western policy in Europe. The
ability to retaHate massively against the centers of Soviet
power will continue to be indispensable to deter a general
nuclear conflict. Beyond that, however, the Soviet Union must
be convinced that we can bar it from obtaining a specific ob-
jective, even a limited one like Berhn, with means appropriate
to the given circumstance. Such a strategy would be more
rational— and therefore more credible to Russia as well as our
allies— than the threat to destroy the Soviet Union in retalia-
tion for any Soviet "pinprick" into Europe.

Yet forces currently available to NATO in western Europe
do not provide the supreme commander at SHAPE with the
needed flexibility. NATO is particularly weak in conventional

272 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

forces— the very kind of forces which the Soviets possess in
abundance.

It does not seem likely that any single strategy or static
combination of forces will suffice to deal with the military
tasks confronting the United States and its allies in western
Europe. Different combinations will be needed for different
time periods as well as for the varying conditions of general-
war, cold-war, and political-crisis support. While the United
States must continue to bear the primary bvuden with respect
to some tasks and some forces, western Europe in time should
accept a greater share in its own defense.

With respect to total war, Europe's geographic position will
continue to be important in terms of bases and warning sta-
tions. In the future it can contribute to some extent to the
nuclear deterrent and assist the United States in the technologi-
cal race. The problem of building a NATO local-defense capa-
bility is more complex. To analyze this problem, it is well to
review the principal alternatives open to the United States.

The Alternative of Reliance on Tactical Nuclear Weapons

One of the principal military arguments adduced in support
of a strategy which places exclusive reliance on nuclear tacti-
cal weapons for the defense of Europe is that, because of ex-
cessive casualties, troop concentrations in an atomJc conflict
must be held to a minimum and that there is, therefore, an
inherent upper limit to the size of forces which can be effec-
tively deployed on a nuclear battlefield. It has been estimated,
for example, that an armored or mechanized division, in order
to proceed against a potential atomic defense, must disperse
over an area of more than 500 square miles. If the Soviets were
to invade, say, West Germany along a 650-mile front, the
total area for deployment, based on a depth of 50 miles,
would be only about 32,500 square miles. This area could
accommodate safely a maximum of 63 divisions, a number
considerably below the figure of 175 divisions which the So-
viets presimiably hold in readiness. The use of tactical nuclear
weapons, it is contended, goes a long way toward solving the
logistical problems of NATO and, at the same time, permits

needed: a new nato shield 273

NATO forces to disperse over the inherently narrow terrain of
the western European peninsula. The use of nuclear weapons
could also serve to deny the enemy territory which could not
eflFectively be defended with conventional weapons.

These claims have much vaHdity, yet they court the danger
of oversimplification. There is no absolute evidence that, even
in a conflict in which tactical nuclear weapons are employed,
the size of forces used ceases to be a meaningful criterion for
victory or defeat. A good big atomic army is hkely to remain
superior to a good small atomic army, this despite the fact that
the defending side in such a conflict does hold some inherent
advantages.

Moreover, the vulnerability of NATO logistical echelons to
Soviet nuclear attack is such that tactical nuclear war may
tend to aggravate, rather than solve, NATO's logistical prob-
lems. United States forces in Europe rely on a long and tenuous
line of communications stretching back across France and
upon vulnerable port and supply facilities en route. Logistical
vulnerability would seem to be a major obstacle to the profit-
able use of nuclear weapons.

The main issue, however, is whether a strategy for limited
nuclear war is feasible or desirable in terms of western Eu-
rope's demographical and psychological cHmate. In an area
as densely populated as western and central Europe, can
atomic weapons be used vdth any degree of safety to civilian
populations? The proponents of a strategy which calls for im-
mediate resort to tactical atomic weapons in the event of a
Soviet attack argue that the distinction must be made between
large and small nuclear arms. They contend that "clean"
weapons in the low-kiloton range can keep the dangers to the
local population to a minimum.

How high, however, is this minimum? Mihtary and civilian
targets in western Einrope are virtually inseparable; even if
megaton weapons were not used, the level of destruction
would inevitably be high. The problem is primarily a psy-
chological one. The opponents of the present NATO strategy,
which calls for the immediate use of nuclear weapons, point
to the growing fear psychosis in western Europe, which is
being exacerbated skillfully by Soviet propaganda. What the
Europeans fear most, these critics claim, is extinction in a

274 PROBLEMS OF MILITABY STRATEGY

Soviet-American conflict which would be limited by the tacit
xmderstanding of the major antagonists to the in-between
areas. From the European point of view, such a conflict would
hardly be a limited one.

Even if tactical nuclear weapons could be refined in terms
of yield and accuracy to the point where existing casualty es-
timates could be drastically scaled down, there still remains
the problem of the spiraling effect of these weapons upon the
intensity of the conflict. The proponents of a tactical atomic
strategy argue that the level of the conflict, not the weapons
used, will govern its scale and intensity. This assumption im-
plies that the enemy will tacitly agree to certain nuclear
ground rules. Since he presumes that the West is not anxious
to start thermonuclear war and since he him.self is reluctant
to start one, he will surmise that a nuclear weapon dropped
by the West is not intended to start all-out war.

This line of reasoning, to say the least, is fraught with con-
siderable risk. An enemy, swayed by the emotions generated
by conflict, may well mistake the opponent's intentions and re-
fuse to abide by such vaguely adumbrated rules of nuclear
war.

The Alternative of Disengagement

Ever since the Hungarian uprising in 1956, a growing body
of opinion in the West has articulated the concept of a disen-
gagement of East and West along the battle lines of the cold
war. The proponents of this concept hold that the best hope
for European security lies not in a build-up or modernization
of Western forces but in a mutual Soviet-American with-
drawal from central Europe.

The concept of disengagement, while it has broad political
implications, invariably is defended on military grounds. Its
adherents take their cue from what they consider to be the
salient points of American strategy in Europe today. The
United States, in their view, has abandoned all but the pretense
of a conventional defense in western Europe. The main pur-
pose of American forces in central Europe is to act as a trip
wire against Soviet attack— a trip wire which, if crossed, would

needed: a new nato shield 275

automatically activate the mechanism of strategic retaliation
against the Soviet Union. This, they contend, can be the only
logical function of the small array of ground forces which the
Western powers now hold in being. Such a policy is held to
be in accord with the emerging facts of the air-nuclear age,
in which long-range missile power will become the ultimate
arbiter of conflict. The trip wiie, it is argued, can be eflFectively
replaced with an American guarantee of western Europe
against Soviet aggression.

A number of mihtary-strategic benefits are claimed for such
a strategy. A physical separation of East and West along the
line of conflict would relax tensions. More important, it would
reduce the danger of an "accident" which might spark thermo-
nuclear conflict. The Soviets, by vnthdrawing their forces from
eastern Europe, would forfeit poHtical control over this area;
they could not return in force without clearly violating the
sovereignty of independent states. Western Europe, moreover,
would find rehef from the formidable psychological and mili-
tary pressures which the Soviet Army, poised across the Elbe
River, has exerted since World War II. The removal of Soviet
forces several hundreds of miles eastward would give the
West, in the event of a concerted Soviet threat, precious ad-
ditional warning time. Such an attack could then be met in
territory beyond the present confines of the Atlantic alliance.
In other words, disengagement may make it possible to fight
the major actions of a local war outside NATO territory.

These arguments are superficially attractive— and pro-
fotmdly misleading. They proceed from a basic premise: that
the "balance of terror" is a stable balance and, since NATO
shield forces serve no other purpose than that of activating
strategic retaliation, a large-scale mutual withdrawal of Soviet-
American forces can be made the subject of diplomatic ne-
gotiations.

Yet "breakthroughs" of the first magnitude could still up-
set the nuclear balance. Even in the absence of such a break-
through, however, it would not be certain that the United
States will make good its guarantee to protect the exposed
sector of Europe through strategic retaliation at the price of
millions of American casualties. The removal of American
ground forces from the center of Europe would remove the

276 PROBLEMS OF MrLITARY STRATEGY

simplest and most forthright cause for American intervention.

The main political argument advanced by proponents of dis-
engagement—that a vi^ithdrawal of Soviet forces automatically
vi^ould bring about the liberation of eastern Europe— is con-
tradicted by the hard facts of Commimist political control.
Force need not be physically present in order to insure that
each satellite bows to the wishes of the Soviet Union. Whether
the eastern Europeans wall or will not remain subservient to
Russia will depend in large part upon their estimate of the
balance of power and of the determination of the United
States to provide a counterweight to Soviet power in Europe.
An American withdrawal to the fringes of the Continent,
let alone from all of Europe, obviously would belie such
resolution.

Historically, geographical position has been subject to some
but, on balance, to less depreciation than other strategic fac-
tors. For the United States, and therefore for NATO, the
abandonment of the present forward position at the narrow
waist of Europe would constitute a virtually irreversible step.
The European peninsula is not an advantageous theater for
defensive operations, for it lacks geographical depth. The dis-
tance from the Baltic Sea in the North to the Adriatic in the
South is less than 600 miles, and from the iron curtain to Brest
is no more than 850. Disengagement, while it might bring
about a desirable vidthdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern
Europe, would at the same time constrict the NATO opera-
tional area in western Europe to a mere "beachhead." NATO
—if indeed the Western alliance could be maintained following
a, disengagement— would retain precious little space in which
to deploy its forces. Because of contiguity, the Soviets will al-
ways find it easier to reoccupy the territory which they would

A major attraction of proposed disengagement arrangements

is that they seem to reduce the possibility of an accidental
clash between the United States and the Soviets, a clash with
which the United States is unprepared to deal on a conven-
tional basis. This argument, however, is countered by the les-
sons of postwar history. The major case of Communist direct
military aggression occurred in Korea, an area from which the
United States had disengaged. It is quite possible that, follow-

needed: a new NATO SHIELD T-JJ

ing disengagement, Europe, which has been a relatively stable
area of the cold war, might become highly unstable and in-
vite diverse forms of Communist intervention.

Basic to the debate over disengagement is the question of
Europe's importance in the West's global objective of holding
communism at bay. It is the burden of this analysis that Eu-
rope's full poHtical, economic, and military participation is
absolutely essential to the success of Western strategy. A
comprehensive disengagement would mean ipso facto the dis-
solution of the Atlantic alliance as it is presently constituted.
Once it has been dissolved, NATO— as a live military force
composed of national contingents from both sides of the At-
lantic—cannot be put together again.

This does not mean that some limited form of a mutual
Soviet-United States withdrawal from the present line of
scrimmage will never be feasible. However, mutual disengage-
ment, whatever its forms, will satisfy Western security re-
quirements only if adequate local strength compensates for a
redeployment of U.S. units on the Continent.

The AUernative of "Nuclearizing' Our NATO Allies

Several European countries now seek to acquire independ-
ent nuclear power. The United Kingdom has developed ad-
vanced nuclear weapons; France has successfully tested an
atomic device; and Sweden and Switzerland undoubtedly have
the resources for the production of atomic power. Although
France, not to speak of Sweden and Switzerland, are far from
becoming full-fledged nuclear powers— and, indeed, will never
be "full-fledged" in terms of parity with the United States and
the Soviet Union— the trend toward increasing independent nu-
clear capacity is clear. It poses a key question for U.S. policy:
Should we assist certain European powers in the development
of such a capacity or should we continue to withhold our se-
crets and our active support?

From the American viewpoint, an independent nuclear
strength in Europe would hold some advantages. Briefly, they
are these:

1. The individual European members of NATO, if armed

2/8 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

with their own nuclear weapons, would have more flexibility
of defense. Assuming that they continue to maintain conven-
tional forces, they could meet a conventional attack with con-
ventional weapons. An attack with tactical atomic weapons
could be met at the same level at which it is mounted. This
greater flexibihty in defense would, in turn, increase their
ability and willingness to stand firm in the face of Soviet-
created crises and nuclear blackmail.

2. As both the United States and the Soviet Union develop
a long-range missile capability, Europe fears increasingly that
the United States will (a) not retaliate against hmited Com-
munist challenges in Europe or (fo) retaliate so massively that
Em-ope will be destroyed in a nuclear holocaust. It is these
fears which help to spur the Europeans' desire to develop their
own nuclear retaliatory power. The Europeans argue, and not
without some justification, that Western nuclear deterrent
capability would be greater, more credible, and hence more
effective if it were distributed among those nations which man
the front line.

3. The desire for an independent nuclear capability on the
part of European nations is to a large extent a quest for the
prestige which redounds to those who hold membership in
the "nuclear club." These nations, possessed of nuclear power,
would develop a true feeling of "partnership" within the At-
lantic alliance. Thus, they would overcome the third-class-
nation neurosis which has inhibited their wholehearted partic-
ipation in the common effort.

4. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
a multiple balance of power preserved the peace of Europe.
The psychological basis of security in this period was the very
uncertainty of risk which the would-be aggressor had to fear.
This multiple balance has been transformed in our generation
into a scale, or bipolar, balance. Because power is bipolarized,
so is the deterrent. Soviet strategists, in contemplating any po-
tential aggrandizement at the expense of Europe, need to be
concerned only with skirting the risk of a determined Ameri-
can response.

If the multiple balance could be restored in the new form
of independent nuclear power centers, a new dimension of risk
would be intioduced into Soviet calculations. The Soviets, in

needed: a new nato shield 279

planning their gambits, would be forced to calculate, with
considerable accuracy, the threshold of survival not only of
the United States but of the countries immediately involved.
A crisis which the United States does not consider an issue
of national survival may well be deemed precisely such an
issue by a nuclear-armed West Germany, France, or Great
Britain. The greater the uncertainty, the stronger the deter-
rent against ambiguous aggression and the smaller, perforce,
the Soviets' margin of maneuverability in Europe.

5. The possession of nuclear weapons by individual NATO
nations would profoundly change the power relationship be-
tween the western European and the contiguous Communist
satellite countries. We could give nuclear arms to our allies
because, presumably, we can trust them. For various political
reasons, which were demonstrated dramatically by the Hun-
garian uprising, the Soviets cannot place equal trust in the
reliability of their "allies." The confrontation of nuclear-armed
western European nations and "non-nuclear" eastern European
satellites would impale the Soviets on the horns of a dilemma.
It would drastically reduce the chances for success of a Soviet
proxy action against western Europe. More important, it would
strengthen divisive trends within the Communist bloc. The
Soviets would be hard put to resist, without further weaken-
ing their grip upon their empire, the demands of their "allies"
—including Red China— for "nuclear parity" with their western
European neighbors. The anxiety to head off such a crisis in
the internal relationships of the Soviet bloc undoubtedly
looms large in such Soviet-sponsored proposals for the creation
of a nuclear-free zone in Europe as the Rapacld Plan.

Although the reasons for opening fully the gates of nuclear
development and know-how to our alhes are compelling, such
a policy does entail considerable risks. They are the following:

1. The cement of any coalition is necessity. The Atlantic
alliance was foimded in the realization of its members that,
left to their own devices, they could not counter the Soviet
threat and that their survival depended upon the protection
afforded by the United States. To the extent that the acquisi-
tion of an independent nuclear capability may once again en-
courage unilateral policies, the alliance will be weakened.

2. One of the principal objections by Europeans to the dis-

aSo PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

engagement concept is the fact that it would remove the
American protective presence. The development of an inde-
pendent nuclear capability in Europe would to some extent
argue for the withdrawal of American forces from Europe.

3. A change in the nuclear-power relationships within the
Atlantic aUiance would alter the de facto decision-making
power of the various members. Individual NATO countries
might easily become infatuated with their new nuclear capa-
bilities, inadvertently push the button of all-out war, and ex-
pect the automatic backing of their alliance partners. World
War I was touched off when Germany allowed its weaker ally,
the Hapsburg Empire, to "drag" her into conflict. It is a car-
dinal principle of diplomacy that a strong power must not per-
mit its own poHcy to be made by a weaker ally.

4. An even greater risk inherent in the proliferation of nu-
clear power is the use of nuclear weapons in the pursuit of
national objectives. The French Army, for example, in its des-
perate effort to end the Algerian War, conceivably might suc-
cumb to the temptation of employing nuclear weapons against
rebel redoubts. In such an event, the United States, as the
donor of these weapons, would bear the brunt of an enraged
world opinion.

5. There is the danger, also, that European nations, once
they obtain nuclear weapons with all their cormotations of
prestige and power, wiU be reluctant to accept less dramatic,
but nevertheless necessary, military tasks. The resulting gaps
in NATO's weapons systems could prove disastrous. Exclusive
reliance on nuclear weapons would significantly enhance the
danger of total nuclear war.

There is no minimizing the risks inherent in a policy of giv-
ing nuclear weapons to our NATO allies. Yet the debate over
this issue has already become largely academic. Given the
nuclear facts of hfe in the mid-twentieth century, there is little
question that all of our principal allies will sooner or later ac-
quire nuclear weapons. The question is simply whether we
shall give them these weapons or whether we shall permit
them to squander their own resources in the quest for nuclear
power— to the detriment of the over-all NATO defenses. More-
over, no western European power will be able to develop those
second-strike capabilities which are the sine qua non of all-out

needed: a new nato shield 281

nuclear war. For a long time to come, only the two super-
powers will be able to afford so complex a weapons system.

A Dud Capability

Thus far, this chapter has been concerned with three major
alternatives to the present policy tacitly being pursued by the
United States in Europe— namely, the use of NATO contin-
gents as a "trip wire" which, if crossed by Soviet forces, would
activate strategic retaliation. Each of these alternatives has
certain merits. None of them, however, taken singly, brackets
the entire spectnim of challenges which the West is likely to
encounter in the next decade.

A segment in this spectrum is the possibility of nonatomic
war. The West, if it is to gird against this possibility, must
devise some means for complementing its nuclear capabilities
with the capacity to engage Soviet ground forces without auto-
matic resort to nuclear weapons.

The need for such a strategy flows from an objective ap-
praisal of the emerging military-psychological balance in Eu-
rope. The Soviets continue to station massive ground forces ia
eastern Europe. These forces have been held in check since
World War II by the strategic nuclear superiority of the
United States. The significance of Soviet technological-military
progress lies precisely in the fact that by appearing to neu-
tralize America's strategic capabilities it has released Russian
ground strength as a formidable instrument of military-
psychological pressiire against the West. The new Soviet "crisis
strategy," which was unveiled in Nikita Khrushchev's ulti-
matum on Berlin, is designed fully to utilize this pressure. So
long as the weaknesses of allied conventional forces in central
Europe compel the Western powers to contemplate the ulti-
mate choice between a nuclear holocaust and limited defeat,
for just as long are the Soviets able to drive their psychological
advantage home.

Therefore, an effective conventional capability— on a scale
at least twice the force levels available to NATO today— is im-
perative if NATO is to be prepared to (1) wage Hmited non-
atomic conflict and (2) cope with the new Soviet crisis strategy

ZSZ PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

in Europe. The danger which confronts NATO is not so much
a deliberate Soviet aggression against western Europe— al-
though such a possibility cannot be discounted. Rather, the
main threat is a conflict triggered through a Soviet miscalcula-
tion of the West's unwillingness to go to war over a given issue
(for example, Berlin) or conflict by accident (for example,
another satellite uprising) . In either case, the choice of weap-
ons in all likelihood wovdd be ours. And the West, lacking a
nonatomic capability, would have to choose nuclear war.

Is it theoretically possible for the West to muster forces ca-
pable of deahng with the Soviets in a conventional action in
Europe? In seeking to answer this question, Western analysts
have tended to be overly impressed by the supposedly crush-
ing superiority of the Red Army. It is true that the Soviets
have sizable ground forces deployed in central and eastern
Europe. A major function of these forces, however, is imperial
control. The number of Soviet divisions actually available as
a potential invasion task force is substantially below the total
numerical strength of Soviet force levels. In the light of the
Htmgarian uprising, it is doubtful, to say the least, that the
Soviets could release many of their garrison forces for an attack
on western Europe. Thus the eastern European satellites can
be a deterrent to Soviet-initiated groimd action in central and
western Europe.

The problem confronting the West, therefore, is not quite as
hopeless as has often been assumed. It appears even less hope-
less when the manpower pools of East and West are com-
pared. At present, the United States has 31 miUion fit males
of military age; the Soviet Union has 41 million. By 1965, it
has been estimated, the available manpower figure for the
United States will have risen to 35.2 milHon as compared with
the slight increase to 41.5 million for the Soviets. If NATO
is included, the West's relative position is even better. The
Soviet bloc (excluding China) has 58.4 million fit males;
NATO has 85.4 million. By 1965, this ratio will be 59 million
versus 95.4 million.

Perhaps it is illusory to expect NATO to avail itself of its
superior manpower reservoir in order to match the Soviets
man for man. Conventional parity, however, may not be neces-
sary. Given the space limitations of central Europe and the

needed: a new nato shield 283

need for dispersal in the face of a possible nuclear counter-
attack, the Soviets cannot concentrate their much publicized
175 divisions at a single point. They could, of course, bring
up reinforcements rather rapidly— but not without alerting the
West to the scale of the attack and raising at least the danger
of all-out war. It may be quite possible, therefore, for 30
properly armed and trained NATO divisions— the number
called for by the supreme commander— to deal with much
larger Soviet forces without immediate resort to tactical or
strategic nuclear weapons. It should be borne in mind, how-
ever, that the force objective of 30 NATO ready divisions was
agreed upon at a time when the United States still held de-
cisive nuclear superiority. Obviously, 30 divisions could not
cope with all the ground forces which the Soviets hold in
readiness.

Thus, the creation of the kind of conventional NATO force
which would at least block Soviet forces in East Germany from
overrunning western Europe is theoretically within NATO's
means. The principal function of such a force would be to
deter forms of limited aggression which, under thermonuclear
parity, strategic retaliation alone cannot deter. This can be
done by raising the enemy's cost of entry to a point where to
imdertake any direct mihtary action he must deliberately in-
vite strategic retahation. Indeed, the Soviets may be discour-
aged from "feeling their way" into conflict. If a nuclear war
looms as the logical result of a probing operation, then the
Soviets may well deem such an operation a needless and ex-
pensive preface to total war. The Soviets, moreover, would
have to face the risk that a large-scale ground probe into
western Europe might provoke the United States into striking
the first nuclear blow, an advantage which is now conceded to
the Soviet Union.

If a "dual capacity" by NATO is theoretically possible, is it
feasible in practical terms? Opponents of the concept of "dual
capacity" base their arguments on military, strategic, eco-
nomic, and political considerations.

Militarily, they argue, no war in Europe can be fought with-
out nuclear weapons. These weapons will be used if only be-
cause they are the most effective weapons available to both
sides: the Soviets abeady are integrating tactical nuclear

284 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

weapons into their ground units and into their over-all strategy.
The characteristics of an increasing number of weapons which
are required to deal with atomic war are becoming less and
less compatible with the characteristics of those weapons sys-
tems needed effectively to prosecute a conventional conflict.
In other words, there can be no effective "mix" of atomic and
nonatomic weapons systems. A "dual capacity" would mean
the maintenance of completely separate systems. If we under-
took such a parallel build-up of separate systems, we might
discover suddenly that the Soviets had completely abandoned
the capability to wage nonatomic war, leaving us with an ex-
pensive and totally useless conventional estabUshment.

Strategically, the most profound objection to re-emphasizing
a local-defense capability in Europe has been the argument
that such a strategy will serve to weaken the large deterrent.
The contention is that, if we enxinciate a limited-war strategy
for Europe, we will thereby demonstrate to the Communists
our reluctance to retaliate with our strategic weapons. Hence,
statements on limiting our response will simply have the effect
of making war once again a paying proposition for the U.S.S.R.
Some proponents of this viewpoint even argue that the more
we reduce our forces in Europe the more credible becomes
our intention to resort to strategic retaliation.

Economically, the objective of a "dual capacity" is held to
be impractical unless we are prepared drastically to hike our
expenditures in order to generate an adequate mobilization
base for a modern, sophisticated weapons system and at the
same time build up and maintain a substantial nonatomic
arsenal.

Politically, it is argued, a return by NATO to a major con-
ventional capability is against current trends. So long as politi-
cal leaders in the West are dazzled by the new superweapons,
they will not vote the necessary funds for less glamorous con-
ventional arms.

These arguments cannot be dismissed lightly. Every policy
has its imperfections and pitfalls. The problem, however, can-
not be solved simply by dismissing it as impractical.

The fact that the Soviets are integrating atomic weapons
into their strategy in Europe is by no means proof that they
have abandoned, or are prepared to abandon, the capability

needed: a new nato shield 285

to wage conventional war. Indeed, the Soviets cannot give up
this capability so long as imperial control remains a primary
function of the Red Army contingents stationed in eastern Eu-
rope. The Soviets did not use nuclear weapons to put down
the Hungarian rising; instead, they crushed the rebellion with
a full-scale conventional attack. The problem of effectively
"mixing" conventional and atomic capabilities, while admit-
tedly a difficult one, is essentially one of proper integration,
organization, and training.

Conventional capabilities are an integral element of the So-
viet "crisis strategy" in Europe. The forces which have the
greatest maneuverability along the critical points of contact
between the Communists and the Free World— and which vest
the diplomacy of both sides with ready power— are nonatomic
forces. Should the Soviets, in the face of a NATO build-up
of nonatomic forces, decide to shift to an exclusive reMance on
nuclear weapons, then they would forfeit to NATO the very
advantages of diplomatic maneuverability which they now de-
rive from conventional military power.

This is not to negate the importance of nuclear weapons in
any future conflict: we cannot expose to Communist nuclear
attack forces which are prepared to defend themselves only
with conventional arms. The nuclear weapons with which
NATO forces are equipped will serve the purpose of injecting
uncertainties into Soviet calculations and cautioning them
against using their nuclear weapons in a limited attack. Evi-
dently they will be used whenever the limits" of nonatomic
war are pierced by Soviet action. The onus of initiating nu-
clear war must, however, be shifted from Western to Soviet
decision makers.

The argument that an increase in the local deterrent will
detract from the over-aU strategic deterrent is superficially
convincing. Yet, as pointed out above, Soviet nuclear progress
puts in doubt the willingness of the United States to resort to
massive nuclear retaliation in response to every intermediate-
range Soviet challenge. The greatest danger of total war in the
next decade is not a pre-emptive strike on the part of either
side, but rather the "degeneration" of a local engagement
into all-out war. The Soviets may well calculate that they
can effect a smash-grab of weakly defended areas in western

286 PROBLEMS OF MILIXARY STRA.TEGY

Europe and thus confront the United States with a fait ac-
compli which we will be reluctant to reverse at the cost of
initiating nuclear war. The same estimate of U.S. intention,
however, would not necessarily apply to a large-scale and in-
tensively contested local conflict. In Soviet calculations, an
American nuclear riposte would be much more likely in the
heat of a protracted grotmd engagement. The ability of the
United States and its aUies to meet a Soviet grotmd probe with
effective military force thus enhances, rather than diminishes,
the deterrent to general war.

Can NATO afford a "dual capability?" The Soviets, with a
gross national product considerably below that of the com-
bined economies of North America and western Europe, are
maintaining such a capability. The question, therefore, is not
whether the West can afford such a capability but whether it
vAll recognize the full spectrum of dangers and take the
requisite measures to deal with them. While this change in
strategy will impose added burdens upon the economies of the
individual members of NATO, these burdens can be lightened
by an effective specialization and co-ordination of tasks within
NATO. The problem is one of effective leadership. The United
States, in order to encourage its NATO alHes to make the
necessary effort, must demonstrate its determination to imple-
ment a plausible strategy for the defense of western Europe.

A strategy based on a "dual capabihty" is thus compatible
with, the psychological climate of Europe and with the objec-
tive factors of the Eioropean situation. It is compatible, too,
with the requirements of a "win" strategy which wiU enable
the Western powers to shift the psychopohtical conflict onto
the Communists' terrain. We failed to exploit, in 1956, Com-
munist difficulties in Hungary because, having geared out
NATO strategy exclusively to nuclear weapons, we feared that
any Western interference in Hungary (such as the shipment
of arms to the Htmgarian insurgents or the recognition of the
Imre Nagy government) would lead to war v^dth the Soviet
Union— a war which, given our strategy, could only have been
a nuclear conflict. A successful campaign of psychological war-
fare against communism's most vulnerable area, namely east-
ern Europe, requires a supporting military establishment which
is flexible enough to allow us to take calculated risks.

21. Se

by Commander Ralph E. Williams, Jr., U.S.N.

A graduate of the University of Texas, Com-
mander Williams entered the Navy as an
ensign in 1Q41 and during World War 11 saw
service at Pearl Harbor and Tarawa. He is re-
garded by many as one of the most accom-
plished writers in the armed services today.
He has served on the staff of the Naval War
College and in the Strategic Plans Division
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions. He has also been a special assistant to
both the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Secretary of the Navy. In 1Q58, Commander
Williams was appointed to the White House
staff.

Every so often in its military experience, a nation arrives at
one of those critical points beyond which it finds itself no
longer able to continue doing the things it has been doing in
the way it has been doing them.

To the relatively few who actually saw them and to the
millions more who read and heard about them, the Soviet
earth satellites which appeared in the sides above the United
States in the fall of 1957 seemed to herald such an event. But
the truth is simply that Sputniks I and II, for all their spine-
chiUing imphcations, were but two particular items in a long

This article appeared in the March 1958 issue of the United States
Naval Institute Proceedings and is reprinted by the kind permission
of the publisher and author. The United States Naval Institute, a
private organization not connected with the Navy Department, is
the Navy's professional society and acts as a "university press" for
the Navy. In addition to publishing the Proceedings, a leading pro-
fessional journal of naval and maritime affairs, it also publishes some
100 books of professional, technical, and historical naval interest.

Zbb PROBLEMS OF MTLrTAKY STRATEGY

procession of political, military, and technological events which
had already determined that the United States would soon
reach a crisis o£ the first magnitude in its national security
policy.

This crisis compounds both a budgetary and a strategic
dilemma. Our terms of reference for the present conflict re-
quire that we maintain forces and weapons suitable for use
against the contingencies of both general war and hmited war.
These weapons and forces are frightfully expensive and be-
coming more so, and, as they are now organized, they are
largely mutually exclusive in the nature of their prospective
employment. The fiscal effect of our having to maintain this
dual panoply of armaments is such that we cannot continue
the force levels we now have under anything remotely ap-
proaching a balanced federal budget. At the same time, the
range and destructive effect of modem weapons have increased
enormously, and, as they have done so, they have swept away
the spatial limitations which used to form such useful guides
in assigning tasks and missions. Finally, the deep and trou-
bled stirrings of the world beyond our shores now urgently
demand a review of the assumptions upon which our mihtary
posture is based.

In the critical and deeply earnest re-examination that the
nation will surely make of its mihtary posture, the Navy will
fare according to the contribution it is demonstrably ready
to make to the security of the United States. The word "de-
monstrably" is vital, for tmless the American people are pre-
sented with a clear picture of the opportunities of sea power
vsdthin the context of the strategic situation confronting them,
they wSl not only fail to reahze these opporixinities, they will
dissipate and eventually lose the sea power they now have.
The object of this chapter is to invite attention to these very
great possibilities open to us as the world's premier sea power
and to suggest ways in which the power of modem naval
weapons may be used to advance the prospects of our nation.

Weapons' Cost

First, let us consider the cost of weapons. There was a time
when the Navy could buy a destroyer for $6 million and a

SECUBITY THBOUGH SEA POWER 289

submarine for something over $4 million. We paid less than
$30 million apiece for the aircraft carriers Enterprise and
Yorktown. The later cruisers built during World War II
priced out at $60 million, including ordnance, or approxi-
mately the cost of the Nautilus. Today we are converting those
cruisers to missile ships at $90 million each, and we shall have
to pay a minim vmi of $150 million for a new atomic-powered
missile ship. The estimated cost of the first atomic-powered
carrier is about $300 million, with an aircraft load of at least
$100 million more.

The experience of the other services follows the same pat-
tern. The Army Nike I replaced a gun battaHon that cost one
third as much and is due to be superseded by the Nike B,
which costs fom: times as much. The B-52 at $8 milhon is
twice the cost of a B-36 and nearly fifteen times the cost of a
B-29. To replace our B-47S v^dth B-58S, together with the new
jet tankers required, the Air Force will need $24 billion. And
we shall be extraordinarily lucky if we are able to get our in-
tercontinental balhstic missiles into operational imits for any-
thing less than a billion dollars a wing.

The strategic eflEects of the skyrocketing costs of weapons
are equally far-reaching. By and large they are rooted in the
fact that atomic weapons, alone out of all the important arms
we own, have become vastly cheaper and more plentiful as
they have become vastly more powerful and efficient. In all
other cases, cost has gone up in virtually geometrical ratio to
performance. Today's operational fighter flies twice as high
and three times as fast as its World War II predecessor— and
costs twenty times as much. In many other cases we have paid
exorbitant prices for what turned out to be marginal gains in
performance. To a large extent the heavy emphasis which our
strategy now places on atomic weapons is due to the simple
fact that we have priced ourselves out of any conventional
capability in many fields. We pay so much to get the weapon
on the target that nothing less than an atomic warhead makes
it wortli the effort expended.

Supplemental appropriation or not, we are headed for even-
tually lower personnel levels. We are part of a mechanized,
automated economy, and the solutions to our cost-control
problems will reflect this fact. At the materiel level, this trend

ago PHOBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

finds its complement in bigger, more expensive, and hence
fewer units. This means a smaller establishment, both in terms
of numbers and units. And because there will be fewer units,
there is a powerful incentive to build into each of them as
much destructive capacity as possible.

These two trends, of rising costs and ever greater destructive
power of weapons, combine to rob us of much of our former
flexibility. The concept of "Bigger Bang for a Buck" is not
merely a clever slogan; it expresses very well this translation
of the economy of mass production into the economy of mass
destruction. There is in each case an enormous invesfanent in
the physical agents of the process, and, to make these costly
agents pay their way, there is a like demand for enormous out-
put: production in the one case, destruction in the other.

We are thus reaching a point where, for the first time in
military history, what has always been the very hardest thing
to do has now become the very easiest to do: that is, to de-
stroy an opponent utterly. And precisely for this reason such a
capability has no positive value whatever to a nation whose
opponent can do the same thing. What will in fact be the
hardest thing for us to do is to restrain the use of force to the
minimum necessary to attain our political objectives.

This loss of flexibility of our own forces, combined with the
great growth in Soviet nuclear power in all categories, has
produced a fundamental change in the character of our alli-
ances and the function they were designed to perform.

Our immediate strategic problem since World War II has
been how to prevent Soviet domination of the remaining por-
tions of the world, particularly those parts of it in Europe and
Asia which are immediately and directly menaced. The pres-
ent focus of the conflict is thus in the peripheral lands of the
Eurasian mass which lie between the ocean areas and what the
famous British geopolitician HaUord John Mackinder caEed
the central "Heartland." To accomplish our objectives in this
critical area, we have actively sought to consolidate and
strengthen the resistance of these threatened nations to fur-
ther encroachment. This has led to large economic grants-in-
aid and substantial military contributions undertaken under
several bilateral and regional security agreements intended to
give these nations some promise of security against not only

SECURITY THBOUGH SEA POWER SQl

atomic attack but a variety of other physical threats to which
they, but not we, were being subjected. The essential quid
pro quo, where there was one, took the form of permission to
base elements of our Strategic Air Command on territory
owned or controlled by these allies. These advanced bases
were, of course, fully as vital to our own security as they were
to the security of the coimtries on whose territories they were
built.

Strategy of the 1950s

These agreements were consummated several years ago,
when we had what amounted to an operational monopoly on
atomic weapons. The risks incident to the construction of our
new air bases were of an order acceptable to our aUies, par-
ticularly those in Europe, who had the rapidly growing NATO
defense structure to tmdergird their hopes for an air-ground
shield which would keep the Russians out. But the surprisingly
rapid development of Soviet nuclear capabihties over the past
decade has brought a completely new face to the problem
these agreements were designed to deal with. Because of it,
the risks arising out of the prospective employment of these
air bases have now been transformed into the risks of all-out
atomic war, and these are the ultimate risks assumed by a
nation. They are risks to which no government permits an-
other to commit it for any reason whatever. They are risks
that vvdll only be taken, at the time they are presented, by the
nation whose survival is the stake in the game.

Put simply, any arrangement whereby the acts of one sov-
ereign nation put at risk the very survival of another vdll oper-
ate only where there is absolute identity of interest, and these
occasions represent only a narrow band on the total spectrum
of possibilities confronting the partners to the alliance. The re-
maining eventualities wall be met with vagueness, delay, and
dangerous irresolution, at the very time when speed, precise-
ness, and decision are urgently needed.

This serves poorly the interests of all parties concerned.
Through it our alUes— small, crowded, and geographically
much closer to Moscow than they are to us— are made liable
not only for their own failures and indiscretions but for ours

ZgZ PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

as well. In oxir turn we suffer a large and uncompensated loss
in flexibility and freedom of action by having our feet quite
literally in concrete around the Eurasian perimeter— concrete
owned in the last analysis by the host countries and subject
to their disposal in the event of a showdown.

This does not mean that we cannot have viable security
agreements with these smaller, weaker, more exposed mem-
bers of the non-Communist world. It means rather that we
should recognize that there is one particular category of risk
In which we cannot reasonably expect them to participate
with us on a general-average basis: that of all-out war. It
happens that this eventuality is the very one whose likelihood
we are seeking by every means to reduce to zero. If we are
successful in this undertaking, our aUies can play a very mean-
ingful role in the cold- and limited-war situations with which
we shall still be confronted. And this is of prime importance
to our strategy, because it is within the context of those less
violent situations that we must look for the answers to the
security problems which now beset us. If we cannot win here,
we cannot win anywhere, in any terms meaningful to a free
people. Whether the cold war goes on for ten years or for a
htmdred, we shall urgently need the environment we can only
have within a large confederation of free peoples.

The years ahead will inevitably see a progressive dissocia-
tion of our overseas allies from any responsibility for the Ameri-
can strategic striking capability. Considering the large and
perhaps fatal chance of misfire in our present arrangements,
this development can only be a good thing. It should be noted,
too, that during the same period there will be a further loss
of European power and influence in the remaining portions of
Asia and Africa as the breakup of the colonial empires con-
tinues. Whether this is, on balance, good or bad is debatable,
but it is nonetheless inevitable. The newly ransomed states
wiU in almost every instance tend to be neutral and to stand
aside from the main issue between the Communist and anti-
Communist blocs.

There will thus be a steady falling away of land areas about
the Eurasian crescent which will be available to the United
States for military purposes in its struggle with the Soviet
Union. Modest concentrations of conventional and tactical

SECUKITY THEOUGH SEA POWER 293

atomic forces may still be acceptable to certain host nations,
but we shall have to look elsewhere for sites on which to base
our all-out deterrent capabihty.

The Danger of a Fortress America Strategy

This was the situation we faced before Sputnik put its own
heavy stamp on our defense thinking. We were already headed
for a fundamental revision of our strategy forced by the factors
just discussed. The impact of the Soviet missile program will
serve greatly to accelerate and intensify these changes which
were already imder way. Our reaction to the new conditions
had been evidenced in our efforts to produce a truly modem
intercontinental bomber and a 5000-mile missile, together with
a much lesser degree of interest exhibited in sea-based de-
terrent systems. Until recently, however, there was a lack of
the necessary sense of urgency required to insure ftJl budget-
ary support of the programs estabhshed in these fields.

Now we appear to have a greater sense of mrgency, and
we may expect greater expenditiires of effort and funds to be
made on nuclear delivery systems which will be wholly and
exclusively under U.S. control. This can either be a blessing or
a curse of unprecedented magnitude, depending on the direc-
tion we go, because the actions we are now at last prepared
to take are sufficient to commit us irrevocably either to a sound
and balanced strategy, stUl at the service of the larger pur-
poses of the Free World alliance, or to the discredited, out-
moded, and self-defeating concept of a Fortress America. The
danger is not that we shall at the outset choose the latter
dehberately, with our eyes open, but that we shall be led up
to it gradually by the unintended consequences of actions we
undertook vvdth quite different objectives in mind.

In view of the demonstrated Soviet competence in long-
range missilery, it is altogether natural for us to press for an
operational capability in this field with the utmost speed. In
the interim it would seem logical for us to broaden by every
feasible means the base of our own piloted striking force by
increasing both the numbers of its planes and the bases from
which they operate. And finally, there is a strong incentive to

^■^

394 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

adjust our continental defense to the new operational require-
ments as ballistic rockets replace manned bombers as the ma-
jor threat to our security.

These are objectives which no one could oppose. But the
real problem is how to accomplish them and at the same time
provide for the other necessary concomitants of a balanced
defense— for, however great, these are not the only threats con-
fronting us.

Two things deserve to be mentioned here. The first of these
is that, to achieve its objective in general war, the Soviet Union
must first disarm us, and it must do it conclusively and early.
Our atomic delivery capability is thus the prime target system
in the Soviet war plan, the one whose destruction must be
assured before any weapons may be allocated to the destruc-
tion of our economic and population base. Second, because this
is true, the location of any portion of our dehvery forces in the
continental United States will inevitably draw dovvTi counter-
battery fire upon it. If all our delivery capability comes to be
based at home, we shall have enormously increased the value
of the United States as a general target for thermonuclear
weapons. At the same time, we shall have greatly simplified
the enemy delivery problem by providing him with fixed tar-
gets of known locations, and we shall have further presented
him with an important bonus effect in the havoc virought upon
onx cities and coimtryside by the blast and fallout from the
warheads delivered on the primary targets. This in itself
achieves the practical effect of having increased the enemy
stockpile by several dozen weapons.

The notion that this basically unfavorable set of relation-
ships can be remedied by dispersal and the multiplication of
planes and bases within the same general three-million-square-
mile target area has always been a snare and a delusion and
will become more so as the Soviet missile capability increases,
for the simple reason that it is infinitely cheaper, and easier,
and quicker, for our enemy to build missiles than it is for us
to build bases. This is a race we cannot possibly hope to win.
Ironically, the addition to our offensive strength in this par-
ticular manner compounds our own defensive problem rather
than the enemy's, since every one of the new locations requires
an elaborate point defense and throws a further load on our

SECURITY THROUGH SEA POWER 295

warning and control nets. We can easily spend oiirselves into
bankruptcy and on balance come out with less security than
we had before, because each new base we create assures a
measurable increase in the number of weapons that wiU fall
on the United States in the event of Soviet attack, without
securing a compensating decrease in the likelihood that such
an attack will occur.

Indeed, there is every reason to beheve that this kind of
action on our part might well serve to increase the chances
of attack. In the age of ballistic missiles, the great inherent
flaw of a fixed and immobile striking system is that it confers
an enormous, and quite conceivably decisive, advantage upon
the side which hits first. If our enemy achieves an operational
capability in intercontinental missiles before we do, there wiU
be the added temptation to strike while he stiU has this very
considerable advantage. The combination of these inviting cir-
cumstances may well prove irresistible.

Other thoughts present themselves. Since, once begun, the
requirements of a "crash" program in these kinds of armaments
are bottomless, our capabilities in other fields of military effort,
already squeezed and straitened by the heretofore "moderate"
demands of these larger competitive programs, would simply
disappear. Inevitably this would lead to the loss one way or
another of the remaining non-Communist portions of the East-
em Hemisphere and our unceremonious retreat three to five
thousand miles to our own shores. This forfeit of the seas and
the Eurasian littoral would vastly weaken our defense, no mat-
ter how much effort we poured into our three-dimensional
"Maginot Line." And, as the conviction of the utter hopeless-
ness of our situation settled in upon us, our whole nation would
take on the form of an armed camp.

The Advantages of a Sea-Based Deterrent

This transformation may indeed happen. Arms races are
common enough in military history. But it need not happen.
We can do far better— and at far less cost and risk. There is a
real and promising alternative. Instead of confining our critical
military activities to the land, and deploying our forces so as

296 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

to insure that a thermonuclear war, if it comes, will be fought
on and over the land (including our own) , we can play for aU
it is worth the role of the very great sea power we are.

As was previously mentioned, the great, perhaps fatal, dis-
ability of a land-based nuclear delivery system is its lack of
security, which richly rewards the aggressor's initial surprise
strike and, for that reason, greatly increases the chances of
such a course being undertaken. We have enjoyed a degree
of stability so far because our enemy has not fully developed
his long-range strike capabilities and because our warning net
seriously degraded the prospects of genuine surprise by pi-
loted aircraft. These factors which have aided us up to this
point will vanish with the advent of a Soviet long-range missile
capability, against which there will be neither defense nor
warning.

Well before this point is reached we must have taken the
action necessary not merely to destroy the advantage of the
aggressor's initial strike but to attach a severe penalty to it.
Only if we can accomplish this can we hope to break out of
the pernicious grip of strategic instability, which will lead us
not only to sap our strength in a futile arms race but will tend
powerfully to promote the very attack which we went to such
great lengths to forestall.

Yet it is extremely imlikely that we can restore this critical
element of stability to our relationships with the Soviets as
long as we continue to base the major part of our retaliatory
capability on land. For on land there is not only no place to
hide, there is no place to go. The all-important features of
mobility and concealment are effectively denied any land in-
stallation the size of an airfield or missile launcher. Only in
the vastness of the world's oceans can we hope to base a
striking force which, through its inherent capabilities for move-
ment, concealment, and dispersal, can be made virtually im-
mime to surprise attack. And with this immunity assured us,
the whole advantage of such an attack disappears. Since the
enemy must, as a first reqtiirement, eliminate our retaliatory
capability, which he cannot even locate, he is left with nothing
to shoot at. He would be effectively deterred from attacking
other vital targets by the knowledge that such acts would
bring down upon him the full force of our sea-mounted striking

SECURITY THROUGH SEA POWER 297

force, unreduced in any important way by his own strike.
Moreover, it would descend upon him from all directions,
rather than along a narrow band of polar trajectories. This is
not the kind of considerations that encourage an enemy com-
mander to bold action.

The security available to naval forces buys a second im-
portant effect. It establishes the governing relationship as be-
ing that between our offensive forces and the targets they are
designed to destroy, rather than that between our own offen-
sive forces and those of the enemy. The very name "retaliatory
force" implies that our long-range aircraft bases and missile-
launching installations will begin any engagement as potential
targets of an enemy attack. This means they must be sufficient
in number to endure such an attack and still retain the capa-
bility of destroying their preselected targets. In the absence
of any real security, it follows that the size of our offensive
base must be related, not to the targets it must hit, but to the
prospective order of damage it m.ay receive. But as we have
already seen, the enemy can increase this order of damage far
more readily than we can expand ottr offensive base. If, on
the other hand, our retaliatory forces are secure, there is no
measurable increase in order of damage to be received, no
matter how greatly the enemy increases his offensive force,
and therefore no requirement to increase our oviai on this ac-
count. The problem, once solved, tends to stay fairly well put,
and we shall be left with adequate resources available to apply
to lesser contingencies.

This means something very much more than the simple
availability of dollars, materials, and manpower for translation
into U.S. forces capable of dealing with limited-war situations.
It means that we also have something left over for military aid
and the build-up and support of allied forces. It means that
we can do a whole spate of things in the political and economic
fields necessary to promote the strength and solidarity of our
Free World collective-secinrity system. But most important of
all, it means that our big-war deterrent, our limited-war forces,
and the forces of our allies can all be worked together in har-
ness toward the common objective of maximum security for
the resources expended. Our allies, freed from the paralyzing
fear of being made the targets of a surprise thermonuclear

298 PKOBLEMS OF MILITAKY STRATEGY

attack, can employ their forces boldly in the common defense,
knowing that they have much more to gain than to lose by so
doing. Moreover, they would be further encouraged to resist
by the knowledge that we had the forces to back them up
which met the tactical and political requirements of the situa-
tion—and that we ourselves had some place to stand between
the extremes of retreat and total war.

A Comprehensive Military Posture

Thus, the outlines of our new military posture begin to
emerge. We must continue to have an adequate general-war
deterrent, and to make it truly effective we must base a sig-
nificant part of it at sea. If this is done, the size of our de-
terrent forces can be substantially less than it is now, and very
much less than it is likely to become if we attempt a target-
building contest with the Soviet Union.

The sea-borne portion of this deterrent would have its major
strength in a force of nuclear-powered missile-launching sub-
marines, which combine maximum concealment, mobility, and
dispersion in the same system. Long-range missile-carrying
seaplanes, jet- and eventually nuclear-powered, and based
upon ships operating in remote water, offer an additional sys-
tem with many of the desired virtues. There is mobility, dis-
persal, some degree of concealment, and an ability to approach
from many directions. Finally, there is the important capa-
bility represented by naval carrier forces, which can apply the
full range of air power from conventional high explosives to
thermonuclear bombs. Together, these systems offer the best
hope for preventing general war that we have had since the
atomic age began.

In regard to continental defense, we would do well to rec-
ognize that its chief value is that of a warning mechanism,
and that this value will diminish to the vanishing point as
missiles take the place of bombers. Since the purpose of such
a warning is to deter enemy attack by making its results un-
predictable, the loss of this capability will not be serious if
we have established a sea-borne deterrent by the time it occurs.
As for the "defense" aspect of the term, we might as well

SECURITY THROUGH SEA POWER 299

swallow the unpleasant fact that there is not going to be any—
and proceed to apply our resources to more promising pro-
grams.

In the more active field of limited and brush-fire wars, it
seems inevitable that all services must come to depend largely
upon low-yield nuclear weapons— of an order of two Idlotons
and below— for the good reason that we shall often lack the
necessary number of tmits to achieve the required fire effect
with high-explosive weapons. This admittedly means the loss
of some flexibility, but the alternatives— surrender or all-out
war— represent the loss of flexibihty altogether. Even so, there
is adequate basis for mixing both atomic- and conventional-
weapons capabilities in the same structure, and this we are
doing.

The tactical problems of employing low-yield weapons will,
of course, be easier to master than the political problems they
create. But these problems are susceptible of solution provided
our general-war deterrent is made secure. A nation enlarges a
conflict to better its prospects, not to worsen them, as our
enemy would surely do by attacking us directly before elimi-
nating our nuclear strike capability. There is obviously much
we have to learn about the nuances of applying power of this
order, but it seems appropriate to start with the assumption
that it can be done without its getting out of hand. Unless we
do this, we shall have made the capital error of supposing
that small nuclear war is necessarily equivalent to big nuclear
war and is therefore to be risked only for the ultimate stakes.

Whether nuclear or conventional weapons are called for,
the requirement for mobility, versatility, and discrimination
will remain. Prompt and spirited action is the essence of con-
trolling local conflicts, as we have seen time and again. The
time in which a military objective can be attained is perhaps
the decisive factor in an enemy's calculation of risk. Days,
even hours, are of crucial importance.

These special demands for time and place in the exercise of
our national power have particular application to naval forces.
Since the site of the present phase of the conflict is in the
peripheral lands of Eurasia, most outbreaks of aggression will
occur in areas readily accessible to the seas. The mobility and
sustained combat power of the Navy's carrier and amphibious

300 PKOBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

forces remain continuously at the service of the Free World in
these vital areas. These forces contain their own strong de-
fenses. Their logistics are part of the ready package. They
have their own versatile, precise tactical aircraft, able to de-
liver both conventional and nuclear weapons eflFectively. And
the same forces can be used repeatedly in diflFerent parts of
the world as the needs for their services develop. There is no
problem of salvage or roll-up, no duplication of eflFort, no
costly, unused facilities left behind in the backwash. On the
basis of utihzation of eflPective capacity, naval forces represent
the best money the nation ever spent on its national-security
program.

In simimary, several things may properly be said about the
requirements of our defense posture and programs. We need a
secure, effective general-war deterrent, constituted so that it
will penalize, rather than reward, a surprise enemy attack.
This deterrent must be stabihzed at some level within our
capacity to support over the long term. We want forces ade-
quate to achieve our military and political objectives in small
wars, and this too must be supportable over the long term.
We want loyal allies, with working arrangements bet-vveen us
of a nature to develop the greatest possible combined strength
out of the assets each brings to the alliance. We must find a
way to meet the new challenge of Soviet missile technology
vdthout getting involved in an arms race and without walling
ourselves off from the rest of the world. To accomplish these
things, we must effectively use whatever contributions the var-
ious services are capable of making to the national defense.

These are some of the aspects of our basic security problem
which we must deal with, and we must continue to deal with
them for the rest of our Hves. It has been the object of this
chapter to show that these conditions can be met by the proper
application of sea power. Once we grasp this all-important
fact we stand to win for our country and the world a larger
measure of security than we have known in a quarter century
of turmoil and strife.

by James D. Atkinson

Associate professor of government at George-
town University, Dr. Atkinson was from iggo
to 1954 director of Georgetown's special
course in psychological warfare. His articles
have appeared in Army, the Marine Corps
Gazette, the MiKtary Gazette, the United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, and other
professional and scholarly journals. An intel-
ligence officer during World War II, he is to-
day a colonel in the Army Reserves, a mem-
ber of the Advisory Board of Directors of
the Association of the United States Army,
and president of the American Military In-
stitute. He lectured at the first National
Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

Most people in the Western democracies still tend to think in
terms of the traditional distinctions between peace and war
and hence do not readily accept the idea of the mixture of the
two, which the late General William Donovan called "un-
conventional warfare." The Communists have, without spe-
cifically using the term, practiced unconventional warfare for
more than four decades. Lenin enlarged Marx's theory of the
class struggle into the concept of universal conflict. On this
broad battlefield, according to Lenin, the techniques of cul-
tural, psychological, political, conspiratorial, and economic
warfare would not be used so much to support miHtary opera-
tions as in the past; rather they would supplement and even
supplant the orthodox use of armed force.

Unconventional warfare fits perfectly the precepts of a revo-
lutionary strategy. Unlike orthodox warfare, it can be ex-

302 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

panded and contracted at will. Its pitch can be raised to the
threshold of mihtary conflict— as was the case in the Soviet
blockade of Berlin in 1948— or lowered to the less provocative
levels of propaganda and intelHgence operations.

Unconventional warfare, therefore, embraces a broad spec-
trum of conflict which includes such diverse activities as prop-
aganda, economic warfare, sabotage, espionage, subversion,
strikes, civil disturbances, terrorism, pohtical warfare, and
guerrilla war. These methods of conflict are used either singly
or in concert, within the framework of an over-all grand strat-
egy. Unconventional warfare employs both nonviolent and
violent techniques; indeed, its most distinctive characteristic
is that it blends violence and nonviolence into a new synthesis
of warfare.

Unconventional Warfare as a Modern Phenomenon

The Communists did not originate unconventional warfare,
which has been waged in one form or another since the dawn
of history. The makers of the French Revolution, for example,
experimented with many methods of unorthodox warfare. In
the United States, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison pioneered in such economic-warfare devices as the
embargo against Great Britain. Yet, not until the early twen-
tieth century did this mode of conflict come into its own. It
did so for three basic reasons. First, the revolution in the com-
munication of ideas— radio transmission, wireless telegraphy,
and photography— provided unconventional warriors with
ready-made weapons. Second, a burgeoning "thinking elite"
in modem mass society furnished cadres for, and lent con-
tinuity to, revolutionary movements and fifth columns. Finally,
modern society has become at once more complex and more
vulnerable to attack by unconventional methods. The paralysis
which gripped Singapore in 1955 after a Communist-inspired
general strike is but one illustration of the sensitivity of today's
highly organized, closely interlocking society to unconven-
tional warfare.^

The West's conspicuous lag behind the Communists in this
important area of the conflict spectrum cannot be traced so

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 303

much to a lack of understanding of the capabihties of uncon-
ventional warfare. The effectiveness of resistance movements
in German-occupied countries during the Second World War
demonstrated that the democracies possess both extensive as-
sets and know-how for waging— and waging successfully— this
highly specialized version of combat. Rather, the West's failure
to keep pace with its adversaries stems from a contrasting view
of conflict as such: the Communists, possessed of a guiding
ideology and an operational doctrine, have recognized more
quickly and discerningly than the peace-loving and legalistic-
minded Western democracies that unconventional warfare can
be waged more effectively under the cloak of formal "peace"
than under conditions of open and declared war.

Communist Propaganda

Propaganda is one of the oldest and most important weapons
in the Communist arsenal of unconventional warfare. Its im-
portance derives from the fact that not only is it a technique
in itself but it is used in support of other techniques, such as
strikes, economic warfare, and especially political warfare.

Immediately after they came to power in Russia, the Com-
munist leaders created the Agitation and Propaganda Section
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Their early
operations against Germany set the tone for a propaganda
offensive which has been waged unremittingly, and with many
refinements, down to the present day. The Soviet embassy in
Berlin served as a center for propaganda dissemination, as
did the consulates in Stettin and Hambxirg. Couriers and
trained agitators regularly commuted between these centers
and Moscow. The Petrograd Telegraph Agency (later renamed
TASS), created ostensibly for commercial activities, also was
used as a propaganda medium in Germany, thus establishing
a pattern which was to become world-wide.^

Another pattern set during this early period was the lavish
expenditure of money for propaganda purposes. The Soviet
ambassador and his staff in Germany in 1918 had a large sum
of money at their disposal for bribing writers, covertly con-
trolhng newspapers, and overt propaganda. These massive out-

304 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

lays have continued down to the present time. By 1953, for
example, it was estimated that Communist countries were
spending over three billion dollars armually for internal and
external propaganda. One authority has estimated that the
Soviet Union alone spent one and one half billion dollars in
1951.^ There is every indication that these sums have mounted
steadily in the years since.

The magnitude of Communist propaganda operations comes
into focus when we look at two widely separated parts of the
globe. In France, during 1953, the French Communist Party
pubhshed 15 daily newspapers, 51 weekly newspapers, and
56 reviews and magazines of various types— this in addition to
the Party's "routine" propaganda activities, such as the dis-
tribution of leaflets and posters and the harangues of speakers
and agitators. While the Communists have lost ground in
France since 1953, their propaganda efforts remain both vigor-
ous and extensive.

On the other side of the world, the Chinese Communists
employ a number of effective propaganda organizations as
spearheads in the psychological battle for Asia. The "Chung-
king Democratic League," formed in 1946 as a federation of
leftist groups and now completely dominated by the Commu-
nists, wages propaganda through student societies, cultural
groups, and business firms among the overseas Chinese. Its
chief work is along the Hong Kong-Bangkok-Singapore- Jakarta
line, which the Commimists call the "Great Nerve of Asia."
The "Federation of Democratically-Minded Chinese Youth
Organizations"— in collaboration with the Soviet-dominated
"World Federation of Democratic Youth"— spreads propa-
ganda among young people both in China and abroad. The
"Min-Seng-She" organization, either directly or through aflBl-
iated organizations, conducts propaganda through the me-
dium of sports clubs, debating societies, and other recreational-
cultural groups in the Far East.

These are but several examples of an unrelenting offensive
which the Communists have pressed, with remarkable success,
ever since Bolshevism's seizure of power. The basic themes in
this offensive— "anticolonialism," "anti -imperialism," "peace,"
"peaceful coexistence," and disarmament— have remained es-
sentially unchanged, but they have been adroitiy varied to fit

UNCONVENTIONAL WABFAKE 30$

specific circumstances. While Western propaganda efforts
liave been desultory, un-co-ordinated, and— more often than
not— starved for funds, Communist propaganda warfare has
been a highly specialized and centrally planned operation,
carefully integrated into the over-all conflict pattern. Its major
objectives are to confuse and divide the Free World, to in-
culcate guilt feelings among the Western elites, to camouflage
the real nature of the Communist conflict machine, and to
magnify the impact of Soviet power— in short, to undermine
the psychological defenses on which purposeful resistance to
aggression can be based.

Espionage and Subversion

Communist espionage and subversion operations are care-
fully meshed with propaganda activities if only because they
are carried out by the same "army": communism's global net-
work of official and semiofficial Soviet agencies, militant Party
formations, "fronts," and other auxihary organizations. This
dual function is illustrated by the role of Soviet commercial
representatives in the United States, Great Britain, and else-
where. In 1927, for example, British security personnel raided
the official Soviet trade organization and Arcos, Ltd., a British
"front" company, and uncovered evidence which showed that
the Soviets had been using their foreign trade posts as a cover
for propaganda, espionage, and subversive activities. Volumi-
nous evidence attests to the similar employment of AMTORG,
a Soviet trade agency in America.

The Soviet news agency TASS is a prime example of an
organization which carries out espionage missions imder the
convenient cover of diplomatic immunity. A report of the
Canadian Royal Commission indicated that Nikolai Zheveinov,
TASS correspondent in Canada, was engaged in the direction
and supervision of a large number of persons who were col-
lecting highly secret information from Canadian Government
sources for transmission to Moscow. Similarly, in 1951-52,
Viktor Anisimov, chief of the Stockholm bureau of TASS, was
revealed to be the director of a spy network in Sweden.

Soviet propaganda, in the years following the death of Sta-

306 PROBLEMS OF MILrTAHY STRATEGY

lin, took pains to place the onus for terrorism, espionage, and
similar activities upon the reign of the departed dictator. The
implied suggestion was that the book had now been closed
permanently upon these "ungentlemanly" activities. Behind
the new fagade, however, the old activities have been carried
on as before, albeit with greater subtlety and circumspection.
In March 1956, for example, the Iranian Government expelled
the assistant military attach^ of the Soviet embassy after he
had been arrested while engaged in receiving secret docu-
ments from an officer of the Iranian Air Force. In i960, a
West German court trial brought out information that a former
West German naval officer had, along with other Germans,
both civilian and naval, been transmitting naval and military
secrets to Soviet intelligence officials in East Berlin.

In the sinister game of espionage and subversion, the Com-
munists hold some strong cards over the Western democracies.
One is the international Communist movement, which provides
the agents, the saboteurs, the infiltrators, and the agitators.
More fundamental, however, is a basic contrast in systems.
An open democratic society is just that— open to the discern-
ing eyes of its enemies. In order to compile his intelligence
reports, a trained enemy agent very often needs only to read
our free newspapers or listen to the unfettered debates of our
free pohtical system.

Economic Warfare

The Russian economy since 1917 has been a closed econ-
omy, totally subservient to the will of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the Soviet
economy, therefore, foreign trade has always played a second-
ary role and has been used primarily for purposes of propa-
ganda, as a cover for espionage and subversion, and as a sup-
port for Soviet political warfare. The role of foreign trade in
Communist conflict techniques was set down by Lenin in 1920.
In explaining the question of granting concessions to capitalist
business concerns, he pointed out that "our chief interest is
pohtical; the economic importance ... is but secondary . . .

UNCONVENTIONAL WAKFARE 307

[while] we do not for a moment believe in lasting trade re-
lations with the imperialist powers."

The Soviet economic offensive, which has been in full swing
since Khrushchev's rise to leadership, has four principal targets:

1. The removal by the non-Communist world of all export
controls on sensitive and strategic goods destined for the coxin-
tries of the Soviet and Chinese Communist bloc.

2. Soviet-bloc penetration of the emerging nations of Africa,
the Middle and Near East, southeastern Asia, and Latin
America under the guise of economic or technical assistance.
Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon has stated that the
Soviet Union has granted about two and one half billion dol-
lars in military and economic credits to the new countries be-
tween 1954 and 1959 and that one billion of this has been in
a one-year period, 1958-59. At the same time, the number of
Soviet technical "representatives" in these nations has risen to
four thousand.'*

3. The beckoning of American business to Communist-bloc
countries. The immediate objective is to secure technical
know-how and industrial prototypes and processes— especially
in chemicals, drugs, and light metals— from American industry.
An additional aim is to soften up America's business and finan-
cial community in order to prepare the way for the extension
of economic aid and long-term credits to the Communist bloc.
Mr. O. V. Tracy, vice-president and director of Esso Standard
Oil Company, has issued a warning concerning Soviet trade
blandishments which should be required reading for every
American businessman. He has said: "Both Khrushchev and
Mikoyan have asked for technical knowledge and equipment.
They want the latest models of our advanced machines and
instruments— to serve as prototypes for their own production.
. . . The Russians are buying machinery and specialized proc-
esses only to copy them— and I don't think too much 'repeat
business' can be expected."^

4. Eventual grants of economic aid and long-term credits
or loans to the Communist bloc by the United States and by
other countries of the highly industrialized Western alHed
powers. The Communist leadership appears quite cognizant
of the fact that the only sure way it can make good Khru-
shchev's boast to "catch up" with the United States is by the

308 PKOBLEMS OF MILITAHY STRATEGY

massive transfusion of goods, credits, and processes from the
American and other economies (the booming West German
economy, for example) into the Communist bloc's economic
system.

Guerrilla Warfare

The degree of physical force used by the Commimists in
their unconventional-warfare operations depends on the con-
crete situation. Guerrilla warfare represents the application of
a greater amount of physical force than most methods of un-
conventional warfare. Nevertheless, from the Communist view-
point, guerrilla warfare must not be equated with physical
force alone. Rather, Communist guerrilla operations deftly
blend violent warfare with such nonviolent techniques as prop-
aganda and political organization.

Mao Tse-tung, who has written about guerrilla warfare
more extensively than any other Communist leader, illustrated
the concept of guerrilla warfare as a mixture of violent and
nonviolent methods when he stated that "without a political
goal guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political ob-
jectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and
if their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be
gained." Implicit in this assertion is an idea which permeates
all Communist imconventional warfare— namely, that guerrilla
warfare issues from the agitation and propagandizing of the
people, from economic bases, from political-organization ac-
tivities, and, in many cases, from acts of sabotage and of
terrorism.

There is ample evidence that the Communists adhere to
this concept in concrete situations. Thus Tito, when he
launched his partisan warfare campaign in Yugoslavia, built
a powerful political machine well before his partisans engaged
the German forces or (later) the anti-German and non-
Communist Chetniks of General Mikhailovitch. A "People's
Committee" was set up to serve as a framework for a "shadow"
government in Serbia; a Communist guerrilla newspaper,
Borba (Fight), was printed; and a "People's Front" was es-
tablished to attract Yugoslav nationalists along with Com-

UNCONVENTIONAL WAKFABE 309

munist sympathizers. All these steps were taken with the pre-
meditated idea that they would form the basis for the new
Communist regime which Tito and his associates hoped to
forge from the fires of the guerrilla war. Similarly, in Greece
the ELAS (Communist) partisan force, according to Field
Marshal Papagos, "was developed not to help the Allies win
the war but to help Moscow win the peace after the war—
and with the ultimate, very long-range objective of placing
the Soviet Union in a dominant position in the Mediterranean."

Terrorism has become a major stock in trade of the guerrilla
fighter. During the Second World War, Khrushchev was the
Soviet pohtical commissar in charge of guerrilla warfare in
one large sector of the Eastern Front. In order to gain more
recruits for the guerrilla bands and to inflame the populace,
he gave orders for the assassination of the milder local puppet
rulers set up by the Germans, while the more cruel puppet
leaders were to be spared. This was done with the calculated
object of fanning hatred of the Germans among the occupied
population.

Whether the methods used are "People's Fronts" for vmi-
ning over segments of the population, the employment of
clandestine newspapers and roving agitators to enhst sympa-
thy, the use of terrorism, or extensive hit-and-rxin raiding (as
in Laos and South Vietnam early in i960) , the object of Com-
munist guerrilla warfare is to combine violent and nonviolent
techniques into an integrated pohtico-military effort. It can be
expected to play a continuing role in Communist-bloc strategy
diiring the next decade.

Political Warfare

Pohtical warfare is in many ways the synthesis of all
unconventional- warfare techniques. Its distinguishing charac-
teristic is that it is conducted not only against people, classes,
institutions, or political parties but also on the broadest pos-
sible scale against governments themselves. It embraces the
pressures and intimidation of diplomacy, cultural propaganda,
the stirring up of class, rehgious, racial, and ethnic tensions
and hatreds, the imposition of threats to governments and

310 PROBLEMS OF MrLITARY STRATEGY

their citizens, and, above all, the sapping of the will of both
governments and of the popular mass to resist.

While "peaceful coexistence" has by now become a standard
theme of Commimist political-warfare thrusts, a less obvious
campaign has been also under way for some time. This is
political warfare on the grand scale, in the gradual yet relent-
less process through which the Moscow-Peiping axis is encir-
cling the United States with a ring of countries ranging from
actively anti- Western to avowedly neutralist. A Peiping radio
broadcast on December 26, 1959, xmderscored this Commu-
nist strategy when it pointed out: "The unprecedented upsurge
of the fight against dictatorial rule and the brilliant victory of
the Cuban people are the most outstanding events in Latin
America this year, . . . The successful struggle of the Latin-
American peoples has greatly shaken the dominant position
of the United States in Central and South America." There is
little question that Communist political warfare in Latin
America as well as in the new nations of Africa and Asia will
be accelerated in the coming years. It will be waged side by
side with diplomatic, propaganda, and political pressures di-
rected toward weakening and ultimately breaking up the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the other mutual-
security systems (such as SEATO and CENTO) which link
the defenses of the Free World.

A new and frighteningly effective form of Communist po-
litical warfare has been that of nuclear-missile blackmail.
Commimist propaganda hammerings on the horrors of nuclear
war, on the power and deadliness of Soviet missiles, and on
the development of even newer and deadlier weapons have
been a calculated counterpoint to the "peaceful coexistence"
theme. The aim is to produce a somber climate of fear and fu-
tility, and hence a paralysis of the will, in the non-Communist
countries. This was the obvious purpose of Soviet rocket fir-
ings into the Central Pacific in early i960. The boast that a
rocket "fell less than two kilometers away from the predeter-
mined point" was intended to support the doubtful claim that
any American city could be hit with pin-point accuracy by
Soviet missiles.

These and similar threats are used to convey to Americans
the false proposition that the United States faces only two

XJNCONVENTIONAL WAKFABE 3II

alternatives: utter destruction or "accommodation"— a Com-
munist euphemism for appeasement. Public opinion in both
Europe and the United States is implicitly exhorted to pressure
their respective governments to make concessions on a broad
political and military front.

Important as is the scientific and technological race in the
current conflict, it may well be overshadowed by the politico-
psychological struggle. As both sides amass the means to an-
nihilate each other, the conflict will be decided not so much
by military capabihties as by the will and determination to use
these capabihties. It is this "arsenal of intangibles" which is
the principal target of Communist political- warfare thrusts.

Summary

The weapons of unconventional warfare forged by Lenin
and Stalin have been used skillfully by their Russian and Chi-
nese disciples. The world is witnessing a chmactic period in
the clash of techniques that are not so much unique in them-
selves but "new" in the way in which they are employed on a
massive and co-ordinated scale. A Communist Party theoreti-
cian, writing in Kommunist in December 1953, stated that
"Lenin and those who agreed with him fought for a Party
fxmctioning as the combat staff of the working class, an or-
ganizational whole, built as a united and centralized organiza-
tion working tmder a single plan." The "single plan" continues
to guide Communist efforts.

Thus far the great democracies have responded to the chal-
lenge of this new form of warfare only hesitantly and hap-
hazardly. Notwithstanding the success of export controls and
other economic- warfare devices directed against the Moscow-
Peiping axis, the non-Commianist nations have been reluctant
to meet their adversaries in the arena of imconventional war-
fare. They have shied away from this engagement despite their
huge stockpiles of potential weapons which could carry the
struggle onto the Commimist terrain.

The late Secretary of State Dulles suggested the most potent
of these weapons in a speech in Cleveland, Ohio, on Novem-
ber 18, 1958, when he pledged the support of the United

^^^^^■^^■^■^^^■^^■^■^Hl

312 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

States to "political independence for all peoples who desire it
and are able to undertake its responsibilities." The hope of
liberation continues to beckon powerfully to the captive na-
tions of eastern Europe, the former states of Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia, Tibet, and other nations and ethnic groups sub-
jugated by the new colonialism of the Moscow-Peiping axis.
Yet the West has failed to exploit the centrifugal forces which
continue to tear at the Commxmist empire. In view of this
sorry record, it may well be asked whether the Free World
will ever tread purposefully on that vast and shifting battle-
ground which is unconventional warfare.

1. See, for example, the New York Times, June 13, 1955.

2. Today TASS seems to concentrate more heavily on espionage
than on propaganda. See, for example, the Report of the Austral-
ian Royal Commission on Espionage, Sydney, August 22, 1955.

3. Richard L. Brecker, "Trutli as a Weapon of the Free World,"
The Annals, Vol. 278 (November 1951), p. 1; see also F. Bowen
Evans (ed. ), Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities
(New York: Macmillan, 1955), passim.

4. C. Douglas Dillon, "The Challenge of Soviet Russian Economic
Expansion," Free World Forum, I, No. 5 (1959), 23.

5. O. V. Tracy, "Doing Business with the Russians," address before
the Manufacturing Chemists' Association, June n, 1959, pp. 10—
12.

23. Disa

by Henry A. Kissinger

Dr. Kissinger is recognized as one of the
leading writers in the field of international
relations. He received his A.B., M.A., and
Ph.D. degrees from Harvard University and
is now Director of Special Studies at Har-
vard's Center for International Affairs. He
has written articles for numerous journals,
including Foreign AfiEairs, the Yale Review,
the Reporter, and the New Republic. His
book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy
was published for the Council on Foreign
Relations by Harper in 1Q57 and later re-
issued as a Doubleday Anchor Book. Dr.
Kissinger lectured at the first National Strat-
egy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

The notion that armaments are the cause rather than the re-
flection of conflict is not new. It has been the basis of schemes
of disarmament throughout history; it was the rationale for
all the disarmament conferences in the twenties and thirties.
Nevertheless, it is open to serious doubt. Between the Congress
of Vienna and the imification of Germany, the standing armies
were very small because the outstanding disputes did not in-
volve, or were not thought to involve, matters of life and
death. After 1871 there started an armaments race which has
not ended to this day. Between the unification of Germany
and World War I, Europe was torn by two schisms vi'hich, to

Excerpted from Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, by Henry
A. Kissinger (abridged edition; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Anchor Books), Chapter 8. Copyright by Council on Foreign Re-
lations, New York.

314 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

the powers concerned, seemed to involve "vital" interests: that
between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine and that
between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia over the
fate of the Balkans, After the First World War the rebellion
of Germany and the U.S.S.R. against the Treaty of Versailles
and the rise of the dictatorships created a climate of insecurity
which doomed all disarmament efforts to futihty. And after the
Second World War the intransigence of the Soviet bloc forced
the Free World to restore a measure of its strength even after
it had disarmed unilaterally almost to the point of impotence.
There is little indication that the level of armaments itself
produces tension. Great Britain has a strategic air force and a
nuclear stockpile capable of inflicting serious, although per-
haps not fatal, damage on the United States. But this fact has
caused no uneasiness in the United States and no increase in
our defense effort. Conversely, Great Britain did not seek to
forestall the development by the United States of a navy su-
perior to its own— something it had fought innumerable wars
to prevent in the case of other powers. This was because the
"vital interests" of both powers are in sufficient harmony so
that they can have a large measure of confidence in each
other's intentions. Each can afford to permit the other to de-
velop a weapons system capable of imperiling its security and
perhaps even its survival because it knows that this capability
win not be so used.

The Vicious Circle of Armaments

To be sure, the degree of confidence between the United
States and Great Britain is exceptional. More usually, powers
are conscious of some clashing "vital interests." As a result, a
rise in the level of armaments of one major power may set in
motion a vicious circle. Increased military preparedness serves
as a warning of an increased willingness to run risks. The
other powers can escape the pressure implicit in a stepped-up
defense effort only by making concessions (a dangerous
course, for it may whet appetites and establish a method for
setthng future disputes) or by entering the armaments race
themselves. But while the vicious circle of an armaments race

disahmament: illusion and reality 315

is plain, it is not nearly so obvious that it can be ended by an
international convention. If disagreements on specific issues
had been tractable, the armaments race would never have
started. Since negotiations on outstanding disputes have proved
unavailing, it is improbable that a disarmament scheme ac-
ceptable to all parties can be negotiated.

A general disarmament scheme, to be successful, must de-
prive each party of the ability to inflict a catastrophic blow
on the other; at the very least, it must not give an advantage
to either side. A meaningful agreement is, therefore, almost
impossible under present circumstances. For the same mis-
trust which produced the armaments race wiU reduce con-
fidence in any agreement that may be negotiated and it will
color the proposals which may be advanced. Each side will
seek to deprive the other of the capability it fears most as a
prelude to negotiations, while keeping its most effective
weapon under its control until the last moment. Thus, the
phasing of disarmament has proved almost as difficult a mat-
ter to negotiate as the manner of it. During our atomic
monopoly, the Soviet Union insisted that the outlawing of nu-
clear weapons precede any negotiations on disarmament,
while we in turn refused to discuss surrendering our atomic
stockpile until an airtight control machinery had first been put
into operation. With the growth of the Soviet nuclear stock-
pile, both sides have continued to strive to neutralize the
other's strongest weapon. The Soviet Union has attempted to
expel our troops and particularly our air bases from Eurasia.
We have striven for means to neutralize the Soviet ground
strength. Each side wishes to protect itself against the conse-
quences of the other's bad faith; each side, in short, brings
to the disarmament negotiations the precise attitude which
caused the armaments race in the first place.

The Technological Problems

A reduction of forces is all the more difficult to negotiate
because it seeks to compare incommensurables. What is the
relation between the Soviet abihty to overrun Eurasia and
American air and sea power? If the United States weakens its

3l6 PKOBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Strategic Air Command, it would take years before it could
be reconstituted. If the Soviet Union reduces its ground forces,
the strategic impact would be much smaller, and, given the
structure of Soviet society, the troops could be reassembled
in a matter of weeks. A substantial reduction of Soviet forces
would not deprive the Kremlin of its large reserves of trained
and rapidly mobihzable manpower.

In such circumstances a reduction in forces would not con-
tribute a great deal to a lessening of tensions. Even if a scale
of comparison between different weapons systems could be
agreed upon, it would still not remove the real security prob-
lem: the increasingly rapid rate of technological change.

Disarmament plans of the past were based on a reasonably
stable weapons technology. Once the proposed reduction of
forces was implemented, strategic relationships remained fairly
constant. But under present conditions, the real armaments
race is in the laboratories. No reduction of forces, however
scrupulously carried out, could protect the powers against a
technological breakthrough. Even were strategic striking forces
kept at fixed levels and rigidly controlled, an advance in air
defense sufficient to contain the opposing retaliatory force
would upset the strategic balance completely. The knowledge
by each side that the other is working on ever more fearful
means of destruction or on means of attacking with impunity
would cause current international relations to be carried on
in an atmosphere of tenseness and im.minent catastrophe, what-
ever agreem.ents may be concluded about reduction of forces.

In addition to the technological problems, the structure of
international relations will prevent a reduction of forces from
going beyond a certain point. None of the major powers, cer-
tainly not the U.S.S.R., will accept a disarmament scheme
which impairs its relative position vis-a-vis secondary states.
Nothing is likely to induce the U.S.S.R. to accept a level of
armaments which reduces its ability to control the satellites or
to play a major role in contiguous areas such as the Middle
East. But forces sufficient to accomplish this task are also suffi-
cient to imperil all the peripheral powers of Eurasia. A reduc-
tion of forces which does not affect the relative Soviet position
vis-a-vis the secondary powers will not diminish the basic se-
curity problem of the non-Soviet world.

disabmament: illusion and reality 317

Nor is it a foregone conclusion that a reduction of forces
would inevitably be beneficial. A reduction of nuclear stock-
piles might well increase the tenseness of international rela-
tionships. Given the diffusion of nuclear technology, a reduc-
tion of stockpiles would be almost impossible to verify. Thus,
each power would probably seek to keep back part of its stock-
pile to protect itself against the possibility that its opponent
might do so. An attempt to reduce nuclear stockpiles, far from
removing existing insecurity, may merely serve to feed sus-
picions.

Moreover, to the extent that nuclear stockpiles are in fact
reduced, any war that does break out is likely to assume the
most catastrophic form. The technical possibility of limiting
nuclear war resides in the plentifulness of nuclear materials.
This makes it possible to conceive of a strategy which em-
phasizes a discriminating use of modern weapons and to utilize
explosives of lesser power which, from a technical point of
view, are really "inefficient" high-yield weapons. But if the
quantity of weapons decreases, a premium will be placed on
engineering them to achieve maximum destructiveness and to
use them on the largest targets. The horrors of nuclear war
are not likely to be avoided by a reduction of nuclear ar-
maments.

Inspection and Control

Because a reduction of forces has proved so nearly impos-
sible to negotiate and because its rewards would be so ques-
tionable even if achieved, the major emphasis of disarmament
efforts has turned to the problems of inspection and control
and to the prevention of surprise attack. However, for a variety
of reasons, every inspection scheme that has proved accepta-
ble to the Free World has been objectionable to the U.S.S.R.
As a result, the negotiations about control and inspection have
produced the same vicious circle as the efforts to bring about
a reduction in armaments: were it possible to agree on an
inspection-and-control machinery, it would also be possible to
settle some of the disputes which have given rise to existing

3l8 PROBLEMS OF MrLITARY STRATEGY

tensions. As long as specific issues prove obdurate, there is lit-
tle hope in an over-all control plan.

In addition to the psychological and political problems, the
technological race makes it difficult to negotiate a control
plan. For the rate of change of technology has outstripped
the pace of diplomatic negotiations, so that control plans
change their meaning while they are being debated. The con-
trol scheme of the first United States disarmament proposal
(the Baruch Plan) assumed that an international authority
with powers of inspection and in control of mining, processing,
and producing fissionable materials would be able to eliminate
nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the powers. The United
States contribution was to be the destruction of our nuclear
stockpile as the last stage of the process of disarmament. Even
this scheme would not have been "foolproof." Within the
United States atomic energy program, with every incentive to
achieve an accurate accounting and no motive for evasion, the
normal "slippage" in the handling of fissionable materials due
to error and mechanical problems of handling is several per
cent. A nation determined on evasion could easily multiply
this percentage without being in obvious violation of interna-
tional agreements and utilize the "saved" shppage slowly to
build up a nuclear stockpile of its own. Their awareness of this
possibility would, in turn, give other powers a motive for
evasion.

Nevertheless, at the early stages of the atomic energy pro-
gram the stockpiles were still so small and the possibility of
building them up to substantial proportions through evasions
was so slight that an inspection program would have con-
tributed materially to reducing the danger of nuclear war. Any
power determined to produce nuclear weapons wotJd have
had to break existing agreements flagrantly and thereby bring
down on itself either the international enforcement machinery
or war wiih the United States. But in the age of nuclear
plenty, the control machinery envisaged by the Baruch Plan
would prove futile as a means to eliminate stockpiles. So many
nuclear weapons of so many different sizes have been pro-
duced and they are so easy to conceal that not even the most
elaborate inspection machinery could account for all of them.
Control machinery cannot effectively prevent the accumulation

disarmament: illusion and reality 319

of nuclear weapons at this stage of their development, even
assuming the desirability of doing so.

And so it is with each new technological discovery. In the
very early stages of development, a scrupulous control system
may forestall its being added to the weapons arsenal. But by
the time disarmament negotiations have run their tortuous
course, the weapon will have become so sophisticated and the
production of it will have reached such proportions that con-
trol machinery may magnify rather than reduce the existing
insecurity: it may compound the fear of surprise attack with
fear of the violation of the agreement by the other side.

The inconclusiveness of negotiations about inspection ma-
chinery reflects also the difficulty of controlling the develop-
ment of new weapons. And without such control, disarmament
schemes will be at the mercy of a technological breakthrough.
Since each scientific discovery opens the way to innumerable
other advances, it is next to impossible to define a meaningful
point to "cut off" weapons development. At the beginning of
the atomic age, a strict inspection system might have suc-
ceeded in stopping the elaboration of nuclear weapons. By
1952 it might still have been possible to "control" the develop-
ment of thermonuclear weapons, albeit with great difficulty.
For the hydrogen bomb developed so naturally out of research
on nuclear weapons that the definition of a meaningful dividing
line would have been exceedingly complicated. By 1957 the
production of thermonuclear devices had so far outstripped
any possible control machinery that the emphasis of disarma-
ment negotiations turned from eliminating stockpiles to meth-
ods of restraining their use. And with the diffusion of nuclear
technology among other powers, effective control of the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons even by smaller states will be
almost out of the question.

Moreover, once a weapon is developed, its applications are
elaborated until ever wider realms of strategy become de-
pendent on it. A nation may be wdlling to forego the offensive
uses of nuclear weapons, but it will be most reluctant to give
up its defensive apphcations in, for example, the form of anti-
aircraft or antimissile devices. But in advanced stages of their
elaboration weapons find a dual purpose: the launching site
for antiaircraft missiles can be used as well for attacking

320 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

ground targets; a nuclear weapon launched from a plane
against enemy bombers will be equally eflEective against enemy
supply centers. Thus, weapons can be kept from being added
to stockpiles only at their inception, when their implications
are least understood. By the time their potential is realized,
the possibility of preventing their addition to existing arsenals
by means of inspection or control has usually disappeared.
Hence it may already be too late to control missiles, many of
which have entered production, with others soon to foUow.

"Preventing" Surprise Attack

The diflBculty of devising eflFective machinery to control the
development of ever more destructive weapons has caused
most disarmament negotiations since 1955 to concern them-
selves with means to prevent surprise attack. Since one of the
causes for present tensions is the insecurity caused by the fear
of imminent catastrophe, so the argument goes, an inspection
system which would reduce the danger of surprise attack
would also remove some of the urgency from international re-
lationships. This reasoning produced President Eisenhower's
proposal at the Geneva summit conference, in July 1955, to
exchange military blueprints with the Soviet Union and to per-
mit aerial reconnaissance of each other's territories.

It caimot be denied that the danger of surprise attack con-
tributes to the tensions of the nuclear age even if it does not
cause them. It is less clear, however, that inspection schemes
so far proposed would add a great deal to existing warning
methods and intelligence information or that they would sig-
nificantly reduce the element of surprise.

The relative inefiFectiveness of inspection in preventing sur-
prise in an all-out war is due to the nature of strategic striking
forces. Because it cannot afford to be caught on the ground,
a strategic striking force must be prepared to attack from its
training bases at a moment's notice. If properly prepared, it
should require no noticeable mobilization to launch its blow.
Since "normal" peacetime maneuvers of a strategic striking
force should approximate as nearly as possible its behavior in
case of emergency, an enemy should not be able to teU

disabmament: illusion and reality 321

whether a given flight is a training mission or a surprise attack
until his early-warning hne is crossed. Unless most planes are
grounded all the time, there is no guarantee that planes on so-
called training missions will not be used for a stirprise attack.

Even when all planes are grounded, the maximum warning
achievable by inspection is the interval between the time when
planes leave their bases and the time when they would have
been detected by 'existing warning systems. With the present
family of airplanes, an inspection system at best would add
perhaps three hours' warning to the side which is being at-
tacked. To be sure, three hours' additional warning is not
negligible; it may indeed spell the difference between survival
and catastrophe. But since the victim of aggression cannot be
certain what the apparent violation of inspection signifies, he
may have difficulty in utilizing the additional warning eflFec-
tively. And if inspection is coupled with the grounding of the
strategic striking force, the gain in warning time may be out-
weighed by the aggressor's knowledge of the opponent's de-
ployment.

As the speed of planes is increased the warning time afforded
by even a perfect inspection system, correctly interpreted, is
progressively reduced. In the age of the intercontinental bal-
listic missile the maximum warning time, assuming perfect
communication between the inspector and his government,
would be thirty minutes, the period of time the missile would
be in transit. In the age of the missile and the supersonic
bomber, even a foolproof inspection system will tell the powers
only what they already know: that the opponent possesses the
capability of launching a devastating attack at a moment's no-
tice and with a minimum of warning.

The proposals for inspection as a bar to surprise attack in
fact reflect the thinking of a period when forces-in-being could
not be decisive and when their power and speed were of a
much lower order. As long as the forces-in-being were rela-
tively cumbersome and had to be concentrated before an at-
tack could be laimched, the warning afforded by an inspection
system might have been strategically significant. As late as
1946, had the Baruch Plan been accepted, a nation deter-
mined on nuclear war would have had to wait several months
or even years after a violation until its stockpiles had been

322 PROBLEMS OF MILITAHY STRATEGY

built up to respectable levels. The existence of a control system
in such conditions afforded a breathing spell to all powers.
With the power and speed of current weapons, however, even
an airtight inspection system would not supply such guaran-
tees. When wars can be fought by the forces-in-being and
when striking forces are designed to be able to attack with no
overt preparation, warning can be attained under optimtrai
conditions only for the time the delivery vehicles, whether
planes or missiles, are in transit.

It is, therefore, difficult to imagine that present vigilance
could be reduced or that insecurity would be removed by
any inspection system now in prospect. The machinery re-
quired would be so formidable and the benefits relatively so
trivial that an inspection system may actually have pernicious
consequences. It may give a misleading impression of security
and, therefore, tempt us to relax our preparedness. More
hkely, given the prevailing distrust, it will induce both sides
to place their striking forces in an even greater state of readi-
ness in order to compensate for the loss of secrecy by a dem-
onstration of power.

Indeed, unless designed vsdth extraordinary care, a system
of inspection may well make a tense situation even more ex-
plosive. The value of an inspection system depends not only
on the collection but also on the interpretation of facts. But the
information produced by inspection is of necessity fragmentary
and it is likely to be most difficult to obtain when it is most
needed, when international tensions are at their height. On
the other hand, the only meaningful reaction to an apparent
violation of the inspection system is to launch an immediate
retaliatory attack, because negotiations or protests could not
begin to be effective before the enemy force has reached its
targets. The knowledge that aU-out war is the sanction for
seeming violations may well add to the tenseness of relation-
ships. Instead of reducing the danger of all-out war, inspection
systems may make more hkely a showdown caused by a mis-
understanding of the opponent's intentions.

disabmament: illusion and reality 323

The Chimera of an International Authority

The technical complexity of inspection and its futility in the
present climate of distrust has induced some thoughtful indi-
viduals, appalled at the prospect of nuclear war, to advocate
an international disarmament authority as the only solution.
As long as both sides possess thermonuclear weapons and the
means to deliver them, it is argued, a vicious spiral of con-
stantly growing insecurity is inevitable. The only solution, this
school of thought maintains, is the surrender of all strategic
weapons to a world authority which would be the sole agency
to possess heavy armaments and the means for dehvering
them. The disarmament executive should be composed of
minor powers which are not part of the East-West struggle.
With a preponderance of force, it could play the role of a
world policeman and enforce peace if necessary. The United
Nations Emergency Force for Egypt was greeted in some quar-
ters as the forervmner of such an international agency.

The idea of escaping the tensions of international relations
by an analogy to domestic police powers has come up repeat-
edly in the past and usually at periods when international
schisms made it least realizable. It is true, as the advocates of
the plan of world government contend, that the system of
sovereign states produces international tensions because a sov-
ereign will can be ultimately controlled only by superior force.
But it is hardly realistic to expect sovereign nations, whose
failure to agree on issues of much less importance has brought
about the armaments race, to be able to agree on giving up
their sovereignty. History oflFers few examples of sovereign
states surrendering their sovereignty except to outside com-
pulsion. To be sure, the lessons of history are no more con-
clusive than the unparalleled destnictiveness of modem weap-
ons; still, it is difficxilt to imagine any motive which could
induce the Soviet Union to give up its thermonuclear stockpile
to an international body. And the reaction of the United States
Congress will hardly be more hospitable.

The various proposals for a world authority would, there-
fore, scarcely warrant extensive consideration were they not

324 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

such an excellent illustration of the prevailing notion that the
United Nations somehow has a reaUty beyond that of the
powers comprising it. It is a symptom of our legaUstic bias that
so many consider a legal entity, the United Nations, as some-
how transcending the collective will of its members. For as long
as the United Nations is composed of sovereign states it will
reflect the precise rivalries that animate these powers outside
that organization. To be sure, the United Nations offers a con-
venient forum for the settlement of disputes, and it can give
symbolic expression to world consensus on particular issues.
But the gap between the symboUc acts of the United Nations
and its willingness to run substantive risks is inherent in its
structure. The delegates represent not a popular constituency
but sovereign governments, and they vote not according to
their convictions but in pursuance of the instructions they re-
ceive. The effectiveness of the United Nations can be no
greater than the willingness of its component governments to
run risks. The United Nations Emergency Force would never
have entered Egypt had not both parties sought a device to
liquidate military operations. The United Nations Emergency
Force did not cause the cessation of the war; rather, it ratified
a decision already made. For this reason it does not offer a
particularly hopeful model for what wiU be the real security
problem of our period: the growing Soviet power coupled with.
a refusal to yield to anything except superior force.

The argument that a supranational authority composed of
neutral minor powers will be able to resolve tensions which
have proved intractable to direct negotiations and that it can
be entrusted with the exclusive custody of weapons capable
of encompassing the destruction of hximanity reflects two re-
lated beliefs: that the nature of aggression is always unambig-
uous and that weakness somehow guarantees responsibility
and perhaps even superior morality. But in the nuclear age,
recognizing aggression has proved as complicated as resisting
it. Were a supranational disarmament executive charged with
enforcing the peace, it is predictable that its major problem
would be to define a meaningful concept of aggression. It is
significant that in 1957 the United Nations had to give up a
prolonged effort to achieve such a definition.

Moreover, it would be difficult to find powers clearly rec-

IDISABMAMENT: ILLUSION AND REALITY 325

ognized as neutral to act as custodians of the thermonuclear
stockpile or with sufficient technical competence to administer
it were they so recognized. And the very quality which would
make powers acceptable as members of a disarmament au- J
thority— their neutrahty— will reduce their willingness to run I
risks. In the face of a dispute between the United States and |
the U.S.S.R., these states will lack the power to impose their |
will or the will to use their power. (

Nor is it clear why a monopoly of power in the hands of '
states dependent for equipment, training, and facilities on I
the two superpowers should bring about stability. It is not at
all obvious that weakness guarantees responsibility or that
powers which have difficulty playing a role in their own re-
gions will be able to judge global problems with subtlety and
discrimination. And this still overlooks the dilemmas of where
to store the international stockpile of bombs, and where to
locate the bases of the international air force— all of which will
become matters of life and death to the nations of the world.
In short, there is no escaping from the responsibilities of the
thermonuclear age into a supranational authority, for, if all its
complicated problems could be negotiated, the substantive is-
sues now dividing the world would be soluble too.

!4. The Strategic Role of Civil Defense

by Rogers Cannell

A professional engineer, Mr. Cannell received
his training in both mechanical and industrial
engineering at Stanford University. During
World War II he served as a captain of the
Army Engineers in the Pacific. Since 1954 he
has been a member of the Stanford Research
Institute, where, as Manager of Industrial
and Civil Defense Research, he has been
most recently engaged in studies to develop
nonmilitary -defense systems and programs
for the survival and recovery of the nation
following an attack.

Nonmilitary-defense programs have a key role in preventing a
"cold war" from becoming a "hot war." The United States
announced policy of nuclear retaUation in response to major
aggression can hardly convince the Russians unless we are also
capable of withstanding attack.

While deterrence can be the most desirable function of non-
military defense, an adequate program has other vital advan-
tages even if the primary function fails and war does break
out. Lifesaving protection is available to the bulk of the popu-
lation, and a foundation for post-attack recovery is provided.

It is important to remember that nonmilitary actions may
be defensive but they are not passive, not submissive. They
can be a positive war-deterrent force, and they are a prerequi-
site to survival in any total-war situation.

This article was originally published in the Stanford Research In-
stitute Journal, Fourth Quarter 1959. Reprinted by permission.

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 3^7

Nonmilitary Protection in Total War

Two of several possible situations illustrate the importance
of nonmilitary defense in total war— one in which the United
States is attacked first and the other in which we respond to
an act of aggression with massive retaliation. The examples
are chosen to show that even in the least destructive attack
the nonmilitary-defense role is important.

Assume first that the Russians attack the United States but
aim their weapons at our military bases and try to avoid oxxr
cities. With our present limited civil protection, we could lose
about 25 per cent of our population just from fallout. On the
other hand, should our damaged forces strike back, they would
be assaulting an enemy whose population has been trained in
civil defense and has adequate warning to evacuate and make
fallout shelters.

A large portion (perhaps most) of the adult population of
the Soviet Union participated not long ago in a compulsory
nation-wide civil-defense course of twenty-two hours. It was
to be followed by a fourteen-hour course. In addition, large
civil-defense organizations are maintained on a local basis.
These are trained in such activities as decontamination, shelter
improvisation, and atomic-, biological-, and chemical-warfare
protection. In 1958, Khrushchev claimed that 20 million peo-
ple were trained in civil defense, a reference probably to the
number in organized cadres. With Russian industry decen-
tralized, with military targets empty of weapons and cities
empty of people, we would have difficulty inflicting a serious
blow with our second-strike forces.

Even if the Soviets purposely avoided wiping out our cities,
oiu- population losses would be greater than Russia's, princi-
pally because our population has virtually no protection.
When metropolitan areas are targets, protection becomes even
more of a necessity. In fact, it is the only way we can avoid
giving enemy forces an insurmountable advantage if they
strike first.

There is also the possibihty that if Russia marched into
western Europe and we followed our announced poHcy of mas-

3a8 PROBLEMS OF MILITAIIY STRATEGY

sive retaliation, we would be the first to launch a nuclear at-
tack. If our strategists thought we could achieve surprise, we
would probably aim at Soviet military bases. Russian civil de-
fense could be effective against the fallout from such an at-
tack, since their program emphasizes radiological protection.
In any event, the natural dispersion of Russian population cen-
ters and the fact that many of their military targets are far
from cities would keep Russian casualties to a smaller per-
centage. Any attack returned to the United States from Rus-
sia's damaged forces would probably be aimed at oixr cities
and industry, since our retahatory bases would be empty. Un-
der these circumstances, our chances of sxirvival would depend
upon just how many of our people we could protect from the
attack by evacuation and hastily built fallout shelters. With
Americans inadequately informed or ill-prepared to react
properly in such a situation, it is questionable whether we
would dare to launch a massive retaliation considering the vul-
nerability of our people.

Shelter, then, is the central feature of nonmilitary protec-
tion, because it saves lives directly. Evacuation can also save
lives, but it is effective only with sufficient warning— and does
not eliminate the need for fallout shelter.

People have been led to beheve that one nuclear weapon
could destroy an entire city, so they conclude that no type
of protection can be effective. Preoccupation with this notion
has obscured the truth: protective actions can be quite effec-
tive—not only at distances from a target city but also within it.

The first need is protection from fallout. In many areas, ex-
isting structures would provide enough protection depending
on their construction and the radiation intensity. Fallout in-
tensity is difficult to predict at any place; however, adequate
shelters should reduce exposure to radioactivity by a factor of
1000. This could be accomplished either by improving exist-
ing buildings or by building special shelters. Calculations for
many possible attacks show that over one half of the United
States population would survive if they had fallout shelter,
yet would die without it.

Fallout is not the only hazard, however. The immediate
weapon effects— heat, fire, blast force, and radiation from the
nuclear fireball itself— are the principal dangers in the areas

THE STBATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 3^9

near ground zero. Blast shelter would reduce the fatal areas of
destruction for one weapon to one two-hundredth of the area
that would be so aflFected if shelters were lacking. Studies of
many possible attacks indicate that a program providing good
blast shelters in urban areas plus fallout shelters in the rest
of the nation could hold total casualties to less than lo per
cent of the population.

The Cost of Protection

The United States has the technical know-how to provide
the protection needed to save 90 per cent of the population in
nuclear war. In 1958 a report stated: "Postponement of basic
shelter construction is not warranted in our judgment by any
lack of essential technical knowledge."^ It is significant that
a government research program has carried us this far.

But authorities have expressed doubts about the economic
feasibility of such a program. Studies at the Stanford Research
Institute^ have indicated that effective shelter systems can be
designed for costs which are small ia comparison with our
present total defense budget.

This fact can be illustrated by three nonmihtary-defense
programs. Each depends on a different shelter system: (1)
maximum use of existing fallout shelter, (2) construction of
special fallout shelters, and (3) construction of special blast
shelters in metropolitan areas and fallout shelters in non-
metropoHtan areas. About one third of the cost of the first two
programs and one half of the third is in shelter. The remainder
is for warning, decontamination, monitoring, stockpiling of
food and fuel, and so on. These programs cover the range be-
tween the lower and upper Limits of complete programs for
protection and recovery.

Program 1. Shelter in the first program fits the current gov-
ernment poUcy. The government is now urging the public to
make maximum use of existing shelter— improving it where
necessary— and to provide themselves with survival supplies.
The average family investment would be about $200 and the
cost to the government would be an additional $5.00 per fam-
ily per year.

330 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The government must act to make the individual's invest-
ment effective. For example, warning is essential, because
without it no one would enter a shelter. (We have warning
measures in most cities, but not in smaller communities, where
fallout shelters could be most effective.) Other neccessary ac-
tivities include: survey and marking of existing shelter in large
buildings, monitoring of radiation hazards, pubhc information,
and so on. The cost of these to the government would be about
a half billion dollars. If the program were completed in two
years, its annual cost to the government would be about $1.50
per person, contrasted with $230 per person for the present
military budget.

This program could— if there were substantial public re-
sponse—add 20 to 30 million survivors over and above those
who would survive without it. For the next several years this
would be adequate effectiveness in an attack against military
targets— but not against major population centers. It would be
less than adequate in any attacks later on.

Program. 2 would involve construction of special fallout shel-
ters. In this case, the government would bear the cost of the
shelters and the emergency supplies in addition to the expense
of warning, monitoring, and the like. A program of this scope
would cost on the order of $5 billion per year if completed in
six years. This is equivalent to an annual cost of about $30 per
person.

This plan would not seriously compete with any military
program for manpower or resources. On the contrary, over
the past few years we have frequently had idle in the United
States sujfficient plant and personnel to undertake it without
even pressing the economy (over 10 bilHon dollars' worth in
1958) . This program could add 60 to 90 million survivors over
and above the number who would survive with no program.
It would provide adequate fallout protection in any attack on
the United States at least through the 1960s. However, in at-
tacks against population centers this program could not pre-
vent millions of blast casualties.

Program 3 would provide maximum shelter against imme-
diate blast effects in metropolitan areas plus fallout shelter
elsewhere. If this program were to be completed in eight years,
it would cost about $5 billion per year for the blast-shelter

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 331

portion of the program, but the fallout portion of the program
would cost less because fallout shelters would no longer be
needed in cities. The total annual cost would be $55 per per-
son. This program would add approximately 80 million more
survivors than would be saved by a fallout-shelter program
in the case of a heavy attack against military and population
targets.

The Objective of a Civil-Defense Program

The true value of any defense program lies in its contribu-
tion to national objectives. If total war should come, the sur-
vival of the people— and they are the nation— would be a pri-
mary objective. A program saving 20 miUion Uves in target
areas wotild be satisfactory if virtually the entire population
survived. But even a program saving 20 million lives would
not be satisfactory if virtually no one else survived. In the one
case, the nation could achieve its objectives; in the other, it
could not. What the nation is willing to spend on defense pro-
grams is an indication of how intent it is on achieving its ob-
jectives. At present, this nation is spending each year about
25 cents per person for nonmiUtary defense— a rather low valu-
ation of hvunan life for a Western nation. Even a neutral coun-
try Hke Sweden spends about $4.00.

Civilization Can Recover

Many accept the idea that shelter can eflPectively reduce
casualties but beUeve that survival in the post-attack environ-
ment would be impossible. They fear the invisible and mysteri-
ous atomic radiation and believe that recovery from the loss
of a major portion of the nation would be impossible.

A radioactive environment will take its toll. This fact must
not be minimized. But it is also important to know that its toll
is not worse than a setback of only a few decades in medical
history. Our lives would be as long as our grandfathers', and
the proportion of stillborn children and child deformities
should be no worse than thirty years ago. In fact, with our

332 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

present state of medical knowledge the post-attack environ-
ment would be somewhat safer than the one most of us en-
tered at birth.

History offers further evidence that a civilization can recover
from a devastating war. Take, for example, the Thirty Years'
War— an ideological conflict fought in central Europe in the
first half of the seventeenth centtiry. The loss of life due di-
rectly to the war has been placed by the lowest estimate at
one third of the entire population of both Germany and Bo-
hemia. Other estimates run as high as 80 per cent. The social
effects were catastrophic— entire districts were turned into des-
erts, wolves ran in the streets of once populated cities, and
cannibalism was widespread. Yet, in roughly fifty years, these
areas had recovered in most respects. After a nuclear attack
short in duration and starting from a much higher base of
knowledge, recovery would be far easier for us. War must be
prevented at any cost— and protection and preparation for re-
covery are part of that cost. But war is not the end of civiliza-
tion. We must take every step we can now to accelerate the
recovery process.

Recovery from Total War

The second task for nonmihtary defense in total war is re-
covery from attack— whether or not the war continues after
bombs fall. The purposes of the recovery effort are to re-
establish the nation's social structure and to get the economy
back into business.

The first job would be to make available to the people the
surviving resources— food, medical care, housing, and so forth
—needed for their physical and mental well-being. Then, wiih
the people cared for, the fob is to control the investment of
surplus manpower, materials, energy, and productive capa-
bility for repair and rebuilding. Effective central planning and
control would be the key to the rate of recovery.

If attack is directed only against mihtary bases, few cities
are damaged and there is little permanent disruption of the
social order or the economy. The net effect on the economy

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 333

in nuclear war of this sort will be mainly a loss of production
while fallout denies access to the facilities.

But if cities are targets, the post-attack situation will be
vastly different. A segment of the social order will be destroyed,
and a large percentage of the industrial plant will be lost. Such
an attack would force the economy back to a more primitive
form. In this case, the problem will be to redevelop a modem
industrial society.

Historically, the growth of an industrial economy has de-
pended on agriculture. Crops have fed more people than it
took to raise them, leaving a manpower surplus for industry
and services. Industrial recovery after any attack will depend
first on adequate farm production. Analysis of the effects of
many possible attacks has shown that the crop-producing fa-
cilities of this nation would survive well enough to permit a
strong agriculture in the post-attack period. At least 30 per
cent of our crop land should receive less than 100 roentgens
per hour an hour after attack. This is sufiBcient land to meet
oiu' food requirements under any shelter program, and foods
grown in soO with this level of contamination would be quite
safe for human consumption. Enough farm machinery would
be available to meet the need for ten to fifteen years after an
attack, but the fuel for this equipment would be in question.

In addition, farm surpluses stored by the Commodity Credit
Corporation and other food stockpiles would feed the popula-
tion for at least two years. Even if petroleum to run farm
machinery were in critically short supply after an attack, we
would not need to take a crop from the land immediately.

A major obstacle in making use of the surpluses, however,
would be their location. The stocks should be moved nearer
population centers so they wiU not have to be hauled there in
case of attack. This is just one of the many examples of the
need for planning to speed recovery.

Besides agriculture, a strong economy would need transpor-
tation and power. Preliminary studies indicate that sufficient
transportation equipment would survive to last many years.
Dependent only on the availability of fuel, air transport could
be back in operation immediately, railroads would be running
within a few months, and trucks would operate in all local
areas within six months after an attack. Electric-power-

m^mmBsm99

334 PROBLEMS OF MILITARY STRATEGY

generating plants should stand attack better than their con-
sumers, and they are generally close to the demand. These
plants normally have on hand fuel for several months' opera-
tion. With a reduced load, these stocks should last many
months.

The immediate demand for fuel, then, v^^ould be for trans-
portation. It could be provided by stockpiling of some fuel in
secure storage. Production could finally be resumed from con-
tinuing supplies of petroleum and by setting up distillation
units stockpiled before the attack.

Recovery also requires manpower— laborers as w^ell as peo-
ple with technical and managerial skills. With farming mech-
anized, a few people will still be able to produce food for
many. Accordingly, sufBcient labor will be available to repair
and rebuild the country. A substantial number of technical
and managerial persons would also survive an attack on the
metropolitan areas of the country. They would provide a res-
ervoir of leadership and know-how to rebuild a productive
society.

The people who would survive would have about a fourth
of the nation's industrial plant with which to start reco^'ery;
that share is located in non-metropolitan areas and could be
recovered. In many instances the surviving plant would have
to convert to new products and use different materials, but
these changes are not impossible. Abandonment of "planned
obsolescence" and the use of salvaged materials would speed
the recovery process.

We have had examples of rapid recovery in the industrial
age. In World War II, the Soviet Union lost from its control
about 60 per cent of its coal, iron, steel, and aluminum pro-
duction and up to 95 per cent of some key military production.
The problem was further complicated by the relocation of
much of the remaining plant. Yet, thorough all of this, Russia
was able to maintain some productivity and recover. With a
broader base of technical know-how, more plant intact, and
more material that could be saved, our problem would not
likely be as difficult as was Russia's.

The United States cannot be defended, much less be victori-
ous against an attacker, with any strategy that does not in-
clude an effective nonmilitary program. Many so-called "im-

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE 335

practical" protective measures do not become obsolete as
quickly as complicated weapons systems. Furthermore, they
are effective. Countless independently conducted studies,
based on much more than mere arbitrary assumption, con-
clude that protective shelter can save many millions of Ameri-
can hves for a relatively low outlay of funds. Because it can,
it should be an indispensable part of our country's policy of
deterring an enemy attack.

Notes

The Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Nonmilitary

Defense, by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the

National Academy of Sciences and the National Research

Council.

For the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

The surge of science and technology confronts our generation
with a vexing dilemma. Vast new wealth and resources have
been unlocked, and powerful new forces have been harnessed.
Yet, at the same time, the very burgeoning of this wealth
across the globe and the changes which it has wrought in
international society pose an ever increasing host of baffling
questions.

What is the nature of the Soviet economic threat? What
is the import of Soviet economic growth for United States pol-
icy? How are we to cope with this challenge, satisfy the rising
demands of awaking peoples, shoulder the military burden,
and preserve the health of our economy?

25. The

of Soviet Imperialism

by Lieutenant General Arthur G. Trudeau, U.S.A.

General Trudeau graduated from the United
States Military Academy in 1Q24, later re-
ceiving an M.S. in civil engineering from the
University of California. His military career
has marked him as a highly efficient combat
commander, staff officer, and lecturer. He
saw service in Europe and the Pacific in
World War H and later in the Korean War.
In 1958 he became Chief of Research and
Development, Department of the Army.
General Trudeau lectured at the first Na-
tional Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers.

It is a truism that the capacity of any nation to carry out its
national objectives is based not only on its national will and
military strength but on the strength, balance, and flexibility
of its economy. The Soviets early recognized this principle.
Lenin proclaimed it in his report to the Eighth Congress of
the Soviets in 1919:

Communism is the Soviet power plus electrification of
the whole country. . . . We are weaker than capitalism,
not only in the world scene but within the country. . . .
Only when the country has been electrified, when indus-
try, agriculture, and transport have been placed on a
technical basis of large-scale industry, only then shall we
be finally victorious.

When we look at the Soviet economy today, we see that
Lenin's goal has been attained. The U.S.S.R. is the world's
second-largest industrial power today. Its gross national prod-
uct is over two fifths that of the United States and has been

mm

340 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

growing at a rate more than twice that of the United States.
Undoubtedly this last statistic prompted Khrushchev to make
the ominous statement: "We will bury you." When questioned
about this remark during his 1959 visit to the United States,
he blandly remarked that he did not mean burial by war but
"only by economic competition." It will be shovvni later that
"only by economic competition," in the Communist parlance,
means that if the present rates of industrial growth remain
unchanged, the U.S.S.R. will surpass the United States before
the turn of the century. Khrushchev boasts of accomplishing
this in a much shorter time.

A comparison of the two economies as they exist today is
not reassuring. The U.S.S.R. and other Communist-bloc econ-
omies are expanding at a much faster rate than those of most
of the Free World. Moreover, our potential enemy is devoting
a substantially larger portion of his economy both to arma-
ment and to the rapid expansion of his industrial base. He is
able to do this by denying consumer goods to his people and
imposing upon them a spartan standard of Hving.

Steel and Petroleum Production

A comparison of the industrial strength of the U.S.S.R. and
the United States might focus on two primary items : steel and
petroleum.

American steel production during 1959 totaled over 100
million metric tons. During the same period, the steel produc-
tion of the entire Soviet bloc amounted to almost 80 million
metric tons. Of this, the U.S.S.R. accounted for 60 million
tons, the eastern European satellites for 20 million. These fig-
ures do not include the small Chinese production, although
recent reports indicate substantial increases in Communist
China's output.

In 1940, before the U.S.S.R. entered the war, she was pro-
ducing 18 million tons of steel. A large part of the steel ca-
pacity was lost as a result of the German invasion; only 9 mil-
lion tons annually were produced in 1943 and 1944. Of this
annual output, about 6 million tons were devoted to direct
military production, including production of 30,000 tanks and

ECONOMIC THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 34 1

80,000 pieces of artillery per year. Of course, the United States
was then pouring tremendous quantities of steel in the form
of trucks and weapons into the U.S.S.R.; nevertheless, the
above figures reflect the reasonably small amount of steel
needed by the Soviets for military production. As a matter of
comparison, the United States produced 20 million tons of
ships during World War II, and in 1944 our military require-
ments for steel alone totaled 27 million tons.

The experience of Germany and Japan in World War II
reveals that the steel production of these two countries, al-
though low by U.S. standards, was not a limiting factor in
their armament production. Germany fought the war with an
average annual production of 20 million tons, and Japan with
only 5 million tons. After all, one miUion tons of steel can turn
out 25,000 tanks, or more than our entire Army and Marine
Corps possess today. In terms of comparative military poten-
tial, therefore, the present disparity between American and
Russian steel production is misleading.

If the Soviet mihtary machine faces any shortage in the
event of war, it is probably in petroleum, especially jet fuel.
This is one of the factors impelling Soviet expansion into the
Middle East. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union now has access
to over 140 million tons of petroleum per year— a figure which
includes eastern European satellite production. Significantly,
this represents an increase of 80 per cent in the last four years,
and current Soviet petroleum exports, while limited, indicate
that the Soviets have largely solved this shortage.

At the start of World War II the Soviets were producing
only 31 million tons of petroleum annually, or less than a third
the present amount. Production fell to 17 miUion tons at the
height of World War II, but even this amotmt almost sufficed
to meet the wartime needs of the Soviets. Increased mechani-
zation of the Army and more aircraft have stepped up current
Soviet war requirements. Meanwhile, petroleum production is
one of the fastest growing industries in the Soviet bloc, and
oil production has more than kept pace with Soviet require-
ments.

The threat to the Western oil supply from the Middle East
inherent in the unrest in the Arab world and the vulnerability
of the Suez Canal and the pipelines traversing Syria is the most

342 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

critical danger confronting the economy of the Free World
today. It is stiU valid to assert that whoever controls the oil
of the Middle East controls the economy and hence the in-
dustrial and political complex of western Europe. The flow of
oil from Africa will materially change this situation by 1970.
In the meantime, however, control of the area within a thou-
sand-mile radius of Cairo will remain the key to control of
most of the Eastern Hemisphere.

The Soviet Labor Force

Let us turn to another vital cog of the Soviet economy-
its labor force. The total Soviet labor force numbers roughly
100 million, as compared with approximately 70 milHon for
the United States. Yet, while our total labor force is much
less than that of the Soviets, our industrial labor force is 20
per cent larger than theirs. The reason is that only 6 mil-
lion Americans are employed in agriculture, whereas in the
U.S.S.R. 48 million peasants till the soil. While one Russian
peasant supports five persons with his produce, one farmer
in the United States feeds twenty-eight Americans. By a simi-
lar comparison, it is apparent that American industry is still
at least twice as eflBcient as Soviet industry today.

So far, the comparison between our economy and that of
the Soviets appears extremely favorable to us. We produce
more than they do, both on the farm and in the factory, with
a smaller but more eflFective labor force. There are two danger
signs, however. First, as has been noted, the economy of the
U.S.S.R. is growing at a faster rate than ours. A major reason
for this is that the Soviet Government chaimels an inordinately
large portion of its production efiFort into capital goods at the
expense of consumer goods. The Soviet and satellite peoples
are denied food, clothing, and housing in order to produce
more factory buildings and machine tools— the means of fur-
ther industrial production.

A second danger sign is that the U.S.S.R. habitually de-
votes a greater percentage of its gross national product to both
investment and armament than we do. In 1959, the Soviets
devoted more than 15 per cent of their gross national product

ECONOMIC THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 343

to their military establishment while we spent less than 9 per
cent of our GNP for this purpose. The Soviets invested about
25 per cent of their income in expansion while we invested
less than 20 per cent. Consumer goods accounted for about
70 per cent of our GNP, but only somewhat more than 50
per cent of the Soviet GNP was allocated for this purpose. It
is difficult to compare price structures, but a single illustration
bears out the disproportionately meager emphasis given to
consumer production in the Soviet Union. In Russia, a tank
costs the equivalent of at least 2000 pairs of shoes; in the
United States, by contrast, a tank costs at least 10,000 pairs
of comparable quality.

The Soviet Industrial Surge

A comparison of Soviet and U.S. industrial production from
1895 to date brings to Ught some interesting facts. United
States industry has grown at a rather steady rate, with short-
term upward surges occasioned by war or booms and short-
term depressions, which in the case of the 1929-32 crash was
severe.

In Russia, substantial industrial progress was made in the
period between 1890 and World War I. This period witnessed
the emergence of the industrial proletariat— a class of workers
which the Bolsheviks roused in revolt against the Czar. Dur-
ing the period of World War I through the Revolution, pro-
duction dropped to a negligible amount. The period 1921-
27 featured a high growth rate, which is deceptive in that
the Bolsheviks started from "scratch" and simply put war-
damaged plants back into operation. From 1928, when the
first Five- Year Plan went into effect, real progress was made
to the extent of an average armual growth rate of 11 per cent
up until 1940. The German invasion in 1941 caused a setback,
for much of Russia's main industrial centers were overrun by
the Wehrmacht. The period 1944-45 shows an over-all dip
due to the difficulties of reconverting and relocating industries,
although steel and some other basic industries actually raised
their production. From 1948 to 1955, however, production re-
gained its high prewar average annual growth rate of 11 per

344 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

cent, tapering oflF toward the end of the period. It is believed
that this high growth rate will level oflP at 8 to 9 per cent an-
nually during the coming years, but the rate of industrial
growth will probably continue to be at least double that of
the United States. Even in periods of high prosperity, our
growth rate seldom approaches 5 per cent. Today, the rate
is considerably slower.

At these comparative rates— say, 4 per cent compared with
8 per cent— the U.S.S.R. could match the United States in in-
dustrial production by 1990, or at least by the turn of the
century. This is only thirty to forty years hence— a relatively
brief span in the lifetime of a nation. It would be disastrous
if we fail to plan ahead or if we lack the foresight and initiative
to take dynamic measures to insure our security and the ad-
vancement of our way of life.

Comparative Trade Positions

A comparison of the Soviet economy with ours must take
into account also a study of access to the world's markets and
to the raw materials which feed production. Although the
United States contains within its continental boundaries an
abundance of certain natural resources, it lacks, either entirely
or in part, sufficient quantities of more than fifty critical ma-
terials to satisfy our current industrial needs. Examples are
manganese, tin, chromite, bauxite, mica, rubber, cobalt, and
niobimn. The Soviets, by contrast, are self-sufficient in most
raw materials required by modem industry. Moreover, the So-
viet bloc includes vast stretches of comparatively or completely
unexplored territory which will undoubtedly yield untold
wealth in coal, iron, oil, and other minerals yet imtapped. The
United States has been explored to a much greater extent,
and it is doubtful that we possess natural resources in sub-
stantial excess of those already discovered.

An important underpiiming of the Communist bloc's econ-
omy is intra-bloc trade. The percentages of trade conducted,
during the period 1936-38, among the countries which con-
stitute today the Communist bloc were small: 17 per cent for
the satellites and only 5 per cent for China, the bulk of their

ECONOMIC THKEAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 345

commerce being conducted with the Western world. Today
the picture has changed drastically. The satellites now carry
on 75 per cent of their external trade with Communist-bloc
members, and China conducts 80 per cent of its trade with
Communist nations, with only a dribble to nations in the Free
World.

The degree of actual Soviet control over China's economy
—as weU as Soviet political control of China— is a subject of
much dispute among experts. However, the two nations can
be expected for some time to provide as solid a front against
the Free World in the economic arena as they do in the po-
litical and ideological fields. If further Communist intrusion
into the Free World is prevented, however, the future fate
of this alliance is highly problematical, to say the least.

The relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the satellites is
clearer. The U.S.S.R. dominates her satellites economically as
well as politically and has integrated their economies into its
own. For this reason, the contribution made to the Soviet econ-
omy by the addition of the satellites is particularly pertinent
to any analysis of U.S.S.R. economic strength.

It is estimated that the satellite economies combined equal
about one third that of the Soviet Union and, by order, they
are complementary to it. It is noteworthy, however, that the
rate of growth of satellite production in coal, electric power,
steel, petroleum, and aluminum during the last three years
has been less than that in the U.S.S.R. itself. It is quite likely
that this lag has been due to disruptions in satellite economies
caused by resistance to intrinsically harmful Soviet economic
policies.

Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. steadily increases its efforts to woo
the uncommitted and economically underdeveloped nations of
the world with real or promised economic assistance. As of
December 1959, the Soviet bloc had extended $3.2 billion
worth of credit to these nations. Of this sum, about $800 mil-
lion was for military equipment ($315 miUion for Egypt, $132
million for Syria, and the balance for Afghanistan, Indonesia,
and Yemen). Trade between the Soviet bloc and the under-
developed countries also has increased markedly. In 1957 this
trade was more than 50 per cent greater than in 1955.

346 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Economics as a Controlled Soviet Weapon

When we realize that slightly more than one third of the
world lives under the hammer of communism, we begin to
gain some appreciation of the Communist economic threat.
Production and trade within the Commmiist bloc, xmlike that
within competitive Free World markets, is manipulated and
controlled for political as well as economic purposes. No com-
petition injurious to bloc objectives is permitted to exist. The
Communists can destroy the Free World through military
means; they can destroy it more slowly but no less surely by
gradual seizure of world markets and the sources of raw ma-
terials. Unless the Free World rises to the challenge the time
may come when the Communist businessman and banker may
exert such control over international trade that they can, in
effect, say to the still uncommitted nations of the world: "Com-
rades, you can either join us or be destroyed. The game is
open, but the play for trade in our sphere of influence is now
four dollars to the ruble and no longer four rubles to the dol-
lar." Imagine the pressures on those nations of the world who
are committed to freedom but must trade in order to survive.
Imagine the dilemma faced by a nation hke Japan if more of
its natural markets and sources of raw materials should fall
under the Commimist sway.

Congressional testimony before the Joint Economic Commit-
tee has emphasized this point of control over a command econ-
omy. It was reported: "While there may be economic motiva-
tion underlying the expansion of Soviet trade, it is undoubtedly
entwined with political considerations. Centralized control
makes trade more readily subject to manipulation. Friends can
be rewarded and enemies pimished by shifts in the trade pat-
tern. The Soviet Union has demonstrated that it can turn trade
on (Iceland, Burma, Egypt) or off (Israel, Yugoslavia, Japan)
at the spur of the moment. One can fear that this increase in
the Soviet capabilities has created a greater capacity to dis-
rupt world markets, as happened recently in the case of tin
and a few other incidents."

If we acknowledge and understand the facts of economic

ECONOMIC THBEAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 34/

life today as they exist in our bipolar world, we can only sense
that something must be done by the United States, and done
soon. Over the next few decades, the economic race between
the two opposing economies may prove to be more decisive
than the armaments race. It is with these thoughts in mind
that we must consider some of the requirements for a positive
American economic policy that will insure dynamic growth.

The Gross-National-Product— Debt Ratio

The first area of interest ia our own economy is the rela-
tionship between our gross national product and our national
debt. One often hears the statement that we cannot afford the
current expenditures to support both our national and inter-
national commitments when our national debt is so high. We
hear the warning that we can spend ourselves into economic
ruin. Certainly we are keenly conscious of the need to main-
tain a healthy national economy. We realize that more than
the prosperity and happiness of our people are at stake. It is
hardly necessary to explain that a strong American economy
is the indispensable Free World bulwark against communism.
But are we spending too much today in comparison with our
income? And just what is the comparison between the gross
national product and the national debt? This ratio is the most
valid and meaningful measurement of the strength of our
economy.

There are some interesting statistics on this matter. In 1940
the GNP was twice as great as the debt; in 1945 it was only
eight tenths of the debt; in 1949 the GNP and the debt were
about equal. Since then the GNP has increased, tmtil in 1958
it was one and a half times the national debt. Although the
national debt has risen since then by about 15 billion dollars,
our GNP has increased by more than 40 billion dollars. Presi-
dent Truman's prediction, more than ten years ago, that the
GNP woiild reach 500 billion dollars by i960 will be realized.

An interesting historical parallel was the GNP-debt ratio
in Great Britain in 1815. In that year, after the British had
spent the preceding two decades fighting Napoleon and had
been at war during most of the eighteenth century, the GNP

348 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

was only six tenths of their national debt— an "inabalance"
much worse than any we have ever known.

World leadership, then, may become as expensive today as
it was in 1815. Yet we must be willing to spend whatever is
necessary to insure our survival. And there are ways of doing
this while still significantly increasing the value of the gross
national product and without significantly increasing the na-
tional debt.

Increasing Our Growth Rate

The U.S.S.R. aims at an economic growth rate of about 8
per cent annually in its new Seven- Year Plan, and it has ex-
ceeded this pace for the last ten years. The most optimistic
estimates call for an American growth rate of 5 per cent over
the next few years; in recent years it has been less than 2 per
cent. The Russians— and the Chinese Communists as well— are
working harder and with a greater sense of direction than we
are, and are devoting a far larger proportion of their output
to national strength. It is indispensable to our economy that
we increase our growth rate to upward of 5 per cent so that
the needs of an increasing urbanized population are met and
an adequate national defense can be provided.

One method to make possible a meaningful increase in the
GNP would be to use existing American plants at full capacity,
rather than at the three-fourths capacity at which they are
generally operating today. This would permit an increase in
the resources that we are using for national purposes and put-
ting into competition in foreign trade without lowering ovir
standard of living. Our economy has not yet begun to test
its full strength. In order that it may do so, there must be a
strong stimulus to expand the rate of growth— a stimulus in
the form of expanding markets and lower unit prices.

Pressing Our Economic Advantages

One of the greatest possessions of America is its system of
private capital and free competitive enterprise. The dynamic,

ECONOMIC THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM 349

kaleidoscopic nature of our kind of capitalism, if we are de-
termined to preserve and extend it, cannot be matched in the
long nin by a system which delegates exclusive responsibility
for creative, progressive thinking and execution to one manage-
ment team for each product Hne. What is almost completely
lacking in the Russian system is entrepreneurial opportunity
and incentive. There being but one entrepreneur, the state,
the urge and opportimity for the individual to venture, to in-
vest, and to create new enterprises are almost entirely lacking.
Therefore, we must maintain and strengthen the array of in-
centives—worker incentives, manager incentives, and entrepre-
nexirial incentives— which has built and sustained our economy.

As our population grows and our natural resources become
depleted, we are becoming increasingly dependent on foreign
trade, including imports of raw materials. What is more, our
continued growth may not be possible unless it is matched by
similar advances in the remainder of the Free World.

Our general policy should seek to create the kind of healthy
world economy into which the Evuropean Common Market and
similar regional imdertakings can fit and within which they
can grow to full maturity. There should be enhanced oppor-
tunity for direct private investment to create, in time, increased
demand for our goods and further outlets for capital invest-
ment. We should give needed assistance, accompanied by
thoughtful coimsel, to the underdeveloped countries and their
two biUion people. These peoples— diseased, imdemourished,
illiterate, impoverished, in many cases living in overpopulated
areas— are caught in the sweep of a gigantic revolution. They
share a common awareness of their problems and a passionate
conviction that they can bridge the gap between their Uving
standards and those of the West, In the interests of peace and
stabihty, their transition must be a slow and gradual one.

If we accept assistance to the development of these areas
as an enduring phase of our foreign policy, then certain de-
cisions must be taken. First, we must encourage private in-
vestment and protect it with adequate guarantees against
expropriation or war. Next, we must emphasize long-term
commitments and, where feasible, liberal term loans rather
than grants. Third, over-all economic planning for any coim-
try must be addressed to the objectives of progress and sta-

350 * PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

bility. EflForts must be concentrated initially on those under-
takings where private investment is least likely to be attracted
or is unavailable.

Much of the answer to Russia's challenge is to be found in
bolstering our own economy and those of our aUies by en-
couraging a high level of multilateral trade and Free World
co-operation. We must embrace an economic policy that is
fully integrated into our national strategy— one that serves our
over-all interests and objectives. It should support a free and
expanding world economy and not be enctimbered by vested
interests, crash programs, and negative or impracticable so-
lutions.

Whether we are formulating a policy toward Europe's Com-
mon Market, extending technical assistance to southeast Asia,
disposing of surplus wheat, or fixing the tariff on Japanese
textiles, our decisions should be aimed at promoting a broad
framework of mviltilateral co-operation. This implies a recog-
nition on our part that we can continue to grow and prosper
and maintain our strength relative to the U.S.S.R. only if the
remainder of the Free World keeps pace.

26. Soviet Economic Growth

by Howard C. Petersen

President of the Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Company, Mr. Petersen has served the na-
tion in many capacities since the beginning
of World War II. He received his B.A. de-
gree from DePauw University and a law de-
gree from the University of Michigan. In
1941 he became Assistant to the Undersec-
retary of War, then Special Assistant to the
Secretary. From 1945 to 1947, as Assistant
Secretary of War, he supervised the Army's
military-government activities in Europe, Ja-
pan, and Korea, representing the Army in all
foreign politico-military matters in the State
Department. He has been a member of the
Subcommittee on Economic Policies for Na-
tional Security and of the Committee for
Economic Development.

The following analysis of the size and growth of the Soviet
economy in relation to our own is based on three major as-
sumptions.

The first assumption is that at the start of the 1960s the
total gross national product of Russia is at least two fifths that
of the United States and its per capita output at least one
third of ours, but not much more.

The second assumption is that the yearly percentage in-
crease in Russian gross national product during the past dec-
ade has significantly exceeded that of the United States. In

This selection consists of excerpts from a report prepared by the
Committee for Economic Development in 1959 for the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee of Congress.

352 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

this period the Russian growth rate may have been 6 or 7 per
cent a year. By contrast, our average long-term rate, in which
there is no clear evidence of change, has been about 3 per
cent. If that figure is used as measuring our current trend,
the average absolute yearly increase in total Russian gross na-
tional product is less than that in oiu*s but is approaching it
and, if recent growth rates continue, may soon exceed it. On
the basis of the same estimates, the absolute yearly increase
in Russian per capita gross national product already is larger
than ours.

The third assimiption is that the diflFerence between the
growth rates of the two countries cannot be extrapolated into
the distant future. It is easy enough to show arithmetically
that if one country maintains a higher growth rate than an-
other, eventually it will reach and surpass it. If the Soviet
gross national product is now two fifths as large as ours, and
if the Russians maintain a growth rate one percentage point
above ours— say, 4 per cent as against 3— their gross national
product wiU match ours in 93 years. If the difference is two
percentage points, it vidll take 47 years; if three percentage
points, 31 years; and if four percentage points, 24 years. Such
calculations are startling but provide an inadequate basis for
present policy. While economic growth results from a complex
of influences, the exceptional height of the Soviet growth rate,
if it really exists, is evidently made possible, in the main, by
five forces. These are:

1. Russia has devoted a large proportion of her output to
investment. On a comparable basis, gross investment in real
assets, public and private, represents perhaps 25 per cent of
gross national product in Russia and 20 per cent in the United
States. The diflFerence in net investment rates is larger.

2. The Soviet authorities have been able to control demand
patterns in a way that has diverted production and supporting
investment from activities where the value of output per em-
ployee is low, calculated on the basis of controlled internal
relative prices, to activities where it is high.

3. The Russians have experienced a large expansion of the
nonagricultural labor force, based on the shift of workers from
agriculture.

4. Russia has experienced the large gains made possible by

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 353

the spread of a basic education among a previously largely
illiterate population and the initial training of a quickly ex-
panding industrial labor force.

5. Russia has had opportunities to increase productivity
greatly by the introduction of techniques already prevalent in
Western countries and, increasingly, in the technologically ad-
vanced sectors of the Soviet economy. This is probably the
most important element of all in making possible her large
output advances.

These advantages are not, of course, unique with Russia;
they are at least potentially available in varying degrees to all
but the most advanced countries. Unlike most other countries,
however, Russia has had an all-powerful centralized authority
with the drive to take full advantage of them to push growth
regardless of the present sacrifice imposed upon her popu-
lation.

Can Russia's high growth rate be maintained? Despite in-
ternal pressure for better living conditions, Russia may con-
tinue indefinitely to devote the present high proportion of gross
national product to investment. This would permit consump-
tion to expand in proportion to gross national product, which
may be sufficient to satisfy her population. But the other four
elements permitting exceptionally rapid growth are essentially
transitional advantages which will become of decreasing im-
portance as the stage of development of the Russian economy
becomes more similar to ours. As the diflFerential in the level
of output is reduced, it is Hkely that the differential in growth
rates will also narrow. The realistic expectation as of the pres-
ent time is that our relative advantage over the Russians will
continue to diminish, but at a slackening rate.

If we compare the output of the NATO alHance as a whole
with that of the European Communist-bloc countries as a
whole, the comparison with respect both to present level and
to growth appears more favorable to us. Some of the western
European countries have been growing about as fast as Russia,
and the total economic potential of our NATO allies greatly
exceeds that of the European satellites.

354 PKOBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Ways in Which Soviet Economic Expansion
May Affect Us

The relative size and growth of the Soviet and American
economies may affect the Soviet threat to us in a number of
ways. Among the principal points of possible impact are: (i)
the ability to bear the burden of military programs and to
progress in military strength; (2) aid and trade with the un-
derdeveloped world; (3) the Soviet ability to conduct an of-
fensive economic policy against the United States and other
industrial countries and our ability to withstand or retaliate;
(4) the attitudes of the "neutrals," mainly underdeveloped
countries; (5) the attitudes of the U.S. population and gov-
ernment; (6) the attitudes of our allies; (7) the attitudes of
the Soviet satellites; and (8) the internal Russian political situ-
ation and the international objectives of Soviet policy.

The prospect of faster economic growth in the Soviet Union
than in the United States probably is adverse to our position
in almost all of these areas. Nonetheless, it does not seem likely
to be the decisive factor in the outcome of the East- West strug-
gle, provided that our own performance is at least as satis-
factory as in the past.

Military Strength

The larger a country's national income, the smaller is the
burden of financing military expenditures at any stated level.
Economic growth clearly increases the size of the military pro-
gram which a nation can support. Among countries with at
all comparable resources, however, differences in actual mili-
tary strength are much more closely related to their appraisals
of need and willingness to sacrifice than to rates of economic
growth or absolute limits imposed by the size of their econ-
omies. If we were devoting the same proportion of gross na-
tional product to national security as in fiscal year 1953, as we
would be if defense expenditures had kept pace with economic
growth over the intervening period, we would now be spend-

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 355

ing $66 billion a year for national defense instead of $46 bil-
lion. Were our government convinced that it was necessary,
we could and would spend a good deal more than that.

Despite a much smaller economy and a larger population
to support, the Soviet Union maintains a powerful and diversi-
fied military machine suflBcient to provide approximate mili-
tary parity with the United States. She does so by devoting a
larger portion of her gross national product to this purpose
than we do, by eliminating features that add more to the com-
fort and safety of her armed forces than to their striking
power, and by paying her armed forces a great deal less than
we do, as well as by less obvious means.

Clearly the size and rate of growth of the United States and
Soviet economies, though important variables, are not the de-
cisive ones in determining the relative military strength of the
two countries.

Aid and Trade with Underdeveloped Countries

Soviet aid has very largely taken the form of loans at rather
low interest rates. Whether, and under what conditions, Soviet
loans to underdeveloped countries outside the bloc are adverse
to our interests is itself a complicated question. If Soviet loans
actually contribute to economic progress in these nations,
which certainly is an objective of our own policy, they may
even be in our long-term interest. In any case, even more than
that of military programs, the scope and character of economic
aid to underdeveloped free nations will be determined by con-
siderations other than the capacity to provide aid. In neither
Russia nor the United States does such assistance amount to
more than a fraction of 1 per cent of gross national product
or to any considerable proportion of defense spending. Heavy
concentration on aid requiring use of a particular type of fa-
cility, such as the provision of steel mills, might well tax Rus-
sian capacity at present. But this is a matter of foresight in
arranging for expansion of specialized capacity in such areas
or in scheduling aid programs rather than of general economic
growth.

Trade of most underdeveloped free countries with the Soviet

356 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Union is presently trivial in comparison with their trade with
the West. Russia accounts (based on 1956 data) for more
than 10 per cent of imports only in Afghanistan and Yugosla-
via, and of exports only in these two countries and Iran. Meas-
urement by trade with the bloc as a whole would add only
four other countries to such a Hst. Soviet trade is small prima-
rily because Russia has followed a poHcy of extreme autarchy.
The Russian policy of self-sufficiency has been relaxed in re-
cent years, but only slightly insofar as countries outside the
bloc are concerned. If Russian trade with most covmtries were
doubled or tripled as a result of Soviet economic growth, it
would still be tiny in comparison with their trade with the
West. The volume of Russia's future trade, conducted for or-
dinary commercial purposes, will depend far more on her trade
policy than on her rate of economic growth.

Most underdeveloped nations are greatly dependent on the
export of one to three raw materials. A sharp drop in the
volume or price of exports of these commodities has cata-
strophic consequences for these countries' balance of payments
and hence for their development programs. In the past few
years, Russia has stepped in with offers to buy whenever such
situations have developed. In some well-publicized cases these
commodities have reappeared in markets outside Russia to
compete in the original exporter's usual markets, and the
transaction has neither helped the underdeveloped nation nor
earned good wSl for the Soviets. It is evident, however, that
real opporttmity exists for Russia to advance her influence by
buying raw materials in depressed markets in good faith. Con-
sumer commodities Hke coffee and fish can be offered to Rus-
sian consumers. Industrial raw materials can either be per-
mitted to replace Russian production or, if she is unwilling to
relax her policy of self-sufficiency, stockpiled or destroyed.
Only in the last case is any real cost imposed upon the Russian
economy by this type of purchasing; it then becomes, in effect,
a form of aid.

Russian growth will contribute to Russia's ability to expand
trade on a commercial basis. It may result in a wider variety
and better quahty of goods offered for export. It will increase
her ability to absorb imports. It will increase her economic
capacity to provide aid through purchase of unwanted com-

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 357

modi ties, just as in other forms. But the future course of all
forms of Russian trade with underdeveloped countries will be
determined much more by her policy decisions than by the
rate of her economic growth.

The larger the Russian economy, the greater will be her
ability to incur the costs of a policy of economic warfare
against the United States and other industrial nations. This
might involve dumping commodities to disrupt Western mar-
kets, preclusive buying of commodities in short supply, and
possibly attempts at manipulation of foreign currencies. But
there is httle evidence of any deliberate Russian policy to en-
gage in such activities. Such practices would necessarily in-
volve costs to her. In fact, the aggressor in this type of warfare
usually is not likely to inflict as much loss on an opponent as
he himself incurs. Moreover, defensive steps are possible. This
writer does not see strengthening of Russia's capacity to en-
gage in this kind of activity as an important consequence of
her higher growth rate.

Attitudes of Peoples Throughout the World

A situation in which the Soviet economy is generally rec-
ognized to be growing faster than ours, not only in percent-
ages but also absolutely, not in spurts but steadily, and is ap-
proaching ours in total size, could, it may be supposed, greatly
affect the attitudes of peoples throughout the world. It might
greatly strengthen the confidence of the Russians in their own
system, strengthen the dependence of their satellites upon
them, increase the attraction of the Communist system for the
independent, underdeveloped countries, make our allies ap-
prehensive of their reliance upon us, and weaken our own mo-
rale. Yet, all of these things are either unlikely to occur as a
result of comparative U.S.-Russian growth rates or unlikely to
be important to our position.

Consider the underdeveloped nations of the Free World
that are either emerging into a phase of sustained economic
growth or hoping to do so. Their success is of the utmost im-
portance to us. If they achieve vigorous growth and visibly
rising living standards, they are not likely voluntarily to aban-

358 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

don freedom for communism; if they do so, it will be for other
reasons, such as the inability of the masses to eliminate by
other means an unacceptable distribution of income or system
of land tenure. If their plans for economic development are
badly disappointed, they will, indeed, consider the Communist
alternative. But they are more likely to compare their experi-
ences with that of China, Mongolia, North Korea, or North
Vietnam than with that of Russia or the European satellites.
Insofar as third-party comparisons are made at all, a compari-
son of the growth rates of India and China, the largest under-
developed countries of the Free and Communist worlds, is
likely to seem more relevant than that of Russia and the United
States.

It is the effect upon Russian attitudes that is most open to
question. Surely, the Russians may be expected to take pride
in their progress and to exult if they ever succeed in their goal
of overhauling us in what they view as an economic race. But
it is hard to see how the Soviet leaders could become more
implacable enemies of the Western democracies than they
have been in the past. And it is hard to see why their own
success should increase hostility toward us among the Russian
people.

On the other hand, there is at least reason to hope that ris-
ing living standards will lead to humanizing poHtical and eco-
nomic changes vidthin the Soviet society, the emergence of a
different type of leadership, and a less truculent attitude to-
ward the outside world. This must, indeed, be our principal
hope for a more assured peace in some future period. But this
hopeful prospect is far too hypothetical to permit us to rest
policy upon it now.

Implication for U.S. Policy

The rise of Russian economic power is one of the great de-
velopments of world history. It was probably inevitable re-
gardless of the form of Russian government. It is important
that we understand it and that the peoples of the world un-
derstand it and place it in its proper perspective.

Our reaction should not be one of amazement or despair.

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 359

What Russia is doing other nations have done, though other
nations have done it with less feverish haste and far less human
cost. Our reaction should not be to attempt to match the pres-
ent Russian growth rate simply because the Russian rate is
higher than ours.

In general, there are four broad types of action we might
consider to accelerate our own rate of growth.

First, we can try to reduce involuntary unemployment of
resources, especially to minimize the depth and duration of
recessions.

Second, we can try to make ovir economic system work more
smoothly so as to get more real product from the resources
now going into production. We can try to make our system
more competitive and remove public and private impediments
to the mobility of resources and to the introduction of im-
proved techniques. We can reduce barriers to trade. We can
re-examine our tax structure with a view to improving incen-
tives and reconsider various governmental subsidies and price
supports.

These are desirable things to do. In our own interest we
should try to reduce unemployment and increase the efficiency
with which we use resources regardless of the Russian threat.
But the reduction of unemployment and elimination of most
of the barriers to efficiency we can readily think of would
mainly provide one-time gains. They would yield a limited
nonrecurrent increase in output but not an increase in the rate
of growth. Nonrecurrent gains, though well worth while, will
not go far toward matching the Russian growth rate.

The third possibility, then, is to increase the amount of work
done in our society. In the past, average annual hours of work
have declined about one half per cent a year. If we stopped
this reduction now, we might thereby hope to add to our past
growth rate about one half per cent a year, on the very favora-
ble assumption that none of the past increase in output per
man-hour was the result of shortening hours. The other pos-
sibility of increasing total man-hours is through faster expan-
sion of the labor force, but the possibilities for cumulative ef-
fects here, except by aflFecting the size of the total population,
appear much smaller.

360 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Fourth, we can increase the rate of economic growth by
devoting more of our output to uses that promote growth.

More investment, more research, more education, are
needed for growth, but they are needed just to sustain the
rate of growth we have been getting. We have achieved an
average growth rate of 3 per cent per annum over the past
fifty or seventy-five years by increasing our annual devotion
of resources to investment, research, and education. In order
to increase the rate of growth, it is not sufficient just to in-
crease these things; it is necessary to increase the rate of
increase.

The amounts of increase in the rates of savings, investment,
education, and research needed to get any given increase in
the rate of growth are hterally unknown. There is great need
for much more information before we can talk sense about this
subject. Some crude calculations of what might be necessary
give staggering results. They suggest that we have to find out
not whether it would take $3 billion or $5 billion or even $10
billion more a year of investment, research, and education to
get our growth rate up from 3 per cent to 5 per cent, but
whether it would not take something like $75 billion a year.

Suppose the 3 per cent growth rate results from an annual
increase in the labor force of 1 per cent a year and an annual
increase in output per worker of 2 per cent a year. Unless we
speed up the increase in the labor force, to raise the 3 per
cent growth rate to 5 per cent would require the annual in-
crease in output per worker to be raised from 2 to 4 per cent
—that is, to be doubled.

To obtain the present increase in productivity, we are spend-
ing something like $75 billion a year, or 15 per cent of our
total output at high employment, on net investment in produc-
tive assets, public and private, on education, and on relevant
research. The simplest estimate is that to double the increase
in output per worker we would have to double these expendi-
tures to $150 billion a year, or 30 per cent of our output. An
increase of $75 billion in these private and public outlays im-
plies, of course, a corresponding increase of $75 billion a year
in the sum of the nation's savings and tax payments. To get a
simultaneous increase in taxes and savings on such a scale

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 361

without seriously impairing incentives important to growth
would clearly be extremely difficult.

These figures may be debatable, but the main point is
that the requirements for an increase in the rate of economic
growth, say from 3 per cent to 5 per cent— which still would
not equal the present Russian rate— may be very large, much
larger than seems to be contemplated in current discussion.

There is no reason to think that the United States is exempt
from the law that we are preaching to underdeveloped coun-
tries all over the world— that more growth in per capita in-
come requires more savings and more investment in productive
facilities, education, and research. And there is no reason to
presume that the proportionate increase required is smaller
than the proportionate increase in the growth rate desired. In
fact, this assumption is in all probability overoptimistic, since
it is not likely that an increase in growth-supporting expendi-
tures will yield a fully proportionate return.

To increase the long-term growth rate by one or two per-
centage points is a formidable undertaking, requiring some
really basic changes. It probably can be done, if this is ac-
cepted as a sufficiently urgent objective of national policy to
give it an overriding priority.

A Competition of Systems, Not of Growth Rates

The United States should promote its own growth by rea-
sonable means, not by all means. Our past performance has
given us an economy that has long been the envy of the world
and that has given us the highest living standard ever known.
Surely we wish to progress as rapidly as in the past and to
do better if we can— but not at any cost. There is no necessity
for us to match the present Russian growth rate.

We are engaged in a competition of systems, not a competi-
tion of growth rates. Our strategy in this competition should
be to make our own system work as well as we can, in terms
of its own values. The values that our system serves are the
values that men everywhere would choose if given the chance.
Men want freedom, security, rising living standards for them-
selves and their families, relief from the burdens of toil, fair

362 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

treatment, and personal dignity. If they did not, we would be
faced with an awful dilemma. But we are justified in believing
that people everywhere want the basic things that we want,
and that the attractiveness of our system is enhanced by its
demonstrated success in achieving these goals.

More rapid growth contributes to the success of the system,
but it is not identical with success or the sufficient means to
its achievement. For us to seek to force our rate of economic
growth by a great expansion of the role of govenmient, and
by curtailing the freedom of families to choose between con-
stimption and saving and between work and leisure, would be
inconsistent with our own values. And it would not make our
system more appealing to others.

The Russian threat is grave. It demands from us a strong
and varied response. The response should not be imitative.
Our danger is not that our total economic resources are, or
will be in the foreseeable future, too small for the promotion
of U.S. policy. Our great need is not for larger resources but
for the best use of the resources we have. We should use the
resources we have— which are superior to those of the Russians
now and will be at least equal to them for the foreseeable
future— to promote U.S. pohcy better.

Our Untapped Economic Resource

If larger defense expenditures will add to our security, they
should be made. Otir greater economic strength gives us the
ability, if we wish to use it, to seize the initiative in the de-
velopment of large and varied military forces and in the de-
liberate obsolescing of equipment and to place pressure on the
Russians to maintain equahty with us. Whether we should do
so is a political question, not a matter of economic potential.

We should be providing much more economic development
assistance to the underdeveloped countries of the world than
we are doing now. Their success is vital to us, and our as-
sistance to them may be critical to their success.

In neither of these fields should we hold back because of
vaguely felt fears that we cannot afiFord to do what is neces-
sary, that financing adequate defense and assistance programs

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH AND U.S. POLICY 363

will somehow damage our economy or impair our growth. Any
additional pubhc expenditures for these purposes must be
matched by higher taxes to avoid feeding inflationary pres-
sures. Stability of the value of the dollar is properly an im-
portant objective of our economic policy. Attention must be
given to the way in which taxes are raised so as to minimize
any curtailment of private saving or incentives to work. Given
the exercise of a reasonable degree of common sense and re-
sponsibility in these matters, however, such fears have httle
foundation.

We should be acting vigorously to counter the Soviet drive
for foreign expansion in all its aspects— not only the Soviet use
of, or threat to use, force but their propaganda, their use of
foreign trade as a political weapon, their support of subversion
of government, and their meddling in domestic politics every-
where, often combined with the supplying of money and arms.
Wherever possible we should be seizing the initiative.

We should be moving vigorously to reduce international
trade barriers. We should utiHze fully the powers granted by
the Trade Agreements Act to achieve gradual and selective
reductions in our own tariffs and, by negotiation with other
countries, to secure reductions in their barriers to international
trade. Aside from the direct advantage of such a policy to us
and to other advanced countries, we must insure a structure
of international markets that will provide newly developing na-
tions opportunity to participate fully and fairly in international
exchange. Our new addiction to the imposition of quotas when
foreign countries successfully penetrate our markets is the
worst possible course for us to foUow, one that is especially
well designed to harm our friends and to create opportunities
for the politically inspired Russian trade offensive.

At home, we and other advanced Western nations should
adhere to our own values of what is good and desirable and
manage our domestic affairs in the light of our own criteria of
success, not by the criteria of Soviet communism, if we wish
to maintain vigorous and self-confident societies. Of course,
economic grovi^ decidedly continues to be one of the central
objectives of domestic policy in our ovim interest. Public poli-
cies must be reviewed from the standpoint of their effect upon
growth. It is the source of our ability to provide better living

364 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

standards, more freedom of choice, more leisure, and better
educational opportunities and to protect the less fortunate
against the hazards of life. We are far from having reached
the state where additional income is of little interest to us.
But economic growth is not an overriding objective that calls
for drastic changes in the way we organize our society and al-
locate our resources.

Our success in the continuing struggle against Communist
imperialism will be determined by our faith, determination,
willingness to sacrifice, intelUgence, and ingenuity. If we fail,
it will not be the result of an inadequate economic base, unless
future changes in relative economic growth are much different
from what we can now foresee.

by Walt W. Rostow

Professor Walt W. Rostow is director of the
Center of International Studies, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology. A Yale gradu-
ate and former Rhodes Scholar, he has writ-
ten a number of books on Soviet society,
American foreign policy, and economic as-
sistance. The following is a condensation of
a lecture delivered by Professor Rostow in
Moscow in the spring of iQSQ.

All societies, past and present, may be usefully designated as
falling within one of the five following categories: (i) the
traditional society, (2) the preconditions for take-off, (3) the
take-off, (4) the drive to maturity, and (5) the age of high
mass consumption. Beyond the age of high mass consumption
lie the problems and possibilities which are beginning to arise
in a few societies when the biirdens of scarcity gradually re-
treat and what Karl Marx called communism is approached.
These five stages of growth are based on a dynamic theory
of production. Out of this theory comes one key proposition:
At any period of time the momentxun of an economy is main-
tained by the rapid rate of growth in a relatively few key lead-
ing sectors. In some periods, cotton textiles have been a key
leading sector; in others, railways, chemicals, electricity, and
the automobile have served this fvmction. Specifically, key sec-
tors have two effects: their rapid growth sets up a direct de-
mand for new inputs; second, the development of these new

In its original form, this selection was published in the Decenv-
her 1959 issue of Fortune. Copyright 1959, Time, Inc. All rights
reserved.

366 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

primary and secondary sectors induces new developments in-
directly, elsewhere in the economy.

Each stage of growth is associated with certain ranges of
income and types of demand. But we must go beyond mere
technical economic analysis. For at each stage of growth so-
cieties have been confronted with choices— basic choices of pol-
icy and of value— which transcend economic analysis.

How should the traditional society react to the intrusion
of a more advanced power? When modem nationhood is
achieved, how— in what proportions— should the national ener-
gies be disposed: in external aggression, to right old wrongs or
to exploit newly created or perceived possibilities for enlarged
national power; in completing the political victory of the new
national government over old regional interests; or in modern-
izing the economy?

Once growth is under way with the take-oflF, to what extent
should the requirements of increasing the rate of growth be
moderated by the desire to increase consumption per capita
and to increase welfare?

When technological maturity is reached— and the nation
commands a modernized and differentiated industrial machine
—to what ends should it be put, and in what proportions: to
increase social and human security, including leisure; to ex-
pand consumption into the range of durable consumers' goods
and services; or to increase the nation's stature and power on
the world scene?

The stages of growth are, then, not a set of rigid, inevitable,
predetermined phases of history. The process of growth does
pose for men and societies certain concrete problems and pos-
sibilities from which they must choose, and these problems
and possibilities may be observed at similar stages in each so-
ciety—including contemporary societies.

The Stages in History

I define the traditional society as one which has not learned
to make invention and technological innovation a regular flow.
The traditional society is not static; but its growth is con-
strained by a productivity ceiling beyond which it cannot

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 367

penetrate. This ceiling decrees that something like 75 per cent
of the labor force will be in agriculture; that its income above
minimum consumption levels is likely to be dissipated in high
living for those who command land rents (or otherwise dis-
sipated) ; and that its social values wiU be geared to relatively
limited fatahstic horizons.

Historically, the traditional societies of western Europe were
stirred into what I call the preconditions for take-ofiE by the
expansion of trade from, let us say, the sixteenth century for-
ward. The rise of trade interacted with the development of
modern science, invention, and innovation to produce an inter-
locking series of developments in transport, industry, and agri-
culture, as well as a rise in population. Britain was the first to
move from the preconditions period into take-ofif.

Once the British take-oflf— or Industrial Revolution— was im-
der way from, say, 1783, it set in motion a series of what
might be called positive and negative demonstration effects.
These profound demonstration effects, still operating actively
in the world, will bring industrialization to virtually the whole
of the planet. The last major take-off may well begin before
two centuries have passed since the British showed the way.

Technically, there are three leading sectors in the precon-
ditions period whose transformation is a necessary condition
for sustained industrial growth. First, agriculture: a produc-
tivity revolution in agriculture is required to feed the expand-
ing population of the preconditions period and to feed the
cities likely to be expanding at even higher rates than the aver-
age. Second, the export sector: industrialization in its earliest
stages is likely to create an expanded bill for imports, which
can be met only by quickly applying modem techniques to the
extraction and higher processing of some natural resource.
Third, social overhead capital: the technical transformation of
a traditional society into a position where growth becomes
relatively automatic requires large outlays on transport, educa-
tion, sources of power, and so on.

The development of these sectors is not an antiseptic techni-
cal process; it requires profound social, psychological, and po-
litical change— from the attitudes of peasants to those of civil
servants and poUticians. Much analysis— both Marxist and non-
Marxist— has emphasized the role of the new commercial and

368 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

industrial middle class in bringing about this transformation.
But the role of the middle class and the profit motive is only
a part of the story. Both in the contemporary world and in
the more distant past it is perfecdy clear that another factor
was the repeated demonstration that more advanced societies
could impose their will on the less advanced. This demonstra-
tion of the national and human costs of backwardness has ac-
celerated the preconditions process in many lands. A reactive
nationalism has been a major factor in leading men to take
the steps necessary to permit growth to become a society's
normal condition. This was so for the transitional periods of
Germany, Japan, and Russia in the nineteenth century; and,
earlier, it played a crucial role in the formation of the United
States under the Federahsts. And it is perfectly evident that
in the contemporary world the most powerful motive for mod-
ernization in the underdeveloped areas is not the profit motive
of the middle class but the widespread desire to increase hu-
man and national dignity.

Nationalism may be diverted to external goals or ambitions
or it may be channeled at home into the economic and social
modernization of the society. It is, therefore, one of the techni-
cal preconditions for take-ofi^ that the governments which come
to power in the transitional areas be prepared to channel a
high proportion of their peoples' energies, talents, and re-
sources into the tasks of economic growth rather than other
possible objectives. For the leading sectors of the precondi-
tions—a productivity revolution in agriculture, the generation
of increased foreign exchange, and the build-up of social over-
head capital— all require a significant degree of goverrmiental
leadership and programing— phrases not to be confused with
total government ownership and total plaiming, which are not
necessary conditions for the preconditions period.

In essence, the take-off consists of the achievement of rapid
growth in a hmited group of leading sectors: textiles for Great
Britain; railroads for the United States, France, Germany,
Canada, and Russia; modem timber cutting and railroads in
Sweden. The take-off is distinguished from earher industrial
surges by the fact that growth becomes self-sustained. Invest-
ment rises and remains over 10 per cent net, suflBcient to out-

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 369

strip population growth and to make an increase in output per
capita a regular condition.

After take-off there follows what I call the drive to matvirity,
defined as the period when a society has effectively applied
the range of (then) modern technology to the bulk of its re-
sources. During the drive to maturity new leading sectors
gather momentum to supplant the older leading sectors of the
take-off. After the railway take-offs of the nineteenth century
—with coal, iron, and heavy engineering at the center of the
growth process— it is steel, the new ships, chemicals, electricity,
and the products of the modem machine tool that dominate
the economy and sustain the over-all rate of growth.

As societies move toward technological maturity, a nimiber
of economic and noneconomic changes occur: the working
force not only becomes more urban but the category of semi-
skilled and white-collar workers expands; real incomes and
standards of consumption rise; the professional managers be-
gin to take over from the original buccaneers who laiinched
the take-off and dominate the early stages of the drive to
maturity.

But there is a deeper change as well, reflected in literature,
social and popular thought, and in politics. What is that
change? Men react against the harshness of the drive to ma-
turity; they begin to take growth and the spread of technology
for granted; they cease to regard the further spread of modem
technology as a sufiBcient human and social objective; and
they ask this question: How shall this mature, industrial ma-
chine, with compotmd interest buUt firmly into its structure-
how shall it be used? As suggested earlier, there are essentially
three directions in which the mature nation can go: toward
social security and leisure; toward the expansion of power on
the world scene; or toward what I caE the age of high mass
consumption— the diffusion of the mass automobile, improved
housing, and the electric-powered household gadgetry, from
iceboxes to TV, that an industrial civilization can offer to make
life easier, more pleasant, and more interesting in the home.

American history in the twentieth century reflects, at dif-
ferent times, elements of each choice. There was the brief
American flirtation with world power at the turn of the cen-
tury. Then there was a phase of social reform in the Progres-

370 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

sive era, followed by the plunge in die 1920s into the age of
high mass consumption, with its new leading sectors: automo-
biles, rubber, oil, roads, suburban housing, and the familiar
gadgetry. As for the Germans, at maturity they were terribly
tempted and twice succvmibed to the temptation of pressing
for world power; and as Japan came to technological maturity
in the 1930s, it did the same. In the past decade western Eu-
rope has made that transition and is now experiencing a ver-
sion of the American 1920s. And in Japan (at lower levels)
something of the same sort is happening. This new phase of
growth has given these economies a momentum beyond that
predicted by the greatest optimists just after World War II.
As for the Soviet Union, in the 1920s it reorganized the
society which had experienced a take-off between 1890 and
1914 but had broken down under the terrible pressures of the
First World War. Then, in 1929, the drive to maturity began,
and it was resumed with great energy after reconstruction of
the damage of the Second World War. This sequence then,
since the 1890s, brings the Soviet Union to the point where
the three-way choice of the technologically mature society now
confronts its poHtical life. That is, in what proportions shall the
resources of the society be used for leisure or for mass con-
sumption or for increased power on the world scene.

The Stages Today

While the stages of growth have been moving forward since
the end of the Second World War in reasonable order and
briskness in the northwestern part of the world, elsewhere
a great historical drama has been unfolding; these vast socie-
ties, embracing the bulk of the world's population, have been
accelerating the preconditions for take-off or actually moving
into take-off. Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and— nota-
bly—China and India are actually in the take-off. These so-
cieties face many vicissitudes; but the bases have been laid
for sustained growth. The commitment to carry forward goes
very deep. In China and India, for example— looking ahead
over the next decade— none of us can be confident of the politi-
cal form those societies will assume; but they will, on the aver-

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 37 1

age, maintain investment rates that substantially outstrip cur-
rent rates of population increase. South of the Sahara are
societies in the traditional stage, which will need a longer pre-
conditioning process.

The question now arises: Is it scientifically correct to use
the concept of the stages of growth derived from a generaliza-
tion of the historical past to analyze the contemporary prob-
lems of the underdeveloped areas? There is much that is famil-
iar to the historian in the current scene. The technical problems
of the preconditions still center about the three leading sectors
of that stage: social overhead capital, the generation of in-
creased exports, and a technological revolution in agriculture.
The social and psychological transformations that must occur
are, again, broadly famihar from the past: the siphoning oflF
of land rents into the modem sector, the changing of peasant
attitudes, the training of a new leadership— public, private, or
both in various combinations— capable of bringing modem
techniques to bear in the various sectors of the economy. And,
above all, we can again see, as in the past, that a reactive
nationalism, tempted to move in directions other than eco-
nomic growth, lies close to the heart of the political process
in many of these regions.

But there is a major technical difference; the pool of tech-
nology available to these underdeveloped nations is greater
than ever before. At periods in the past, other late-comers—
Germany, Russia, Japan— have been able to benefit somewhat
by learning from the leading nations. But in degree we must
admit that there is a substantial difference between the present
and the past, stemming from the size of the pool of available
technology.

This difference, however, cuts two ways: it both compli-
cates the problem of growth and offers the possibility of ac-
celerating growth. It complicates growth because the availa-
bility of modem techniques of medicine and public health
leads to a radical fall in death rates, which yields much higher
rates on population increase than those in most societies in the
past. Excepting the United States and Russia, which had re-
serves of good land, population increase in the preconditions
and take-off were imder 1.5 per cent— generally about 1 per
cent. Today the newer nations without reserves of good land

372 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

are trying to move forward with population-increase rates of
2 per cent and more. This means that higher rates of invest-
ment must be generated to achieve sustained growth; more
precisely, it means that the revolution in agricultural technique
must be pressed forward with great vigor if the whole develop-
ment process is not to be throttled for lack of food.

The Conditions of Aid

Now, what about peaceful coexistence in the face of this
problem? If the only objective in the world of the Soviet Union
and the United States were to assist these new nations into
sustained growth, technically the more advanced countries
should execute a joint program in three parts. First, offer the
underdeveloped areas ample supplies of capital— to ease the
general problem of capital formation under regimes with high
rates of population increase. Second, offer these nations special
assistance— to achieve prompt and radical increases in agricul-
tural output. Third, conduct them toward policies which
would encourage local poHticians to concentrate their hopes
and energies on the task of economic development; and avoid
policies which would divert them from these objectives.

The United States, for its part, would have to do these four
specific things: First, accept the idea that its major objective
in these areas was to create independent, modem, growing
states, whether or not they were prepared to join in mihtary
alliance with the United States.

Second, the United States would have to accept each na-
tion's right to choose its own balance between private and pub-
lic enterprise; and so long as the growth process was seriously
pursued, it would have to refrain from imposing as a condition
for loans the acceptance by other societies of American pat-
terns of organization.

Third, the United States would have to accept the fact that
the democratic process is a matter of degree and direction and
not expect these transitional societies to blossom forth promptly
with forms of political organization similar to those of the
United States and western Europe.

Fourth, with these objectives and self-denying ordinances.

THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 373

it would have to oflPer substantial, long-term loans and techni-
cal assistance which the local politicians and planners could
count on over, say, a five-year interval.

These are precisely the directions in which American pohcy
has been moving in recent years. This trend lies behind the
creation in 1957 of the Development Loan Fvind and the re-
cent initiatives in the U. S. Senate to enlarge that fund and
put it on a long-term basis. Many in the United States— in-
cluding this writer— believe this trend has not gone far enough;
and, as citizens, we are pressing to see it further developed.
But an objective assessment will support the judgment that
this is the trend in American policy.

Many Roads to Growth

Now, what about Soviet policy? Leaving China and eastern
Europe apart, what is required from Moscow is a parallel set
of shifts in policy. The bulk of Soviet lending outside the Com-
munist bloc has been localized in a few areas: Egypt, Syria,
and Iraq; Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and India. It is clear that
in each of these areas, excepting India, the Soviet Union has
had clear, short-run strategic objectives— objectives other dian
increasing the rate of growth. The Soviet economic-assistance
program would have to be substantially modified if it were
to offer a basis for a serious collaborative effort with the United
States in the underdeveloped areas.

We all know, however, that the problem of coexistence is
not merely a technical matter of collaboration in accelerating
the process of economic growth. The presently underdevel-
oped areas are moving through the preconditions or into take-
off in a world setting of cold war— of intense ideological and
military competition.

It is the general theme of much Communist thought in the
imderdeveloped areas that only a Communist dictatorship is
capable of overcoming the social and psychological resistances
to modernization and of pressing forward into sustained eco-
nomic growth. We in the West, on the contrary, believe— as a
matter of history and faith— that the problems of the precon-
ditions and of the take-off can be overcome without the sur-

374 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

render of human liberty which the Commiinist formula re-
quires.

I would not wish to enter into the discussion going forward
in Communist countries as to whether there is one or whether
there are many roads to sociahsm. But I would assert cate-
gorically that there are many roads to economic growth. Co-
existence demands that we leave the outcome of the ideologi-
cal debate to the processes of history within each of these
societies; and if we are anxious in our concern for their fate,
that they proceed to solve their problems in a setting where
capital and technical assistance is made available to them,
without strings concerning their pohtical and mihtary ori-
entation.

One may recall the famous phrase of Mao Tse-tung, shortly
after the Communist victory in China in 1949. He announced
his intention to pursue a lean-to-one-side pohcy. The condi-
tion of competitive coexistence in the underdeveloped areas is
that we both pursue policies— both the United States and the
Soviet Union— which encourage stand-up-straight policies.

28. Military or Economic Aid:
Questions of Priority

by Arnold Woifers

Born in Switzerland and an American citizen
since 1939, Dr. Woifers' attention has long
been directed toward the study and interpre-
tation of U.S. foreign policy. He is Ster-
ling Professor Emeritus of International Re-
lations, Yale University, has been a member
of the resident faculty of the National War
College, and since iggj has been director of
the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re-
search, Johns Hopkins University.

In recent years, serious pressures have been exerted upon the
Administration for a shift from the prevailing emphasis on
mihtary assistance (including defense support) to a greater
emphasis on economic aid. These pressures are generated by
at least three distinct motivations, which raise different sets of
questions:

1. Many people, both inside and outside of the United
States, are disturbed that so much expenditure goes into build-
ing up defenses against the Soviet or Communist threat vt^hen
millions of men and women are living in a state of dire poverty.
In terms of American values, or hiunan values generally, they
would naturally prefer to see their country engage in economic
rather than in military aid— as they would prefer a national
budget devoted to social welfare instead of military prepared-
ness. Perhaps the late John Foster Dulles had this in mind
when, on November 26, 1958, he said that "as an abstract
proposition, too much throughout the world is being spent on
mihtary and not enough on economic."

This selection consists of excerpts from the Report of the President's
Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program, July 1959.

37^ PKOBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

However, whether the United States can afford to engage
in costly humanitarian tasks abroad, given the limited funds
likely to be available for foreign aid even imder the best cir-
cumstances, depends obviously on the requirements for press-
ing nonhumanitarian tasks and on the priorities to be allotted
to the various tasks falling under foreign aid.

2. A second motivation behind the demand for a shift to
economic aid is less clearly or not exclusively humanitarian.
The Millikan-Rostow school of thought^ argues forcefully in
favor of an aid program designed to assist all covintries "in
achieving a steady, self-sustaining rate of growth" irrespective
of the "short-run political interests of this country."

The assumption here is that "self-sustaining growth," once
attained, will not merely relieve human poverty but "resolve
the cold war," "render military deterrence superfluous," "con-
vince the Kremlin that the game for Eurasian power hegemony
is hopeless," and thus, in the long nm, accomphsh more ef-
fectively the defense task that is presently being assigned to
military aid and short-run economic aid.

It is necessary to determine whether the assumptions on
which the M.I.T. study rests are valid if a decision is to be
reached on the relative emphasis to be placed on short-range
military and economic aid, on the one hand, and on long-range
economic-development aid on the other.

3. Pressure comes from a third source: Eight senators, in a
letter to the President on August 25, 1958, criticized the "seri-
ous distortion in the present relative importance which is at-
tached to military and related aid, on the one hand, and tech-
nical assistance and self-liquidating economic-development
assistance on the other." These senators may have been moti-
vated in part by the humanitarian and M.I.T. arguments men-
tioned above, but they stated a different reason to justify a
shift to economic aid.

The primary task of the aid program in their view consisted
in "strengthening the resistance of the other nations to totah-
tarianism." They see the danger now faced by the United

1 See the study "The Objectives of United States Economic Assist-
ance Programs," presented to a special committee of the Senate in
July 1957 by the Center of International Studies, Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology.

MILITAHY OR ECONOMIC AID 377

States and the Free World as a Sino-Soviet threat to individual
freedom and civil liberties, rather than as a threat to the in-
dependence of nations from Sino-Soviet control. As a conse-
quence, they fear that mihtary assistance may increase what
they regard as the chief danger, by contributing to the main-
tenance in power of "regimes which have lacked broad sup-
port within the countries we have assisted," by creating "a
militaristic image of the United States," and by "creating in
them perpetuating military hierarchies . . . which . . . may
endanger the very value of individual freedom which we seek
to safeguard."

Here the question must be answered whether, in the light
of the threat of further Sino-Soviet expansion, the United
States can aflFord to give priority to the promotion of Ameri-
can democratic ideals and to the defense of individual freedom
against autocratic government. Communist or other, even
where such defense would tend to increase the Sino-Soviet
military menace. In any case, it should be asked: (i) whether
defense aid against Sino-Soviet expansion caimot be adminis-
tered in a way that will minimize the danger of promoting
the type of autocratic or militaristic rule that runs counter to
American values, and (2) whether it would be wise, anyway,
to interfere with the internal development of other countries
or to try to insist on democratic institutions where the pre-
conditions for their effectiveness are absent.

The problem here is not whether the development of de-
mocracy in other countries is desirable when the necessary pre-
conditions exist— which nobody would deny— but whether in
the face of the Sino-Soviet threat the United States can afford
to combat non-Communist autocratic government in situations
where the short-nm result would be to weaken the mihtary
defenses against the Sino-Soviet threat.

Labels versus Purpose

It clarifies the issues if one distinguishes the actual purposes
for which aid is intended from the labels under which it is
presented to the public at home and abroad. At times, it is
expedient to speak of military assistance, although the recipi-

378 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

ent country is actually in need of aid to bolster its economy
or to balance its payments; in other instances, it is politic to
label the aid as economic although the aim is to strengthen the
military establishment of the recipient. Usually the terms are
almost interchangeable, since almost aU mihtary aid, whether
in dollars or hardware, will reheve the economic strain on the
recipient country and allow it to divert more of its own funds
from armaments to other uses. Conversely, almost any type of
economic assistance gives the recipient country new opportu-
nities to spend more of its own funds on military preparedness
if it so desires.

What needs to be decided, therefore, is not under what
name to accord aid but to what uses the United States wishes
such aid to be put, whether to mihtary use, to economic-
emergency purposes, or, iBnally, to the end of long-term eco-
nomic growth and industrialization.

A division into the two categories of military assistance and
economic assistance is not particularly enhghtening and may,
in fact, be confusing. The chief distinction is between short-
run aid, mihtary or economic, both being in the field of de-
fense broadly conceived, on the one hand, and, on the other,
economic-development aid that wiU bear material fruit at best
after two or three decades. It should be noted that some
sound long-run economic-development programs have favora-
ble short-run psychological and pohtical effects that place
them in the first, or defense, category.

The demands for a shift in the U.S. aid program raise two
different questions:

1. Has the present struggle between East and West changed
in such a way that the short-run task of defense of the West
has come to require more emphasis on economic and less,
therefore, on military aid?

2. Has the present danger of the East- West struggle re-
ceded to a point where short-run defense efforts, whether mili-
tary or economic, should give way to long-run efforts at eco-
nomic development?

MILITARY OR ECONOMIC AID 379

Short-Run Defense Needs

The dangers of the cold war are present dangers. To meet
them, eflForts of the most exacting kind are needed that can
be expected to produce results immediately, or within a brief
period of time. Only if and after they have been met can there
be room for efiForts that will bear fruit at best in two or more
decades hence.

Concerning the short-run efforts, controversy has arisen as
to whether changes in the circumstances characterizing the
East-West struggle have not made military assistance less
valuable than it was some years ago, and economic assistance
more urgent than before. Several arguments have been put
forth sustaining this thesis.

1. It is said that the Soviet bloc has practically given up
the idea of expansion through miHtary conquest, which it tried
in Korea, and is now concentrating on gaining control over
other nations through economic penetration and particularly
through economic aid. The United States must, it is said, be
prepared therefore to meet competition in this new field rather
than to emphasize the race for adequate military defenses.

Undoubtedly, East- West competition in economic aid has
become a fact, but it may be asked whether it constitutes a
substitute for the earlier military competition or has merely
added a new dimension to the struggle. It is worth remember-
ing (a) that in the case of all of the recent serious cold-war
crises— Quem.oy, Iraq and Lebanon, Berlin— the character of
the challenge was military rather than economic, and (b) that
the Soviet and Red Chinese governments can return to the
method of military expansion at any time, since they have not
reduced but continue to increase their military striking power.

2. According to another argument, American strategic doc-
trine places chief reliance on long-range strategic nuclear
striking power rather than on local forces of countries receiv-
ing military assistance. Moreover, since allied local military
power is alleged to have lost much of its former value, it there-
fore becomes more important to supply friends and allies with
economic staying power that will help them resist indirect con-

380 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

quest by infiltration and subversion than to assist in building
up local forces.

If we leave aside for the moment the question of whether
economic aid is regularly a better means of warding off the
dangers of indirect conquest, it should be noted that the strat-
egy of deterrence and defense through strategic nuclear power
is meeting mounting criticism, with many experts arguing that,
in the hght of the high degree of nuclear stalemate, the pos-
sibility of limited military engagements that reqmre on-the-
spot local forces should in the future be given more attention.

3. The argument of the eight senators is also relevant to this
point. As mentioned above, they assume that the issue today
is a struggle between totalitarianism or autocracy, on the one
hand, and individual freedom or democracy, as we understand
it, on the other, rather than a struggle between two antagonis-
tic blocs, one of which is seeking to upset the present world
balance of power in its favor. If this assumption were correct,
only such aid would be justified as promised to promote de-
mocracy and freedom, and it is more likely that economic
rather than military aid would serve this pvirpose, although
neither may be able to stem the tide of autocracy in under-
developed countries.

Against this argument it should be said that if the struggle
in fact were essentially concerned with autocracy in all of its
forms, and not with Sino-Soviet expansion and control, the
United States and its Western allies would have lost the battle
for the time being. The West today is a democratic island in
a sea of autocracy, though autocracy varying widely in degree
and character. Communist here, Fascist or military elsewhere.

The struggle has not been lost for good, however, as long as
the Sino-Soviet bloc remains contained within its present bor-
ders. In time, many of the autocracies may become hberalized.
Meanwhile, although foreign aid should be administered in a
way that will promote rather than hinder a process of liber-
ahzation, democratic values would not be served if the means
of containment were neglected and these countries were al-
lowed to fall into the arms of Soviet totahtarianism, thereby
becoming the enemies of the West and losing most of their
chance of future hberalization.

MILITARY OR ECONOMIC AID 38 1

External versus Internal Defense

In the defense field it makes sense to distinguish between
aid intended to help countries protect themselves against ex-
ternal Sino-Soviet military attack and aid intended to help
them withstand internal events and pressures that would draw
them into the Soviet orbit even in the absence of any external
attack. The first, which covers both military deterrence and
defense, might be called aid in the context of "hot-war strat-
egy," the latter, aid in the context of "cold-war strategy/'

1. In terms of hot-war strategy, there can be no substitute
for military aid (including defense support) if the aim is to
improve the abihties of the indigenous forces of the recipient
country to stand up against an external military attack. This
is not to say that it would be wise for the United States to try
to bolster the military capabilities of all members of the non-
Communist world. Military assistance to the coimtries that are
exposed to Sino-Soviet military attack must be looked at with
a critical eye and with regard to a number of considerations.
The area of the recipient country may not be worth the costs
of its defense; or no amount of aid within reason could build
up local forces to a level at which they would be both able
and willing to take up arms against a Sino-Soviet attacker; or
better military results, dollar by dollar, may come from ex-
penditures on the American defense establishment; or the ef-
fort required to build up indigenous forces adequate for ex-
ternal defense may wreck the recipient country by destroying
its internal pohtical, social, or economic balance. However,
where the conditions are favorable, military assistance adds to
the defensive power of the anti-Soviet coalition and thus to
the security of the United States.

(It might be worth mentioning that on occasion it makes
sense to give extemal-mihtary-defense assistance to countries
that are in no danger from the Sino-Soviet bloc at aU but whose
survival is necessary to the stability of a regional power bal-
ance. Military assistance to Israel or Jordan falls under this
heading since it serves the purpose of balancing the military
power of non-Communist countries and, by making them ca-

382 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

pable of mutual deterrence, of pacifying the non-Communist
world, )

2. In respect to cold-war strategy, where the issue is in-
ternal rather than external defense, the relative merits of mili-
tary aid and economic aid, and the character to give to either,
raise difiBcult and controversial questions. Unless they are an-
swered, no decision can be reached for or against a shift to
more economic aid, or from short-range economic aid to more
long-range economic-development assistance.

There would seem to be three distinct ways in which coun-
tries might fall imder Soviet control by events short of war,
or at least refuse to be aligned with the West:

(a) The government in power may decide to shift the al-
legiance of its country to the side of the Soviet bloc, or to
choose a course of "positive neutrahty" favorable to the So-
viets, or, finally, to give up ties with the West based on
coUective-defense agreements in favor of genuine neutrality.

(b) Opposition parties may come into power and replace a
pro-Western or neutral government with a pro-Soviet gov-
ernment.

(c) Communist forces within the country may arise to
power, presumably on the basis of considerable revolutionary
public support, and turn the country into a Soviet or Red Chi-
nese satellite and people's democracy.

Not all of these dangers are present in each of the countries
that are presently or potentially recipients of U.S. aid. The
government of Chiang Kai-shek will not, and in fact cannot,
swing to the Soviet side or tiun neutral. In Europe, the only
conceivable danger would be a shift of a NATO country from
aUiance to genuine neutrality, which would raise the question
of the price it woxild be worth paying to prevent such a shift.

Almost everywhere, there are opposition forces with more or
less anti- Western sentiments but whose ascendancy to power
would not everywhere be sufficiently detrimental to Free
World defenses for the United States to let itself be black-
mailed into giving unlimited support to the "friendly" in group.

The danger of a rise of indigenous communism, supported
by the Sino-Soviet bloc, diflFers greatiy from country to coim-
try. It, too, is frequently exaggerated by a government in
power as a means of obtaining whatever aid it wants. It is

MILITAEY OR ECONOMIC AID 383

also doubtful in many instances whether such aid will stem
the Communist tide. Some aid, in fact, tends instead to in-
crease Communist strength in the recipient country, because
it bolsters an unpopular regime.

Stability Aid: Military and Economic

It is often argued that the economic poverty of the mass of
the population is the source of the major internal threat to
Western interests. The conclusion is that economic aid is the
logical answer, whereas mihtary assistance tends to burden the
recipient country with a military establishment that will re-
duce the hving standards of most of the civihan population
and thus, in fact, enhance the internal danger.

However, of the three types of internal threats to the West
listed above, none can be definitely and universally traced to
the misery or aspirations of the mass of the people, though a
dissatisfied and rebellious populace may be a factor behind
any one of the three threats. As a rule, the most effective type
of aid will be aid that promises to give the greatest satisfaction
to those elite groups who are eager to keep the country out
of Communist or Soviet control.

1. In many instances mihtary assistance may be the best
means of bringing about such stabihty and satisfaction. A
strong mihtary estabhshment can be an element of order; it
gives the government authority and prestige; it offers to many
a chance of social and technical advancement. However, not
aU demands for military assistance or for "internal order and
immunity against communism through military strength" are
justified in terms of the American interest. Military autocracies
are not always stable; they may provoke rebeUion led by the
Communists. They are not always reliable; there have been
cases where the leaders of the armed forces or influential junior
officers have gone over to the Soviet camp (Syria? Iraq?) . Ex-
cessive mihtarization may break the economies of weak coun-
tries, or it may arouse fears in neighboring non-Communist
coimtries, or split the international non-Communist camp
(Pakistan-India). Mihtary assistance as a means of stemming
the internal dangers should be scrutinized carefully, therefore.

384 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

country by country, with an eye to any adverse eflEects it may
have in particular instances.

2. Short-run economic aid, or what can be called either
economic-emergency aid or economic-defense aid, has a vital
part to play in the defense against the internal dangers men-
tioned earlier. Here Soviet competition in economic aid be-
comes a major factor, though it is not the only justification for
such aid.

Soviet economic competition or no competition, there is rea-
son to fear that governments in grave financial, monetary, or
commercial difficulties may be overthrown, or may look else-
where for support, and that economic crises may lead to the
kinds of dangerous unrest on which the Communists can capi-
talize. Therefore, economic-emergency aid— short-run assist-
ance to help countries overcome monetary, fiscal, or bal-
ance-of-payment troubles— is an important defense tool. Its
significance has increased since the Soviet Union entered the
economic field and now stands ready to offer emergency aid if
help from the West is not forthcoming, or is not adequate.

One should not conclude that the U.S. aid program should
provide funds sufficient to meet every emergency. In many in-
stances, rehance on U.S. aid tends to perpetuate the emergency
or increase the probabiHty of its repetition— governments that
can coimt on being bailed out have no incentive to raise taxes,
reduce spending, or do any of the other painful things that
would remedy the situation. As a consequence, the doUar gap,
the inflationary pressures, the budgetary deficits, may continue
unabated. In the case of all countries receiving or demanding
economic-emergency aid, it must be asked, therefore, whether
the risks of their alienation or of their acceptance of Soviet aid
are great enough to justify an assistance intended to remedy
deficiencies caused by their own imsound fiscal or economic
poHcies.

Long-run economic aid, properly called economic-develop-
ment aid, must be treated separately, both because of the large
investment of fvmds it requires and because of its pecuhar re-
lationship to the defense tasks of the United States and its
alhes.

MBLITARY OR ECONOMIC AID 385

Economic-Development Aid

The idea of long-run economic-development aid to under-
developed countries is extremely appealing, not only because
it suggests help to the imderprivileged and represents a con-
structive effort but also because it conforms with, long-run
American interests. It promises advantages to the *Tiaves," the
countries of high living standards, similar to those that slum
clearance offers to the privileged parts of an urban commu-
nity. However, the benefits that flow from the actual com-
pletion and successful operation of economic-development
schemes, for which the Aswan Dam can serve as a symbol,
are likely to translate themselves into benefits for the mass of
the impoverished sections of a people only after decades, as
the M.I.T. report emphasizes. Therefore, even if all the as-
sumptions of the M.I.T. report were accepted— that the recipi-
ent country will, in fact, devote the development aid to de-
velopment and not to current uses, that it has and employs
the necessary skills to bring the projects to fruition, that it will
survive the long interim period as a free covmtry— the material
benefits of industrialization which lie in a more or less remote
future cannot in themselves remove or lessen the present dan-
gers of the cold war.

In order to serve as an instrument of cold-war strategy, here
and now, economic-development aid must be of a kind that has
psychological results favorable to the West long before it pro-
duces any material results. Some development aid has this ef-
fect, and the Soviets have not been slow to realize it. In the
competition for the allegiance of governments and for the
preferences of elites and peoples, particularly of the uncom-
mitted nations, the winner may well be the country that can
best demonstrate its concern for an imderdeveloped country's
industrialization and future economic well-being, no matter
how remote and uncertain these may be. (Victory in this com-
petition may come long before the long-run projects are com-
pleted, and in fact independently of whether they ever are
completed or ever prove economically sound.)

Here one runs into a serious dilemma. From the point of

386 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

view of cold-war strategy, a relatively phony "economic-
development" project, such as the paving of the streets of
Kabul by the Soviets, may be more successful than a very
costly but in the long run sound irrigation project. Yet it would
be tragic if large funds had to be wasted on the type of
phony aid for which the Soviet Union shows a marked prefer-
ence. Probably it will be fovmd that the competitive value of
the phony aid is short-hved and that sound projects, if properly
publicized and attractive to the ehtes of a country, will pay
higher dividends even in the cold war.

What needs to be stressed, however, is the fallacy of think-
ing that the time has come to shift from "unconstructive" de-
fense aid (mihtary aid and short-term economic-emergency
aid) to "constructive" soimd long-term economic-development
aid. The latter can at best have a psychological side eflFect
that will be valuable to the present and exacting defense effort
imposed by the cold war. It is also hkely to have unfavorable
effects, such as creating social dislocation, increasing a restless
industrial proletariat, or undermining an estabhshed cultural
and rehgious order. The M.I.T. report takes hghtly the proba-
bihty that the transition period of several decades preceding
self-sustaining growth will witness "an increase in the appe-
tites for improvement surpassing the resources for their sat-
isfaction and cause unrest." The authors of the report must
assume that the Free World can afford to create additional
dangers for itself while waiting for the happy outcome of its
long-range efforts. If this assumption is not justified, economic-
development aid must be judged in each instance on the basis
of shorter-range calculations, which weigh the favorable psy-
chological effects of "holding out the prospect of economic
betterment" against whatever imfavorable effects— social dis-
ruption or increased political instability— may materialize dur-
ing the transition period. Only so can the expected net benefit
be compared with the advantages that would flow from using
the funds for economic-emergency aid, military assistance, or
additional American national armaments.

It may seem out of place to raise doubts about the value
of vmderwriting the economic development of friendly but un-
derdeveloped countries or to suggest limiting such aid, as a
rule, to the amounts either needed to meet Soviet competition

MILITARY OR ECONOMIC AID 387

in development aid or likely to produce short-range psycholog-
ical capital for the donor. Particularly with respect to India,
it is argued that unless India, through our assistance, can
match Red China's economic development, the cause of the
Free World and its way of life will be damaged beyond repair
throughout the underdeveloped parts of the world. To this it
can be answered that unfortunately no amount of economic
aid will be able to supply India with the equivalent in capital
and working hours that the Communist regime can extort from
its people. It can also be suggested that if external economic
aid by the United States helps India over its short-run emer-
gencies, gives her technical and educational assistance, and
meets Soviet psychological competition by some striking dem-
onstrations of Western skill, the United States may be doing
as much as it can to meet the dangers flowing from a Red
Chinese victory in the productivity race. Similar considerations
would apply to other countries in which the government, hke
that of India, is genuinely concerned with economic develop-
ment. Where it is not— and cannot be induced to be so con-
cerned—favorable psychological side effects are the only worth-
while results to be anticipated from economic-development aid
anyway; here, even the resort to "phonies" may be expedient.

by Robert L. Garner

Mr. Garner, president of the International
Finance Corporation, has since IQ17 been
active in the hanking field. A native of Mis-
sissippi, he received his B.S. degree from
Vanderbilt University and did graduate work
at the School of Journalism, Columbia Uni-
versity. During World War I he served as a
captain with the jjth Infantry Division in
France. From IQ47 to 1956 he was vice-
president of the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development. Since it was
formed, in 1956, he has been president of the
International Finance Corporation, an affiliate
of the World Bank. Mr. Garner lectured at
the first National Strategy Seminar for Re-
serve Officers.

The Communist objective to bring all the world under its
domination, frankly proclaimed by its leaders, is steadfast; the
strategy and tactics of communism are most flexible. Having
emphasized various combinations of violence, military threats
and action, subversion and propaganda, the Commimists' most
recent strategy gambit is economic penetration.

The play now seems to be centered on the imderdeveloped
world, principally the Middle and Far East and Africa but
also, to an increasing extent, Latin America. If Commilmsts
can gain control of the manpower and natural resources in

This chapter is based on an address made by the author to the
fourth annual National Military-Industrial Conference in Chicago,
February 18, 1958. Printed by the kind permission of the author
and the International Finance Corporation.

PRIVATE enterprise: America's best export 389

such areas, they might well hope gradually to isolate and
strangle the United States and Europe.

The Stakes in the Underdeveloped World

In these less-developed areas, the revolution of communism
encounters another revolution in process— an economic and so-
cial revolution. Whole peoples are learning for the first time of
ways of life different from their ancestral status. This awaken-
ing, in certain areas, coincides with the decline of colonialism
and other forms of control or supervision on the part of the
more highly developed countries. It is not surprising that the
impact of new economic, social, and political factors, even in
those less-developed countries which have long been poUtically
independent, have produced great stresses and strains.

A great part of the world is now catching a glimpse of the
industrial progress which transformed the United States and
Europe during the past centuries. The peoples of the emerging
nations face new and difficult conditions and problems, a fact
which we need to keep in mind when we meet with their
sensitivities, their sometimes extreme nationalism, and their
suspicions. Since the past with which they are breaking was
related to the West, their suspicions and fears are directed
principally in that direction, not toward Russia, from which
they have heretofore been largely isolated. All of this affords a
happy hunting ground for the Communists.

The above outline of Communist strategy is obviously over-
simphfied. It requires two additional comments. First, only at
our peril do we fail to realize that the Communists will
quickly use any possible weapon or device whenever the
changing scene, or any misstep or weakness of the Free World,
provides them with an opening. Second, in working toward
their objective, the Communists take the long-range view.
They will not be discouraged if they cannot dominate the
world in this decade; there still lies before them the next
century.

We, too, need to plan for the long pull. Economically, we
have a vital stake in what happens in the non-Communist
world outside our borders. Increasingly our growing industry

390 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

feeds upon imported raw materials— iron ore, copper, manga-
nese, and innumerable other essentials which we either lack or
of which we have insufficient quantities. Industry, as well as
agriculture, is geared to produce in excess of our consumption,
and our needs for foreign markets are growing. Access both
to raw materials and to the markets wiU depend upon the po-
litical, social, and economic direction taken by the countries
concerned. This applies particularly to those coimtries which
are in the early stages of economic development. They are go-
ing to develop— the question is whether they will develop along
the hnes of economic and pohtical freedom or in ways which
incline them towards communism.

The Fallacy of Rapid and Massive
Development Schemes

A substantial number of informed Americans basically agree
that the course of the economic development of emerging na-
tions wiU have a significant bearing on our security and pros-
perity. However, there is a wide range of opinion regarding
the pace at which progress in the less-developed countries can
be made. A considerable school of thought takes the line that,
to meet the rising expectations of these countries, we must
somehow speed the pace of development so that Hving stand-
ards of their peoples Vidll be greatly improved within a few
years. These advocates feel the hot breath of communism on
our collective necks and stress that, vmless we muster an extra
biu-st of speed, much of the world will go Communist by de-
fault. And, believing that money makes the mare go, they hold
that the speed of development depends largely upon the
amount of funds the United States provides. They contend that
any possible expense to us for such development is small com-
pared with the cost of war.

The motives behind these exhortations are beyond re-
proach. But wiU the methods suggested be eflFective?

The greatest experiment in intergovernmental aid was the
Marshall Plan for Europe. On balance, the plan was success-
ful: it assisted western Europe to get back on its feet and per-
haps saved it from commimism. But the Marshall Plan was a

PRIVATE enterprise: AMERICAS BEST EXPORT 39 1

reconstruction project in an area long developed industrially,
politically, and socially. Experienced leaders, competent ad-
ministrators, and skilled workmen were available. The Euro-
peans knew how to use the tools we supplied.

While U.S. aid has not widely won the gratitude of Europe
(which we should never have wished or expected) or, more
important, won general agreement with, and support of, our
policies, the Marshall Plan was justified in our own self-
interest. Whether or not European countries like us, Europe
has today a relatively strong and stable economy, with many
basic interests similar to ours.

It seems wise to consider some lessons learned from this ex-
perience.

First, it gives strong support to the view that govemment-
to-govemment aid does not win friends. Second, it shows that
economic aid, as all other aspects of foreign policy, should be
based on national self-interest. And finally, the experience of
the Marshall Plan indicates that economic progress is not
chiefly a matter of capital, but of men competent to apply
capital to natural and human resources under conditions of
relative political and social stability. And the scarcity of such
men and of such conditions on the economic frontiers of the
world today is holding back development much more than
is lack of capital.

The Characteristics of Underdeveloped Areas

In varying degree and with exceptions which do not alter
the general pattern, it is accurate to outline the prevailing
characteristics in underdeveloped areas somewhat as follows:

1. A considerable degree of political and financial instabil-
ity, particularly among the newly independent countries, but
not uncommon even among those with a century or more of
political independence behind them, as in Latin America.

2. Economic systems largely agricultural— much of it merely
subsistence farming— with wealth in the hands of a few and
Uttle in the way of a stabilizing middle class in between.

3. A shortage of people trained and experienced in manage-
ment and administration, public or private; at the same time,

392 PKOBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

many with good academic or professional education find no
suitable jobs.

4. Unsure and erratic financial administration, accompa-
nied by inflation, which induces flight of local capital, quick-
turn speculation, and investment largely in such things as real
estate.

5. Traditions and habits which frequently run coimter to
economic development.

These are some of the handicaps. On the credit side of these
new frontiers are substantial natural resources— some of them
exceedingly great— waiting to be put to use. There is an
abundance of people who, with sound leadership, training,
and the prudent apphcation of capital, could produce much
more and hve much better. Almost everywhere these people
are in the throes of economic development. The question is
how development can be achieved, and what manner of effec-
tive assistance the United States can give.

The objective of United States policy should be to encour-
age and aid orderly and continuous progress toward the devel-
opment of the natural and human resources of these countries,
along lines which give promise of their achieving the habits
of free and stable institutions and a decent hving for their peo-
ple, and in the hope that this vidll block the encroachments of
communism.

However attractive another objective might appear— namely,
to bind recipients to us as firm allies in our defense against
communism— we must regretfully conclude that our aid pro-
gram has had only limited success in this area and seems im-
likely to have greater success in the future. Cotmtries are anti-
Communist or neutral or inclined toward the Communists
because of their own interpretation of their self-interests, and
seldom, if ever, because of our financial assistance. Only as
they achieve conditions which bring them to identify their in-
terests as being in accord with the way of life which we repre-
sent will they act on our side.

PRIVATE enterprise: AMERICAS BEST EXPORT 393

The Shortcomings of Government Assistance

Now let us consider some of the means by which we might
obtain the objective. This ^Titer's observation leads him to
question the merit of large amounts of loans and grants from
the U. S. Government, whether their purpose is primarily to
promote development in the recipient countries or to facilitate
certain special classes of U.S. exports. This does not mean, of
course, that in certain special cases U. S. Government aid can-
not be justified on grounds of important national interests of
the United States and where there is not a basis for the recipi-
ents to borrow on the test of capacity to repay.

Financial assistance to underdeveloped areas should largely
be to improve basic htmian and physical facilities as a neces-
sary foundation for future economic progress. Such assistance
would be more realistic if given largely in the form of grants
and not of loans, which may well be beyond their capacity to
repay and may prevent them from becoming credit-worthy for
a long time in the future. This is quite difiFerent from a program
of our government's financing economic development every-
where. It is not so much that the amount of money involved
might not be worth the gamble, but such a program is not
Ukely to achieve the objective of sotmdly building the econo-
mies of the recipients or of reducing the blandishments of
communism. It is doubtful that in the long run it helps either
them or us.

Experience in international lending seems to indicate that
only a limited amount of funds can effectively be invested by
most of these countries in any given time. They need outside
planning and supervision of expenditures, but their national
sensitivity makes it difficult for the United States to set effec-
tive economic Hmitations and conditions. PoUtical considera-
tions inevitably play a large part in such transactions— a fact
which is realized and resented by the recipients. Short-range
programs, inherent in our legislative process, change con-
stantly and thus reduce the effectiveness of the aid. There are
inevitable contradictions between financial aid on the one hand
and tariff and other policies on the other, which retard the

394 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

progress that our funds seek to promote. Aid to one country
spurs pressure from others, and the attitude has been built up
among some undeveloped countries that they have a vested
right to financial assistance from the United States, irrespec-
tive of what they do to help themselves.

Furthermore, the U. S. Government is frequently induced
to finance industrial projects owned and managed by govern-
ments, sometimes in the absence of all efforts by these govern-
ments to raise all or part of their capital from private sources
and in the absence of any provision for adequate management.
Not only are the governments generally ill-equipped to pro-
vide efficient management, with the result that not infre-
quently these projects are liabilities to economic development,
but their control by government encourages a trend to the col-
lective state, which is certainly more in accord with Com-
munist objectives than with ours.

The Merits of Private Investment

The question may well be raised as to where, if the U. S.
Government is not to provide the funds, reasonable credits may
be available to governments for those appropriate enterprises
necessary to economic development. The answer is that the
World Bank was created for such purpose and that it is con-
tinuing to provide loans to credit-worthy countries under con-
ditions not only to insure sound selection and execution of
projects but to influence the adoption by the borrowing coun-
tries of economic policies and practices which promote solid
development. More than $3 billion of such loans have been
extended (helping to finance projects having a total cost of
some $6 to $7 billion). The record will confirm that they
have been handled on a sound business basis without political
considerations and have made a notable contribution to eco-
nomic progress.

There are several reasons why the encouragement of private
industrial development in the less-developed countries, par-
ticularly through the establishment and expansion of private
American business operations in them, can best promote de-
velopment. Our private-enterprise system is an intrinsic part

PBIVATE enterprise: AMERICA S BEST EXPORT 395

of our way of life— it is what we do best and what, therefore,
we can demonstrate most eflFectively. And free enterprise is an
integral component of man's whole free way of Hfe.

The most dynamic force in producing a better life, and a
more worthy life, comes from the initiative of the individual—
the opportunity to create, to produce, to achieve for himself
and his family— each to the best of his individual talents. This
is the essence of the system of competitive private enteiprise—
twentieth-century model— as it has been developed by en-
hghtened and successful business concerns.

Since this system has produced its benefits for us, why
should we not promote most vigorously its spread among those
we wish to aid in their development? American business is
now increasingly inclined to look abroad. It is aware of the
profitable record which companies operating abroad have
achieved in the past. It feels the need for developing new re-
sources overseas and the opportunities for profitable markets.

There are tangible results when U.S. business (and this can
apply to European business as well) extends its operations
abroad. Among them can be hsted the following:

It provides foreign capital and management, so that unused
local resources can be profitably utilized.

It creates new jobs and teaches new skills. Usually these
jobs pay better than the local prevailing wages.

It offers opportunities to local people to learn the elements
of modem management and business, now so often lacking
even among men of education and abifity.

It introduces new concepts of production and marketing,
labor relations and financing, and other progressive business
practices. It plants the seeds of initiative, ingenuity, change,
and growth.

It provides better and cheaper products to local consumers,
and in certain cases develops new export products.

In a number of cases, and the trend seems to be in this
direction, foreign enterprise attracts local capital, thus stimu-
lating the investment climate and laying the basis for develop-
ment of local capital markets.

And finally, by demonstrating the widespread advantages
of sound free enterprise, not only to local entreprenetirs but
also to employees, to consumers, and to the community at

396 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

large, it helps to remove misconceptions that private enterprise
benefits only the few. All of this tends to relieve pressures on
governments to extend their activities into business.

American business, in looking for opportunities abroad, is
naturally selective, being wary of those countries where po-
litical or financial instability or hostility to foreign enterprise
presents acute risks. It is properly cautious of the risks of
rampant inflation and of such ill-advised actions by local gov-
ernments as burdensome controls and restrictions, expropria-
tions, and violation of contracts. Yet one can confidently say
that there has been, over the past several years, a general im-
provement in the investment climate in the undeveloped
countries. If American enterprise extends its operations where
conditions are reasonably favorable, the benefits of American
investment will become quickly apparent to other countries.

Some Concrete Measures

The following steps are suggested as part of a definite pro-
gram for the encouragement of the export of American private
enterprise:

First, our government must support more positively expan-
sion of private business abroad. Too frequently ofiBcials take a
negative attitude toward free enterprise and neither defend nor
promote it. We must enlarge existing information programs
for foreign students, joumalists, and businessmen in order to
explain and demonstrate our system. Perhaps we might say
less about our comforts and gadgets and more about how,
setting foot on a hostile and unexplored continent, we have
by hard work and initiative created a better hfe for all our
people in freedom.

Second, use should be made of every legitimate inducement
to stimulate foreign investment. The most practical would be
positive tax incentives.

Third, there must be firm support by our goveniment of
the rights of U.S. business which invests abroad, including vig-
orous stands against discrimination or against violation of con-
tractual rights by foreign governments.

Fourth, our government agencies should exercise restraint

PRIVATE enterprise: AMERICA S BEST EXPORT 397

in financing foreign governments in enterprises suitable for pri-
vate capital. Exception should be made only in cases of ab-
solute urgency where every effort to develop private interest
has failed.

There is frequently an alternative to government investment
if sufficient effort is made. The World Bank has proved this
in more than one instance. The Commtmists preach their doc-
trine of absolute state control of all economic activities. We
should counter their offensive by promoting our incomparably
superior system.

In assisting economic development we should take care to
assure recipients that our help will strengthen the values in
which we believe. Modem machines and money alone will not
win the minds of men to our side. We need to demonstrate
faith in our way of Hfe. Let us not merely defend against the
Communist Manifesto, but let us attack their brutal system
with our own Manifesto of Free Enterprise.

by James F. Brownlee

A trustee of the Committee for Economic De-
velopment since 1946, Mr. Brownlee brought
to the organization wide experience and
knowledge acquired in business and in gov-
ernment service. He served as a member of
the Business Advisory Council and the War
Production Board; was director of the Trans-
portation War Food Administration, deputy
administrator in the Office of Price Adminis-
tration, and deputy director in the Office of
Economic Stabilization. He served as chair-
man of the CED Subcommittee on Economic
Policies for National Security, which in 1958
issued the policy statement "The Problem of
National Security." He is chairman of the
board of Minute Maid Corporation and a di-
rector of the American Sugar Refining Com-
pany, R. H. Macy 6- Company, the Chase
Manhattan Bank, and the Gillette Safety
Razor Company.

How much should the American people be willing to spend
lor security against their foes?

This is a question that has no easy answer. But the Ameri-
can people, determined that their national defense be assured

This selection is based on the article prepared by tJie author to pre-
sent in brief form the substance of the "Statement an National Pol-
icy" issued by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee
for Economic Development. It was originally published in booklet
form by the CED in August 1958 and is reprinted by permission of
the CED and the author.

THE DEFENSE WE CAN AFFORD 399

and hoping to avoid war, cannot afford the luxury of not pay-
ing the bill.

Periodically the timid suggestion comes from many quarters
that high expenditures for national defense might lead the
country to economic stagnation or collapse. A realistic ap-
praisal of the situation shows that this fear has been greatly
exaggerated. The truth of the matter is that the American
people will have to decide for themselves what they think se-
curity is worth. But they can afford whatever has to be spent
in the cause of national defense.

We live today in a situation of constant danger, a danger
we are Ukely to be Uving with for years to come. Since there
seems to be no foreseeable future without danger to peace,
no probabihty of a return to normalcy, we must not hobble
ourselves with the notion that there is some arbitrary limit on
what we can spend for defense or a limit that we can exceed
only with disastrous consequences.

Threats We Face

Today we are in a position of great uncertainty. We cannot
select one most probable form that the threat to our security
may take and prepare for that in the hope of thus avoiding
the costs of preparing for alternative threats.

We do know that we wiU not be the aggressor in any pos-
sible war. We do know that we have no ambitions of world
conquest. At the same time there is great uncertainty as to
both present and future Communist capabilities and inten-
tions. We must prepare for many contingencies. The Soviets
maintain and utilize a wide variety of capabilities. Their poli-
cies will be adapted to exploit our weaknesses. The conse-
quences of putting all our eggs in one basket would be terrible
to contemplate. We must accept the circtimstances that any
"hot" war, total or peripheral, would come at a time and,
initially, at a place chosen by our adversaries. We will not get
in the first blow, and we must be prepared to react to military
aggression whenever and wherever it may come.

With the advent of thermonuclear air power and ballistic
missiles, the swiftness with which the Soviet Union has de-

400 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

veloped its atomic and missile capabilities, and the decisive
superiority of offensive over defensive weapons, the United
States now lives under the threat of instantaneous and im-
measurable destruction. To deter such an attack, and meet it
should it come, even the largest war potential is of no avail.
In the United States as well as in allied countries, what is
needed for this purpose is military forces-in-being and the ca-
pacity quickly to restore a broken economy. Previous prepara-
tions, not reserves or potential reserves, will be crucial in such
a war.

But it is not only the military threat we must face. The
Soviet bloc employs economic blandishment on a wide scale,
uses foreign trade as a pohtical weapon, combines subversion
with supplying arms and money, and capitalizes upon the eco-
nomic and political instabihty of the imderdeveloped countries
in its unceasing struggle to control the world.

Meeting this threat is costly. From 1955 to 1957 expendi-
tures for provisions for national security averaged 1 1 per cent
of our gross national product, as compared with only a little
over 1 per cent back in the 1930s. We are not suie even these
sums have been adequate.

The Soviet Union has developed with great speed in the last
few years a series of operational modem weapons systems. We
have no reason to think she will not continue to advance in
this field. Her rapid growth in science and industry and her
leaders' determination to assign the best of Russia's human and
material resources to the increase of its mihtary power only
prove to us that the Communists can, and probably will, in-
crease their pressures upon us.

At no time in history has our survival depended not so much
upon the state of combat readiness as upon "the battle of the
laboratories." It is for this reason that Soviet leaders have in-
vested much more than we in training manpower for research
and development. They know that, Hke saving and investing,
research and innovation are keys to growing productive and
military power. They firmly beheve we are Hving in a scientific
age. Their educational system has become permeated with this
view.

We should meet the challenge. By accelerated research and
rapid technological advance in our own weapons and those of

THE DEFENSE WE CAN AFFOBD 4^1

our allies, we might well render obsolete the military equip-
ment of our opponents and thus put a great and even crippling
strain upon the Communist economies. Indeed, whether the
point of cold-war competition is scientific leadership, inter-
national trade, economic development of the underdeveloped
countries, propaganda, or whatever, our larger economic base
is an advantage upon which we should capitalize far more
than we have done up to this time.

It would be a delusion to believe that the Soviet threat will
let us continue with "government and business as usual." We
do not live any more in a "usual" world.

The Problem of Choice

We face a seemingly endless list of choices. Should we con-
centrate upon delivering hydrogen bombs to the homeland of
the potential aggressor, thus running the risk of a full-fledged,
universal nuclear war? If we follow this course, should we use
more of our resources for building up civil defense and our
capacity to recuperate from disastrous retaliatory blows? Or
should we support a military organization geared to react to
local and limited aggression by use of conventional forces and
nuclear weapons adapted to the attainment of strictly limited
objectives?

How much should we spend on increasing the mobility of
ground forces? How much on guided and ballistic missiles and
their supporting installations? How much for basic research?
How much to the improvement of weapons likely to be out of
date two or three years from now? How much on submarines?
How much on the conquest of outer space?

The implications of these questions are apparent, and many
of the choices may have awful consequences. They may seri-
ously affect QUI future survival. If we shift too large a propor-
tion of our funds from planes to research and development,
we may find ourselves at a critical moment vdthout sufficient
retaliatory striking power. Prototypes and missiles on the draw-
ing board cannot fight. If we economize excessively on re-
search and development, including basic research, we may
discover that the Soviet Union has achieved a technological

402 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STBATEGY

breakthrough in a weapons system which renders our forces-
in-being obsolete. If we are parsimonious about active and
civilian air defense, and the "big deterrent" fails to deter, we
may have caused the death of millions who might have stir-
vived. If we spend so much on air defense or on large con-
ventional surface forces that we caimot provide enough for
retaliation, we may have blunted our crucial power of deter-
rence. If we economize excessively on mobile ground forces
and tactical air forces that are able to engage in local wars,
we may see Communist rule expand by means of military
blackmail or local warfare because we hesitate to unleash an
unlimited nuclear war of mutual destruction.

These choices, once made, cannot be quickly changed. They
wiU determine our state of readiness for many years into the
future. Throughout the military establishment there is a lead
time, often stretching over several years, before decisions on
the development of weapons or new fighting units yield new
military power ready for immediate use.

It took six years for the B-52 to move from the drawing-
board stage to that of combat readiness. It takes a long time,
from the initial decision, to man, equip, and train an air-borne
division. This lengthy cycle in the production of modem mili-
tary forces means that many errors in deciding on the size,
composition, and equipment of the armed services cannot be
quickly retrieved. This holds equally true of measures designed
to prepare the United States for withstanding and recovering
from unlimited thermonuclear attack.

In making important decisions on defense, errors are likely
to be frequent, fateful, and, except over long time spans, irre-
coverable. This calls for prudence. We cannot afford to gamble
for the sake of economy.

Thus, it can be seen that the making of choices on the divi-
sion of our national-security dollars are many and hard. That
we will err in some of our decisions is obvious. Even with
reasonable intelligence in making the decisions, the less we
spend on defense the harder will be our choices, die more we
wiU have to rely on our frail capacity to foresee the future.
And the fewer wiU be the contingencies against which we can
defend ourselves.

THE DEFENSE WE CAN AFFOBD 403

The Health of Our Economy

The United States need not turn itself into a garrison state.
But it may have to spend more of its output in order to save
itself from disaster in this frighteningly changing world. Since
this is unfortunately, but overwhelmingly, the case, we are
faced with a serious problem. And this is the main theme of
this chapter: How much are we willing to spend for national
defense? To this should be added another question: How much
can we afford to spend?

In determining the size of our defense effort, we will have to
distinguish clearly and sharply between the limitations im-
posed by the amount of our total production that we are will-
ing to devote to this purpose and the limitation imposed by the
consideration that too heavy a defense burden will weaken our
economy— and with it our abihty to maintain our security for
the long run.

In recent years there have been periods of contraction in
defense spending of some magnitude, based primarily on the
Mddely held behef that the so-called "American way of life"
has been threatened by economic deterioration vidthin, as well
as by aggression from without, and by the belief that a "sound
economy" is the first mainstay of defense.

This sharply felt, but vaguely understood, fear may well
have acted as a hindrance to making rational decisions by our
people and their national leaders. What it has most effectively
done is to make apparent the need for a new look at both
defense and nondefense programs to see whether we should
spend more on the mihtary aspects. As the Research and
Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment has stated:

Preconceptions about the expenditures we can afford,
the taxes we can stand, or the debt we can bear should
not be allowed to interfere with informed and rational
balancing of the gains and losses of enlarged national se-
curity programs.

This raises two important questions: (i) Should we accept
a high rate of defense expenditures (and the taxes that go

404 PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STRATEGY

with it) , even if this leaves the nation's economy fully intact?
(2) Will this high spending (and taxing) undermine the
soundness of the economy, even if as patriotic individuals we
are willing to assume the tax burden?

If high defense expenditures threaten to sap the strength of
the economy, we must take heed; a healthy economy is the
major base not only of our defense eflFort but of the entire
American way of life. By a healthy economy is meant one in
which saving, investment, and innovation are sufficient to keep
up productive growth, with the GNP rising by an annual aver-
age of from 3 to 4 per cent. It means, too, generally high
employment, without inflation or deflation. And finally, it
means the maintenance of an acceptable balance between pri-
vate and public economic decisions, without unwarranted gov-
ernmental controls.

If we can finance defense without inflationary methods, we
need not— in the absence of war— impose direct governmental
controls over the economy to stabihze prices. Such controls
are in conflict with our private-enterprise system's major eco-
nomic objectives of growth and stability. The Committee for
Economic Development is convinced that the necessity to
choose between defense-occasioned inflation and governmental
controls can be avoided by sufficient taxation.

We see no need to be apprehensive about whether or not
the American economy can stand the strain of the present
budget or even a considerably larger one. The risk that defense
spending of from 10 to 15 per cent of the gross national prod-
uct, or if necessary even more, will nain the American way of
life is slight indeed. It is even less Hkely that there is some
magic number for defense expenditures that, if exceeded,
would bring economic disaster; rather, the impairment of
growth caused by increasing taxes is a gradually rising one.
We have not reached a point at which anxiety over the healthy
functioning of the economy demands that defense expenditures
be slashed regardless of the dictates of military prudence. We
can afford what we have to afford.

We will not soon be able to reduce defense expenditures.
But, while acknowledging this, we should also reahze that if
changes in the world situation should make it possible, we

THE DEFENSE WE CAN AFFORD 405

should not fear that contraction of defense markets inevitably
means a depression.

This would mean an increase in private disposable income,
and a consequent expansion of private purchasing to offset
the decline in defense spending. There is, in fact, no end of
desirable private and public uses to which the resources freed
by a reduced armament burden could be applied. For example,
there is the apparent need and value of expenditures for urban
redevelopment and roads, to say nothing of the possibilities
for additional investment in education and developmental as-
sistance abroad.

Such an adjustment cannot be carried out without some
temporary unemployment and disruption of production. But
twice within the past fifteen years— after World War II and
after the Korean armistice— it has been shown that the read-
I'ustment period need not be long. Such transitional difficulties
would be a small price to pay for the permanent increase in
living standards that a substantial reduction in the defense
burden would make possible.

PART SIX

'ONSES

INTRODUCTION

However we may assess the march of history in the past dec-
ades—whether the yardstick is strategic real estate, techno-
logical prowess, or economic preponderance— the verdict is
clear: we have been losing the struggle at an accelerating rate.
Om- losses have been all the more tragic because, buoyed by
comforting notions regarding the innate superiority of our
spiritual and material wares, we have failed to appreciate the
full extent of our retreat.

Our wares are superior. Once before we tested them on the
battlefield against those of a totahtarian opponent and emerged
victorious. But we confront today an enemy who has mastered
the refinements of the indirect approach and the flanking ma-
neuver. Until he is assured of victory, he is not hkely to present
us with the kind of forthright challenge which galvanized us
into action in the past.

What we lack is a national policy which brackets the full
spectrum of challenges and synthesizes the means and weapons
at our command. The following proposals are not offered as
panacea: there is no magic solution to the nettlesome problems
which we face. They are presented here simply to stimulate
thought and generate the kind of discussion on which purpose-
ful policy can be based.

31. The Premises of American Policy

by Dean G. Acheson

Mr. Acheson served as Secretary of State un-
der President Truman from iq4q to 1953. He
has been Undersecretary of the Treasury and
Assistant Secretary and Undersecretary of
State. Much of his life has been devoted to
the service of his country in the military, eco-
nomic, legal, and diplomatic fields. He re-
ceived his A.B. from Yale University and his
LL.D. from Harvard University.

At the root of many of our diflSctilties today is our failure to
see what is around us. We fail to see the world in perspective
because we regard it through eyes which we have inherited
from our grandparents and great-grandparents.

Our conceptions are essentially nineteenth-century concep-
tions. We do not see the world in which we Hve. The nine-
teenth century represents normalcy to us. We Uve almost in
a way which proves Bishop Berkeley's theory that reahty is
subjective, that there is no oak which crashes imheard in a
forest to which man has not come.

Yet, the nineteenth century, instead of being normal, was
perhaps the most abnormal period through which man has
ever Hved. It was an imusual century. No century in the armals
of human history knew fewer international wars. There was
greater freedom of movement, thought, goods, and capital
than in all the previous ages of the history of man put together.
The world, in a curious way, pardy by domination, pardy by
other means, seemed to be one world. This imity was brought

This selection, which originally appeared in the Fall 1959 issue of
Orbis, is based on an address the author gave at the first National
Strategy Seminar for Reserve Officers. Reprinted by permission.

410 HESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

about through the Concert of Europe and through the six
great empires, Eiuropean empires, whose dominion stretched
over almost the entire globe. Not that these empires controlled
every part of the world, but their influence did.

Because we have accepted these imique conditions as norms
of international life and because we are really nineteenth-
century people, we speak of world organization and absence
of conflict as though they were the normal state of interna-
tional society. We aspire to a state of equilibrium because the
nineteenth century had reached such a balance.

The fact is, however, that all of the great empires of the
nineteenth century are no more. Some have disappeared al-
together. Others are greatly weakened. Others have com-
pletely changed their character, as, for example, the Russian
Empire. The Austro-Hungarian Empire has disintegrated;
Germany as an empire has disappeared; the Ottoman Empire
has been erased from the map; Italy has lost her overseas
possessions; the French retain only scattered imperial outposts;
and the British Empire has transformed itself iato a Common-
wealth.

Two world wars were conspicuous in this transition from
empire. They were not its cause but, rather, its manifestation.
A marked trend during the nineteenth century was the steady
movement of power eastward— from the time when it took all
of Europe to contain France, to a period when it took more
than all of Europe twice to contain Germany, and to the pres-
ent period, when it is at least open to doubt whether all the
rest of the world will contain the Sino-Soviet combination.
The great problem of the twentieth century is whether a new
equilibrium can be brought into being; whether the expansion
of the Sino-Soviet bloc can be checked; whether there can be
a balance of power.

One of the great questions of our time is the destiny of
what we call the uncommitted people— largely the masses of
Asia and Africa but also, to a lesser extent, the nations of
South America. What will happen to this vast mass of people
will strongly determine whether or not there will be an inter-
national equilibrium.

Another phenomenon which we fail to see and understand
clearly is not merely the industrial revolution through which

THE PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY 4II

we have lived but the scientific revolution in which we find
ourselves today. We cannot accept the fact that there is noth-
ing superior, nothing very complex, about an industrial civili-
zation. We think that it implies some mystical processes which
other people cannot master. This is nonsense. The Russian peo-
ple, starting with very little, have succeeded in coming, not
abreast of the United States, but certainly more than halfway
toward matching us in production— and they are bridging the
gap rapidly. As a matter of fact, the period of Soviet construc-
tion spans only twenty years. The other two decades since the
Bolshevik take-over— the ten years after the Revolution and the
ten years of World War II and its aftermath— were years of
conflict and reconstruction. Twenty years is a very short time
in the life of a people. This progress can be achieved by other
peoples. It can be accomplished by the Chinese. It can be
done by the Africans. It can be done, in short, by all peoples
who are capable of learning. Surely it is important whether a
country has resources. But the idea that there is in industrial
progress something mystical and difficult which only white
people can master is an illusion. Thus, there will perforce be
ever more profound changes in the world in which we Hve.

The Requirement of Western Unity

What are the policies which will direct those changes and
will direct the efiForts of the Free World to maintain an equi-
Hbrium to hold in check the movement toward unchallenged
power by the Soviet Union and China?

It is quite apparent that the United States alone cannot
bring about this equihbrium. In the first place, America does
not control enough territory. There must be spaciousness in
the environment in which free peoples live. Therefore, it is
not enough that the United States be free from domination.
There must be no further diminishment of that part of the
world which now lies outside the dominion of Russian or Chi-
nese commtmism.

How is this "spaciousness of freedom" to be guaranteed?
Basic to the problem is the will of independent peoples to re-
main independent. Second, they must have the ability, and

412 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

therefore the opportunity, to develop in their own way. And,
finally, there must be the military strength to protect them and
ourselves in this effort.

Effective military strength means inevitably a coalition, or
a number of coalitions— a combining of national efforts into
greater efforts, directed by a central leadership. No one except
the United States is strong enough to exercise this leadership,
and sometimes the United States shows neither the desire nor
the understanding for this task. Indeed, a key question of the
twentieth century is whether the United States can develop
this desire and this imderstanding. If she cannot, then the Sino-
Soviet drive for global hegemony wiU remain unchallenged.

Yet, when we engage in coalitions, we must do so with
clearly defined objectives. The most important objective today
—indeed the sine qua non of Free World survival— is to hold
together those sources of strength which we possess. These
sources are North America and western Europe— highly indus-
trialized areas capable of a productive output which can be
three times that of the Soviet Union and its satellites; of a
military effort which can be as great if the will exists; and of
effective manpower three times that of the Soviet Union. This
equation excludes Chinese manpower. A billion people are not
a power factor if they are merely a mass. Only when they
become organized and possess the tools of power do they be-
come formidable, and Communist China has not yet reached
this level of development.

The Free World, in short, possesses the capacity for bring-
ing about a new equilibriimi— provided that its core, western
Europe and North America, is maintained intact, that it fol-
lows harmonious policies, and that it directs its great capacities
toward effecting this equilibrium.

This assertion immediately draws the usual objections : "But
you will throw in your lot with the colonial empires. Great
new movements are afoot in the world. Don't you see how
important it is to sustain American principles in Asia, in Africa,
and in South America?"

If we would approach life from the point of view of formal
moralistic rules, this caveat may be interesting. But if we ap-
proach our problem from the point of view of solving it, then
these considerations are not at all important. It is not that we

THE PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY 4I3

consider the French, or the Germans, or the British more de-
sirable people than the Indians, the Burmese, or the Viet-
namese; it is simply that, at the present time, the center of
power in the non-Commimist world is in North America and
western Europe. Once this center is dissolved or fragmented,
then the problems of the world, from our point of view, become
unmanageable. We may enjoy the most intimate relations with
South America and other areas. But these relations will not
solve the problem of the balance of power at the present time.

The unity of the Atlantic world has been imdermined in
recent years by imprudent policies on both sides of the Atlan-
tic. One of these led to the Suez crisis of 1956. Suez was a
disaster from every point of view. This was virtually the lowest
point in the history of American diplomacy, for we maneu-
vered ourselves into a position in which we ultimately took
the side of our enemies against our friends. This shortsighted
policy destroyed Europe's confidence in American leadership,
and the heahng process has, to date, been far from complete.
One of the prescriptions of leadership is that those who are led
must believe that the leader has their interests, and not only
his own interests, at heart. After the Suez debacle, the belief
was widespread in western Europe that American leaders had
placed purely American interests above the wider interests of
the Atlantic alliance.

But if American policy has, at times, created difiBcult prob-
lems for NATO, its principal allies, France and Great Britain,
have also been responsible, on more than one occasion, for
cracks in the alliance. They have tended to give priority to
national, rather than community, interests.

The United States must meet with her Em"opean allies to
discuss thoroughly and candidly the problems which are driv-
ing all of us apart, with a view to determining whether we
cannot modify those divisive policies in the general interest.
If the United States will take the lead in this direction, then
we can revive in Europe the will to make greater sacrifices for
NATO and cement the unity of the Atlantic nations.

Therefore, the first pohtical principle on which we must
operate is that the unity of western Europe and of North
America is the single most essential factor in the pohcy of both
of those areas.

414 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

Many considerations follow from this premise. It follows,
for example, that one does not become stronger by becoming
weaker— a principle which seems to have been embraced by
the advocates of disengagement. Under present circumstances,
there can be no effective unity between western Europe and
North America if the very mihtary pillar of this relationship,
namely NATO's forward position in Europe, is removed.
Therefore, if Germany should be neutrahzed, disarmed, and
wrested from the Western alliance, then the dissolution of the
alliance is only a question of time, leaving us no place to make
our stand except in the United States. And we cannot solve
the problems of the world from Fortress America.

Selectivity in Assistance Programs

So much for the basic premise of Free World security. In
addition to maintaining the Atlantic alliance, we confront an-
other task: namely, to create an environment in which people
who wish to develop will have the opportunity to do so. We
must make it possible for them to develop— if for no other
reason than they will and must develop in one way or another.

Many of us seem to approach this problem within the con-
ceptual framework of the nineteenth century. They suggest
that if uncommitted peoples threaten to go Communist unless
given American aid, we should simply tell them: "Gol" This
is like a child throwing its toy onto the floor and breaking it
because it is told to go to bed.

Uncommitted peoples will not go Communist out of pique;
they may go Communist because they choose what seems to
them the shortest road to modernization. No longer do they
live in the darkness which in the past benevolently shielded
from them the magnitude of their plight. They are aware of
the outside world.

They know that they no longer must live like Neanderthal
man. They know, in short, that progress can be made. There
is nothing mystical about development: people can learn— they
can learn within a generation. What they need besides learn-
ing is capital, and the capital can be obtained either from the
West or from the Soviet Union,

THE PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY 415

The Soviet Union will not strain its economy in order to meet
the demands of underdeveloped peoples everywhere. In the
foreseeable future she will not enter into a competition with
the United States over which side can give the most assistance.
But she will put capital into areas the development of which
is hkely to cause the most trouble in the Free World.

The Communists are pursuing this strategy in Asia today.
The economic development of Communist China confronts all
of Asia, including India, with a formidable dilemma. If Pei-
ping's "forward leap" should prove successful— and there is no
reason to believe that it will not— then India will be under
tremendous pressure to achieve a comparable level of develop-
ment. And, indeed, there is no reason for Indians to believe
that in deference to something called democracy they must
live on a standard below that of their Chinese neighbors.

People, in short, will turn anywhere, and to any system, for
a solution to their economic problems. It is of overriding im-
portance that we be the ones to extend to them this opportu-
nity. We have it in our power to give them the needed help.
If, then, the Russians also offer assistance, all to the good. That
the Russians are building steel mills in India is not a misfortune.
It will be a misfortune, however, if they build all the steel
mills in India as well as all the other plants of India's industry.

But the burden of development is too great to be shouldered
by the United States, or even by the United States and western
Europe. We cannot give assistance "across the board." What
we should endeavor to do is to help people who are willing
and able to help themselves.

This means selectivity in our assistance programs. We can-
not, and should not, for example, try to assist development in
countries torn by revolution. One cannot move forward in the
midst of an upheaval. We should be tmderstanding of, and
sympathetic with, the efforts of troubled countries. But, in
extending aid, we should select areas in which it is possible to
do something.

It is possible to do something in India, in Brazil, and in other
parts of the Western Hemisphere. Let us show that it can be
done. Let us create an environment in the Free World in which
people can say: "Look, if we just once stop fighting among
ourselves, we can raise our standard of hving, of health, of

4l6 RESPONSES TO THE CHAJLLENGE

food, and of education." This incentive is essential to the
growth and vitality of the Free World.

The Requirements of Military Security

The problem of a military forward strategy for the Free
World is a more vexing one. How can we, at the present time,
design and implement a strategy which can provide the Free
'World with a sense of security?

At the end of the war, we had the only atomic weapons in
the world. We were preoccupied with the comforting thought
that possession of these weapons represented the key to se-
curity. This concept never was wholly correct. Most of the
"facts" upon which the pubHc based its belief in the efficacy
of nuclear deterrence were not facts. But the concept had an
element of truth which formed the basis of the initial strategy
of NATO— namely, a strategy based on the possession of an
atomic striking force which can inflict massive damage upon
the Soviet Union in the event of a Communist invasion in
western Europe and on sufficient forces in Europe to prevent
a Communist coup d'etat or a probing thrust by Soviet or
satellite forces.

It was a sensible theory, which contained but one flaw: it
could not, and did not, last. As military men in our government
had pointed out for a long time, nations of comparable power
and techniques will, given equality of will, eventually achieve
equality of power. Thus, the Soviet Union put its scientists
and espionage agents to work and became a nuclear power.

We waited until the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weap-
ons and then announced the doctrine of complete rehance on
them. This decision was the triumph not of intelligence, nor
of any military group, nor of any foreign-policy concept, but
of the Treasury Department, which does not always represent
the highest form of human thought. In 1954, we announced a
strategy of massive retaliation, at a time when it was becom-
ing impossible to carry it out. Since that time we have placed
more and more rehance on atomic striking power, and weak-
ened more and more the conventional branches of our defense.
The result is that we are rapidly getting into the position

THE PREMISES OF AMEKICAN POLICY 417

where we have not the requisite power to sustain our political
positions.

We need not have strayed into our present quandary. Sup-
pose, for instance, that instead of the scattered and weak
ground forces which NATO holds in being on the central front,
western Europe were guarded by the well-equipped and well-
trained army of 30 divisions caUed for by General Lauris
Norstad. The situation would be entirely diflFerent. It is per-
fectly clear that Mr. Khrushchev has no more desire to provoke
war over Berlin or any other issue than we have. But he wiU
make every effort to drive us from Europe short of provoking
war.

By making it clear to him that all the available means for
defending ourselves by force will not, or cannot, be used, we
can hardly expect to deter him in this objective. Given the
present inadequacies in our military posture, Khrushchev's
only problem is time, and he is a master of time. Yet we can
upset his timetable if we take the requisite measures.

What are these measures? In the first place, we should con-
tinue to look to our atomic strength. It is rather shocking, to
say the least, when our Secretary of Defense tells us that within
three years the Soviet Union will achieve a three-to-one su-
periority over us in long-range missiles. He seems to derive
comfort from the possibility that our intermediate-range mis-
siles and manned bombers will bridge the power gap. None of
these hopes are comforting, however, if one looks at the situa-
tion several years hence. If, by that time, the Russians wiU
have conquered— as it appears that they will— the problem of
putting missiles on target through intercontinental space and
will have ICBMs in quantity, then a new strategic situation
will have arisen.

This new strategic situation will either be one of Soviet nu-
clear superiority or, if we put forth all possible efforts under
the very best of circumstances, one of nuclear parity. The im-
plications of a Russian nuclear superiority are clear: the So-
viets would gain the power at any time to disarm the United
States and, once the United States is eliminated as a con-
tender, to dictate the terms by which the rest of the world
must live. A Soviet nuclear superiority, in other words, would
be the death knell of the Free World.

4l8 RESPONSES TO THE CaEtALLENGE

But let us suppose that we reach a state of nuclear parity.
By nuclear "parity" is not meant nuclear "equahty." Equahty
in numbers is not necessary to parity. Nuclear equality con-
notes a condition which is highly unstable— one in which the
power of destruction hes with the side which strikes the first
blow. Parity, by contrast, describes a situation in which the
nation which strikes first cannot so wipe out the nuclear capac-
ity of the other that it will not receive a blow greater than it
wishes to receive.

Such a situation, once it is reached, will have somber im-
plications for American strategy. AU other factors of power re-
maining the same, we will confront vastly superior Russian
conventional forces. And in the long run, power casts its
shadow before it. In the long run, the Soviets will be able to
impose their will upon all areas within physical reach of the
Red Army.

There is still time to redress this imbalance in East- West
ground forces. Modem science and technology have given us
the means whereby we need not match the 175 ground divi-
sions which the Soviets presumably hold in readiness. It is
quite conceivable that 30 NATO divisions, equipped with
modem weapons, can contain a much larger Soviet invasion
force. They can do this by achieving tactical mobihty, by pre-
venting the enemy by scientifically designed obstacles from
striking along a broad front, and by using new weapons to
brake the thrust of a Soviet ground offensive— jiist as the Eng-
lish archers at Agincourt prevented the French knights from
gaining the momentum which would have enabled them to
break the line of English foot soldiers.

The problem, in short, is not hopeless. The West has it
vdthin its means to muster the forces called for by General
Norstad and to deploy them in such a way as to confront any
Soviet ground probe with the very danger which the Kremlin
wants to avoid— namely, the risk of a nuclear holocaust. If the
West achieves the capacity to contain an invading army -with
a smaller and modemly equipped force for a period of, say,
six months, then the Soviets, in contemplating such an attack,
must calculate that tensions will mount to the point where
they cannot be sure that the United States will not strike the

THE PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY 419

first thermonuclear blow. In other words, a situation will be
created in which predictability will be impossible.

An eflFective and credible defense of Europe is not only a
military necessity but the sine qua non of any prospective set-
tlement of the political problems of the Continent. The tran-
scendent Soviet objective is to drive us from Europe. So long
as the Soviet leaders believe that this objective lies within their
grasp, for just so long will a conclusive settlement— in Berlin
and elsewhere— be impossible. If, on the other hand, the So-
viets are brought to realize that in the foreseeable fuhire their
aims will be blocked by a comprehensive and flexible de-
fense of western Europe, then the psychological groundwork
will be laid for a reduction of armaments and the possible
solution of outstanding political problems.

The Chimera of a "Moral" Solution

This, then, is the general picture of the world as it is un-
folding in the last half of the twentieth century. It is a dis-
turbing picture. There is a strong tendency to escape from it
—to believe that this can somehow be avoided through the
United Nations. This is impossible.

When the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg called the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations "the town meeting of the
world," he was being poetic. It had none of the qualities of
the town meeting. The town meeting was the whole, the en-
tirety of government in New England. The town meeting was
to New England what the Curia Regis was to England under
the Plantagenet kings. It was all things: legislative, executive,
judicial. It was the government. The United Nations has no
power, and it will not acquire any power.

The United Nations is as excellent as its Secretary-General,
a very wise and sensible man, has said it is, when it acts as
an aid to diplomacy. The United Nations, insofar as it believes
that by its votes and by its debates it is accomplishing any-
thing, could not be more mistaken. In fact, it can be harmful.
Therefore, we cannot look to that organization by itself for a
solution to problems. We must look to our own understanding

420 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

of the problems and to our own will and the will of others to
solve them. This is the nature of things.

Another escape from our problems is to call for a moral
revolution. I remember some earnest people who once came
to me, asking me what I thought of a scheme by which one
of the great foundations would finance a vast campaign to
carry the doctrine of disarmament to the general public. I said:
"You need not carry the doctrine of disarmament to the Amer-
ican pubhc. Everybody in the United States is desperately
eager to get rid of the burden of armaments. You need to carry
this message to the very places which are closed to you,
namely, the Soviet Union. If you can enhst people with that
same sense of devotion which sustained the Jesuits in Canada
in the early days when they carried the Gospel to the Indians
risking tortiure and death, then by all means send them out.
But you will not find many graduates of American colleges
enrolling in such a crusade."

A realistic vision of what lies ahead can easily be mistaken
for cynicism. Yet to look at things as they are is neither cynical
nor amoral.

For example, in 1862 President Lincoln received a letter
from Horace Greeley in which Greeley queried the President
on his attitude toward slavery. President Lincoln replied that
he was concerned with the preservation of the Union. If he
could preserve the Union by freeing all the slaves, he would
free all the slaves. If he could maintain the Union by freeing
none of the slaves, he would accept that alternative. And if
he could do it by freeing some slaves and leaving others in
bondage, he would take that course. In short, his attitude to-
ward slavery would be governed by the exigencies of preserv-
ing the Union.

To be sure, there is a moral content in man's action in the
international sphere. Yet moral teachings and moral doctrines
can be of little guidance, if any, in assessing the substance of
international problems. Moral concepts are important insofar
as they determine the actions of men. Telling the truth, being
loyal to one's friends, being courageous at the risk of suffering
harm— these doctrines should govern one's conduct. If they do,
not only will one not deceive one's enemies and one's friends

THE PREMISES OF AMERICAN POLICY 421

but one also will not deceive oneself. This is what matters most
in a democracy.

Self-deception is very easy in a democracy. Leaders are
tempted to deceive the people because the people themselves
want to believe, despite some concrete evidence to the con-
trary, that this is a good world inhabited by none but men
of good will. Such illusion should not be mistaken for morality.

The armed forces have a perfectly clear idea when they
speak of the conduct becoming an officer and a gentleman. A
gentleman is he whose code of conduct prevails even when
common sense urges an easier course. Why do people stand
up when it would be easier to give in? Because, as the British
say: "It simply is not done." When this axiom guides the con-
duct of nations, then diplomacy and politics are made of
sterner stuflF. Then there is hope that democratic peoples,
knowing the truth and willing to face it, can solve the problems
of the next half century.

32. A Political Offensive
against Communism

by David Sarnoff

Brigadier General David Sarnoff, chairman of
the board of the Radio Corporation of Amer-
ica, is recognized throughout the world as a
pioneer and leading force in the development
of radio, television, and electronics. Born in
Russia, he was brought to this country when
he was nine and shortly thereafter began his
business career by selling newspapers. The
innumerable awards, service medals, presi-
dential citations, and honorary degrees he
has received have been given in recognition
of the service he has rendered to the nation
in the communications field. General Sarnoff
lectured at the first National Strategy Semi-
nar for Reserve Officers.

Political-psychological oflFensives are not new. They have fre-
quently been employed in wartime to supplement ordinary
military action. The United States used them in both world
wars. Their purpose has been to soften the enemy's will to re-
sist, to win friends and allies in hostile areas, to drive wedges
between belligerent governments and their citizenry.

The democracies are familiar with warmaking in the nor-
mal military sense and hence do not hesitate to make huge
investments and sacrifices in its name. They do not shrink from
the prospect of casualties. All of that seems "natural." But
they are startled by proposals for effort and risk of such

This selection consists of excerpts from "Program for a Political Of-
fensive against Communism," a memorandum prepared by the au-
thor for President Eisenhower in April 1955. Reprinted by the kind
permission of the author.

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 4^3

dimensions in the life-and-death struggle with nonmilitary
means. Under these circumstances it has become incumbent
upon our leadership to make the country aware that non-
miHtary war, or cold war, is also terribly "real"— that the pen-
alty for losing it will be enslavement.

Hot war is always a possibility. It may come through force
of circumstances even if no one wants it. Limited, localized
wars are also a continuing threat. Indeed, superior physical
force-in-being is the indispensable guarantee for efiFective non-
military procedures.

But short of a blunder that ignites the Third World War
which nobody wants, the immediate danger is the debilitating,
costly, tense war of nerves that is part of the cold war. Because
there is no immediate sense of overwhelming menace, no
thunder of falling bombs and daily casualty figures, we are apt
to think of this period as "peace." But it is nothing of the sort.

The primary threat today is political and psychological.
That is the active front on which we are losing and on which,
unless we reverse the trend, we shall be defeated. Its effects
are spelled out in civil wars in parts of Asia, legal Communist
parties of colossal size in some European countries, "national-
ist" movements under Communist auspices, "neutralism" and
rabid anti-Americanism in many parts of the world— in pres-
sures, that is to say, of every dimension and intensity short of
a global shooting war.

Unless we meet this cumulative Communist threat with all
the brains and weapons we can mobilize for the purpose, the
United States at some point in the future will face the terrifying
implications of cold-war defeat. It will be cornered, isolated,
subjected to the kind of paralyzing fears that have already
weakened the fiber of some technically free nations. We will
have bypassed a nuclear war— but at the price of our freedom
and independence. We can freeze to death as well as bum to
death.

Our Counter strategy

Logically we have no true alternative but to acknowledge
the reality of the cold war and proceed to turn Moscow's favor-

424 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

ite weapons against world communism. We have only a choice
between fighting the cold war with maximum concentration
of energy or waiting supinely until we are overwhelmed. Our
political counterstrategy has to be as massive, as intensive, as
flexible as the enemy's. We must meet the cold-war challenge
in our oviTi household and in the rest of the world and carry
the contest behind the iron and bamboo curtains. We must seek
out and exploit the weak spots in the enemy's armor, just as
the Kremlin has been doing to us these thirty-odd years. We
must make our truth as eflFective as and more productive than
Moscow's he.

Our pohtical strategy and tactics should be in terms of a
major enterprise, on a scale for victory, with all the inherent
risks and costs. We cannot fight this fight -with our left hand,
on the margin of our energies. We have to bring to it re-
sources, persoimel, and determination to match the enemy's.
This is a case where, as in a military conflict, insufficient force
may be as fatal as none at all.

If obliged to make tactical retreats, moreover, we must not
bemuse ourselves that they are enduring solutions. To do so
would be to disarm ourselves and open ourselves to new and
bigger blows. This is a principle of particular importance dur-
ing intervals when negotiations with Moscow or Peiping are
being discussed or are in progress.

The question, in truth, is no longer whether we should en-
gage in the cold war. The Soviet drive is forcing us to take
countermeasures in any case. The question, rather, is whether
we should undertake it with a clearheaded determination to
use all means deemed essential, by governments and by private
groups— to win the contest. Our countermeasures and methods
must be novel, unconventional, daring, and flexible. They
must, moreover, be released from the inhibitions of peacetime,
since it is peace only in outer forms.

Almost against our will, in point of fact, we have launched
more and more cold-war activities. But they have been piece-
meal, on an inadequate scale, and often without the aU-
important continuity of action. Worst of all, diey have not been
geared for total victory, being treated as extras, as harassment
operations, while hoping against hope that there will be no

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 425

outbreak of war or that there will be a miraculous outbreak
of genuine peace.

Our current posture shares the weakness inherent in all de-
fensive strategy. The hope of a real compromise is a dangerous
self-delusion. It assumes that Soviet Russia is a conventional
country interested in stabihzing the world, when in fact it is
the powerhouse of a dynamic world movement which thrives
on instability and chaos. Our duty and our best chance for
salvation, in the final analysis, is to prosecute the cold war-
to the point of victory. To survive in freedom we must win.

The Enemy Is Vulnerable

The Free World, under the impact of Moscow's cold-war
victories, has tended to fix attention on Soviet strengths while
overlooking or discounting Soviet weaknesses.

The Communists experdy exploit all our internal tensions,
injustices, and discontents. Yet within the Soviet empire the
tensions are incomparably greater, the injustices and discon-
tents more vast. Our opportunity, which we have failed to use
so far, is to exploit these in order to undermine the Kremlin,
exacerbate its domestic problems, weaken its sense of destiny.

The nature of a malady can be deduced from the medicine
applied. In its fifth decade of absolute power, the Soviet re-
gime is obliged to devote a major portion of its energies, man-
power, and resources to keep its own subjects and captive
countries under control, through ever larger doses of terror.
There we have the proof that the Commimists have failed to
"sell" their system to their victims. After all discoimts are made
for wishful thinking and error, ample evidence remains that
in the Soviet sphere the West has millions of allies, tens of
millions of potential aUies.

Whether the potential can be turned into actuality, whether
the will to resist can be kept alive and inflamed to explosive
intensity, depends in the first place on the policies of the non-
Soviet world. Our potential fifth columns are greater by mil-
lions than the enemy's. But they have yet to be given cohesion,
direction, and the inner motive power of hope and expectation
of victory.

426 BESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

Guidelines for Political Offensive

Our guiding objectives in an all-out political offensive are
fairly obvious. They must include the following:

1. To keep alive throughout the Soviet empire the spirit of
resistance and the hope of eventual freedom and sovereignty.
If we allow that hope to expire, the KremHn will have per-
petuated its dominion over its victims.

2. To break the awful sense of isolation in which the inter-
nal enemies of the Kremlin live— by making them aware that,
like the revolutionists in Czarist times, they have devoted
friends and powerfvd aUies beyond their frontiers.

3. To sharpen, by every device we can develop, the fear of
their own people that is aheady chronic in the Kremhn. The
less certain the Soviets are of the allegiance of their people,
the more they will hesitate to provoke adventures involving
the risks of a major showdown.

4. To provide moral and material aid, including trained
leadership, to oppositions, undergrounds, resistance move-
ments in satellite nations and China and Russia proper.

5. To make maximum use of the fugitives from the Soviet
sphere, millions in the aggregate, now hving in free parts of
the world.

6. To appeal to the simple personal yearnings of those vm-
der the Communist yoke: release from police terror, ownership
of small farms and homes, free trade-unions to defend their
rights at the job, the right to worship as they please, the right
to change residence and to travel, and so forth.

7. To shatter the "wave of the future" aura around com-
munism, displacing the assumption that "communism is inevi-
table" with a deepening certainty that "the end of communism
is inevitable."

8. To inspire millions in the free countries with a feeling of
moral dedication to the enlargement of the area of freedom,
based on repugnance to slave labor, coerced atheism, purges,
and the rest of the Soviet horrors.

This inventory of objectives is necessarily sketchy and in-

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 427

complete. But it indicates the indispensable direction of the
cold-war effort.

The Message of Freedom

We must be quite certain of our destination before we can
begin to figure out means of transportation. There is little point
in discussing the how of it until a firm decision for an all-out
political-psychological counteroffensive is reached. In hot war,
you need a weapon and means of delivering it to the target.
The same is true in cold war. The weapon is the message;
after it has been worked out, we can develop the facilities for
delivering it to the world at large and to the Communist cap-
tive nations in particular. The essence of that message (and
its formulation is the critical first step) is that America has de-
cided, irrevocably, to win the cold war; that its ultimate aim
is, in concert with all peoples, to cancel out the destructive
power of Soviet-based communism.

Once that decision is made, some of the means for im-
plementing it will become self-evident; others will be ex-
plored and developed under the impetus of the clear-cut goal.
Agreement on the problem must come before agreement on
the solution. Adjustment of our thinking in accord with such
a decision to win the cold war demands clarity on at least the
following points:

1. The struggle by means short of general war is not a pre-
liminary bout but the decisive contest, in which the loser may
not have a second chance.

2. It must therefore be carried on with the same focused
effort, the same resolute spirit, the same willingness to accept
costs and casualties, that a hot war would involve.

3. In order to establish credence and inspire confidence, our
conduct must be consistent. Our philosophy of freedom must
embrace the whole of mankind; it must not stop short at the
frontiers of the Soviet sphere. Only this can give our side a
moral grandeur, a revolutionary elan, a crusading spirit not
only equal to but superior to the other side's.

4. We must learn to regard the Soviet countries as enemy-
occupied territory, with the lifting of the occupation as the

428 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

over-all piirpose of freedom-loving men everywhere. This not
only applies to areas captured since the war, but includes Rus-
sia itself. Any other policy would turn what should be an anti-
Communist alliance into an anti-Russian alliance, forcing the
Russians (as Hitler forced them during World War II) to rally
around the regime they hate.

5. The fact that the challenge is global must be kept clearly
in view. Red guerrillas in Burma, Commimists in France or
the United States, Red agents in Central America— these are
as much "the enemy" as the Kremlin itself.

6. We must reahze that world commimism is not a tool in
the hands of Russia— Russia is a tool in the hands of world
commtmism. Repeatedly Moscow has sacrificed national in-
terests in deference to world-revolutionary needs. This provides
opportunities for appeals to Russian patriotism.

7. Though the Soviets want a nuclear war no more than we
do, they accept the risk of it in pushing their political offensive.
We, too, cannot avoid risks. The greatest risk of all, for us, is
to do less than is needed to win the cold war. At worst that
would mean defeat by default; and at best, a situation so men-
acing to the survival of freedom that a hot war may become
inevitable.

Toward Cold-War Victory: Organization

An organizational framework for fighting the cold war al-
ready exists. It needs to be adjusted and strengthened in line
with the expanded scale and intensity of operations.

A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the cold-war equiv-
alent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side, is sug-
gested. It should fimction directly vmder the President, with
cabinet status for its head. Top representatives of the State
Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the U. S. Information Agency, should sit on
this board. Liaison on a continuous basis should be main-
tained with all other agencies which can play a role in the
over-all effort.

There will be various operations which the Board would
undertake in its own name, with its own facilities. But its pri-

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 429

mary function should not be operational. It should be to plan,
initiate, finance, advise, co-ordinate, and check on operations
by other groups and agencies, whether already in existence or
created by the Board for specific undertakings.

Financing

On the matter of funds one cannot at this stage oflFer specific
estimates. As a working hypothesis, it is suggested that a spe-
cific and more reaUstic ratio between mihtary and nonmilitary
appropriations be worked out: say, an amount equivalent to
5 or 7V2 per cent of military-defense appropriations to be
granted to the Strategy Board for Pohtical Defense— this, of
course, without reducing the military budget and not count-
ing foreign mihtary aid and Point Four types of expenditure.

If the American people and their Congress are made fully
aware of the menace we face, of the urgent need for meeting
it, and the possibiHty of doing so by means short of war, they
will respond willingly, as they have always done in times of
national crisis. They will realize that no investment to win the
cold war is exorbitant when measured against the stakes in-
volved and against the costs of the bombing war we seek to
head ofiE.

Implementing the Counteroffensive

We must go from defense to attack in meeting the political,
ideological, subversive challenge. The implementation of the
attack would devolve upon speciahsts and technicians. In gear-
ing to fight a hot war, we call in mihtary strategists and tacti-
cians. Likewise, we must have speciahsts to fight a cold war.

This imphes, in the first place, the mobihzation of hard,
knowledgeable anti-Conmiunists who understand the issues
and for whom it is not merely a job but a dedication. The
speciahst in communications is important; but the message to
be commimicated is even more important.

The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to the masses
—and even more so to the ehte groups (Army, inteUigentsia,

430 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

and others)— in the Soviet camp is that we have not always
been consistent in what we had to say to them. Our message
has been vague and subject to change without notice. As long
as we regard Communist rule as permanent, we can have no
strong psychological bridges to those who are under its yoke.
The only Free World goal that is relevant to them is one that
envisages their eventual emancipation.

With the formulation of a message, we will at last have
something to say that interests them, not only us, and can
devote ourselves to perfecting the means of delivering the
message.

Before essaying a breakdown of cold- war methods and
techniques, we should recognize that many of them are already
being used, and often effectively. Nothing now under way
needs to be abandoned. The problem is one of attaining the
requisite magnitude, financing, co-ordination, and continuity
— aU geared to the long-range objectives of the undertaking.
The expanded offensive with nonmilitary weapons must be im-
bued with a new awareness of the great goal and a robust
vdll to reach it.

In aU categories the arena of action is the whole globe. Our
cold-war targets are not only behind the iron and bamboo cur-
tains but in every nation, the United States included. In the
battle for the minds of men, we must reach the Soviet peoples,
our allies, and the uncommitted peoples.

The agencies involved will be both oflBcial and private. The
objectives must aim to achieve dramatic victories as swiftly as
possible, as a token of the changed state of affairs. While the
Kremlin has suffered some setbacks and defeats, its record in
the cold war has been strikingly one of success piled on success.
This trend must be reversed, to hearten oxir friends, dismay
the enemy, and confirm the fact that Commimist power is a
transient and declining phenomenon.

Propaganda

If the weapon is our message, one of its basic elements is
propaganda. It is the most familiar element, but we should
not underestimate its inherent difficrdties. Hot war is destruc-

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 431

tive: the killing of people, the annihilation of material things.
Cold war must be constructive: it must build views, attitudes,
loyalties, hopes, ideals, and readiness for sacrifice. In the final
check-up it calls for greater skills to affect minds than to de-
stroy bodies.

Propaganda, for maximum effect, must not be an end in it-
self. It is a preparation for action. Words that are not backed
up by deeds, that do not generate deeds, lose their impact.
The test is whether they build the morale of friends and un-
dermine the morale of foes.

No means of commxmication should be ignored: the spoken
word and the written word; radio and television; films; bal-
loons and missiles to distribute leaflets; secret printing and
mimeographing presses on Soviet-controlled soil; scrawls on
walls to give isolated friends a sense of commtinity.

Communist Targets

The Communist sphere must be ringed with both fixed and
mobile broadcasting faciUties, of a massiveness to overcome
jamming. The Voice of America will acquire larger audiences
and more concentrated impact under the new approach. Its
name, it is suggested, should be expanded to "Voice of Amer-
ica—for Freedom and Peace." This slogan added to the name
will, through constant repetition, impress the truth upon re-
ceptive ears.

Besides the oflBcial voice, we have other voices, such as
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation. There are other
popular democratic voices that should make themselves
heard: those of our free labor movement, American war vet-
erans, the churches, youth and women's organizations.

Already there is a minor flow of printed matter across the
iron curtain, especially aimed at the Soviet occupation forces.
The volume and effectiveness of this effort can be enormously
enlarged. Magazines and newspapers which outwardly look
hke standard Communist matter, but actually are filled with
anti-Communist propaganda, have brought results.

A greater hunger for spiritual comfort, for religion, is re-
ported from Soviet Russia and its sateUites. Programs of a spir-

432 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

itual and religious character are indicated. They should preach
faith in the Divine, abhorrence of Communist godlessness, and
resistance to atheism. But in addition they can offer practical
advice to the spiritually stranded— for instance, how to observe
reHgious occasions where there are no ordained ministers or
priests to oflBciate.

The enslaved peoples do not have to be sold the idea of
freedom; they are already sold on it. The propaganda should
wherever possible get down to specifics. It should expose the
weaknesses, failures, follies, hypocrisies, and internal tensions
of the Red masters; provide proof of the existence of friends
and aUies both at home and abroad; offer guidance on types
of resistance open even to the individual. It should appeal to
universal emotions, to love of family, of country, of God, of
humanity.

Free World Targets

The fighting front is everywhere. The program of the U. S.
Information Agency should be reappraised with a view to im-
provement and expansion. "The Voice of America— for Free-
dom and Peace" has tasks to perform in many nations of the
Free World second in importance only to those in the unfree
world.

Merely to point up the inadequacy of our present effort,
consider Finland— a country on the very edge of the Red em-
pire and under the most concentrated Soviet propaganda bar-
rage. Soviet broadcasts beamed to Finland total over forty-
three hours weekly. A television station is now being built in
Soviet Estonia which will be directed to a milhon potential
viewers in nearby Finland. To maintain their morale vmder this
pressure, the Finnish people, still overwhelmingly pro-West
and pro-American, have desperate need of our encoviragement.
Yet the Voice of America in 1953 was compelled to discontinue
its daily half -hour broadcast to Finland to save $50,000
annually.

We need, in every country, newspapers, magazines, radio
and TV stations, consciously and effectively supporting our
side. Those that exist should be aided materially to increase

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 433

their range and vitality; others should be started with our help.
The strongest individual anti-Communist voices must be pro-
vided with better facihties for making themselves heard in
their own countries.

Mobile film units are already penetrating backward areas.
The operation should be enlarged, its message and appeal per-
fected. In addition, mobile big-screen television units in black
and white and in color can carry our message. Their very nov-
elty will guarantee large and attentive audiences. Vast regions
in Asia and elsewhere, where ilUteracy bars the written word
and lack of radios bars the spoken word, could thus be
reached. To quote the Chinese saying: "One picture is worth
ten thousand words."

The so-called backward parts of the world, particularly Asia,
are under the most concentrated Communist psychological at-
tacks. Of necessity the counteroflFensive must take this into ac-
count and develop special techniques for reaching both the
masses and the elite of those areas.

Use of Facilities in Friendly Countries

Nearly all European and many Asian countries possess
broadcasting facilities. We should seek to enhst their use to
supplement and intensify American broadcasting on a world-
wide scale.

In some cases this could be negotiated on a quid pro quo
basis where we are providing mihtary or economic aid; in other
cases we may have to buy the necessary time for transmitting
our message. Oiu: friendly allies, such as Great Britain, have
vast short-wave facilities of world-wide scope and range and
have the same reasons as we have for seeldng to win the cold
war. We need their help in this field. We are fully justified in
asking for such help and ought to receive it.

Propaganda is a large concept. In a sense it includes and ex-
ploits aU other activities. Its successful use calls for imagina-
tion, ingenuity, continual technical research, and, of course,
eflFective co-ordination with all other operations that bear on
the problems of the cold war.

434 BESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

Passive Resistance

Pending the critical periods when active resistance in one or
another Soviet country is possible and desirable, full encour-
agement and support must be given to passive resistance. This
refers to the things the individual can do, with minimum risk,
to create doubt and confusion in the ranks of the dictatorship,
to gum up the machinery of dictatorship government.

The worker in the mine and factory, the farmer, the soldier
in the barracks, the office worker, are able to do little things
that in their milhon-fold totality wiU affect the national econ-
omy and the self-confidence of the rulers. It is the method that
comes naturally to captive peoples, especially in countries with
a long historical experience in opposing tyrants.

Our opportunity is to give the process purposeful direction.
In this concept the individual opponent of the regime becomes
a "resistance group of one." He receives, by radio and other
channels, specific suggestions and instructions. The tiny drops
of resistance wiU not be haphazard, but calculated to achieve
planned results.

Special action programs of the t5^e that do not require large
organization— or, at most, units of two or three— would be
worked out and transmitted. Our sympathizers in the Soviet
orbit would feel themselves part of an invisible but huge army
of crusaders. Symbols of protest would appear on a million
walls. The rulers' morale would be deliberately sapped by a
multitude of actions too small, too widespread, to be readily
dealt with.

The special value of passive resistance, aside from its direct
effects, is that it nurtures the necessary feehng of power and
readiness for risk and sacrifice that will be invaluable when
the passive stage is transformed into more open opposition.

Organized Resistance

Pockets of guerrilla forces remain in Poland, Hungary, the
Baltic States, China, Albania, and other areas. There is always

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMXWTISM 435

the danger of activating them prematurely. But their existence
must be taken into the calculations and, in concert with exiles
who know the facts, they must be kept supplied with informa-
tion, slogans, and new leadership where needed and prudent.

Many of these resistance groups are so isolated that they do
not know of each other's existence. The simple realization that
they are not alone but part of a scattered network wiU be in-
valuable; methods for estabhshing haison, for conveying direc-
tions, can be developed.

The uprisings in East Germany and Hungary, the strikes
and riots in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, and Poznan, Poland, the
dramatic mutinies inside the concentration camps of Vorkuta
in the Soviet Arctic, are examples of revolutionary actions that
failed. But they attest that insiirrection is possible.

We must seek out the weakest links in the Kremlin's chain
of power. The country adjudged ripe for a breakaway should
receive concentrated study and planning. East Germany is
among the weakest links. Its revolt would ignite neighboring
Czechoslovakia and Poland. The time to prepare for such ac-
tions is now— whether the time to carry them out be in the
near or distant future. Meanwhile we must not allow the Soviet
propaganda to make unification appear as the Communist's
gift to the Germans. It is a natural asset that belongs to West
Germany and her allies.

Collaboration with EmigrSs and Escapees

Tens of thousands of self-exiled fugitives from Commimist
oppression emerge eager to plimge into movements for the
freeing of their homelands. When they fail to find outlets for
their zeal, disillusionment and defeatism set in.

Maximum exploitation of this manpower and moral passion
is indicated. They must be drawn into specific, weU-organized,
well-financed anti-Conmiunist organizations and activities; uti-
lized for propaganda and other operations; enabled, in some
cases, to return to their native lands as "sleeper" leaders for
future crises.

Officers' corps of emigres can be formed: perhaps groups of
only a score to a hundred, but available for emergency and

436 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

opportunity occasions. The existence of such nuclei of mihtary
power— a fact that will be widely known— should help generate
hope and faith among their countrymen back home.

Planned Defection

Escapees have come, and will continue to come, spontane-
ously, now in trickles, other times in rivers. Beyond that the
need is to stimulate defection on a selective basis. Individual
"prospects" in Soviet missions and legations, in Red cultural
and sports delegations, can be carefully contacted and de-
veloped. Types of individuals needed to man cold-war under-
takings win be invited to escape, assured of important work.
Special approaches can be worked out to encourage defection
of border guards, army officers, secret-police personnel dis-
gusted by their bloody chores, scientists, important writers, and
others.

Escapees today are often disheartened by their initial ex-
perience. They are taken into custody by some foreign intel-
ligence service, pumped for information, and sometimes then
left to shift for themselves. Their honest patriotism is offended
by the need to co-operate with foreigners before they are psy-
chologically ready for it.

It is suggested that 6migre commissions be set up, composed
of trusted nationals of the various countries. The fugitive
would first be received by the commission of his own country-
men. Only when found desirable and prepared for the step
would he be brought into contact with American or British
agencies.

Training of Cadres

The immediate and prospective activities of the cold-war
oflFensive will require ever larger contingents of specialized per-
sonnel for the many tasks; to provide leadership for resistance
operations; to engage in propaganda, subversion, infiltration of
the enemy; even to carry on administrative and civic work

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMUNISM 437

after the collapse of Communist regimes in various countries,
in order to stave oflE chaos.

Already, limited as our political eflForts are, there is a short-
age of competent personnel. Meanwhile thousands of yoimger
men and women among the emigres are being lost to factories,
farms, menial jobs. This amounts to a squandering of poten-
tially important human resources.

We need a network of schools and universities devoted to
training cadres for the cold war. The objective is not educa-
tion in a generic sense but specific preparation for the intel-
lectual, technical, intelligence, and similar requirements of the
ideological-psychological war. This training, of course, should
not be hmited to people from the Soviet areas. A sort of "West
Point" of political warfare— analogous to the Lenin School of
Political Warfare in Moscow— might be established. Staffed by
the ablest speciahsts obtainable, it would seek out hkely young
people willing to make the struggle against commimism their
main or sole career.

The present "exchange of persons" program is clearly valua-
ble. Hundreds of foreign students go back home with a better
and friendlier understanding of America. But beyond that, it is
possible and necessary to educate invited young people from
abroad, carefully selected, along lines of more direct and spe-
cialized value to the cold-war effort.

In a sense these shock troops of democracy would be like the
"professional revolutionaries" on the Communist side. They
would be equipped to operate openly or as secret infiltrees
wherever the enemy's assaults need to be neutralized. Trained
anti-Communists from Asian areas, dedicated and knowledge-
able, would be available for countries imder Communist pres-
sure, as today in southeast Asia; Latin Americans, Europeans,
would serve similar functions in their respective regions.

Thus, from a largely amateur enterprise, our counteroffen-
sive would gradually be transformed into a professional un-
dertaking.

438 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

Diplomacy Is a Weapon

The Kremlin treats foreign aflFairs as a primary arena of ideo-
logical and psychological efifort. It makes moves on the dip-
lomatic chessboard for their propaganda impact: to rally its
friends in the outside world, to win over a particular element
in some country, to embarrass its opponents. In the meastire
that democratic diplomacy fails to do likewise, it is defaulting
in a vital area of the cold war. Let us bear in mind:

1. Day-to-day conduct of foreign aflFairs is pertinent to the
struggle for men's minds. The rigid observance of protocol, in
deahng with an enemy who recognizes none of the traditional
rules, can be self-defeating. We must make proposals, de-
mands, exposes, publications of oflBcial documents, and so
forth, that are carefully calculated to show up the true motives
of the Kremlin, to put a crimp in Moscow's political campaigns,
to mobilize world opinion against Soviet crimes and dupHcities.

For ten years we have made one-shot protests against Soviet
election frauds in satellite countries, against violations of trea-
ties and agreements, against shocking crimes in the areas of
human rights as defined by the U.N. Charter. The archives
are packed with these documents. These should be followed
up through consistent pubhcity and renewed protests.

Even when nothing practical can be immediately accom-
phshed, the facts of slave labor, genocide, aggressions, and vio-
lations of Yalta, Potsdam, and other agreements must be kept
continually before the world. Diplomacy must champion the
victims of Communist totalitarianism without letup. At every
opportunity the spokesmen of free nations should address
themselves to the people in the Soviet empire over the heads
of their masters; to the people of free countries in terms of
universal principles of morality and decency.

2. The measiu"es of reciprocity should be strictly applied to
Soviet diplomats and trade and other representatives. These
should enjoy no more privileges, immimities, access to infor-
mation, than is accorded to Free World representatives in
Communist lands. Even socially they should be made aware of
their status as symbols of a barbarous plexus of power. The

A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE AGAINST COMMIWISM 439

desire to belong, to be respectable, is by no means alien to
Red officialdom.

3. Economic leverages, too, must be applied. Trade can be
turned into a powerful political weapon. The stakes are too
high to permit business-as-usual concepts to outweigh the im-
peratives of the cold war. Where acute distress develops in a
Communist country, our readiness to help must be brought to
the attention of the people as well as their bosses. If and when
food and other rehef is oflFered, it must be under conditions
consistent with our objectives— to help the victims, not their
rulers.

4. In virtually all countries outside the Communist sphere
there are large or small organizations devoted to combating
communism, at home or abroad or both. There is little or no
contact among such groups— no common currency of basic
ideas and slogans, no exchange of experience. Without at this
stage attempting to set up a world-wide anti-Communist coali-
tion, or "Freedom International," we should at least facilitate
closer liaison and mutual support among anti-Soviet groupings
already in existence.

33. What Is to Be Done?

by Frank Rockwell Barnett

Mr. Barnett's intense concern with the pres-
ervation of freedom and his abilities as a
speaker have earned him the applause of
military and civilian organizations both here
and abroad. A native of Illinois, he studied
at Wabash College and the universities of
Syracuse, California, Zurich, and— as a
Rhodes Scholar— Oxford. His proposal to re-
cruit a "Legion of Liberation," printed in the
Congressional Record in 1951, induced Con-
gress to appropriate $100,000,000 to form
iron-curtain refugees into military units for
the defense of the Free World. Mr. Barnett
is director of research of the Richardson
Foundation, Inc., and an officer of the Insti-
tute for American Strategy. He lectured at
the first National Strategy Seminar for Re-
serve Officers. It was due largely to his ef-
forts that the seminar was organized and
convened.

A half century ago, an unemployed lawyer wrote an obscure
little book. It had a limited— almost private— circulation. Its title
had no sex appeal. It was called, very simply, What Is to Be
Done?

When the book was published, in 1902, its author was in
exAe, living in a dingy boardinghouse. Living frugally on small
subsidies from the political underworld and scorning all the

This selection is based on the article "Disengagement or Commit-
ment," which appeared in the Winter 1959 issue of Orbis. Reprinted
by permission.

■WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 441

values of his middle-class heritage, this bald, squat lawyer
was the self-appointed leader of a handful of other outcasts
from society.

To the property owners, statesmen, and generals of the Vic-
torian world, this man and his circle of impractical agitators
were "rabble." The power elite of that day ignored his pam-
phlets and did not read his book. Nor, for the most part, have
the property owners, statesmen, and generals of mid-century
America.

Yet the man who wrote it and his disciples— exploiting the
practical, concrete ideas set forth in What Is to Be Done?—
have seized two continents and set fire to the others. Today,
whole libraries, as weU as the graves of twenty nations and 40
million people, bear witness to the deadly poHtical science of a
movement whose cumulative conquests now exceed the com-
bined empires of Alexander, Hitler, and Tamerlane— and whose
accelerating capability to lay waste the great globe itself must
be the touchstone for determining our national and even our
private objectives. The lawyer's name, of course, was Lenin.

Nearly six decades removed from the pubhcation of What
Is to Be Done? Americans who never heard of Vladimir
Ulyanov confront the consequences of his mind, will, and fear-
ixd talent. Until Lenin, various forms of sociahsm were quack
experiments or futile terrorism in the night. But to Lenin, com-
munism was not simply an idea; it was a power technique.
Communism, after Lenin, was more than a philosophy. It was
a triumph of organization. Under his tutelage. Communists be-
came "managers"— con^icf managers. They learned how to in-
tegrate and co-ordinate almost every form of human activity
to achieve the goals of a heartless Policy Committee.

The position of America in i960 is, of course, not nearly
so hopeless as the plight of Lenin in 1902 or of General Wash-
ington in the winter of Valley Forge. But the odds against this
republic are far heavier than some may suppose. Because no
exploding bombs illuminate the "precinct pohtics" of Com-
mimists in Afro- Asia, too many imagine there is still time to
refer the conduct of the battle to another research committee.
Because our defeats have been chiefly in the twilight, vmde-
clared war of nerves, propaganda, and trading, no dramatic
scoreboard signals the loss of a Free World bishop or the en-

442 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

emy's ambiguous gambit to advance the red queen, fifteen
moves hence, to check and mate. Indeed, for amateurs at chess
or geopoHtics, each move of an opponent seems to present an
isolated challenge; the pattern is concealed; the savage end
game not even imagined.

The Lead Time of Survival

A struggle for markets, a clash between armies, competition
in research and development— these are not static affairs. To
the tmtrained eye, the contest is evenly matched at a particu-
lar time and place; yet triumph and disaster have been fore-
ordained by "lead time" in logistics and the laboratory. Al-
though Nazi Germany and Japan seemed to sweep the board
in 1942, their fate had been unobtrusively influenced in a labo-
ratory in Chicago and on the production lines of Detroit.

The Chinese Communist fighter pilots who died not long
ago, in sky battles over Quemoy, were doubtless brave and
skilled airmen. But they were dead airmen when Sidewinder
missiles uncoiled from American jets. Technically, those pilots
were still "alive" until the missile actually struck; but were
they not dead when the release button was pushed, since no
courage or vdshful thinking on their part could thereafter avert
the predetermined end? Were they not, in a sense, already
doomed when the blueprints for the Sidewinder were approved
for production?

Whole civilizations, as well as a single aircraft, have a point
of no return if they permit an opposing society to gain too
much lead time in the science of conflict— whether the "war"
is hot, cold, economic, political, limited, or all-out. The con-
flict managers and chess players of Russia have planned on a
century of conflict if need be— though they are now arrogantly
confident we will not last that long. They do not need to debate
their one clear-cut objective; their tactics, rather than their
policies, are flexible; and their economy is geared to the cost
accounting of the battlefield. And they have gained a "lead
time" of more than forty years in the arts of nonmilitary war-
fare, deception, and the training of professional cadres for
ideological combat and subversion.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 443

Our democracy, sensitive to the variable breezes of public
opinion and the random tides of pressure groups, improvises
"strategy" from one election to another. As free men, we would
not dispense with elections or limit debate. But surely, for all
our individualism, we can achieve a working consensus on the
need to survive— on the obligation to preserve intact, and with
its charter of incorporation unchanged in principle, this unique
laboratory called America— a co-operative research institute
where, on a voluntary basis, men from all lands join together
to conduct experiments in liberty and opportunity. When more
Americans become serious students of strategy, there is little
doubt that our response vidll be adequate to the enemy's chal-
lenge. But first we must place the problem on the agenda of
business groups, universities, and professional societies as well
as government.

Students of Strategy

"Strategy" connotes perspective, the selection of the right
priorities, relating the parts to the whole. The student of strat-
egy is never so hypnotized by science and sputniks that he
ignores the other battle fronts of foreign-language training,
propaganda analysis, international trade, and our domestic
economic growth. While he evaluates the challenge of Soviet
trade, aid, patronage, and manipulation of the markets, he will
not, however, ignore the clenching of the Soviet mailed fist
—or the jostling of Moscow's political elbow.

If it is true that the U. S. Strategic Air Command cannot—
with massive retaliation— prevent Moscow's subtle penetration
of Latin- American markets, it is equally true that economic aid
to India cannot avert a coup d'etat and assassination in Iraq.
Expanding technical assistance and U.S. business investment
in Africa may be vital to our security; it will not, however,
avert butchery in Himgary or Tibet. It vdll not carry the cold
war, by nonmilitary means, into the restless, vulnerable em-
pire of the enemy, where the people of eastern Europe and
Asia groan under Russian conquistadores and Peiping's cruel
dogma of the yellow man's burden.

Economic aid to emerging new nations is important to our

444 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

own future as a free people; but, by itself, this assistance will
not blunt the danger of communism. One does not win a non-
military war— whose victories thus far have gone to the enemy
—by simply denying that enemy a further series of advances
on Free World soil.

American aid, whether private or governmental, will not off-
set the Soviet economic thrust unless the managers of U.S.
economic activities are themselves sensitive to ideological, po-
litical, and strategic nuances. Random largesse, with no regard
to specific goals or national priorities, may be "humanitar-
ian," It has nothing to do with "strategy" and the science of
conflict management. The best-seUing book The Ugly Ameri-
can amply illustrates how the Communists have applied
Gresham's Law to international politics— that is, bad propa-
ganda drives out good deeds. To be specific, $i million worth
of Communist agitation, covert activity, and blackmail can
sometimes offset $100 million worth of American economic aid,
distributed with "no strings attached"— indeed, not even the
strings of requiring prudent management and accounting. Of
course, we need to do more in the economic sphere, both
through government and the private sector; but we need
"strategists" and "conflict managers" of our own to disburse
and co-ordinate those simis to insure better returns for Free
World survival.

Finally, in any discussion of strategy, it is imperative to keep
science and mihtary readiness on the agenda. A nuclear war
over Berlin may be "improbable." But we dare not delude our-
selves with the wishful clich6 that hydrogen bombs have made
general war "unthinkable." The categories of thought em-
ployed by the heirs of Ivan the Terrible and Lenin are not
necessarily the same as those which prevail in the peace-loving
democracies of the West. Stalin cheerftJly scorched the Rus-
sian earth and sacrificed 25 million countrymen to stop the
Nazis. Hitler was prepared to let all Germany bima in some
mad Wagnerian sacrifice to Thor and Woden. Mao and Chou
En-lai will not bhnk at the loss of 100 million Chinese, upon
whose broken bodies, in the next decade, they intend to rear
the heavy industry and nuclear armaments of the anthill state.

Khrushchev, who stood at Stahn's side while 3 million
Ukrainians were deliberately starved to death, is not Hkely to

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 445

be more squeamish about liquidating Americans en masse, if
he ever has the chance. Let the Russians spend more for basic
research; let them shorten the lead time between invention and
production. Let Moscow develop some as yet unknown elec-
tronic defense against our aircraft and missiles. Let Soviet en-
gineers erect that defense system only six weeks before we
have a similar capacity to ward off their rocket-laimching sub-
marines and ICBMs. In short, let the Kremlin but once enjoy
over us the weapons advantage we once held over them (but
did not use) and the world is likely to have another demon-
stration of how Khrushchev defines "peaceful coexistence." In
this country, not even our military leaders talk of preventive
war; but Soviet mihtary journals are full of the doctrine of
strategic surprise, the use of deception in the nuclear age, and
the case for the pre-emptive blow.

Where Our Opportunities Lie

What is to be done? Lenin's question challenges us not only
to think but to implement. Some responses to the question can
only be made by government. For example, $20 million could
be allocated for a special poHtical-warfare fund to organize in-
tensive, persistent propaganda throughout all Afro-Asia against
Chinese machine guns in the monasteries of Tibet; or $500
million, if necessary, to form a NATO Board of Economic
Warfare to make "flooding the market" bad business for the
Kremhn; or $5 billion, if needed, to keep SAC in the air, to
give the Army an airhft for limited war, to put missiles on
merchant ships or "obsolete" destroyers as a temporary make-
shift while the Navy perfects Polaris and builds an invisible
armada of nuclear submarines.

But it is in the field of nonmihtary warfare that our greatest
opportunities may he today. Russia is now the last of the great
colonial powers. Russian colons exploit the people of Soviet
Central Asia. Russian coloniahsts govern the Ukraine, Georgia,
the Baltic Repubhcs, and Armenia; their confreres manipulate
power in the captive nations of eastern Europe and are active
in Korea and China. In all the forums of world opinion— re-
lentlessly and without cessation— Russian coloniahsm must be

446 KESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

exposed, condemned, and used as a psychological-warfare
weapon against communism.

Nor should we forget that, conceivably, the Russian power
elite itself is divided. We know now that the supposedly mono-
lithic Nazi state was in reality a caldron of intrigue. The SS,
Gestapo, Nazi bureaucracy, and German General StafiF were
at one another's throats. From time to time, we ghmpse signs
that the same laws of internal contradiction may plague the
Sino-Soviet empire. In World War II, Lieutenant General
Andrei Vlassov led a Free Russian Army against Moscow.
More than 300,000 Ukrainians fought with the Germans. More
recently, Beria has been executed, Zhukov demoted, Molotov,
Malenkov, and Kaganovich dispatched to the provinces, Bul-
ganin "retired," and General Serov purged. Others may be
next. Will Gomulka remain? How does the Red Army really
feel about the Secret Police and the Communist Party?

We know now, in the light of history, that Germany had an
underground— that members of the German General StafiF were
in touch with the British Foreign Office prior to World War
11, Some of these proud Jimker generals would have hked to
move against the Nazi upstarts before Munich. But when Mr.
Chamberlain went hat in hand to Mimich, he served unwit-
tingly to defeat the one compelling argument of the anti-Hitler
conspirators— that Hitler's designs on Czechoslovakia would
lead the nation into a disastrous war. From the moment Cham-
berlain bowed to Hitler, the dissident elements in the General
StafiF were helpless: the Fiihrer was demonstrating to the Ger-
man people that his policy of blufiF was paying dividends. The
majority of the Germans were convinced that German hegem-
ony in Europe could be bought without payment of blood or
treasure.

The Fourth Weapon: PsychopoUtical Forces

The lessons of the past suggest that America must learn the
arts of foiu--dimensional warfare— of conflict by communica-
tions and of psychological combat. Subversion might be a hun-
dred times more dangerous to Moscow and Peiping than to
Washington and London. But subversion and political warfare

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 447

require as much professional competence as commanding an
aircraft carrier or an infantry division— and, as yet, while we
have splendid academies to train young people how to use
firepower, there are no training schools in this country which
equip Americans to compete with the graduates of Soviet in-
stitutes of irregular warfare.

One operational objective might be, therefore, the creation
of an American fourth weapon, coequal with the Army, Navy,
and Air Force. Its purpose would be to oflFset the current Soviet
advantage in nonmUitary weapons systems, which may enable
them— under the umbrella of nuclear terror— to seize Asia, the
Middle East, and Africa piecemeal by coups d'etat, precinct
politics, fifth columns, and popular fronts. Obviously, in order
to wage psychopoHtical warfare, we must have an impenetra-
ble shield of science and mihtary power. We must match the
Soviets in missiles and air power, in submarines, in capacity to
wage limited wars— including guerrilla wars through oui own
proxies— and finally, in psychosocial combat.

An American "fourth weapon" might consist of the following
components and activities:

1. A separate cabinet oflBce with at least the status and
budget of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
(If we are driven into a thermonuclear comer, where we can
only choose either to surrender or to cremate the earth, there
will be no health, education, or welfare.)

2. A joint congressional committee on cold- war strategy—
to take advantage of the fact that our own practicing, profes-
sional politicians have skills which may profitably be employed
in the arena of pohtical warfare.

3. An Assistant Secretary for Nomnilitary Defense in the
Pentagon.

4. A career service for officers who elect to become spe-
cialists in the propaganda and psychological-warfare fields.
Too often, the intelligence function in this country has been
regarded as "the shelf" by able officers who feel that, in order
to win promotion, they must get back to troops and military
hardware.

5. The creation of foreign legions composed of Russians,
Poles, Hungarians, Koreans, Chinese, Ukrainians, and others
who have fled from behind the Iron Curtain. If the Soviets

44° RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

threaten to send "volunteers" to the Middle East or Indonesia,
the Free World should have another string to its bow: namely,
the possibility o£ sending free Russians against Soviet volun-
teers. This international "captive nations' brigade" would be
trained in all the arts and sciences of propaganda and conflict
through communications. Part of its mission would be what
the mission might have been in Korea— if we had used defect-
ing Chinese and North Koreans to promote defections from
the enemy on the field of battle.

6. The establishment of what Brigadier General David
Samoff, in his memorandum of April 1955 to President Eisen-
hower, called a "West Point of poHtical warfare."

Citizen Experts in Political Warfare

Another operational objective to be achieved, if we are to
survive the contest of the next two decades, is the voluntary
commitment of private resources to certain aspects of national
defense. The Communist Party manifestly can mobiHze the
total resources of the Soviet empire for the cause of conflict
—because the Communist Party has the machinery of total
government. By definition, our limited government cannot, and
should not, compete with Moscow in kind. This means, how-
ever, that imless trade associations, educational institutions,
private foundations, labor unions, and opinion leaders commit
a portion of their energies to ideological, economic, and pohti-
cal defense, the Kremlin's total thrust will continue to be un-
opposed in many vital sectors of nonmihtary and ideological
combat. What we need to achieve, therefore, is a new kind of
informal partnership in defense between civilian and govern-
mental sectors.

In World War II, the American military developed new
forms of teamwork and learned to work successfully in com-
bined operations. Air power, naval gtmfire, frogmen, and in-
fantry assault troops all worked together on the beachheads in
splendid co-ordination. The combined operations of the cold
war require even broader teamwork. They require that dip-
lomats, military attaches, college professors, American busi-
nessmen overseas, foreign correspondents, and technicians— to

"WBAT IS TO BE DONE? 449

name just a few— all work together informally to undergird na-
tional strategy.

In this new kind of war, radio commentators, teachers, and
investment bankers are on the front line just as surely as the
men who man the missiles and guard our positions overseas.
Unfor^Jnately, too few leaders in the private sectors of Ameri-
can life as yet realize that we are at war— and that the survival
of Western civihzation is at stake. Americans do not like to do
their homework in world politics, economics, geography, or
history. We refused to read Mein Kampf; today we refuse,
with equal indiflEerence, to read and study the strategy of Le-
nin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.

If strategy is now the business of private citizens, as well
as government, what is to be done by voluntary action? The
ideas which follow are samples of the literally dozens of proj-
ects that could be translated into action once private funds and
staflF were allocated to the prosecution of nonmihtary strategy.

Proposal: A Dynamic History of the American
Experiment

There are missionaries for Communist dogma. There are
high priests of sociahsm. Fascism had its philosophers and
pubh cists. There are exponents of "classical economics," dis-
ciples of Adam Smith and followers of Lord Keynes. But there
are almost no articulate spokesmen for the constantly evolv-
ing, dynamic system that is twentieth-century America. Mod-
em capitalism is as different from the monopoly capitahsm as-
sailed by Karl Marx as it is from Chinese communism. But
American business has no party theoreticians; hence, the en-
emies of the system monopohze the international networks of
communication.

Some American union leaders talk the language of the Fa-
bian Society's discredited efforts to achieve Utopia through
nationalization of industry. Some American business leaders—
who are learning how to integrate automation, atomic energy,
and the behavioral sciences— nevertheless prefer to think in the
cherished symbols of nineteenth-century capitalism.

What few have realized is that communism— which is

4 so RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

really a new and brutal form of state capitalism— is obsolete.
Socialism has been tried and found wanting in western Eu-
rope, Britain, and Australia. Cartel capitalism, which fed the
maw of empire, is rightly on its way out. American-style capi-
talism—which might be called the "private, voluntary welfare
state"— could be the wave of the future. It is incredibly produc-
tive. It is consumer-oriented rather than government-directed.
It concentrates on products that bring an easier life to the
masses, rather than on luxury items for the few. And, increas-
ingly, American-style capitalism is not only efficient; it is at-
tentive to social, ethical, and cultural values.

Sociahsts argue that America is a political not an economic
democracy owing to private ownership and the profit system.
Quite to the contrary! America is more of an economic democ-
racy than sociahst Sweden or Britain imder the Labour Party.
In a socialist system, voters cannot appeal the day-to-day de-
cisions of administrators and politicians who make economic
decisions. Short of turning the government out at the polls,
they must live with arbitrary pohcies for years on end. In
America, every citizen casts economic votes every day— by the
choice he makes when he buys one product and declines an-
other, purchases one stock and sells another, changes his oc-
cupation, agitates for an increased pension plan, lobbies for
or against a tariff, quits his job to start a new business for
himself, goes on strike or votes not to go on strike.

Some sociahsts have represented their model to the world's
vmcommitted nations as the "moderate third force" which
stands midway between reactionary capitalism and the police
terror of the Communist empire. This argument will not bear
scrutiny. American-style capitahsm is itself an effective "third
force" in the world, but we have not been able to project that
image forcefully either to foreign nationals or to some of our
own intellectuals and new generations of students.

No one has adequately described the American phenome-
non—an ever flexible and self-renewing pattern of self-govern-
ment characterized by diffusion of power, partnership between
Washington and the private sector, voluntary welfare, creative
altruism, citizen action, checks and balances, and idealism
mixed with practical business and material benefits for almost
everyone. Where but in America are there more than 4000

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 451

private organizations which labor to solve social, economic,
health, and education problems by nongovernmental action?
Where do men more eamestiy seek to accomplish objectives
by persuasion, co-operation, and good will?

What is to be done? Books, unpublished manuscripts,
speeches, and journals should be examined to see if a "capi-
tahst manifesto" is already in being— although scattered about
in bits and pieces. If so, random articles should be edited into
a coherent whole. If not, a scholar— with a flair for popular
vvTriting— should be commissioned to do the job. Liaison should
be established with college and public school authorities to
insure that the finished product will be used in oiu: own educa-
tional system. The U. S. Information Agency might be con-
tacted with a view toward giving an inexpensive edition of the
book widespread distribution aU over the world. Conceivably,
new material for this book could be elicited from a number
of scholars by ofi^ering a sizable prize, similar to the Atlantic
prize-novel contest.

Proposal: A Propaganda-Analysis Newsletter

There is nowhere any persistent, sophisticated daily eflFort
to analyze Communist propaganda for American audiences
and reveal it for what it really is. Owing to the structure of
our mass media, statements by Commtmist political leaders
are reported as "news" on the front page. Thus— in a sense—
the press, radio, and TV of America give millions of dollars'
worth of publicity to Communist propaganda themes.

American leadership must expend half of its energies in de-
bating spurious and irrelevant themes which the Commtmists
put before the courts of world opinion. This is one of the rea-
sons why we seem always to react to Communist initiative.

What is to be done? We must see if a group of editors,
publishers, columnists, and editorial writers would volunteer
to form a committee to refute Communist propaganda. Schol-
ars associated with research groups could prepare a series of
papers analyzing persistent Soviet themes and setting forth—
in historical perspective— the facts. These scholarly materials
could be reduced to a newsletter and mailed out to, say, a

452 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

thousand editors and editorial writers. Perhaps some news-
papers would even agree to print a brief front-page box en-
titled "The Current Party Line." This could serve as a touch-
stone for the reader who is bewildered by the gyrations and
seeming "concessions" of Khrushchev and his associates.

Proposal: Business Training for Overseas Community
Relations

The Commtmists have trained, literally, tens of thousands
of professional propagandists and agitators. These cadres are
saturating the Afro-Asian world, the Middle East, and Latin
America. Their job is to create a climate of opinion hostile to
American diplomacy, to American mihtary bases, to American
investments and business opportunities.

American business trains executives for labor relations, in-
dustrial relations, and pubhc relations here at home. There is
very little training as yet, however, for the delicate job of
"commimity relations" in an overseas area that is threatened
by Communist penetration, insurrection, economic pressure,
and coup d'itat.

What is to be done? In co-operation with a business school,
research institute, or management association, a special semi-
nar should be set up to concentrate on over-all problems of
management in a specific target area, including political,
strategic, and community-relations factors that bear both on
national and investment security.

To that seminar would be invited representatives of all cor-
porations and banks with present investments and business in
—or futvu-e plans for— Area X (let us say one of the new nations
in Africa, or southeast Asia).

The seminar would include such "normal" components of
a management course as: economic-feasibility reports on Area
X; market-research data; currency-exchange problems; and
training and personnel matters. However, in addition to this,
there would be discussion of: (a) Communist objectives,
strategy, and tactics in that part of the world; (b) analysis of
leading Soviet propaganda themes and how to refute them;
(c) the social responsibilities of modem capitaHsm— in other

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 453

words, practical case studies in how American corporations can
be good citizens of a foreign community; and (d) an inven-
tory of Free World institutions that might be helpful in pro-
moting stability in Area X— including: universities which spon-
sor private technical-assistance programs; private foundations,
welfare agencies, church groups, youth clubs, and labor unions
with contacts in that area; and trade associations and interna-
tional professional societies.

Conceivably, this seminar for businessmen might be at-
tended also by a few oflBcials from the Department of State and
USIA, plus two or three officers about to be assigned as mili-
tary attaches in the given area. The object of including some
government personnel would be informally to "build a team"
—through personal contacts and joint training— that would be
better able to cope with the integrated, disciplined cadres dis-
patched by the Communists to various parts of the world.
Joint training at the National War College and the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces is building understanding and
respect among officers of all the rival services. That principle
can be extended to improve co-operation between American
businessmen overseas and U. S. Govenmient personnel.

Freedom, in short, rests on economic know-how and political
skill as well as mihtary power. The American businessman
overseas, the foreign service officer, and the mihtary attach^
each have a vital role to play— and, if possible, they should
play it more in harmony with one another. The expansion of
the private sector overseas and the growth of foreign middle
classes can greatly strengthen our diplomatic and mihtary al-
hances.

An excellent report, "Expanding Private Investment for Free
World Economic Growth," prepared in April 1959 under the
direction of Ralph I. Straus, has pointed to perhaps the central
reason for the success of our private system of enterprise—
namely, its adaptability. Throughout the West's economic de-
velopment from the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, private
enterprise has had to adjust to almost every conceivable eco-
nomic and political situation. In the tremendous diversity
which is the so-called underdeveloped world, no single blue-
print of central planning can accommodate the gamut of prob-
lems which beset societies ranging from the nearly destitute

454 RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE

to the nearly developed. Private enterprise can do the job, and
do it eflFectively and dynamically.

But selling this, what Robert: L. Gamer calls "America's best
export," is the responsibility not only of American business.
Our government should key its economic-assistance policies to
the objective of creating the kind of climate abroad in which
free enterprise can take root. Specifically, our pohcy makers
might heed the Straus Report's recommendation that U.S. aid
programs increasingly emphasize:

1. Training of foreign teachers and students at American
business schools;

z. University contracts whereby American business schools
establish programs and assist local institutions abroad to train
businessmen;

3. Analogous arrangements for training in public adminis-
tration, law, and economics bearing on the institutional frame-
work for effective business activity;

4. Programs for establishing local trade, manufacturing,
and business-management associations;

5. Practical on-the-job training in industrial plants.

The "Ultimate Weapon"

The rather passive business of conducting seminars, study-
ing strategy, and steeping the mind in the operational tech-
niques of communism may strike some practical men of af-
fairs as a waste of time. Yet effective action does flow from
doctrine, doctrine so thoroughly absorbed that it guides the in-
tuition and governs the reflex of statecraft.

The "ultimate weapon," of course, is neither science nor
politics nor psychological warfare. The "ultimate weapon" is
human courage based on faith in certain imalterable moral
laws. Unfortunately, some in our midst have forgotten the true
meaning of America. We are aheady half afraid of the honor-
able word "revolution," although we are the true revolution-
aries. It was an American Revolution that gave the world its
finest revolutionary ideal— the notion that government is the
servant, not the master, of the people. The Commxmists— who
call us "reactionary"— have turned society back to the days of

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 455

the Pharaohs. The monuments to "socialist progress" erected
in the U.S.S.R.— like the pyramids of ancient Egypt— have been
built with slave labor.

On the other hand, we Americans have developed the most
flexible, continually progressing society known to man. Our so-
called "masses" already enjoy luxuries undreamed of in most
parts of the world. But beyond that is the fact that we are
truly free men. We must not let this remarkable experiment
in human liberty and opportunity perish from want of cour-
age, or lack of sophistication, or failure to meet the problem
with the ablest human resources at our disposal.

The task may seem enormous; but the stakes are even
higher. And let us remember that great events are usually de-
termined by resolute minorities. Forty-three years ago com-
munism was confined to a rented room in Zurich, the brains
of Lenin, and the ambition of a few other outcasts. Fewer than
one hundred men made the American Revolution. (For a time
the whole future of this nation was carried in the will and
heart of a lonely man who walked the winter lines at Valley
Forge persuading his ragged countrymen not to quit and go
home.) There is more than enough talent in modem America
to again change the course of history. But time is impartial.
In politics and war, as in business, time is only on that side
which knows best how to use it.

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